Opinion
No. 6-119 / 06-0009
Filed March 1, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Terry L. Wilson, District Associate Judge.
A grandfather appeals from the denial of his motion for concurrent jurisdiction following the termination of parental rights proceeding for his grandchildren. AFFIRMED.
Andrew B. Howie of Hudson, Mallaney Shindler, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Terry E. Rachels, County Attorney, and Marc R. Wallace, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Mahan, JJ.
Charles is the paternal grandfather of B.H. and I.P., who were originally removed from their parents' home in January of 2003. Later their parents had their parental rights terminated in April of 2005. That termination order was affirmed by our court in In re E.H., B.H., and I.P., No. 05-0671 (Iowa Ct.App. Aug. 17, 2005). After procedendo issued and jurisdiction returned to the juvenile court, Charles moved the juvenile court to grant concurrent jurisdiction to the district court to address the issues of custody, guardianship and placement of B.H. and I.P. pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.3(2) (2005). He noted that if granted, he would request the district court to grant him permanent guardianship of the children.
E.H., who was also involved in this termination order, is not Charles's grandchild, and his interests are not at issue in this appeal.
In denying the motion, the juvenile court stated:
It is not in the best interest of the children to grant concurrent jurisdiction for several reasons. The grandfather proposes a guardianship with only two of three siblings. These young children are currently in a pre-adoptive placement with the third sibling and are well-adjusted. To grant this motion would deny the children the permanency and stability they desperately need.
Charles responded by filing a motion to enlarge or amend the court's order. He alleged that Iowa Code section 600.8, which provides that a person who has been convicted of a forcible felony shall not be approved as a prospective adoption option, is unconstitutional. The court, in denying the motion, declined to address the constitutionality of section 600.8, noting that it had not based its denial on Charles's felony conviction, but rather on the notion that keeping all three children together would be in their best interests. Charles appeals from this order.
Charles first maintains the court erred in denying his motion for concurrent jurisdiction to allow a guardianship petition to proceed in the district court. He asserts that the best interests of the children indicate that he should be their permanent guardian, and that the district court is the most appropriate venue to determine that question.
A party may seek permission to "litigate concurrently in another court a specific issue relating to the custody, guardianship, or placement of the child who is the subject of the action." Iowa Code § 232.2(2). On our de novo review, we see no reason to disturb the juvenile court's ruling which denied concurrent jurisdiction. The court expressly considered the children's best interests, specifically noting the interest in allowing the three siblings to remain together. See In re R.G., 450 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Iowa 1990) (stating ruling on motion should focus on child's best interests). This consideration fully justifies the denial of concurrent jurisdiction, in which Charles would have sought guardianship over only two of the three siblings.
Charles further contends Iowa Code section 600.8 violates his due process and equal protection rights. Section 600.8(2)(b) prohibits anyone who has been convicted of a forcible felony from being considered for adoptive placement. The State maintains the constitutional claims raised by Charles are "moot." While we do not agree the question is moot, we nonetheless decline to reach the issue on grounds of ripeness.
"A case is ripe for adjudication when it presents an actual, present controversy, as opposed to one that is merely hypothetical or speculative." State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2000). Our rules of judicial restraint generally preclude appellate review of issues that depend on matters not yet developed. See State v. Bullock, 638 N.W.2d 728, 734-35 (Iowa 2002) (noting the ripeness doctrine exists to "prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements").
Here, we are not dealing with the denial of a request by Charles to adopt under chapter 600. Rather, we are presented simply with the question of the propriety of a denial of a motion for concurrent jurisdiction under chapter 232. Charles did not seek to adopt the children under chapter 600, but specifically sought concurrent jurisdiction of the district court to pursue a guardianship of the children. Furthermore, the court expressly denied any reliance on section 600.8 and Charles's criminal history in its denial of Charles's motion; rather, it supported its ruling based on the best interests of the children. Therefore, because section 600.8 is not implicated by either the procedural posture of this case or the juvenile court's ruling, the question is merely hypothetical, and we do not reach the constitutional issues raised in this appeal.
We affirm the juvenile court's conclusion that it is in the best interests of these children to deny concurrent jurisdiction.