Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County No. 0073110. Brian M. Arax, Judge.
Arthur L. Bowie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri and Sean M. McCoy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
LEVY, Acting P.J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant B.L. challenges a disclosure order releasing a copy of his juvenile file to a federal probation officer, the United States Attorney’s Office, and experts and investigators who were retained in a federal criminal case pending against appellant. We agree with appellant that the disclosure order is overbroad and cannot be upheld as a reasoned exercise of judicial discretion. We will reverse.
FACTS
In the 1990’s, one or more juvenile delinquency petitions were filed against appellant. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) Although the appellate record was augmented to include appellant’s juvenile file, his privacy right precludes description of its contents.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Cameron L. Ervin wrote a letter addressed to the “Records Personnel” of Fresno County Juvenile Court, dated March 10, 2010. Ervin identified himself as a “US Probation Officer” and wrote that appellant “is presently undergoing an investigation in federal court.” Ervin requested “copies of any and all records, including any true findings, social studies and probation reports.” Appellant objected to release of his juvenile file (Judicial Council Form JV-572).
Unless otherwise specified, all dates refer to 2010.
On April 29, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on Ervin’s request to release the juvenile file. Ervin and appellant’s counsel appeared. Appellant was not present because he was in federal custody outside the San Joaquin Valley.
Ervin stated he was “a pre-offense investigator, United States probation officer, with the United States probation office in the Southern District of California.” The court asked, “And you have been involved … in investigation of a criminal matter pending against [appellant]?” Ervin replied affirmatively. Ervin said he “was ordered by a Judge Clark to complete a presentence investigation, including any and all relevant court documents.” The court asked, “And that’s in connection with a pending criminal charge in the federal court as against [appellant]; is that correct?” Ervin responded affirmatively.
Appellant’s counsel argued the probation department had not “shown any compelling interest overriding my client’s privacy rights.” Also, counsel argued this was “a carte blanche request” for all of appellant’s juvenile records and “I don’t know what’s in my client’s file. I don’t know what court records are being released and I object to it on that basis, too, in the sense that it is overreaching and too broad.”
The court stated that a compelling interest was not required, and that appellant’s juvenile history “is relevant to, perhaps, disposition, for mitigating or exacerbating factors.” The court also said Ervin had a statutory right to a copy of the juvenile file. Appellant’s counsel requested “a copy of whatever it is that you are releasing.” The court granted this request and said it would “probably issue an order of some sort that is a protective order.” The court ruled as follows:
“The Court will order release of the records to Mr. Ervin, release of the records to counsel on behalf of [appellant].
“I will issue a protective order along the lines that only parties in each respective office[] necessary to review these documents may review them. That a copy can be made for any retained expert but no other copy. One copy for each expert. No other copy may be made.
“All such copies to be either gathered back up at the complete cessation of the litigation, including appeal, by the Probation Department, federal attorney’s office, or the defense attorney, or to be seen absolutely that whoever had them, destroys them.”
A Judicial Council Form “JV-574 Order After Judicial Review, ” memorializing the court’s oral disclosure order, was prepared by the court. It provided:
“[The] U.S. Attorney’s office, counsel for [appellant], and Probation may each have a copy [of the juvenile file]. 1 [c]opy may be made for each retained expert … including investigators, who are necessary to defense or prosecution of case may have access to records. Requesting party (Probation) to be responsible for collection of all copies of records produced and Probation to destroy all such copies after litigation is completely finalized.”
DISCUSSION
I. The Disclosure Order Is Overbroad.
“It is the express intent of the Legislature that ‘juvenile court records, in general, should be confidential.’ (§ 827, subd. (b)(1).) This reflects a long recognized public policy of protecting the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings and records. [Citations.] Access to confidential juvenile records is governed by section 827.” (In re Gina S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1081 (Gina S.).)
Appellant argues the disclosure order is overbroad. We agree. Ervin stated that he needed a copy of the juvenile file to complete a presentence investigation for a federal criminal case that was pending against appellant. Ervin did not ask for the juvenile file to be released to anyone else. There is nothing in the record indicating anyone else needed or wanted to examine the juvenile file in connection with the federal criminal case. On its own motion, the court permitted unnamed experts and investigators to have a copy of the juvenile file. The court also authorized the United States Attorney’s Office to have a copy of the file. There is no provision in the Welfare and Institutions Code or the California Rules of Court allowing the lower court to, sua sponte, release a copy of a confidential juvenile file to governmental agencies or people who have not asked for it. Thus, the order is overbroad.
II. Ervin Did Not Have An Absolute Statutory Right To Obtain A Copy Of The Juvenile File.
During the hearing, the lower court stated that “probation officers, judges, referees, hearing officers, attorneys for the parties, law enforcements officers … [¶] … have a legitimate interest and a right to receive those records without application or specific court order or authorization.” The court said these “folks have a right to inspect for those purposes without even a petition.” Then the court said “those folks, who are officially investigating criminal or juvenile proceedings, have a legitimate interest and a right to receive those records without application or specific court order or authorization.” It stated that balancing “come[s] into play” for others who are not “probation officers, law enforcement, and such.”
As will be explained, the lower court’s interpretation of section 827 is erroneous as a matter of law. “We independently determine the proper interpretation of section 827.” (Gina S., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1082.) It is apparent from the lower court’s comments that it believed the right to inspect a juvenile file is concomitant with the right to obtain a copy of the file. The lower court incorrectly equated the word “inspect” contained in subdivision (a)(1) of section 827, with the word “release.” Section 827, subdivision (a)(1) grants probation officers the right to inspect a juvenile file without filing a petition and securing a court order, but they are not statutorily entitled to a copy of the juvenile file.
Subdivision (a)(1) of section 827 provides that a juvenile “case file may be inspected” by various categories of individuals set forth in subdivision (a)(1)(A)-(O). One of the categories of people who may inspect a juvenile file is “[t]he attorneys for the parties, judges, referees, other hearing officers, probation officers, and law enforcement officers who are actively participating in criminal or juvenile proceedings involving the minor.” (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(E).) If a person does not fit within any of these categories, he or she may file a petition to inspect the juvenile file pursuant to section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(P) and California Rules of Court, rule 5.552.
Gina S. holds that individuals who have a statutory right to inspect a juvenile file pursuant to section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(A)-(O), may obtain a copy of it only after securing an order from the juvenile court. (Gina S., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.) Section 827, subdivision (a)(3)(B) authorizes the lower court to order the release of a juvenile file to individuals identified in subdivision (a)(1)(A)-(O) “so long as interested parties are afforded due process, and courts have consistently interpreted the statute to vest the juvenile court with the authority to determine when the release of juvenile court records is appropriate. [Citation.]” (Gina S., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.) The appellate court explained, “Allowing parties the unfettered right to copy such a broad category of documents absent a court order would frustrate the juvenile court’s ability to safeguard the privacy of minors in order to protect their best interests and to control access to juvenile case files. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
We find Gina S. to be well-reasoned and persuasive. Assuming without deciding that federal probation officers are included within the ambit of section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(E), Ervin had a statutory right to inspect appellant’s juvenile file without a court order, but he did not have a statutory right to obtain a copy of it. Whether it was appropriate to release a copy of the juvenile file to Ervin was a matter vested to the proper exercise of judicial discretion.
This subdivision is part of the 1994 amendment of section 827. Prior to the 1994 amendment, subdivision (a) provided that the documents contained in a juvenile case file “may be inspected only by court personnel, the district attorney, a city attorney or city prosecutor authorized to prosecute criminal or juvenile cases under state law, the minor who is the subject of the proceeding, his or her parents or guardian, the attorneys for the parties, and any other person who may be designated by court order of the judge of the juvenile court upon filing a petition herefor.” (Historical and Statutory Notes, 73A Pt. 2 West’s Ann. Welf. & Inst. Code (2008 ed.) foll. § 827, p. 483.)
III. The Disclosure Order Cannot Be Upheld As A Reasoned Exercise Of Judicial Discretion.
In ruling on a request for disclosure of a confidential juvenile file, the lower court is supposed to weigh the competing interests and determine whether releasing a copy of the juvenile file is appropriate under all the circumstances. (Gina S., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084; § 827, subd. (a)(3)-(5).) A decision granting or denying a request to release juvenile records is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (Pack v. Kings County Human Services Agency (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 821, 835.)
In this case, the lower court failed to conduct the requisite weighing process and did not determine if disclosure was appropriate in light of the entirety of the circumstances. During the hearing, the court stated that it decided to hold a hearing on Ervin’s request because appellant had asked for one and because it “wanted to dignify you, sir, by at least having you have the benefit of the Court’s thinking and what the … statutory structure was.” The lower court then stated that balancing of interests “ordinarily for others, other than probation officers, law enforcement, and such.…” In the lower court’s view, section 827 “mandate[d] that release” of the juvenile file be ordered. As previously explained, this interpretation of section 827 is incorrect.
Appellant was prejudiced by the lower court’s legal error because several important factors were overlooked. For example, there is no indication in the record that the lower court examined the contents of the juvenile file. As explained in Gina S., “the records at issue can provide sufficient proof of the harm that would be suffered were they disclosed. [Citation.]” (Gina S., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085.) The lower court did not assess whether some of the documents in the juvenile file contained sensitive information that could cause disproportionate harm to appellant if they were released. Also, it did not consider whether it was necessary to release a copy of the entire juvenile file to Ervin or if Ervin only needed some of the documents contained in the file. Further, the lower court did not consider if Ervin could obtain the information necessary to complete his investigation and prepare the presentence report simply by inspecting the juvenile file. Finally, the overbreath of the disclosure order demonstrates a lack of consideration for appellant’s legitimate privacy right. Accordingly, we conclude the disclosure order cannot be upheld as a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion. Reversal is required. (Gina S., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1088-1089.)
In light of this holding it is not necessary to consider appellant’s contention that the disclosure order must be reversed because Ervin did not file a petition complying with California Rules of Court, rule 5.552.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order releasing appellant’s juvenile file is reversed.
WE CONCUR: CORNELL, J.FRANSON, J.