Opinion
M08CP18013175A
01-29-2019
IN RE CAMERON W.[1]
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 28, 2018, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (DCF or Department) filed coterminous petitions for neglect and for the termination of the parental rights (TPR) of the mother and the putative fathers of their child, Cameron W., born on February 21, 2018, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 et seq. The respondent mother is Shannon W. (Mother), and the respondent putative fathers are Alexander R. and John Doe.
On February 26, 2018, DCF invoked a ninety-six-hour hold on minor child, Cameron W., while he was in the hospital. An ex-parte motion for an order of temporary custody (OTC) was filed on February 28, 2018. The court granted DCF’s ex-parte motion for the OTC, finding that the child was in immediate physical danger from his surroundings and that continuation in the home was contrary to the welfare of the child and vested temporary custody of the child in the Department (Woods, J.). The OTC was sustained at the initial hearing on March 9, 2018, and preliminary Specific Steps were issued at that time.
The respondent Mother was properly served by in-hand service on March 2, 2018, and on March 9, 2018, was advised and appointed counsel. Respondent and putative father Alexander R. was properly served by certified mail on March 9, 2018, and on March 23, 2018, was appointed counsel and a paternity test was ordered. On April 27, 2018, the court received and reviewed the results of the DNA tests and the respondent putative father, Alexander R. On this date, Alexander R. was found not to be the father of the minor child and a finding of non-paternity issued (Suarez, J.). The respondent Alexander R. and his appointed counsel were removed from the case.
An additional putative father, Kyle Matthew B., was cited in on August 28, 2018, pursuant to DCF’s motion to cite in a party and amend the neglect petition to reflect that DNA testing excluded Alexander R. as the biological father of Cameron. On August 28, 2018, putative father Kyle Matthews B. appeared and waived any defects in service as to the petitions. He was advised and appointed counsel. A paternity test was ordered on his behalf. On October 2, 2018, the court received and reviewed DNA tests results regarding Kyle Matthew B. and found that he was not the father of Cameron. A finding of non-paternity was issued, and the respondent, Kyle Matthew B. and his appointed counsel, were removed from the case (Sanchez-Figueroa, J.).
On October 2, 2018, the court confirmed that the respondent putative father, John Doe, was properly served by publication on March 7, 2018, and was defaulted for his failure to appear. Because the TPR proceeding is essentially a civil proceeding, such default effectively admits the truth of the petitioner’s material allegations. John Doe’s whereabouts remain unknown.
The neglect petition alleged the statutory grounds that the child was denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, and that he has been neglected in that he has been abandoned. General Statutes § 46b-120(8)(c) et seq. On October 2, 2018, prior to the start of the trial, Mother entered a written plea of nolo contendere (no contest) to the petition filed by DCF which alleged that Cameron was neglected. On October 2, 2018, Cameron was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of DCF. (Sanchez-Figueroa, J.)
In the TPR petition filed on February 28, 2018, DCF alleged the statutory ground as to Mother, Ground E, that she: (1) is the mother of a child; (2) who is under the age of seven years old and is neglected or uncared for; (3) Mother has failed or is unable or unwilling to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time; (4) considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child; and that (5) Mother’s parental rights of another child have been previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(E).
As to John Doe, the TPR petition alleged abandonment in that he has abandoned Cameron by failing to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). Father John Doe was properly defaulted for failure to appear on the trial date of October 2, 2018. The petitions further alleged that reasonable efforts were made to locate Mother and father, and that Mother and father are unable to or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
This court presided over the trial on the petitions on October 2, 2018, as to the respondent Mother. The respondent Mother appeared for trial and was represented by counsel. The child was represented by counsel who was present for trial. DCF was represented by an assistant attorney general who was also present for trial. All counsels participated in the examination of the witnesses, had the opportunity to call witnesses, and each provided closing arguments. Mother was advised pursuant to In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 794, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). Having adjudicated Cameron W. a neglected child, the court is next called upon to determine whether DCF has met its burden of proving the allegations presented in the pending TPR petitions as to Mother. The court has carefully considered the petitions, the criteria set forth in the relevant statutes, the applicable case law, and all the evidence and testimony presented. The court heard testimony from three witnesses including a DCF supervisor, a DCF social worker, and the Mother and determined the validity and credibility of their testimony. The petitioner, DCF, who bears the burden of proof in this matter, introduced three exhibits and called two witnesses. Mother introduced four exhibits and called one witness. Seven exhibits were entered into evidence.
The court has taken judicial notice of the entire court record including the chronology of the proceedings, the filings or submissions of pleadings, petitions, social studies, statements of facts, affidavits, status reports, court hearing memoranda, and the court’s findings, orders, rulings, and judgments. The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction over the matter, that there are no pending actions affecting the custody of the minor child, and the parties do not claim these proceedings implicate the Indian Child Welfare Act. The court further finds that notice of these proceedings has been provided in accordance with the Practice Book.
These proceedings are governed by General Statutes § 17a-112 et seq. In a proceeding for TPR, the petitioner must first prove by clear and convincing evidence, in the adjudicatory phase, a ground for termination alleged in the petition as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment. See In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 600 A.2d 1028 (1991); see also Practice Book § § 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. See In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 753 A.2d 409 (2000).
On the basis of the evidence presented and the reasons stated below, this court makes the following findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence and finds that the petitioner has met its burden of proof with respect to the termination of parental rights petition as to the respondent Mother, Shannon W.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Mother, Shannon W.
Mother is twenty-nine years old. She was born on March 1, 1989, in New Haven to her parents, Dennis and Sherry W. Mother was raised in East Haven and Westbrook in Connecticut together with her younger brother who is in the military. All went well for Mother until her parents divorced when she was five years old. At the time of the divorce, Mother primarily lived with her mother. The divorce was the beginning of Mother’s disrupted childhood. During the eighth grade, she began having conflicts with her mother and moved in with her father until his death in 2009. Mother graduated from high school in 2007 and chose not to further her education. Mother has never been married. Mother has had a total of three children, none of whom are in her care. All three children tested positive for substances at birth. Mother has had a history with DCF dating back to 2008 due to her issues with substances abuse.
Shortly after high school, Mother had her first child, Hallie W., who was born on July 8, 2007. On March 25, 2008, after her first child was born, the maternal grandmother obtained custody of her first born through the Westbrook Probate Court. On June 3, 2015, the maternal grandmother filed a petition for termination of parental rights with the Westbrook Probate Court. On May 10, 2016, Mother consented and the court granted the TPR to Hallie W. as to Shannon W. and John Doe. On November 23, 2011, Mother gave birth to her second child, Eric. W., who tested positive for opiates at birth and experienced withdrawal symptoms. On November 23, 2011, DCF was granted an OTC by the Middletown Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. On January 19, 2012, a termination of parental rights petition was filed by DCF and on February 3, 2012, the court accepted Mother’s consent to terminate her rights and ordered the termination of the parental rights as to Eric’s putative father, John Doe.
On February 21, 2018, Mother gave birth to her third child, Cameron W., at Lawrence Memorial Hospital in New London. Mother reported that she did not know she was pregnant with Cameron until six months into the pregnancy and continued to use her drugs of choice, heroin and cocaine. When Cameron was born, Mother had been incarcerated since November of 2017 and Mother did not receive prenatal care prior to her incarceration. Because Cameron was exposed to heroin, cocaine, and alcohol in utero, he was diagnosed with Fetal Abstinence Syndrome at birth. Cameron tested positive for methadone at birth. It was not until Mother was arrested and subsequently incarcerated that she involuntarily stopped using heroin and cocaine and was prescribed methadone. When she gave birth to Cameron on February 21, 2018, three months after her incarceration, Mother tested positive for only methadone and benzodiazepine as she had not been using heroin or cocaine due to her incarceration.
Before the Department invoked the ninety-six-hour hold on Cameron, the social worker assigned to the case had a telephone conference with Mother who had been released from the hospital on February 25, 2018, and was returned to the York Correctional Institute (York) where she had been incarcerated since November of 2017. At this time, Mother was put on notice that DCF had concerns regarding Cameron. Mother reported to the DCF social worker that her plan for her son was adoption and that she had been working with Connecticut Adoption Center, a private adoption agency, to effectuate that plan. Mother reported that she had met with the identified adoptive parents and that she continued to want adoption for Cameron. Mother further stated that she wanted to have visitation with Cameron, but did not want to work towards reunification. The adoption plans were halted due to the putative father’s (Alexander R.) disagreement with the adoption. On February 26, 2018, the adoption social worker contacted DCF explaining that both parents were incarcerated, that there was no agreement with the adoption, and that the child would need to be placed with a family. After she learned that the plans for adoption would not happen, Mother was unable to or refused to provide DCF with names of potential resources for Cameron. Although her mother had adopted her first born child, Mother did not believe that the maternal grandmother could be a resource due to their troubled relationship. Mother was adamant that she did not want her mother involved as a possible placement for Cameron. In spite of Mother not wanting the child placed with her mother, DCF did its due diligence and determined that, for independent reasons, maternal grandmother could not be a resource for Cameron.
Mother was unsure of the identity of Cameron’s father and named two potential fathers who were later tested and were each excluded as probable fathers. As discussed in detail above, putative father Alexander R. was excluded following negative DNA tests results. Putative father Kyle Matthew B. was also excluded following negative DNA tests results.
Mother’s parental rights to another child, Hallie W., born on July 8, 2007, were terminated on June 3, 2015, pursuant to a TPR petition filed by the child’s maternal grandmother at the Westbrook Probate Court. Mother’s parental rights to second child, Eric W., born on November 23, 2011, were terminated by this court on February 23, 2012 pursuant to a TPR petition filed by DCF. Mother is a convicted felon and has an extensive criminal and substance abuse history dating back to 2009. Mother has admitted to the use of cocaine and heroin. Mother’s criminal charges included: disorderly conduct, failures to appear, violations of probation, possession of a controlled substance, possession of narcotics, and several larceny in the sixth degree charges. Most recently, Mother was arrested on November 14, 2017, and charged with smuggling, possession of a controlled substance, criminal impersonation, and drug paraphernalia. Mother was incarcerated at the York facility with DOC when she gave birth to Cameron on February 21, 2018. Mother was incarcerated from November 14, 2017, and released in June of 2018.
During her incarceration at York, the Department was unable to provide Mother with any rehabilitative services as she was not available to comply with the services. To her credit, however, Mother took advantage of programs offered to her by DOC and participated in programs such as Stride, which focused on employment and vocational services; Narcotics Anonymous (NA) and Alcohol Anonymous (AA) meetings; and she participated in a child development program. In mid-June 2018, Mother was released to a DOC halfway house, Next Steps, in Willimantic. Next Steps is a structured setting supervised and restricted by the DOC, and she was not allowed to come and go into the community. Mother engaged in services offered by DOC such as an early recovery group therapy, trauma based group therapy, individual counseling and medication management through Perceptions. As a direct result of her incarceration, Mother was not available to be referred to treatment services. Therefore, Mother was unable to benefit from any treatment services DCF could have provided.
On August 20, 2018, Mother was moved to Healthy Lifestyles, a sober house in New London, where she continued with the services she was receiving and became employed. The sober house is privately run and not supervised by DOC and it allowed Mother the flexibility to go into the community. Mother testified that she has been prescribed Vivitrol monthly injections; a medication used to prevent relapse in opioid dependent patients. The Department made a referral for Mother to SCADD (Southeastern Council on Alcohol and Drug Dependence) for substances abuse and mental health rehabilitation and evaluations.
During her incarceration, Mother received monthly visitation with Cameron and upon her release from incarceration and the DOC halfway house, the Department increased the frequency of the visits to weekly. Although the visits have gone well with appropriate interaction, there is no clear bond between Mother and Cameron. To her credit, however, Mother has been consistent with the visits both during and after her incarceration. It has been reported that the visits are enjoyed by both Cameron and Mother.
Mother’s substance abuse history includes use of heroin and cocaine which she reported she began using eight to nine years ago and continued to use until the time of her incarceration on November 14, 2017. Mother reports that she has been sober for ten months from the time she was arrested on November 14, 2017, and has remained sober up until the trial date of October 2, 2018. Mother testified that she had, some years ago, maintained a six-month period of sobriety while in the community. After those six months, Mother relapsed and returned to the drug use. Mother explained that this current attempt at sobriety is different because she is doing it for herself and for Cameron and not at the insistence of her family. Mother’s Exhibit A, a letter from the sober house, Healthy Lifestyles, showed that mother had two recent negative urine drug screens on September 17, 2018, and on September 30, 2018, only two weeks prior to the trial date. To her credit, Mother has participated in substance abuse recovery and relapse prevention programs while in the halfway house and during her current stay in the sober house. Mother testified that she continues to participate in NA and AA meetings on weekly basis. Mother has obtained employment and expressed a desire to be reunified with Cameron.
At trial, Mother testified that she made plans for adoption based on her belief that she did not stand a chance to keep Cameron or care for him given her history with DCF. Mother has had two other children for whom her parental rights were previously terminated. Mother testified that after Cameron was born, her plans changed and she wanted to be reunified with her son. Contrary to her testimony, the evidence shows that Mother had no plans to be reunified with Cameron as she unilaterally initiated the plans to have him adopted prior to the intervention of DCF.
B. Putative Father, John Doe
Putative Father, John Doe, who was properly served and defaulted for failure to appear, has failed to come forward and make his identity known to DCF. He has never seen or made inquiries about Cameron. He has never provided him with any financial support nor has he sent Cameron any cards or letters. He is a stranger to Cameron.
C. The Child
Cameron W. was born on February 21, 2018, and is now eleven months old. At the time of the trial, Cameron was seven months old. He was born to Shannon W. and John Doe at Lawrence Memorial Hospital in New London, CT. Cameron has been in DCF care since February 26, 2018, when he was placed in a legal risk DCF foster family in Connecticut where he presently remains. Cameron was born while his Mother was incarcerated at the York facility. Cameron was diagnosed with Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome and having Fetal Alcohol symptoms, as he was exposed to heroin, cocaine, and alcohol in utero and experienced withdrawal after birth. While in the hospital, Cameron was prescribed morphine to assist him with the withdrawal symptoms and was connected to a Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) machine for the first eighteen hours of his life. Cameron requires a competent caregiver that will meet his specialized needs.
The foster mother reports that Cameron is a happy baby who is developing appropriately. Cameron was eating and sleeping well with a few struggles with constipation that the foster mother properly addressed. It was reported that Cameron had been assessed by Birth to Three in April 2018 and was found not to be eligible. The foster mother reports that Cameron has no developmental issues or concerns. The foster family has provided Cameron with a safe, secure, and caring home life and he has bonded well to his foster mother and family.
Cameron is adjusting well to daycare and the KinderCare staff also reports that Cameron is a happy baby and they have not observed any developmental concerns. All of Cameron’s medical, dental, emotional, and specialized needs are being met and is medically up to date. Cameron is thriving in his foster family’s care. The foster family are willing and able to adopt Cameron if the reunification efforts made are not successful.
Cameron visited with his Mother on a monthly basis during her incarceration, and then on a weekly basis when she was released to the sober house. It was reported that both Mother and Cameron enjoyed the visits. Cameron has a happy disposition and appears to enjoy the visits with Mother. Mother engages Cameron and is reportedly appropriate during her visits. Cameron continues to look to his foster family for all of his needs. Cameron has never seen his father as John Doe’s identity is unknown and his whereabouts remain unknown. John Doe has not come forward to be assessed or to offer himself as a resource for Cameron.
III. ADJUDICATORY PHASE
A. Reasonable Efforts
In order to terminate parental rights of Mother and father, John Doe, the court must first find that DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination exist. "A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ... In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights ... exists by clear and convincing evidence. If a ground for termination is proven, the court must next consider the dispositional phase. The court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest." In re Destiny R., 134 Conn.App. 625, 629, 39 A.3d 727, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 660 (2012); In re Shaun B., 97 Conn.App. 203, 206, 903 A.2d 246 (2006). As is permitted under our law, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases was heard at the same trial. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).
Reasonable Efforts to Locate and Reunify
In order to terminate parental rights, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that DCF "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent ... unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing ... or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required ..." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1). "[T]he department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it has made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate." In re Gabriella A., 154 Conn.App. 177, 181, 104 A.3d 805 (2014), aff’d, 319 Conn. 775, 127 A.3d 948 (2015). "Thus, the department must prove [by clear and convincing evidence] either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., 153 Conn.App. 584, 595-96, 102 A.3d 141, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 902, 104 A.3d 106 (2014); see also In re Anvahnay S., 128 Conn.App. 186, 191, 16 A.3d 1244 (2011); In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 837, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005).
"[I]n determining whether the Department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child or whether there is sufficient evidence that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, the court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis of the events preceding the date on which the termination was filed ... [T]he court, when making its reasonable efforts determination ... is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., supra, 153 Conn.App. 596; see also In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 870-71, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 466 (2014) (same); Practice Book § 35a-7.
Practice Book § 35a-7 provides: "(a) In the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights. (b) In the discretion of the judicial authority, evidence on adjudication and disposition may be heard in a nonbifurcated hearing, provided disposition may not be considered until the adjudicatory phase has concluded."
"[T]he statute imposes on the department the duty ... to make reasonable efforts to unite the child or children with the parents. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act by which the requirements was drawn ... [R]easonable efforts mean doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); see also In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999).
In a juvenile matter, the Department has a continuing duty to make reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the parents. In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 644, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002). But "[t]he department is required only to make ‘reasonable efforts.’ It is axiomatic that this does not require a useless and futile act." In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999). The court may also determine that the respondent parents were either unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. See In re Alexander T., 81 Conn.App. 668, 676, 841 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 924, 848 A.2d 472 (2004).
With respect to the statutory element of reasonable efforts to locate and reunify required for termination pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1), the court finds the following: DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it used reasonable efforts to locate Mother. Mother was found on March 9, 2018, to have been served in-hand with the TPR petition and has appeared in this action and was represented by counsel (Woods, J.). Father, John Doe, was found to have been served by publication and has not appeared (Sanchez-Figueroa, J.).
DCF, has alleged as to Mother that at the time it filed its coterminous petitions, it made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with her child, and in the alternative, has alleged that Mother was unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. The court finds that this allegation was based on Mother’s status at the time of the filing date of the TPR petition. Mother was incarcerated, and according to the DCF’s investigation protocol, the conversations with Mother were about her intentions to put the child up for adoption. The adoption process was only halted due to the putative father’s disagreement, and not the Department’s intervention. Mother wanted the child adopted and she was unwilling and unable to benefit from reunification efforts. In fact, the evidence shows that Mother explicitly informed the adoption social worker that she wanted visitation with the child, but did not want to work towards reunification with the child. The court finds that Mother was unable and unwilling to take advantage of any services DCF could provide her, as she had no plans to raise Cameron and was not available for Cameron due to her incarceration. However, the specific steps provided to Mother clearly guided her to take advantage of all programs offered to her by DOC. Minimal or no services were provided to Mother due to her incarceration and her unwillingness to benefit from the efforts to reunify her with her child. She, however, engaged in services offered to her by DOC as she was unavailable to take advantage of any referrals and services DCF could provide while she was incarcerated. Mother was therefore unable to benefit from DCF’s reunification efforts.
The court acknowledges that incarceration alone cannot be the basis for terminating parental rights, but observed, nevertheless, that the Mother’s incarceration posed restraints on her ability to visit more frequently with her child and meet his needs, particularly given his significant medical issues at birth.
It was evident that Mother had continued to use substances for the last eight to nine years which has resulted in the termination of her parental rights to her two older children. Mother also continued her involvement with the criminal justice system that resulted in three different periods of incarceration with the most recent being in November 2017. In spite of Mother’s presenting problems with incarceration, long history of involvement with the criminal justice system, and her ongoing substances abuse, DCF attempted in reunifying Mother with her child and provided her with visits with Cameron during and after her incarceration at York. The court finds that DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts under the circumstances to reunify Cameron with Mother even when Mother had made it clear that she had no desire to work towards reunification. The court further finds that Mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts made by the Department. The court notes that "the law does not require a continuation of reasonable efforts on the part of [DCF] when such efforts will be futile." In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 872, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 468 (2014).
B. ADJUDICATORY GROUNDS OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITION
1. Failure to Rehabilitate — General Statutes § C.G.S. 17a-112(j)(3)(E) As to Mother
In the adjudicatory phase, the court must also determine whether DCF has proved the statutory ground for termination of parental rights of failure to rehabilitate after the children have been found to have been neglected, according to the requirements of General Statutes § 17a-112(j). See e.g., In re Leilah W., 166 Conn.App. 48, 66-69, 141 A.3d 1000 (2016) (finding failure to rehabilitate); see also In re G.Q., 158 Conn.App. 24, 25, 118 A.3d 164, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 918, 118 A.3d 164 (2015) (finding failure to rehabilitate). "[T]he failure to comply with specific steps ordered by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination proceeding." In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003). In assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved his or her ability to manage his or her life, but rather, whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999). However, "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life within a reasonable time." (Emphasis omitted.) In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000).
"[P]ersonal rehabilitation ... refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent [and] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent’s] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ... [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage his own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Zowie N., 135 Conn.App. 470, 503, 41 A.3d 1056, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 916, 46 A.3d 170 (2012).
The statutory ground alleged for termination of Mother’s parental rights with respect to Cameron is that set forth in General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(E), that she: (1) is the mother of a child; (2) who is under the age of seven years old and is neglected or uncared for; (3) Mother has failed or is unable or unwilling to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time; (4) considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child; and (5) that Mother’s parental rights of another child have been previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(E).
The evidence here proves clearly and convincingly that Cameron has been found to have been neglected. As noted above, Cameron was adjudicated neglected on October 2, 2018. Cameron is under the age of seven years old as he was born on February 21, 2018. It is also established that Mother’s rights to another child were terminated. In fact, Mother’s rights to two other children were terminated as discussed above. The evidence clearly and convincingly shows that Mother is unable to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of Cameron.
In assessing rehabilitative progress of the parents, particularly Mother in this instance, the question is not simply how far the parent has come, but has the parent come far enough to encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, the parent can assume the role as parent in the life of the child. In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230. The issue is not always of rehabilitation; it is whether the particular needs of the child can be met within a reasonable timeframe. See In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85. In light of the statutory elements of this ground as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden to show that Mother has not rehabilitated to the extent necessary to be able to care for the child within a reasonable period of time, given the age of the child and his needs for permanency.
The evidence clearly shows that Mother has a repeated pattern in her history with her involvement in the criminal justice system, repeated attempts at sobriety, and repeated return to substances abuse. At the time the petitions were filed, the Mother’s primary presenting problems arose from her incarceration, involvement with the criminal justice system, her substances abuse issues, and her inability to care and to provide for the needs of her infant child, Cameron. The court acknowledges that Mother has satisfied a great deal of her specific steps by her engagement in the services and programs she was provided at DOC while she was incarcerated, during her time at the halfway house, and her current involvement at the sober house. However, compliance with the specific steps is not the equivalent to rehabilitation. The parent’s compliance with the court-ordered expectations or specific steps is relevant, but not dispositive to the rehabilitation finding. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 168-70, 554 A.2d 722 (1989).
To her credit, Mother has made progress as she is employed and has reportedly tested negative to substances on only two shown instances just a few weeks prior to the trial date of October 2, 2018. The evidence shows that Mother tested negative for substances on September 17, 2018, and again on September 30, 2018. Mother reports to have been sober for the last ten months, from November 2017, and has plans to remain sober. Certainly, this court applauds Mother’s efforts and hopes that she will maintain her sobriety for her own sake. The court acknowledges that it has been the longest time of sobriety for Mother in the last eight to nine years. However, the court also finds that the first six months of Mother’s sobriety began when she was arrested and subsequently incarcerated. Although her sobriety began involuntarily, to her credit, Mother has recently demonstrated a desire to maintain her sobriety. The court further finds that Mother has only been sober in the community for two months from August 20, 2018, to the trial date of October 2, 2018.
Mother remains under the supervision of a sober house, and given Mother’s long history of drug dependency, two months in the community is insufficient time for the court to find that she has achieved the level of personal rehabilitation that would encourage this court to believe that she would be able to assume a responsible position in Cameron’s life. Mother, through her testimony, has expressed love for Cameron and a desire to be reunified with her child. It is clear that Mother has a renewed desire to parent Cameron. However, "the fact that the respondent may love the child does not in itself show rehabilitation." In re Paul M., 154 Conn.App. 488, 500, 107 A.3d 552 (2014). Unfortunately, given her history of significant involvement with the criminal justice system and her long history of substances abuse issues and the totality of the evidence, the court does not find that Mother has rehabilitated to a level where she can take care of Cameron either now or in the foreseeable future. There was no evidence provided to show that Mother has gained the necessary insight and ability to care for her child given his age and needs within a reasonable period of time. See In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873, reargument denied, 251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 364 (1999). Mother has very recently attempted to reach a level of sobriety, and although the court is hopeful that she is able to maintain it, the court cannot draw a conclusion of rehabilitation as her sobriety is in its very early stages. The court is not convinced that Mother’s current attempt at sobriety rises to the level necessary for a finding of rehabilitation. Cameron cannot wait to see if Mother can maintain her sobriety on her own when she is not in a highly structured and monitored environment.
The child is in need of a permanent and competent caregiver who will provide permanency, care, safety, and well-being. The child needs permanency, and to provide Mother additional time to prove that she has reached the level of rehabilitation necessary to care for Cameron is not in his best interest. Providing Mother more time is not consistent with Cameron’s age and needs for structure, nurturing and permanency in his young life. Cameron has been in DCF’s care for his entire young life since he was discharged from the hospital on February 26, 2018, a mere five days after his birth.
Thus, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that as of the end of the trial on this matter, Mother had not sufficiently rehabilitated to the extent she could assume a responsible position in Cameron’s life in view of his age and needs or within a reasonable period of time. Accordingly, the court finds that, based upon the credible testimony and documentary evidence presented, and pursuant to the requirements of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1) and § 17a-111b(a), DCF has met its burden of proof by the rigorous standard of clear and convincing evidence that Mother has failed to achieve the degree of rehabilitation which would reasonably encourage the belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child’s life. The court therefore finds that Mother has failed to and is unable to rehabilitate within a reasonable time, as it has been statutorily defined and has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
IV. DISPOSITION
For all of the above reasons, the court finds that DCF has satisfied the requirements of General Statute § 17a-112(j)(3) to show by clear and convincing evidence the necessary statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner for the termination of Mother’s parental rights. Before deciding whether or not to terminate the parental rights, the court must consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in General Statutes § 17a-112(k). The trial court must determine whether it established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the parents’ parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 97-98, 961 A.2d 1036 (2009). Once the court finds that the allegations of the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court may then find in the dispositional phase that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998). "The best interests of the child include the child’s interests in sustained growth, development, wellbeing, and continuity and stability of [his or her] environment." (Internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis omitted.) In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 766 n.15, 23 A.3d 18 (2011), aff’d, 306 Conn. 438, 51 A.3d 334 (2012). "In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings delineated in [§ 17a-112(k) ]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 794-95, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008). "[T]hose seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ... There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 47, 907 A.2d 126 (2006), aff’d, 285 Conn. 483, 940 A.2d 733 (2008).
General Statutes § 17a-112(k) provides: "Except in the case where termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent."
The court concludes that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the parental rights of the respondent Mother. The court finds that the evidence is clear and convincing that the only way this child will find stability, continuity, development, and growth is through permanency. There is not enough evidence that Mother will be able to rehabilitate at any time in the foreseeable future. Although she has shown some movement towards rehabilitation in the time since the child was placed in DCF care, that time is not enough given Mother’s extensive history with the criminal justice system and her long history of substances abuse. The court further finds that two months of sobriety after her release from the structured environment of incarceration and a half way house, both of which are supervised by DOC, is insufficient time to adequately assess the necessary level of personal rehabilitation. The child has now been in foster care for all of his life and is in need of stability and permanency in order to grow and develop in a healthy manner. While Mother has been compliant with her visitations and has created a relationship with the child during the visits, it does not rise to the level of a parent/child relationship or the parent/child emotional bond that is formed from the day-to-day caring and providing for a child. Mother’s testimony showed a desire to parent her child and to love him. As stated above, love is not enough to show this court that she has rehabilitated. Moreover, Mother was unable nor willing to form a parental bond. Mother has not establish the parent-child relationship that is necessary to enable her to provide Cameron with stability and an environment that would foster his growth and development all due to her extensive history of substances abuse and incarceration. Mother’s circumstances today are the same circumstances she was in during 2007 and again in 2011. Mother’s circumstances have not changed for the last eight to nine years. To allow Mother further time to rehabilitate to show that she may possibly assume a responsible position in Cameron’s life is not fair to Cameron, and more importantly, the court finds that it is not in his best interest. Therefore, the court finds that it is in the child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
The court makes the following seven statutory findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence as of the last day of evidence. See Practice Book § 35a-9.
Practice Book § 35a-9 provides: "The judicial authority may admit into evidence any testimony relevant and material to the issue of the disposition, including events occurring through the close of the evidentiary hearing, but no disposition may be made by the judicial authority until any mandated social study has been submitted to the judicial authority. Said study shall be marked as an exhibit subject to the right of any party to be heard on a motion in limine requesting redactions and to require that the author, if available, appear for cross examination."
General Statutes § 17a-112(k) Criteria
(1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent .
As discussed above, the Department has made reasonable efforts to work towards reunification of Cameron with Mother and Putative father. DCF has offered timely and appropriate services since the opening of the case in an effort to facilitate reunion with Cameron. However, Mother was clear and adamant that she did not want reunification but wanted adoption for the child. Initially, the Department had been unable to offer Mother appropriate services toward reunification of Cameron as she was incarcerated and putative Father’s whereabouts were unknown. Putative father’s whereabouts remain unknown. The Department has provided Mother with monthly supervised visits that were increased to weekly visitations with Cameron. All of the recommended services were reasonable and appropriate, and offered on a consistent, timely and sufficient basis.
(2) Finding whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 .
As discussed above, the Department offered reasonable efforts in order to work towards reunification of Cameron with his mother or putative father, as Mother was incarcerated at the time. Mother was unable to benefit from any efforts as she had no intentions of caring for Cameron. Putative father, John Doe’s, identity remains unknown. However, DCF made efforts to provide Mother visits during and after her incarceration. The court finds that Mother has failed to meet her own expected reasonable efforts to benefit from DCF’s reasonable efforts. The findings made above are incorporated herein by reference.
(3) The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order .
The Superior Court for Juvenile Matters of Middletown ordered specific steps for Mother on February 28, 2018. Due to Mother’s incarceration, she was unable to fulfill the court-ordered Specific Steps. Mother, however, took advantage of programs offered to her while under the strict supervision of DOC.
(4) "[T]he feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties ..."
Cameron is now eleven months old and does not fully understand why he is in foster care. Cameron has been in DCF for all of his short life and he looks to his foster parents to meet his every needs. Although Cameron has supervised visits with Mother, both while she was incarcerated and after her release, he has bonded with his foster family and looks to them to have his needs met. Cameron enjoys his visits with Mother, but he does not have a parent-child bonded relationship with her. Cameron has not seen his father and does not know him as his identity is not known. Cameron is in need of a home and caretaker who understands his needs and responds to him in a consistent nurturing and developmentally appropriate manner. The foster parents are ready, willing, and able to be his permanent caregivers, and they are ready and willing to adopt Cameron.
(5) Finding regarding the age of the child .
Cameron was born on February 21, 2018 and at the time of trial was nearly eight months old.
(6) Finding regarding the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including but not limited to: the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions .
As discussed above, Mother was incarcerated and was offered monthly supervised visits with Cameron. After her release from incarceration, Mother was offered supervised visits on a weekly basis. Mother has failed to sufficiently adjust her circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be reunified with his Mother in the foreseeable future. Although Mother has consistently visited with the child as provided and has made some progress in achieving a level of sobriety, the short period of sobriety does not rise to the level of rehabilitation. Mother has been unable or unwilling to sufficiently address the child protection concerns and is not in a position to provide Cameron with a safe, permanent and stable home environment where he would be able to thrive. As to Father, John Doe, he has not made any efforts to come forward to confirm paternity or develop a plan for Cameron.
(7) Findings regarding the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent .
The court finds there is no credible evidence provided to show that the parents have been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Cameron. DCF has encouraged Mother to maintain a relationship with the child. In fact, DCF requested Mother to provide names of relatives or other potential resources for Cameron, but she focused only on her desire to have Cameron adopted. No unreasonable act or conduct by any person or agency or by the economic circumstances of the parents has prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with his child. Failure to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child has only been a result of Putative father’s own actions or circumstances in refusing to cooperate in coming forward to have his identity established. For Mother, it is has only been through her own actions and circumstances of incarceration and substances abuse that caused her to fail to maintain a meaningful relationship with her child. At the time of Cameron’s birth, Mother was not able to maintain a meaningful relationship with her son and therefore not able to create an emotional bond with him.
ORDERS
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing findings and having considered all of the evidence and statutory requirements, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondents Mother, Shannon W., and Putative father, John Doe, with their child, Cameron W., that parents continue to be unwilling and unable to benefit from those efforts, and that further efforts are no longer required. Further the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist to terminate Mother’s and father’s parental rights as alleged, and that it is in the best interest of the child to do so.
It is accordingly ordered:
That the parental rights of the respondent Mother, Shannon W., and the respondent putative father, John Doe, who has been defaulted for failure to appear, are hereby terminated;
That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent of Cameron W. for the purpose of securing his adoption as expeditiously as possible;
That a written report of the plan as to the status of the child shall be submitted to the court within thirty days, and such further reports shall be timely filed and presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment shall enter accordingly.