Opinion
06-21-00118-CV
09-22-2022
IN THE MATTER OF C.D.M., JR., A JUVENILE
Date Submitted: August 31, 2022
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Bowie County, Texas Trial Court No. 19JV0049-CCL
Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and van Cleef, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Josh R. Morriss, III Chief Justice
After having been determined by a juvenile court to have engaged in delinquent conduct, by committing aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, C.D.M., Jr., had been committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) for a determinate period of thirty years. Later, the TJJD, by its letter dated October 26, 2021, had requested a hearing on whether C.D.M. should be transferred to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to complete his sentence. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(a). Such a transfer hearing was held, resulting in his transfer to TDCJ. C.D.M. appeals the transfer.
The original juvenile court finding was made February 19, 2020, by the County Court at Law of Bowie County, acting as a juvenile court, and the offense was a first-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(b). After finding that C.D.M. used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense, the juvenile court committed him to the TJJD for a determinate period of thirty years with a possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
Because the letter requesting the transfer hearing did not appear in the original clerk's record filed in this appeal, C.D.M. initially asserted that he was deprived of his procedural due process rights because he was not given written notice of the nature of the proceeding or the factual allegation against him. The State filed a motion to supplement the clerk's record with the October 26 letter. We abated the case to the juvenile court to determine (1) whether the October 26, 2021, letter addressed to the juvenile court was received and reviewed by the juvenile court, (2) whether the juvenile court should file the letter in the clerk's record of this matter, (3) whether the Bowie County District Clerk should supplement the clerk's record with the October 26, 2021, letter, and (4) what notice the parties received of the transfer hearing. A supplemental clerk's record and supplemental reporter's record were filed in this appeal that showed the juvenile court held a hearing and entered findings that it received and reviewed the October 26 letter, that the State received notice of the transfer hearing on November 1, 2021, and that C.D.M. and his attorney received notice of the transfer hearing on November 3, 2021. Based on this record, we overrule this issue.
On appeal, C.D.M. contends that the juvenile court erred by not sua sponte ordering a mental evaluation to determine whether he was unfit to proceed with the transfer proceeding. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 55.31. Because we find no evidence that C.D.M. was unfit to be subjected to the transfer hearing, we affirm the transfer.
A juvenile court's decision regarding whether probable cause exists to believe a child is unfit to proceed is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re H.C., 562 S.W.3d 30, 42 n.9 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2018, no pet.). Under the Texas Family Code, a child "who as a result of mental illness or an intellectual disability lacks capacity to understand the proceedings in juvenile court or to assist in the child's own defense is unfit to proceed" and may not be subjected to juvenile proceedings. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 55.31(a).
In his brief, C.D.M. agrees that this is the standard of review applicable to this issue.
The State agrees that Section 55.31 applies to this proceeding.
Procedurally, the Texas Family Code provides that, "[o]n a motion by a party, the juvenile court shall determine whether probable cause exists to believe that a child . . . is unfit to proceed as a result of mental illness or an intellectual disability." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 55.31(b). Consequently, under the statute, the juvenile court is not required to determine whether probable cause exists except on the motion of a party, but in its discretion may do so sua sponte. See In re J.K.N., 115 S.W.3d 166, 168-69 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.20(a) (authorizing, inter alia, the juvenile court, in its discretion, to order a mental examination of a child to determine the child's fitness to proceed at any stage of a juvenile proceeding).
Nevertheless, C.D.M. argues that he has a constitutional right to not stand trial while incompetent and that, since Texas requires a trial court to sua sponte conduct an informal inquiry into an adult criminal defendant's competency when there is a bona fide doubt about the defendant's competency to stand trial, we should find that due process requires the juvenile court to sua sponte conduct an informal inquiry into whether the juvenile is unfit to proceed when there is evidence the juvenile has mental health issues.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004; Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 424-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); superseded by statute as stated in Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 692 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
In his brief, C.D.M. also asserts that the doctrine of parens patriae requires the juvenile court's sua sponte determination of his fitness to proceed. In support of this assertion, C.D.M. relies on an Indiana Court of Appeals opinion in J.M. v. State, No. 21A-JV-1636, 184 N.E.3d 658 (Ind.Ct.App. Feb. 16, 2022) (mem. op.). However, the notation preceding the opinion states: "Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case." Id. Since this case has no precedential value and should not have been cited, we will not consider it. Further, although C.D.M. asserts that parens patriae requires the juvenile court's sua sponte determination of his fitness to proceed, he provides no citation to relevant authority or analysis supporting that assertion. We will not make an appellant's argument for him. Shields v. Shields, No. 05-19-01427-CV, 2021 WL 2282002, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 4, 2021, no pet.). "Bare assertions of error, without argument or authority, waive error." Id. (quoting Bufkin v. Bufkin, 259 S.W.3d 343, 354 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied)). To the extent that C.D.M. contends that parens patriae required the juvenile court to sua sponte determine his fitness to proceed, this issue has been forfeited.
The determination of whether a constitutional protection given to a criminal defendant must also be given to a juvenile defendant requires us to "balance[] the function that [the asserted] constitutional or procedural right serve[s] against its impact or degree of impairment on the unique processes of the juvenile court." In re H.C., 562 S.W.3d at 41 (alterations in original) (quoting Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). "This balancing 'requires an exploration of the specific purposes of both the juvenile system and the constitutional right being asserted.'" Id. (quoting Lanes, 767 S.W.2d at 794).
In this case, we need not decide whether due process required the juvenile court to sua sponte conduct an informal inquiry into whether C.D.M. was unfit to proceed with the transfer proceeding. Even assuming, without deciding, that due process required the juvenile court to conduct an informal inquiry on its own motion, the evidence before the juvenile courtdid not show probable cause existed that C.D.M., because of mental illness or intellectual disability, lacked the capacity to understand the proceeding or to assist in his own defense.
In making its determination of whether probable cause exists to believe the juvenile is unfit to proceed because of mental illness or an intellectual disability, "the court may: (1) consider . . . supporting documents, professional statements of counsel, and witness testimony; and (2) make its own observation of the child." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 55.31(b)(1), (2).
Under the Juvenile Justice Code, "'mental illness' means an illness, disease, or condition, other than epilepsy, dementia, substance abuse, or intellectual disability, that: (A) substantially impairs a person's thought, perception of reality, emotional process, or judgment; or (B) grossly impairs behavior as demonstrated by recent disturbed behavior." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 571.003(14) (Supp.); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 55.01; In re H.C., 562 S.W.3d at 42. "'Intellectual disability' means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the developmental period." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 591.003(7-a); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 55.40; In re H.C., 562 S.W.3d at 42.
As C.D.M. points out, both the testimony and a psychological evaluation report performed about two months before the transfer hearing indicated that he had experienced several mental health issues. He had been diagnosed at various times with conduct disorder, bipolar depression (schizophrenia not identified), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and cannabis use disorder. At the time of the hearing, C.D.M. was being treated with Naproxen, Minocycline, Latuda, Divalproex, and Sertraline. Those medications were prescribed for depression, anxiety, aggressiveness, and mood stabilization. The most recent psychological evaluation indicated that, at the time of his disposition, C.D.M. was in eighth grade special education but that he had 7.5 high school credits at the time of the evaluation. The results of two I.Q. tests resulted in composite scores of 61 and 66, which fell "within the mildly impaired range," but the examiner noted purposeful under performance and concluded that the I.Q. test results "did not appear to be valid."
The psychological evaluation report summarized other evaluations that had been performed both before C.D.M.'s original adjudication and disposition and while he had been in the care of TJJD.
The evidence also showed that, because of his mental issues, C.D.M. went into several mental health treatment programs during his time at TJJD and that he successfully completed at least one of them. However, it also showed that C.D.M. had a history of intentional medication refusal, which had an adverse effect on his behavior.
Significantly, there was no testimony and no indication in the psychological evaluation report that C.D.M.'s mental health issues or his mildly impaired intellectual functioning impaired his capacity to understand the juvenile proceedings or to assist in his own defense. To the contrary, at the beginning of the transfer hearing, C.D.M. attempted to replace his attorney and sought to replace her with another attorney that was representing him in another matter. When informed that the other attorney said he was not going to represent C.D.M. in the transfer hearing, C.D.M. chose to continue with his appointed attorney rather than represent himself. Also, at the end of his case-in-chief, C.D.M.'s attorney notified the court that she had consulted with him regarding his right to testify, that she had advised him not to testify, and that C.D.M had stated he did not want to testify. In addition, there is no indication in the record that C.D.M. made any outbursts or that he displayed any bizarre or inappropriate behavior during the hearing.
Although there was some evidence in the record that C.D.M. had some mental health issues and that he had mildly impaired intellectual functioning, there was no evidence that he lacked the capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in his own defense. As a result, on this record, there was no evidence that C.D.M. was unfit to proceed with the transfer hearing. Therefore, even if due process requires the juvenile court to conduct an informal inquiry on its own motion under certain circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an informal inquiry here. See In re H.C., 562 S.W.3d at 43; In re J.K.N., 115 S.W.3d at 171. We overrule this issue.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the juvenile court's order of transfer.