Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-169 (CSH)
2019-07-08
In the MATTER OF Luigi CANGIANO, as Owner of the 1994 23-foot Wellcraft Eclipse #236, M/V "MARGARITAVILLE" Hull No. WELEGA76L394, Registration CT4425BD, her tenders, gear, furniture, tackle, appurtenances, etc., Petitioner.
Charles Edmund Murphy, Lennon Murphy & Lennon, Southport, CT, for Petitioner.
Charles Edmund Murphy, Lennon Murphy & Lennon, Southport, CT, for Petitioner.
RULING ON PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ORDER NOTING DEFAULTS
Haight, Senior District Judge:
I. BACKGROUND
On February 5, 2019, Petitioner Luigi Cangiano (also "Petitioner" or "Owner") filed a "limitation of liability" Complaint as the Owner or pro hac vice Owner of the 1994 23-foot Wellcraft Eclipse #236 express cruiser powerboat M/V "MARGARITAVILLE" (the "Vessel"). Specifically, in his Complaint, Petitioner asserted his entitlement to the protections or exoneration and/or limitation of liability pursuant to the "Limitation Act," 46 U.S.C. § 30501, et seq. , and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Supplemental Rules"). Cangiano thus requested exoneration from and/or limitation of liability for any claims of damage or injury arising from a particular event, the Vessel's voyage from the West Haven Yacht Club in West Haven, Connecticut, to New Haven Harbor and back on September 17, 2018. Doc. 1, ¶ 3.
Section 30505 provides, in relevant part:
In general ... [t]he liability of the owner of a vessel for any claim, debt, or liability described in subsection (b) [defined in broad terms] shall not exceed the value of the vessel and pending freight. If the vessel has more than one owner, the proportionate share of the liability of any one owner shall not exceed that owner's proportionate interest in the vessel and pending freight. 46 U.S.C. § 30505(a).
Cangiano represents that during that voyage, three passengers aboard the Vessel – namely, Diane Mathews, Cindy Vincent, and Donald Foy – allegedly sustained personal injuries when the Vessel made contact with a bridge abutment and/or piling (herein "the Incident"). Id. , ¶¶ 4-5. As described by Petitioner, at the time of the Incident, the Vessel's engine transmission was either not engaged and/or the Vessel was drifting with the current and not making way. Id. , ¶ 5. As a result of the Incident, the Vessel sustained only minor damage. Id.
Petitioner reported that Attorney Leann Riether, counsel for the three named passengers, provided him, as Owner, with written notice of her clients' claim on October 30, 2018. Id. , ¶ 6. The notice stated:
Please be advised that this office represents the above named individuals who are making a claim for severe personal injuries as a result of a boating accident which occurred on September 17, 2018[,] whereby your [ ] boat struck a piling near the Water Street Bridge, New Haven, Connecticut.
Id. The notice did not include the nature of the alleged injuries or the amount of the claim.
Despite Riether's reference to "severe personal injuries" in the notice, the Owner stated in his Complaint that he "has learned that the Passengers' respective claimed injuries are not serious." Id. He explained that "[r]eportedly, Mr. Foy received stiches [sic] for a hand laceration, Ms. Vincent suffered bumps and bruising to her head and face, and Ms. Mathews received no medical treatment following the Incident." Id.
Cangiano has disavowed that any losses, damages, or injuries from the Incident were "caused or contributed to by any fault, neglect, design or want of due care or due diligence" on his part or that of "the vessel, her crew, or anyone for whom [he] may be responsible." Id. , ¶ 8. He has also represented that he used "due diligence" to make the Vessel seaworthy for the voyage on September 17, 2018, "and at all revelant times the vessel was tight, staunch, strong, fully manned, properly equipped and supplied, and in all respects seaworthy and fit." Id. , ¶ 7.
"Alternatively, and without admitting liability" for damages arising from the Incident, the Owner has requested the "benefits of the limitation of liability" provided in 46 U.S.C. § 30501 , et seq. Id. , ¶ 9. Anticipating that the claims asserted will exceed his interest in the Vessel, the Owner, through his counsel, has presented an "Affidavit of Value" [Doc. 1-1], which indicates that the post-casualty value of the Vessel on September 17, 2018 was approximately $6,115," six thousand one hundred fifteen dollars. Doc. 1-1, ¶ 3. Consequently, in his Complaint, Petitioner requested leave to file an "Ad Interim Security" [Doc. 1-2] with the Court "in accordance with ... Supplemental Rule F" in the amount of $6,115, the asserted value of his interest in the Vessel, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the security, plus costs in the amount of $250, as security for the benefit of claims. Doc. 1, ¶ 15; Doc. 1-2. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(1).
$6,115 was the amount appraised by George Stafford, who is the principal of Stafford Marine Service, LLC and a marine surveyor certified by the National Association of Marine Surveyors, Inc. Doc. 1-1 ("Affidavit of Value" by Charles E. Murphy), at 1-2. The details of Stafford's appraisal are set forth in his "Limitation Action Appraisal." Doc. 1-1, at 4-10. In brief, Stafford found the 23-foot Wellcraft boat to be in "overall below average condition – for the vintage" and stated that the "[r]eplacement value would be approximately $40,000 new for a similar vessel with new gas power." Id. , at 8.
Petitioner states that because the Vessel was a recreational vehicle, there is and was no pending freight. Doc. 1, ¶ 13.
Pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30505 and Supplemental Rule F, the Court entered an Order [Doc. 5], which granted the Owner leave to file his proposed "Ad Interim Security for Value" [Doc. 1-2] for the benefit of claims in the sum of $6,115, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the security, plus costs in the amount of $250, without prejudice to any interested party's right to "seek a modification of the form and quantum of the security, including by substitution of an approved Interim Stipulation for Value." Doc. 5, at 3-4. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(1), (7).
Upon entry of the Order [Doc. 5] on March 21, 2019, the Clerk, as directed, issued the "Notice of Petition of Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability" (herein "Notice") [Doc. 6] to all persons having any claims with respect to which the Complaint seeks exoneration from or limitation of liability. That Notice ordered all such claimants – with "claims or suits against the Petitioner arising or resulting from the boating Incident" – to serve ("deliver or mail") a copy of their claims on Petitioner's attorney, Charles E. Murphy, Lennon, Murphy & Phillips, LLC, on or before May 29, 2019, or be defaulted. See Doc. 6, at 1-2. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(4). Moreover, if any claimant desired to "contest either the right to exoneration from liability or the right to limitation of liability," he or she was directed to "file and serve on the attorneys for Petitioner an answer to the Complaint" on or before May 29, 2019 "unless his or her claim ha[d] included an answer, so designated" or be defaulted. Doc. 6, at 2. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(5).
On April 3, 2019, Petitioner served a copy of the Court's Order of March 21, 2019 [Doc. 5] and the Notice [Doc. 6] on Leann Riether, counsel for claimants Mathews, Vincent, and Foy via email (to lrietherlaw@gmail.com ). See Doc. 8-1 (Email and attachments sent from Nina Rabin of Lennon, Murphy & Phillips, to Leann Riether, April 3, 2019 at 11:09 a.m.). These three claimants were the only claimants known to Petitioner based on Riether's letter to Petitioner, dated October 30, 2018. Doc. 1, ¶ 11. On April 8, 2019, Petitioner again served copies of the Order and Notice [Doc. 5, 6] on Riether, but sent the copies this time by certified mail, return receipt requested. Doc. 8-2, at 2 (Letter from Nina M. Rabin to Leann Riether, dated April 8, 2019, sent "via certified mail"); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(4). Petitioner presented the delivery receipt, proving delivery of and signature for the documents on April 10, 2019, by a "Melissa Granata" for Leann Riether, Esq., at the Law Offices of Charles J. Riether, 31 Broadway, North Haven, Connecticut. Doc. 8-2, at 3.
As Petitioner stated in his "Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability":
There are presently no other demands, unsatisfied liens or claims of liens against Petitioner or the vessel in contract, tort or otherwise, arising out of the incident and no other actions pending or proceedings pending on same so far as are known to Petitioner.
Doc. 1, ¶ 11.
This service upon Riether by mail was not later than the second publication of the Notice in the New Haven Register and Connecticut Post newspapers, which occurred on May 10, 2019. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(4) ("Notice to Claimants," mandating that "[t]he plaintiff not later than the day of second publication shall also mail a copy of the notice to every person known to have made any claim against the vessel or the plaintiff arising out of the voyage or trip on which the claims sought to be limited arose.").
In addition, Petitioner complied with the Court's publication requirements, contained in paragraph 6 of its Order [Doc. 5], by having the Notice published in the New Haven Register and the Connecticut Post newspapers for four consecutive weeks (on May 3, May 10, May 17, and May 24, 2019). See Doc. 8-3 ("Affidavit of Publication"). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(4) (specifying that "[t]he notice [to all persons who may assert claims] shall be published in such newspaper or newspapers as the court may direct once a week for four successive weeks prior to the date fixed for the filing of claims"). Petitioner now moves for an "Order by the Court Noting Defaults." Doc. 9. Petitioner declares that despite service of the Notice, as described supra , "[n]o claims, answers and/or other pleadings setting forth demands on the Petitioner have been filed with this Court." Doc. 9, at 2. The deadline for filing said claims was May 29, 2019. Accordingly, Petitioner "prays for an order noting the defaults of all persons claiming damages for any and all losses, damages, and/or injuries arising out of, occasioned or occurring from the voyage onboard the Vessel on September 17, 2018[,] and barring the filing of claims and answers in this or any other proceeding." Id.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review for Default
Rule 55, Fed. R. Civ. P., creates a " ‘two-step process’ for the entry of judgment against a party who fails to defend: first, the entry of a default, and second, the entry of a default judgment." City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC , 645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting New York v. Green , 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005) ). Under Rule 55(a), the first step is entry of default, which "formalizes a judicial recognition that a defendant has, through its failure to defend the action, admitted liability to the plaintiff." Id.
Rule 55(a) provides that "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After entry of default, the plaintiff may seek a default judgment. Id. 55(b). Therefore, the initial entry of default does not give rise to a protectable expectation that default judgment will follow. Rather, entry of a default judgment lies within the sound discretion of the court.
For purposes of clarity, "[t]he defendants in the limitation action are those parties who have suffered damage in the casualty and would normally be plaintiffs in their own right, had they commenced the action originally." 3 Benedict on Admiralty § 12(A) (2019).
For example, entry of default may be set aside "for good cause," Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c), which is also a matter within the trial judge's discretion.
It is this second step, entry of default judgment under Rule 55(b), that "converts the defendant's admission of liability into a final judgment that terminates the litigation and awards the plaintiff any relief to which the court decides it is entitled, to the extent permitted by Rule 54(c)." Mickalis Pawn Shop , 645 F.3d at 128. The Second Circuit has made clear that a party is "not entitled to a default judgment as [a matter] of right; rather the entry of a default judgment is entrusted to the ‘sound judicial discretion’ of the court." Cablevision of Southern Conn., Ltd. Partnership v. Smith , 141 F. Supp. 2d 277, 281 (D. Conn. 2001) (quoting Shah v. N.Y. State Dep't of Civil Serv. , 168 F.3d 610, 615 (2d Cir. 1999) ). With respect to "entries of defaults and default judgments," the trial court is "in the best position to assess the individual circumstances of a given case and to evaluate the credibility and good faith of the parties." Shah , 168 F.3d at 615 (quoting Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara , 10 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1993) ).
In general, when evaluating whether to enter default judgment, a court should consider factors, such as the following: "(1) the amount of money involved; (2) whether issues of fact or of substantial public importance are at stake; (3) whether the default is largely technical; (4) whether the plaintiff has been substantially prejudiced by the delay involved; (5) whether the grounds for default are clearly established or are in doubt; (6) whether the default was caused by a good-faith mistake or excusable neglect; (7) how harsh an effect a default judgment might have; and (8) whether the court thinks it later would be obligated to set aside the default on defendant's motion." Cablevision , 141 F. Supp. 2d at 281-82 (citing 10 Moore's Federal Practice § 55.20 [2][b] (3d ed. 1999)). See also, e.g. , OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Hawkins , No. 14-CV-4656 (NGG), 2015 WL 5706945, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2015) (enumerating factors to be considered when court decides to enter default judgment), report and recommendation adopted , No. 14-CV-4656 (NGG) (CLP), 2015 WL 5706953 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2015).
See also Pinaud v. County of Suffolk , 52 F.3d 1139, 1152 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing with approval Moore's Federal Practice for list of factors to be considered in entering default judgment); Feeley v. Whitman Corp. , 65 F. Supp. 2d 164, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (listing Moore's factors).
With respect to the case at bar, Petitioner has requested the entry of default, pursuant to Rule 55(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., as to all parties who may have claims which have not been asserted in the limitation action. Entry of default, as opposed to default judgment, is thus before the Court at this time.
As set forth supra, Notice was issued to all claimants to present their claims regarding the Incident on the September 17, 2018, voyage of the Vessel, but no claims were served upon Petitioner's counsel by the May 29, 2019, deadline.
B. Limitation of Liability - 46 U.S.C. § 30501, et seq.
The owner of a vessel may seek to limit his liability by commencing an action in a district court within six months of receiving written notice of a claim related to a marine casualty. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30511(a) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(1). After depositing with the court approved security equal to the owner's interest in the vessel (and pending freight, if relevant), "all claims and proceedings against the owner related to the matter in question shall cease." 46 U.S.C. § 30511(b), (c) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(1). The court then secures the value of the vessel or owner's interest, presides over all claims, and enjoins the prosecution of other actions against the owner or his vessel with respect to the particular marine casualty. Thus, in a limitation action, any pending lawsuits in the United States are stayed and all domestic claims are brought together in concursus before the federal district court in admiralty.
The concursus , the limitation proceeding in district court, is binding only on claims within the United States because limitation orders are only domestic in effect. The Second Circuit has stated that "the absence of an international concursus which can be attained only through the treaty making processes of the United States leaves the decree [by a United States District Judge] in a limitation proceeding clothed with domestic, not international recognition." Petition of Bloomfield S.S. Co. , 422 F.2d 728, 736 (2d Cir. 1970). See also Otal Investments Ltd. v. M.V. Clary , 494 F.3d 40, 63 (2d Cir. 2007). See generally G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty, at 944 (2d ed. 1975).
Under Supplemental Admiralty Rule F, after the court orders notice to be issued to all potential claimants regarding the vessel owner's complaint (seeking exoneration from, or limitation of, liability), the claimants must file and serve their claims by the date specified in the notice, in this case May 29, 2019. Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(4), (5). Moreover, pursuant to Rule F(5), "[e]ach claim shall specify the facts upon which the claimant relies in support of the claim, the items thereof, and the dates on which the same accrued." Id. Additionally, claimants are permitted to contest the owner's right to exoneration from, or limitation of, liability by filing an answer to the complaint. Id. At a minimum, in order to preserve his or her right to recover from the limitation fund, a claimant must file a claim in some form; he or she need not, unless so advised, file an answer contesting a plaintiff's right to seek exoneration or limitation. See, e.g. , In re Triton Asset Leasing GmbH , 719 F. Supp. 2d 753, 757-58 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (collecting decisions by courts "considering the question of whether claimants must file claims and/or answers before they can request relief from the court"). See also generally 3 Benedict on Admiralty § 12(C) (2019) (noting that, upon the potential claimant's receipt of notice of the limitation action, "the first pleading which must be filed is the Claim, which may also include an Answer if the claimant desires to conte[s]t the right to exoneration or limitation").
If claims are filed, "in a proceeding known as a concursus , the district court, sitting in admiralty without a jury, determines ‘whether there was negligence; if there was negligence, whether it was without the privity and knowledge of the owner; and if limitation is granted, how the [limitation] fund should be distributed.’ " In re Henry Marine Serv., Inc. , 136 F. Supp. 3d 401, 412 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Complaint of Dammers & Vanderheide & Scheepvaart Maats Christina B.V. , 836 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1988) ). See also 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (restricting "[c]laims subject to limitation" as those occurring "without the privity or knowledge of the owner"). Moreover, once a court "recognizes exoneration from or limitation of liability of a petitioner by ‘compliance by the owner with the requirements of subdivision (1) of this rule [F] all claims and proceedings against the owner or the owner's property with respect to the matter in question shall cease.’ " Matter of Tappan Zee Constructors, LLC , No. 117-CV-00168 (MAD) (CFH), 2018 WL 1183711, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(3)).
In the Second Circuit, however, "courts have identified two sets of circumstances in which the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty court must give way." Id. (citing Dammers , 836 F.2d at 755 ). "First, if the limitation fund, which represents the value of the vessel and its cargo, exceeds the aggregate of the claims to be made against it, a concursus is unnecessary and the district court must allow claimants to proceed in other forums." Dammers, 836 F.2d at 755 (collecting cases). See also Kreta Shipping, S.A. v. Preussag Int'l Steel Corp. , 192 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[W]here the aggregate value of the claims against the shipowner do not exceed the limitation fund, then the injunction should be lifted irrespective of whether the claimants wish to assert ‘common-law rights’ in state courts or other rights elsewhere.") (citing Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn , 354 U.S. 147, 152, 77 S.Ct. 1269, 1 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1957) ).
"Second, when a lone claimant brings an action seeking an amount in excess of the limitation fund, the district court must lift the stay against other proceedings if that claimant concedes the admiralty court's exclusive jurisdiction to determine all issues relating to the limitation of liability." Dammers, 836 F.2d at 755 (collecting cases). For example, claimants may exercise their "presumed right to a jury trial and common law remedies, as evidenced by the ‘saving to suitors’ clause," Matter of Garvey Marine, Inc. , 909 F. Supp. 560, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1995) ; but that right remains balanced by, and subject to, the vessel owner's fundamental right to limitation of liability under 46 U.S.C. § 30505. See, e.g. , Kreta Shipping , 192 F.3d at 49-50 (In Dammers , in the context of allowing claimants to proceed in a common-law state action before a jury, the Second Circuit, "as had the Supreme Court in Lake Tankers , recognized that vacating the injunction would resolve the conflict between the Limitation Act, which permits a district court to require that all claims against a shipowner be brought in admiralty court, and the saving-to-suitors clause, which protects parties' rights to pursue non-admiralty claims in other forums.").
The Court also notes that when claimants come forward in a limitation of liability proceeding to challenge said limitation, the district court must make a two-step analysis to determine "[w]hether a vessel owner is entitled to limit its liability":
"First, the court must determine what acts of negligence ... caused the accident. Second, the court must determine whether the ship owner had knowledge or privity of those same acts of negligence...." In re Moran Towing Corp. , 166 F.Supp.2d 773, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting In re Keys Jet Ski, Inc. , 893 F.2d 1225, 1230 (11th Cir. 1990) ). The cargo claimant "bears the initial burden of proving negligence," after which the burden shifts to the shipowner to prove lack of knowledge or privity. Id. Both privity and knowledge "turn[ ] on the facts of particular cases." Coryell v. Phipps , 317 U.S. 406, 411, 63 S.Ct. 291, 87 L.Ed. 363 (1943) ; see also In re Complaint of Messina , 574 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that the determination of whether acts of negligence are within the knowledge or privity of the owner "is a fact specific undertaking" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Otal Investments Ltd. v. M/V CLARY , 673 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2012). See also 46 U.S.C. § 30505(b) (delineating claims for which there may be limitation of liability to "those arising from any embezzlement, loss, or destruction of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board the vessel, any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of the owner ") (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, no claimant has filed an answer or claim so there has been no challenge to the Owner's entitlement to limit his liability to the value of the vessel.
The "saving to suitors" clause preserves for plaintiffs (suitors) whatever nonadmiralty remedies they may have available to them, including those arising under common law or the laws in state courts. The federal statute creating admiralty jurisdiction thus provides that the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, the Owner filed the necessary Complaint; and Notice, issued per the Court's Order [Doc. 5], was published weekly in two widely-circulated Connecticut newspapers, the New Haven Register and the Connecticut Post , for a period of one month (from April 29 to May 24, 2019). Also, the Owner timely served the Court's Order [Doc. 5] and Notice [Doc. 6], by email followed by certified mail, upon Attorney Riether, counsel to all persons known to have made a claim against the Vessel or the Owner arising out of the Incident of September 17, 2018. The deadline of May 29, 2019, was set forth in both the Order and Notice for all claimants to respond – i.e. , to file a claim, setting forth supportive facts, and to answer the Complaint in the event they also wished to contest either the Owner's right to exoneration from, or right to limitation from, liability. The deadline expired and no claims and/or Answers were filed. Accordingly, in this proceeding, all parties who may seek to claim damages for any and all losses and/or injuries arising out of, occasioned or occurring from the Incident onboard the Vessel on September 17, 2018, are in default.
Furthermore, neither of the two circumstances under which the Second Circuit has found it appropriate to lift the stay or allow admiralty jurisdiction to give way is present. There is no known aggregate of claims in other forums that does not exceed the shipowner's liability fund; and there is no claimant who wishes to proceed in another forum and concede the admiralty court's exclusive jurisdiction as to limitation of liability. In short, there are simply no known claimants who seek to proceed against the Owner with respect to the Incident on September 17, 2018, in any court at this time.
III. CONCLUSION
Under these circumstances, the Petitioner's "Motion for Order Noting Defaults" [Doc. 9] is GRANTED. The Clerk is hereby ORDERED to enter DEFAULT against all parties who may assert that they have claims against the Petitioner, Luigi Cangiano, or the Vessel (the 1994 23-foot Wellcraft Eclipse #236 powerboat M/V "MARGARITAVILLE," Hull No. WELEGA76L394, Registration No. CT4425BC) arising out of the Vessel's voyage from the West Haven Yacht Club in West Haven, Connecticut, to New Haven Harbor and back on September 17, 2018, and particularly the Incident which occurred during that voyage. Pending further Order of the Court , all such claimants are hereby barred from filing claims and/or answers in this, or any other proceeding in the United States, relating to the Incident. Hereafter, if any claimant seeks to open the default in this action or vacate the injunction as to other domestic actions, that claimant must show cause for the Court to do so. Petitioner may file a motion for default judgment on or before August 7, 2019.
In the interest of fullness, the Court once again clarifies that this Order pertains only to litigation within the United States. It has no extraterritorial effect. See Petition of Bloomfield Steamship Company , 422 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1970) and n.10, supra. In any event, to date, no claimants have come forward and there is no reason to believe that there are grounds for an international claim.
It is SO ORDERED.