Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles CountyL.A. Super. Ct. No. CK 63778, Steven L. Berman, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel and O. Raquel Ramirez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ROTHSCHILD, J.
Appellant Darryl H. appeals from the dependency court’s order, made at a six-month status review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e), requiring that visits between Darryl and his son, Bryan H., continue to be monitored. Darryl contends the court erred by failing to order unmonitored visits, and that no substantial evidence supported the dependency court’s decision that unmonitored visits would be inconsistent with Bryan’s well-being. We disagree and affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Both parties now spell Bryan’s name with a “y,” not an “i.”
BACKGROUND
This is the second appeal in these dependency proceedings. In the first appeal (In re Brian H. (April 27, 2007, B193663) [nonpub. opn.]), we held that substantial evidence supported the dependency court’s assumption of jurisdiction over Bryan pursuant to section 300, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in selecting Bryan’s placement. We review the facts from the first appeal briefly before turning to the facts relevant to this appeal.
In June 2006, 12-year-old Bryan was removed from his paternal grandmother’s house and detained after sheriff’s deputies arrested Bryan’s uncle and cousin for selling drugs from the house and found the house in a dangerous, unsanitary state. (In re Brian H., supra, B193663.) Bryan’s grandmother claimed that she had cared for him since his birth, though she had no formal guardianship over him. Bryan visited with Darryl on weekends. Darryl, Bryan’s grandmother, and other relatives all claimed to be unaware of drug-selling at the grandmother’s house, but Bryan reported being aware of the drug-selling and also told of seeing drugs at Darryl’s residence. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) reported that the grandmother’s house was known for criminal activity. Bryan also indicated that Darryl drank heavily and sometimes drank while driving. Darryl’s criminal history included a conviction for possession of cocaine base for sale in September 2001 and convictions for driving with a suspended license and driving under the influence of alcohol in September 2003, along with a few earlier offenses. Based on these facts, on August 23, 2006, the dependency court assumed jurisdiction over Bryan and found that it would be detrimental to Bryan’s well-being to return him to the care of his grandmother or his father. We affirmed. (Ibid.)
Before Darryl filed his first appeal, the dependency court ordered Darryl to attend a court-approved drug and alcohol rehabilitation program with weekly testing, a parent education class, individual counseling, and joint counseling with Bryan. The court granted Darryl at least three hours a week of monitored visitation. (In re Brian H., supra.) In its report for the February 21, 2007 six-month status review hearing pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e), however, DCFS reported that Darryl had missed nine of his twice-monthly drug and alcohol tests between late July and late November 2006, followed by three positive cocaine tests from early December 2006 to early January 2007. A test in late January was negative for both drugs and alcohol. Darryl first said he did not know that he was supposed to test for substance abuse, then reported that he was hospitalized during November and December 2006. He claimed not to know how he could have positive test results, since he did not take drugs, but suggested that he might have had traces of drugs in his system because of contact with other people.
DCFS noted that Darryl had enrolled in the required classes and counseling programs in August 2006, and his counselor reported that he was doing well but had not completed all the programs. The counselor promised to send a progress report, but DCFS did not receive this before the six-month review hearing. DCFS also reported that although Darryl was entitled to up to three hours of monitored visits weekly, Darryl only visited with Bryan every Sunday afternoon for half an hour to an hour. DCFS reported that these visits went well. Bryan said that Darryl told him the visits were short because of classes Darryl had to attend. Darryl was then unemployed. DCFS recommended that the court retain jurisdiction over Bryan, that Darryl continue to receive reunification services, and that the other orders, including on visitation, remain in full force and effect.
At the February 21, 2007 hearing, Darryl attended and submitted on DCFS’s recommendation of continued reunification services, but requested unmonitored visits with Bryan based on Darryl’s alleged progress on his case plan. Counsel conceded that Darryl had some positive drug test results, but explained that Darryl had been hospitalized and on medication. The court noted, “Not cocaine,” and stated that Darryl was “barely in compliance” after three positive drug tests and nine missed tests, at least seven of which were taken when he was not in the hospital. The court warned that if this pattern continued, at the next six-month status review hearing, the court would set a permanency planning hearing for Bryan. The court found that the conditions justifying dependency jurisdiction over Bryan still existed; by a preponderance of the evidence, that return of Bryan to his parents’ custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to his physical and emotional well-being; and by clear and convincing evidence, that Darryl was only in partial compliance with his case plan and that DCFS had provided reasonable reunification services. The court ordered that all earlier orders remain in effect. Darryl filed a timely notice of appeal in pro per.
DISCUSSION
Darryl contends the dependency court erred by failing to grant Darryl’s request for unmonitored visits because no substantial evidence supported a finding that unmonitored visits might be detrimental to Bryan’s well-being. We disagree.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a trial court’s rulings, an appellate court applies the substantial evidence standard of review. (In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.) Under this deferential standard of review, Darryl bears the burden to show insufficient evidence, and we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving doubts in favor of DCFS. (See In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) A reviewing court must affirm a trial court’s factual findings if there is any substantial evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support those findings. (Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 119.) We will infer any implied findings if substantial evidence supports them. (See In re S.G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260 [the “pertinent rule of appellate review” is that appellate court “will infer a necessary finding provided the implicit finding is supported by substantial evidence”].)
Substantial evidence supports the court’s implied finding of a substantial risk of detriment from allowing Darryl unmonitored visits with Bryan. Darryl had a significant and unresolved drug problem at the time of the February 2007 hearing. Further, Darryl’s failure to avail himself of his full visitation opportunities, particularly when he did not have to fit visits around a work schedule, supports a reasonable inference that Darryl was not yet ready to take greater responsibility for his son. Although Darryl claimed to have almost completed his court-mandated counseling and classes, he did not provide supporting evidence of this to the dependency court, and DCFS was unable to procure such evidence from Darryl’s counselor.
The authorities Darryl cites do not aid him. Both In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581, and In re David D. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 941, 953-954, concern the outright denial of parental visitation. Here, the dependency court granted Darryl parental visits, but Darryl minimally exercised the right. In re W.O. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 906, 907-911, concerns the evidentiary requirements before the initiation of dependency proceedings, not those after a court has appropriately found that a parent’s behavior poses a substantial risk of detriment to a child.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: MALLANO, Acting P. J. VOGEL, J.