Opinion
Case No. 21-42880
04-01-2021
IN RE: Nicholas J. BUSSELL, and Carla M. Bussell, Debtors.
Bryan Yaldou, Consumer Protection Attys of MI, PLLC, Brownstown, MI, for Debtors Nicholas J. Bussell and Carla M. Bussell.
Bryan Yaldou, Consumer Protection Attys of MI, PLLC, Brownstown, MI, for Debtors Nicholas J. Bussell and Carla M. Bussell.
ORDER DISMISSING CASE
Thomas J. Tucker, United States Bankruptcy Judge
On March 31, 2021, the Debtors filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7, commencing this case. But the Debtors are not eligible to be debtors in this case, under 11 U.S.C. § 109(g)(2), which provides:
(g) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no individual or family farmer may be a debtor under this title who has been a debtor in a case pending under this title at any time in the preceding 180 days if–
...
(2) the debtor requested and obtained the voluntary dismissal of the case following the filing of a request for relief from the automatic stay provided by section 362 of this title.
The Debtors were each debtors in a case pending within the preceding 180 days of filing this case: Case No. 19-40861, a Chapter 13 case which was voluntarily dismissed on the motion of the Debtors on March 22, 2021. In that Chapter 13 case, on November 7, 2019, creditor Ally Bank filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay (Docket # 35 in Case No. 19-40861, the "Stay-Relief Motion"). On November 26, 2019, the Court entered an order granting the Stay-Relief Motion (Docket # 38 in Case No. 19-40861). On March 22, 2021, the Debtors voluntarily dismissed the Chapter 13 case, as noted above.
The Court reiterates what it has held about § 109(g)(2) in prior cases, including the case of In re Turner , 583 B.R. 910, 911 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2018) :
The Court agrees with the cases holding that (1) dismissal under § 109(g)(2) is mandatory when that statute applies; dismissal is not discretionary; and (2) it is irrelevant under § 109(g)(2) whether there is some causal link or nexus between the filing of a stay relief motion on the one hand, and the debtor's later voluntary
dismissal of the case on the other hand. Section 109(g)(2) applies, and requires dismissal, in every situation in which, in a prior case pending within 180 days before the filing of the present case, a creditor filed a motion for relief from stay and the debtor later voluntarily dismissed the case, regardless of the debtor's good faith or whether there was any particular connection between the two events. See Andersson v. Security Federal Savings and Loan of Cleveland (In re Andersson ), 209 B.R. [76-78 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.] 1997), and cases cited therein. The undersigned judge has so ruled in previous bench opinions, and adheres to that ruling now. See, e.g., In re Sigh , Case No. 09-62738, November 19, 2009 bench opinion at 5-6 (a copy of the transcript of that bench opinion, ... is filed in the Sigh case at Docket # 42 ...).
See also In re Steele , 319 B.R. 518, 520 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2005) (McIvor, J.).
Id. (citation omitted); see also In re Stachurski , 613 B.R. 251, 252 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2020) (same).
Based on the facts stated above, neither of the Debtors is eligible to be a debtor in any bankruptcy case filed within 180 days after March 22, 2021, and therefore neither of the Debtors is eligible to file any bankruptcy case until on or after September 19, 2021. As a result, this case (filed March 31, 2021) must be dismissed.
180 days after the date the prior Chapter 13 case (Case No. 19-40861) was dismissed (March 22, 2021) is September 18, 2021.
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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that this bankruptcy case is dismissed, as to both Debtors.