Opinion
W.C. No. 4-424-488.
June 15, 2011.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of several orders issued by Administrative Law Judge Harr. We conclude that at least three of four orders appealed by the claimant are not final for purposes of review. We uphold the ALJ's decision to deny the claimant's request for a full order and specific findings and deny the claimant's request to issue either a protective order or stay of proceedings.
The claimant filed petitions to review four orders of the ALJ. The original orders do not appear to be in the record; however, copies are attached to the respondents' brief in opposition and the contents of the orders do not appear to be disputed.
Under § 8-43-301(2), C.R.S., a party dissatisfied with an order "which requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits or denies a claimant a benefit or penalty" may file a petition to review. Orders which do not require the payment of benefits or penalties, or deny the claimant benefits or penalties, are interlocutory and not subject to review. Natkin Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo. App. 1989). Furthermore, orders which determine liability for benefits, without determining the amount of benefits, do not award or deny benefits as contemplated by this statute and consequently, are not subject to review. Oxford Chemicals, Inc. v. Richardson, 782 P.2d 843 (Colo. App. 1989) (order may be partially final and reviewable and partially interlocutory); CF I Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 144 (Colo. App. 1986).
The first order is dated August 25, 2010. The ALJ issued a summary order pursuant to our remand for a new order considering the issue of back due benefits, if any, and calculating the benefits to be paid to the claimant. The ALJ allowed the respondent insurer to take a credit for permanent partial disability benefits paid, retroactively determine the claimant's award of benefits, discount permanent total disability benefits in the amount of $34.39, and adjust the amount of permanent total disability benefits payable to the claimant. After calculating the permanent total disability benefits, the insurer was to either pay the claimant any underpaid benefits or apply for a hearing to recover any overpaid benefits.
However, the claimant did not timely request a full order containing specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by § 8-43-215, C.R.S. That statute further provides that "[t]he request shall be a prerequisite to review under section 8-43-301." The statutory time limits governing appellate review of workers' compensation decisions are usually considered jurisdictional, and thus, such provisions are strictly enforced by the courts. Buschmann v. Gallegos Masonry, Inc., 805 P.2d 1193 (Colo. App. 1991). Accordingly, we have previously held that failure timely to file a request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law bars review of a summary order because § 8-43-215 provides that "such request shall be a prerequisite to a petition to review under section 8-43-301." Royce v. Bullwhackers Casino, W.C. No. 4-244-932 (July 25, 1996). Likewise, we have no authority to entertain the claimant's attempted appeal of the ALJ's summary order here.
The next order is dated September 7, 2010. The ALJ denied the claimant additional time to request specific findings and denied the claimant's request for a full order. This order effectively finalizes the ALJ's disposition of issues surrounding the claimant's receipt of disability payments. We therefore consider the propriety of denying the claimant's request for relief. See Jefferson County Public Schools v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 181 P.3d 1199, 1201 (Colo. App. 2008) (discussing whether order effectively precluded claimant from seeking benefits or required respondents to begin paying them). The ALJ noted that § 8-43-215(1), C.R.S. required a request for a full order to be made within seven working days after the date the summary order was mailed. The ALJ found that the claimant made her request one day late. Citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 24 P.3d 1 (Colo. App. 2001), the ALJ concluded that the claimant's request for a full order had to be received within the seven-day timeframe and that he effectively lacked jurisdiction to grant the claimant any relief. The ALJ determined that his previous summary order dated August 25, 2010 was his final order in this matter.
We agree with the ALJ that the claimant's failure to timely request a full order prohibited the ALJ from issuing specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Under the circumstances, the ALJ's summary order became the final order regarding benefits in this matter.
The claimant appealed the ALJ's order dated September 17, 2010 in which the ALJ denied the claimant's request for either a corrected or supplemental order. Within 30 days after entry of an order, the ALJ may issue a corrected order to correct clerical errors (grammatical or computational errors) or to correct errors caused by mistake or inadvertence. Section 8-43-302(1)(a)-(b), C.R.S. An ALJ may issue a supplemental order "limited to the matters raised in the petition to review." Section 8-43-301(5), C.R.S. Whether to issue a corrected or supplemental order is discretionary with the ALJ. See Broadmoor Hotel v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 939 P.2d 460, 463 (Colo. App. 1996) (issuance of supplemental order discretionary); Baber v. Sangre De Cristo Hospice, W.C. No. 4-730-564 (May 12, 2010) (power to issue corrected order discretionary). The ALJ was persuaded that the claimant was essentially seeking a full order and the ability to petition to review the previous summary order. Not finding a basis for issuing either a corrected order or a supplemental order, the ALJ denied the claimant's request for another order. In view of the claimant's failure to secure a full order, the ALJ was not in a position to issue a supplemental order, which involves a petition to review. The claimant's ability to file a proper petition to review had been foreclosed by her failure to timely seek a full order. Moreover, the ALJ was not persuaded that his summary order contained either clerical errors or errors due to mistake or inadvertence. We find no abuse of discretion by the ALJ in refusing to issue a supplemental or corrected order. See Coates, Reid Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850, 856 (Colo. 1993) (abuse of discretion standard requires showing that alleged abuse exceeds bounds of reason and consideration of whether order supported by applicable law).
The claimant also sought review of the ALJ's order dated October 7, 2010, in which the ALJ denied the claimant's motion to consolidate her petitions to review. This order of the ALJ appears to be purely procedural and not a final order subject to review under § 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. In any event, the ALJ considered his September 7th order that denied the claimant's request for a full order to be his only order subject to a petition to review. The ALJ clearly acted within his discretion to deny the claimant's motion to consolidate her various petitions to review. See Roe v. Industrial Comm'n, 734 P.2d 138, 142 (Colo. App. 1986) (motion to consolidate claims reviewed under abuse of discretion standard).
The claimant also seeks a motion for a protective order or stay of enforcement concerning the ALJ's four orders reviewed above pending consideration of her petitions to review. The claimant characterizes the matter as a review of the ALJ's compliance with our Order of Remand and potential review by the Colorado Court of Appeals. As indicated above, the ALJ's September 7, 2010 order which denied the claimant's request for a full order and denied the claimant additional time to request specific findings, is the closest of the four orders under consideration to a final and reviewable order. In any event, our authority to take action concerning an ALJ's order is limited to what the statutes provide. See London v. El Paso County, 757 P.2d 169, 170 (Colo. App. 1988) (Panel may remand only on grounds enumerated by statute). We may issue procedural orders necessary for our appellate review, but that is not the case here. Further, we must issue our decision within 60 days of receiving the certified record, unless the time is extended by up to 30 days upon the stipulation of the parties pending settlement. Section 8-43-301(9), C.R.S. As there is not a settlement matter here, we deny the claimant's request that we issue a protective order or a stay of proceedings.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claimant's motion for a protective order or a stay pending review is denied, and the claimant's petitions to review the ALJ's orders dated August 25, 2010, September 17, 2010, and October 7, 2010 are dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated September 7, 2010 is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
_______________________ John D. Baird
_______________________ Dona Rhodes
MARIQUITA MORAN-BUTLER, DENVER, CO, (Claimant).
HEALTHONE/SPALDING REHABILITATION HOSPITAL, Attn: KATHY WILLIAMS, AURORA, CO, 80011 (Employer).
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE, Attn: MONICA WESTLAND, C/O: BROADSPIRE, DENVER, CO, (Insurer).
BISSET LAW FIRM, Attn: JENNIFER E BISSET, ESQ., ENGLEWOOD, CO, (For Claimant).
SENTER GOLDFARB RICE, Attn: WILLIAM M. STERCK, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (For Respondents).