Opinion
NO. 09-14-00475-CV
02-18-2016
On Appeal from the 435th District Court Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No.14-04-04628 CV
MEMORANDUM OPINION
John Gates Roberts appeals from a jury verdict that resulted in his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.151 (West 2010 & Supp. 2015) (the SVP statute). In three issues, Roberts contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict, and he contends the trial court erred by overruling two of his objections to arguments the State's attorney presented during closing argument. Because Roberts' issues are without merit, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his brief, Roberts relies on the same arguments to advance his factual and legal sufficiency issues, and he combines his arguments on these issues in one section of his brief. Therefore, we will address Roberts' first two issues together.
Under the SVP statute, the State bears the burden of proving the elements of its case that a person is a sexually violent predator beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.062(a) (West 2010). In reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict in an SVP case, we weigh the evidence to determine whether a verdict supported by legally sufficient evidence is nevertheless a verdict that reflects a sufficient risk of injustice that another trial is required. In re Commitment of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 213 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet denied). We note that given the elevated burden that applies to SVP case, "that burden necessarily affects our review of the evidence." In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002); see City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 817 (Tex. 2005).
When the appellant presents a legal sufficiency complaint, the jury's verdict is reviewed by examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine if a rational trier-of-fact could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the elements needed to prove that a person is a sexually violent predator, as defined by the SVP statute. In re Commitment of Mullens, 92 S.W.3d 881, 885 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied). For Roberts to prevail on his legal sufficiency issue, he is required to demonstrate in his appeal that no evidence before the jury supports the jury's finding that he is a sexually violent predator. See Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983); Christus St. Mary Hosp. v. O'Banion, 227 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, pet. denied).
Under Texas law, a "sexually violent predator" is a person who is a repeat sexually violent offender who suffers from a behavioral abnormality such that he is likely to engage in another predatory act of sexual violence. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(a) (West Supp. 2015). Roberts' legal and factual sufficiency arguments focus on whether the evidence admitted during his trial allowed the jury to rationally find that he has a behavioral abnormality. "Behavioral abnormality" is a term that is expressly defined by the SVP statute; it means "a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a person's emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health and safety of another person." Id. § 841.002(2) (West Supp. 2015). "Predatory act" is also expressly defined by the SVP statute; it means "an act directed toward individuals, including family members, for the primary purpose of victimization." Id. § 841.002(5) (West Supp. 2015).
The trial court granted the State's request for a directed verdict on the question of whether Roberts was a repeat offender, and Roberts does not challenge that ruling on appeal. --------
Roberts' sufficiency arguments suggest that the testimony of Dr. Michael Arambula, a psychiatrist who testified at trial, has sufficient probative value to support the jury's verdict. During the trial, Dr. Arambula expressed the opinion that Roberts "has a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence." On appeal, Roberts does not challenge Dr. Arambula's credentials as they relate to the opinions that were admitted before the jury. Instead, Roberts argues that Dr. Arambula's testimony is wholly conclusory, speculative, and offers legally and factually insufficient support for the jury's verdict.
Under Texas law, wholly conclusory and speculative opinion testimony does not constitute legally sufficient evidence to support a verdict because such testimony "does not tend to make the existence of a material fact 'more probable or less probable.'" City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Coastal Transp. Co., Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2004)). Therefore, "[b]are, baseless opinions will not support a judgment even if there is no objection to their admission in evidence." Id. However, the record does not support Roberts' arguments that suggest Dr. Arambula's opinions were overly speculative or wholly conclusory.
In Roberts' case, Dr. Arambula's testimony before the jury includes his explanation about how he reached his opinions. Dr. Arambula testified that in determining whether an individual has a behavioral abnormality that makes the individual likely to reoffend, he considers the SVP statute's definition of the term "sexually violent predator," and he evaluates the subject's history. In evaluating the individual's history, Dr. Arambula explained that he took into consideration a variety of details about Roberts' past offenses, such as the ages and sexes of the victims involved in his past offenses and the force that Roberts used when he committed those offenses. Dr. Arambula also explained that he considered whether Roberts received any treatment relevant to the condition that led him to offend, and he considered what Roberts learned in treatment about his illness. Additionally, Dr. Arambula indicated that in forming his opinions, he reviewed and considered whether Roberts adjusted to the rules required by the facility where he was imprisoned. Dr. Arambula explained that he also conducted an interview of Roberts, and in the interview, he considered how Roberts viewed the offenses he had committed.
In Roberts' case, the evidence before the jury indicated that Dr. Arambula reviewed Dr. Woodrick's records, which contained information that relates to Dr. Woodrick's examination of Roberts, and that he also personally interviewed Roberts for over two hours. Dr. Arambula testified that he reviewed records that relate to Roberts' criminal history, and that he also considered what Roberts told the jury about himself during the SVP trial. Roberts' criminal history indicates that Roberts was placed on deferred adjudication in 1992 due to an indictment charging him with the aggravated sexual assault of a child. Roberts' history reflects that he participated in a sex-offender-treatment program while serving community-supervision for the assault that occurred in 1992; however, although Roberts had participated in a treatment program, his history reflects that in that time period, he committed additional sexually related offenses against several boys. In 1997, Roberts was found guilty of the conduct alleged in the 1992 indictment charging him with aggravated sexual assault of a child, and the trial court assessed a twenty-year sentence. Additionally, in 1997, Roberts was indicted and convicted for sexually assaulting another child.
During the trial, Dr. Arambula addressed the diagnosis that he gave to Roberts. According to Dr. Arambula, Roberts has "paraphilia not otherwise specified with features of pedophilia." Dr. Arambula explained that because some of Roberts' victims were more than twelve years old, he did not fit completely within the criteria applied to diagnosing a person with pedophilia. However, Dr. Arambula indicated that Roberts had interacted with enough children under the age of twelve that he would not disagree with Dr. Woodrick's diagnosis of pedophilia, and he stated that although he had not diagnosed Roberts with pedophilia, Roberts should be treated as if he had pedophilia.
In forming his opinion that Roberts would likely reoffend, Dr. Arambula explained that he considered the number of individuals Roberts had victimized, and he considered the nature of those incidents. Dr. Arambula's testimony indicates that he considered Roberts' history from a clinical standpoint, which indicates that Roberts had a history involving eight victims who he molested or exploited. Dr. Arambula also addressed the chronic nature of Roberts' condition. Dr. Arambula explained that Roberts is sexually attracted to boys, which tends to be "a more chronic illness." Dr. Arambula also noted that Roberts had a history indicating that he reoffended while being treated for deviant sexual behavior, a history indicating that he rationalized his sexual offenses, and a history indicating that that he sexually fantasized about his specific victims between the occurrences that involved his victims. Dr. Arambula's testimony also indicates that he considered that Roberts, while in prison, continued to engage in acts of self- gratification based on his deviant fantasies. According to Dr. Arambula, Roberts' history reflects that he carries a significantly increased risk that he will commit another sexually violent act after being released from prison.
Dr. Arambula also addressed whether Roberts' age decreased his risk of recidivism. Dr. Arambula indicated that he was aware of Roberts' age, stating that Roberts was sixty-nine when he interviewed him. According to Dr. Arambula, it is unusual for a person of Roberts' age to have such a robust sex drive, but he explained why Roberts' sex drive was unusual, noting that in 2007, Roberts experienced a small stroke that damaged his frontal lobes. Dr. Arambula testified that damage to this area of the brain might explain Roberts' lack of control over his sexual urges, as the area where Roberts experienced his stroke are involved in a person's decision-making, inhibition, and impulse control.
In evaluating the risk that Roberts would commit another sexually violent offense, Dr. Arambula indicated that he also considered Roberts extremely low test score on an actuarial test, the Static-99. Roberts' score on the Static-99 was zero, the lowest possible score. According to Dr. Arambula, Roberts' score considered only his convictions, and he explained that in his opinion the score "fell far short of predicting what kind of risk [Roberts] would carry."
The record demonstrates that Dr. Arambula reached his conclusions by following the methodology that he described in his testimony, and that the methodology he described is similar to the methodologies used by other experts in SVP cases. See, e.g., In re Commitment of Torres, No. 09-13-00491-CV, 2014 WL 6991615, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 11, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The record provides substantial support for the opinions expressed by Dr. Arambula during the trial, and Dr. Arambula's opinions about Roberts cannot be properly characterized as wholly conclusory, overly speculative, or without foundation. The evidence that is contrary to Dr. Roberts' opinion is not so great that it presents a significant risk that the jury reached an improper verdict. Because the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict, we overrule Roberts' first two issues. See In re Commitment of Vines, No. 09-12-00337-CV, 2014 WL 887123, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 6, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Closing Argument
In issue three, Roberts contends the State attempted to shift the burden of proof to Roberts at two points during the State's closing argument. At one point in the State's closing argument, the State criticized the argument presented by Roberts' attorney attacking the opinions of Dr. Arambula, noting that Roberts' counsel spent all of his time talking about Dr. Arambula but did not spend his time talking about Roberts. At that point, Roberts' counsel objected, stating that the State's argument was an effort to shift the burden of proof to his client. Subsequently, the State suggested in closing argument that the jury should consider what type of change they would need to see in Roberts to decide if he had changed. Roberts' counsel again objected, arguing that this argument also shifted the burden of proof to him.
We disagree with Roberts' suggestion that these arguments reasonably suggest that the jury disregard the instructions given to them by the trial court. The trial court's instructions placed the burden of proving that Roberts is a sexually violent predator on the State. Moreover, the arguments at issue relate to the evidence admitted during the trial and to the arguments presented by opposing counsel, so they were not improper. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 269(e). We overrule issue three and affirm the trial court's judgment and order of civil commitment.
AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
HOLLIS HORTON
Justice Submitted on June 24, 2015
Opinion Delivered February 18, 2016 Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.