Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-4099, SECTION "J"(1) and Consolidated Cases
November 7, 2002
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A bench trial was conducted on November 7, 2002 on the personal injury claim of Maureen Green (now known as Maureen Hall). Ms. Hall seeks damages arising out of the December 14, 1996 allision between the MN BRIGHT FIELD and the wharf area known as the Riverwalk Shopping Center on the Mississippi River in New Orleans. At the time of the allision, Ms. Hall and her former husband, Michael Green, were aboard a casino vessel, the Hilton Flamingo, which was docked adjacent to the Hilton Hotel at the Riverwalk. In accordance with the pretrial stipulations of the parties and orders of this Court, the only issues to be tried relate to damages. The Court now renders its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
The evidence clearly establishes that claimant Maureen Hall was present aboard the Flamingo casino vessel at the time the Bright Field veered towards the Riverwalk on the afternoon of Saturday, December 14, 1996. Ms. Hall does not claim any physical injuries, but does claim emotional injury and damages for fear and fright. She also claims damages for loss of consortium as a consequence of physical injuries sustained by her then husband, Michael Green.
Ms. Hall testified that she and her husband were gambling aboard the Flamingo when they heard horns blowing and then saw men running through the casino area giving out life jackets. The P.A. system then started sounding alerts calling for everyone to evacuate the vessel immediately. Ms. Hall and her husband walked outside to the deck of the vessel, where they could see the BRIGHT FIELD, a large ocean-going freighter, heading straight towards the Riverwalk area where the Flamingo boat was docked. There were large numbers of patrons on the gambling vessel at the time, and everyone started to panic, resulting in chaos as they attempted to disembark the vessel via the single gangway available. In the confusion and stampeding of the crowd which occurred, Ms. Hall and her husband became separated from each other. She was finally able to get off the boat and walked into the Riverwalk, then out onto the wharf or dock area away from the Riverwalk complex. During this time, she did not know where her husband was, and feared he was injured or that "something else had happened" to him. She wandered around for about one hour before she was finally able to find her husband, who had suffered injuries to his knees, causing him to limp. Her husband was upset with her and accused her of "abandoning him" on the boat. Ms. Hall strongly disagreed with her husband's statement, and felt that she had only done what she could do in trying to exit the boat in mass panic and confusion. They waited around to locate a couple of other friends who had been with them, then the group went to a local bar, Pat O'Brien's, for a hurricane. After spending about one hour there, they went back to their hotel, where they watched CNN and called their families back home in Indianapolis.
Ms. Hall claims emotional injury as a result of the fear and fright which she experienced. She attributes her emotional injury to her seeing the oncoming BRIGHT FIELD as it was heading directly towards the Flamingo casino boat. She "thought [she] was going to die." There was a lot of screaming and yelling by the crowd which was trying to get off the boat. She did not witness the actual impact when the BRIGHT FIELD struck the Riverwalk, but afterwards she walked back towards the river and saw that the vessel had in fact hit the Riverwalk, coming to rest not very far from where the Flamingo boat was docked. Ms. Hall said she "won't ever forget that horn blowing." She describes having some nightmares about the events of that day, but "nothing extreme" enough to require medical treatment. She describes it all as a "horrible memory" and says that she "will never go on a gambling boat again." Whenever she thinks about that day, she can still hear the horns blowing. Ms. Hall also attributes her emotional injury in part to the one hour she spent looking for her husband, fearing he was injured or that "something" had happened to him.
Once they were back home in Indianapolis, Michael Green underwent two outpatient arthroscopic surgeries on his knees. The surgeries took place in January and February, 1997. He was on crutches for a period following each surgery. Mr. Green's deposition testimony was that he missed about five days of work due to the surgeries. According to Ms. Hall, her recollection is that following each of the surgeries, Mr. Green was incapacitated for "about a week" at home. During that time, Ms. Hall had to "do everything for him' because he could only lie on the sofa. Ms. Hall also claims that Mr. Green was "grouchy" and in a lot of pain during that time period. Mr. Green was also still angry with her for what he considers her "abandonment" of him on the boat.
Ms. Hall had married Michael Green in April, 1994. Even prior to the BRIGHT FIELD incident, they were experiencing marital problems. Ms. Hall testified that their marital problems began in 1995 after the birth of their second child. However, according to Ms. Hall, they were "trying to work through" their problems, and were "optimistic" about their ability to do so. Ms. Hall described their differences, including a radically different view of the roles of husbands and wives. Ms. Hall described her husband as "controlling" and as someone who thought a wife's role was simply to do whatever the husband says. She felt quite differently about her role.
Ms. Hall and Mr. Green attended marital counseling sessions from March 10, 1998 until April 16, 1998. The records from those counseling sessions were introduced into evidence and clearly show a marriage which was troubled for a long time and for a number of different reasons. However, there is no mention in the records of the BRIGHT FIELD incident or any marital problems attributed to that incident. Ms. Hall stopped attending the counseling because she thought it was "a waste of time" because neither she nor her husband would "change who we were." They ultimately separated in May, 1998 and divorced a year later.
Nonetheless, Ms. Hall testified that her husband has never really gotten over what happened and continues to this day to accuse her of abandoning him when they were attempting to exit the casino boat on December 14, 1996. However, Ms. Hall also candidly admitted that it was only one thing that triggered her husband's ill feelings towards her, and that "if it had not been that, it would have been something else." This candid admission accords with evidence which reflects that the marital relationship had previously deteriorated. In short, the evidence does not support a finding that the BRIGHT FIELD incident is responsible for the breakup of Ms. Hall's marriage to Michael Green.
Since Ms. Hall was obviously in the "zone of danger" when attempting to exit the Flamingo gambling boat as she witnessed the BRIGHT FIELD coming directly towards her, she is entitled to recover damages for her emotional injuries, including fear and fright caused by the events she witnessed. These events include the mass confusion, panic and chaos which occurred as the crowd stampeded to exit the gambling boat as emergency horns and warnings were sounded. Also, of course, Ms. Hall's emotional injuries include the one hour she spent separated from her husband, fearing that he was injured or that "something else" had happened to him as they attempted to exit the boat. Finally, her emotional injuries include the continuing memories of the events of that day, which Ms. Hall described as "horrible" and something that she will never forget. Ms. Hall was very credible and candid in her testimony, and there was no indication that she was in any way exaggerating her emotional injuries. The evidence supports an award for moderate emotional injuries, with some lingering effects to this day. Emotional damages in the amount of $10,000 are supported by the evidence.
Rec. Doc. 1664, Minute Entry entered August 31, 1998 (submitted as Benchbook Exhibit 8).
Ms. Hall also claims damages for "loss of consortium." Cosco argues that under Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317 (1990), general maritime law does not allow for loss of consortium damages or other non-pecuniary damages. In support of her claim for loss of consortium, Ms. Hall argues that the Supreme Court's ruling in Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 116 S.Ct. 619 (1996) allows for state law remedies to supplement general maritime law in accidents involving non-seamen in territorial waters, and thus that she is entitled to claim loss of consortium damages. For the reasons previously explained in Liner v. Dravo Basic Materials Company, 2000 WL 1693678 (E.D. La. 2000), the Court agrees that Yamaha allows recovery of non-pecuniary damages, including loss of consortium, under the circumstances of this case.
Because this case involves an allision on navigable waters, it falls within the Court's admiralty jurisdiction. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 206, 116 S.Ct. at 623; Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 361-67, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 2895-98 (1990). When admiralty jurisdiction is invoked, substantive admiralty law applies. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 206, 116S.Ct. at 623. However, the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction "does not result in automatic displacement of state law." Id. (quoting Jerome B. Grubart. Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 545, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 1054 (1995)).
It is undisputed that the claimant, Maureen Hall, is not a traditional maritime worker covered by either the Jones Act or the LHWCA. It is also undisputed that the allision in this case occurred in state territorial waters rather than on the high seas. As a result, the Supreme Court's opinion in Yamaha is controlling in this case.
In Yamaha, a young girl was killed while riding a personal watercraft that collided with an anchored vessel. The Court was confronted with the issue of whether federal maritime law completely displaced state wrongful death law. The Court found that when "Congress has prescribed a comprehensive tort recovery regime to be uniformly applied, there is, we have generally recognized, no cause for enlargement of the damages statutorily provided." Id. at 215, 116 S.Ct. at 628. However, regarding nonseafarers, workers who are not seamen, longshoremen, or otherwise engaged in maritime trade, Congress has not prescribed remedies for their wrongful deaths in territorial waters. See id. at 202, 215, 116 S.Ct. at 621-22, 628. As a result the Court preserved the application of state statutes to deaths of nonseafarers within territorial waters. See id. at 215, 116 S.Ct. at 628.
Yamaha stands for the proposition that non-seamen, not covered by congressional statute, who are pursuing a claim resulting from an accident in state territorial waters, may supplement that claim under general maritime law with applicable state law. The facts of Yamaha parallel those in the instant case. Both cases feature accidents involving non-seamen, not covered by federal statute, in the territorial waters of a state or province. The only distinction is that in Yamaha the girl died, whereas in the present case, the claimant, Maureen Hall, was merely injured. Nothing in the language of the Yamaha decision suggests that such a distinction should be of any relevance. In fact, such a distinction would fly in the face of Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772 (1970), a decision that recognized the inequities produced when the status of a claim is dependent on whether the plaintiff was merely injured or in fact killed. See id. at 395, 90 S.Ct. at 1784-85.
In Kelly v. Bass Enterprises Production Co., 17 F. Supp.2d 591 (ED. La. 1998), a similar case involving a claim arising from an allision with a pipe in state territorial waters, the court held "[a] fair reading of [Yamaha] reveals that the state statutory law applies to non-seafarers injured in state territorial waters regardless of whether their injury was fatal or non-fatal." Id. at 599. Further, Judge Fallon found that even though Yamaha dealt with a wrongful death claim rather than a personal injury claim, "[n]either logic nor maritime history supports restricting Yamaha to only fatal injury claims." Id.
Cosco relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Miles which held damages for loss of consortium to be unavailable under federal maritime statutes, and called into question the availability of non-pecuniary damage awards under the general maritime law. 498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317. In Miles, the Court held that damages available under a general maritime wrongful death action are limited by the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) to "pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought." 46 U.S.C. app. § 762; Id at 31 111 S.Ct. at 325. The Court found such language to be explicit in limiting and foreclosing non-pecuniary losses, such as loss of society in a general maritime action. See id. Respondent in that case argued that the Court has power under Moragne to supplement maritime statutes. However, the Court found that Congress had spoken directly to the issue of recoverable damages on the high seas and that when Congress does speak directly, courts are not free to supplement its answer. See id. Miles does not apply to the facts of this case. In Miles the decedent was a seaman whose death was covered by federal statute. The claimant here is obviously not a seaman and was not injured on the high seas. Thus, her claims are not covered by any federal maritime statute. As a result, under Yamaha Ms. Hall's claims are governed only by general maritime law as supplemented by any applicable state laws. Therefore, Louisiana law may supplement general maritime law regarding an accident occurring in its territorial waters.
Under Louisiana law, Maureen Hall can maintain a claim for loss of consortium damages. Under article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, "[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. Damages may include loss of consortium. . . ." Further, the elements of a loss of consortium claim may include "loss of service, loss of love and affection, loss of society and companionship, loss of sexual relations, loss of support, and loss of felicity." See Doe v. Roman Catholic Church for Archdiocese of New Orleans, 615 So.2d 410 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1993).
Although Ms. Hall is entitled to recover for any loss of consortium, the evidence supporting such an award in this particular case is less convincing than the evidence for her emotional injuries. As previously noted, her marriage to Michael Green was in serious trouble for more than a year prior to the BRIGHT FIELD incident on December 14, 1996. The evidence simply does not support a finding that the events of that day caused or contributed to the marital separation in May, 1998 or the subsequent divorce a year later. Nevertheless, there was testimony that Ms. Hall was required to render special assistance to Michael Green for at least some period of time following each of his two surgeries in early 1997. Ms. Hall described her husband as being particularly "grouchy" and angry towards her during that time. It is reasonable to find that this element of damage continued at least through the period of time that Michael was under active medical treatment and rehabilitation for his physical injuries. The parties stipulated that his treatment lasted until March, 1997, approximately three months following the accident. This evidence supports an award of $1,500 for loss of consortium.
Under general maritime law, claimant is entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of the accident, December 14, 1996. Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1972); Williams v. Reading Bates Drilling Co. 750 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1985). Interest at the annual rate of 5½ percent will be awarded.
The Court finds that there is no just reason for delay and directs that judgment be entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure