Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2014-0034
11-05-2014
IN RE C.I.
COUNSEL Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney By Dale Cardy, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for State Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender By Susan C. L. Kelly, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson Counsel for Minor
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(c); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G).
Appeal from the superior Court in Pima County
No. JV19454201
The Honorable Geoffrey L. Ferlan, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney
By Dale Cardy, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson
Counsel for State
Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender
By Susan C. L. Kelly, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Minor
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Kelly authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Howard and Judge Vásquez concurred.
KELLY, Presiding Judge:
¶1 C.I. appeals from the juvenile court's order adjudicating him delinquent for the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument and placing him on juvenile intensive probation until his eighteenth birthday. He argues the court applied the wrong "reasonable person" standard in relation to his claim of self-defense and erred in finding a crutch was a dangerous instrument. We affirm.
¶2 We view the evidence and resolve all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court's ruling. In re Jessi W., 214 Ariz. 334, ¶ 11, 152 P.3d 1217, 1219 (App. 2007). In July 2013, the victim, who was intoxicated and twenty-five years old, pushed his way through a crowd of people on a sidewalk. The victim remembered being hit in the face, but then did not remember anything until he was being cleaned up by medical personnel. He denied hitting anyone, but C.I. and a friend who had been with C.I. testified the victim had hit C.I., knocking him to the ground. C.I.'s friend testified C.I. had hit the victim one time with his crutch while C.I. was still on the ground. C.I., however, described hitting the victim twice, once while on the ground and once after he was back on his feet.
¶3 A cab driver who was waiting nearby, however, saw C.I. "pushing forward" into the victim's "personal space and shouting in his face." The driver testified he had seen someone else throw the victim to the ground, after which C.I., who was on crutches, dropped one crutch and used the other to strike the victim, swinging it in an arcing motion and hitting the victim in the leg,
buttock, side of the head, and face. He testified the victim had not made "any moves toward" C.I.
¶4 C.I. was arrested, and the state filed a delinquency petition alleging C.I. had committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. After a four day adjudication hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated C.I. delinquent, concluding he had committed aggravated assault and rejecting C.I.'s justification defense. The court explained, "there is the slightest evidence the Minor acted in self-defense; however, the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person in the Minor's circumstances would not have believed that physical force, to the extent used by the Minor, was necessary to protect himself."
¶5 On appeal, C.I. first contends the juvenile court "erred in failing to apply a 'reasonable juvenile' standard in determining the propriety of the force used in self-defense." Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-404(A), "a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself." Our supreme court has explained that the reasonable person standard does not "turn[] on the defendant's subjective motivations," but instead, "[T]he sole question is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have believed that physical force was 'immediately necessary to protect himself.'" State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, ¶ 12, 235 P.3d 240, 243 (2010), quoting § 13-404(A).
¶6 As quoted above, the juvenile court stated it had concluded the state proved "a reasonable person in the Minor's circumstances" would not have believed the degree of force used was necessary. Nothing in the court's ruling suggests it did not employ the proper standard. Rather, C.I.'s argument recounts the facts favorable to his justification defense and essentially amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence of self-defense. That we will not do. See Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d 943, 945 (App. 2004); In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 772, 774 (App. 2001).
¶7 C.I. also contends the juvenile court "erred in finding that [his] crutches constituted a 'dangerous instrument.'" He maintains that because the state did not prove the victim sustained a serious physical injury, the crutch could not qualify as a dangerous instrument.
¶8 A dangerous instrument is defined by statute as "anything that under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury." A.R.S. § 13-105(12). "Serious physical injury" includes "physical injury [impairment of physical condition] that creates a reasonable risk of death, or that causes . . . serious impairment of health or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily organ or limb." § 13-105(33), (39). When an instrument is not inherently dangerous, as is a gun or a knife, the trier of fact must "'determine whether the defendant used the object in such a way that it became' a dangerous instrument." State v. Gustafson, 233 Ariz. 236, ¶ 9, 311 P.3d 258, 261-62 (App. 2013), quoting State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308, 310, 778 P.2d 1204, 1206 (1989).
¶9 In Gustafson, this court rejected the argument that a victim must sustain a serious physical injury in order for the instrument used by a defendant to be ruled dangerous. Id. ¶ 14. As we stated in Gustafson, "§ 13-105(12) only requires that the dangerous instrument be readily capable of producing death or serious physical injury in the circumstances in which it is used." Id.; see also State v. Schaffer, 202 Ariz. 592, ¶ 15, 48 P.3d 1202, 1206 (App. 2002) (concluding prosthesis could be dangerous instrument). We cannot say the court erred in concluding that a crutch—essentially a long metal or wooden stick—swung "in an arcing motion toward" the victim, as a witness testified happened here, would be readily capable of producing death or serious physical injury.
¶10 For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's adjudication and disposition.