Opinion
1010 WDA 2023 1011 WDA 2023 1012 WDA 2023 1013 WDA 2023 J-S46017-23
02-06-2024
IN RE: B.D.B., A MINOR APPEAL OF: P.B., MOTHER IN RE: B.P.B., A MINOR APPEAL OF: P.B., MOTHER IN RE: B.J.B., A MINOR APPEAL OF: P.B., MOTHER IN RE: B.P.B., A MINOR APPEAL OF: P.B., MOTHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered August 2, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Orphans' Court at No(s): 42-2023-0016, 42-23-0017, 42-23-0018, 42-23-0019
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM
MURRAY, J.
P.B. (Mother) appeals from the orders granting the petitions of the McKean County Office of Children & Youth (the Agency or CYS), and involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights to B.D.B. (a son born in June 2019), B.P.B. (a son born in June 2018), B.J.B. (a daughter born in April 2015), and B.P.B. (a son born in April 2016) (collectively, the Children). After careful consideration, we affirm.
The Children's father, B.B. (Father), voluntarily relinquished his parental rights on March 16, 2023. Father is not a party to this appeal.
The orphans' court explained the events that brought the family to CYS's attention:
On January 14, 2021, … CYS[] received a report that Mother threw a sippy cup at B[.J.B.'s] head[,] causing a black eye. On January 14, 2021, CYS caseworkers Mary Dunkle and Lisa Knapp went to the Kane School District to interview B[.J.B.] regarding said report. B[.J.B.] stated that the black eye was due to Mother throwing a sippy cup at her. Caseworker Dunk[le] and Caseworker Knapp then went to Mother's home to speak with the
family. [B.J.B.'s older brother, B.L.B., was outside of the home and stated that Mother threw a sippy cup at [B.J.B]. Mother saw the Caseworkers speaking with B[.L.B.] and became upset. Father then arrived and entered the home. Caseworkers could hear voices from inside the home. Father then exited with a vacuum cleaner and left in his vehicle. Mother exited and refused the Caseworkers access to the home or the Children. The Caseworkers then contacted supervisors and the local police for assistance.
Mother continued to refuse Caseworkers to enter and refused police entrance as well. CYS contacted the court for an emergency verbal custody order to remove the Children from the home. [The Honorable John H.] Pavlock granted said request and issued a verbal custody order granting CYS custody of … [the] Children.
* * *
Mother continued to refuse CYS or police access to the home or Children. She placed the Children in front of the door so that police could not forcibly enter. Once police gained access to the home, Mother was placed under arrest for an outstanding bench warrant in Crawford County, PA related to possession of drug paraphernalia. One of the Children handed a pipe to an officer and stated that it belonged to Mother.
[The] Children were taken to Bradford Regional Medical Center for evaluations on January 15, 2021. Initial examination indicated that the Children would need further testing but neither [Mother nor Father (Parents)] could be reached to give necessary consents. CYS then obtained a Court Order to permit further testing. Four [] of the Children had bruising and contusions. [B.J.B.] … was vomiting and had a black eye. … [B.J.B.] had a shard of glass in one foot and multiple bruises on her body. [B.P.B. (born 6/18)] … had a puncture wound on the bottom of one foot, a blister on the other foot, a wound on his wrist, and other scratches and bruises. [B.D.B.] … had a swollen ankle and leg. On January 19, 2021, a piece of plastic was found imbedded
in [B.D.B.'s] foot and was subsequently removed. [B.P.B. (born 4/16)] … had scratches and bruises on his face and back.
B.L.B. is the Children's oldest sibling. Though B.L.B. was also placed in CYS's care as the same time as the Children, he is not implicated in this appeal. B.L.B. opposed termination of Mother's parental rights. N.T., 6/26/23, at 55.
Orphans' Court Opinion, 3/30/21, at 1-2 (footnote added; formatting and some capitalization modified).
On January 25, 2021, CYS filed emergency dependency petitions seeking custody of the Children. After conducting multiple days of dependency hearings, the orphans' court adjudicated the Children dependent on March 30, 2021. The court ordered Mother to, inter alia, (1) obtain updated drug and alcohol evaluations and follow through with all recommended treatment and counseling; (2) comply with random drug testing; (3) obtain updated mental health evaluations and follow through with all recommended treatment; and (4) cooperate with CYS and service providers. In its August 2, 2023, memorandum and order, the orphans' court competently explained the relevant history that occurred after the orphans' court adjudicated the Children dependent in March 2021. See Memorandum and Order (B.J.B.), 8/2/23, at 5-7. We adopt the court's recitation as though fully stated herein.See id.
On January 20, 2023, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights (TPR petitions) to each of the Children, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). CYS claimed that termination of Mother's parental rights was appropriate, where "[t]hroughout the course of the dependency proceedings, … [Mother has] failed to perform [her] parental duties" and "she has been unable to make progress through her services to be able to provide care" for the Children. TPR Petition, 1/20/23, ¶ 21. CYS further asserted the Children's "developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare are best promoted" by termination of Mother's parental rights. Id. ¶ 22.
The Children had been out of Mother's custody for nearly two years at the time of filing the TPR petitions.
The orphans' court held evidentiary hearings on the TPR petitions on May 15, 2023, May 19, 2023, and June 26, 2023 (TPR hearings). B.D.B. and B.P.B. (born 6/18) have been placed with their foster family, the Glogaus, since June 17, 2021. B.P.B. (born 4/16) and B.J.B. have been placed with a kinship family, the Oaks, since August 9, 2021. Again, the orphans' court thoroughly detailed the testimony from the various witnesses at the TPR hearings in its August 2, 2023, memorandum and order, as well as Mother's mental health and substance abuse histories. See Memorandum and Order (B.J.B.), 8/2/23, at 7-25. Our review confirms the orphans' court's exhaustive summation, and any further summary by this Court would be redundant. Thus, we incorporate the orphans' court's recitation as though fully stated herein. See id.
Both the Glogaus and the Oaks have expressed their desire to adopt the respective children in their care, if possible.
The orphans' court issued a substantially identical description of this history in its respective memoranda and orders filed for each child. The primary differences in the respective memoranda concern the TPR hearing testimonies of two CYS employees: case aide Chelsea Lekana and caseworker Sarah Glover. Both Ms. Lekana and Ms. Glover observed visits between Mother and the Children, and testified about how the Children are doing in their respective placements. Ms. Lekana testified to observing B.J.B. and B.P.B. (born 4/16) interact with their kinship family, the Oaks, on multiple occasions. N.T., 5/19/23, at 22-23. According to Ms. Lekana, B.J.B. and B.P.B. are bonded with the Oaks and turn to the Oaks for their needs and comfort. Id. at 23. Ms. Glover testified that she observed B.D.B. and B.P.B. (born 6/18) interact with their foster family, the Glogaus. N.T., 5/19/23, at 62-63. According to Ms. Glover, B.D.B. and B.P.B. are bonded with the Glogaus and have expressed a desire to remain in the Gloagau home. Id. at 73-74.
The orphans' court appointed Megan C. Willey, Esquire (Legal Counsel), as legal counsel for B.P.B. (born 4/16), B.D.B., and B.J.B. Legal Counsel asserts on appeal that B.D.B. and B.P.B., due to their young ages, "were unable to form a subjective, articulable preference" with respect to termination of Mother's parental rights. Legal Counsel Brief at 6. Accordingly, Legal Counsel advanced her argument "solely on behalf of B.J.B." Id.
The orphans' court appointed Gregory Henry, Esquire, to represent the legal interests of B.P.B. (born 6/18). Attorney Henry stated at the TPR hearing that six-year-old B.P.B. "was unable to give me a consistent answer with respect to where he desired to live…." N.T., 6/26/23, at 57. Attorney Henry opined B.P.B. lacked the "ability to make … an intelligent or consistent decision" as to his desired placement. Id. at 58. Attorney Henry has not filed an appellate brief.
On August 2, 2023, the orphans' court issued orders terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and a contemporaneous concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), at each docket. On September 13, 2023, the orphans' court issued Rule 1925(a) opinions as to each of the Children. One week later, this Court sua sponte consolidated Mother's appeals. Order, 9/20/23 (stating the separate appeals "involve related parties and issues."). Mother presents seven issues for review:
The orphans' court did not terminate Mother's parental rights with respect to her oldest child, B.L.B., who is not implicated in this appeal.
I. Whether the Trial Court erred or committed an abuse of discretion in terminating [Mother]'s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?
II. Whether the Trial Court erred or committed an abuse of discretion in terminating [Mother]'s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)?
III. Whether the Trial Court erred or committed an abuse of discretion in terminating [Mother]'s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)?
IV. Whether the Trial Court erred or committed an abuse of discretion in terminating [Mother]'s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)?
V. Whether the Trial Court erred or committed an abuse of discretion by failing to consider Mother's substantial progress from January 20, 2022, until the filing of the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights on January 20, 2023, when granting the Agency's Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights?
VI. Whether the Trial Court erred or committed an abuse of discretion in terminating [Mother]'s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
VII. Whether the Trial Court erred or committed an abuse of discretion by allowing Agency's caseworker to testify as an expert witness under Pa.R.E. 702 without the caseworker being qualified as an expert?Mother's Brief at 4-5 (footnote added; issues reordered).
Mother withdrew her seventh issue. Mother's Brief at 25 (conceding the claim is "frivolous").
We review the termination of parental rights for an abuse of discretion. In the Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1104 (Pa. 2023). This standard of review requires appellate courts to
accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] discussed in [In re:] R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)], there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review…. [U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead, we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some citations omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.In re B.J.Z., 207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted). "The standard of 'clear and convincing' evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1004 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted). Finally, this Court need only agree with the orphans' court as to "any one subsection of [Section] 2511(a), in addition to [Section] 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights." In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Instantly, we examine Mother's challenge pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide:
(a)General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent[,] by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition[,] either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.* * *
(b)Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
Accordingly, we do not address Mother's issues numbered II - IV, which implicate other subsections of Section 2511(a). See In re T.S.M., supra.
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(1), "the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties." In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 706-07 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998) ("Section 2511 does not require that the parent demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform parental duties." (underline omitted)).
We have explained that in applying Section 2511(a)(1),
[t]he court should consider the entire background of the case and not simply … mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of h[er] parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations and ellipses omitted). However, the General Assembly's emphasis on the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition indicates the timeframe is the "most critical period for evaluation" of a parent's conduct. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 592 (Pa. 2021).
Regarding the definition of "parental duties," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained,
our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and support. Parental duties are carried out through affirmative actions that develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and association. The performance of parental duties requires that a parent exert [herself] to take and maintain a place of importance in the child's life. Fortitude is required, as a parent must act with "reasonable firmness" to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of preserving a parent-child relationship and may not wait for a more suitable time to perform parental responsibilities.Id. (citations, some quotation marks, and brackets omitted). "Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances." In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004).
[A] parent's basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child's right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment. A parent cannot protect h[er] parental rights by merely stating that [s]he does not wish to have h[er] rights terminated.Id. at 856 (citations omitted).
Here, Mother claims the orphans' court erred in determining that CYS met the requirements for terminating her parental rights, under Section 2511(a)(1), by clear and convincing evidence. See Mother's Brief at 11-16. According to Mother,
[i]n the six months immediately preceding the Agency filing the petition to terminate parental rights on January 20, 2023, the evidence has not shown Mother had a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to [Children] or had refused or failed to perform her parental duties. The evidence in the record shows that Mother continued to have contact with [Children], including regularly scheduling, confirming, and preparing for visits by preparing meals and activities for her children, as allowed by the Agency.Id. at 12. Mother emphasizes she "has obtained and maintained sobriety since January of 2022," i.e., one year before CYS filed its TPR petitions. Id. at 13. According to Mother, she "worked with the Agency, was engaged with her own as well as [Children's] mental health services, and was pro-active in seeking out other services." Id. at 13-14.
Mother further maintains she "demonstrated her willingness and ability to perform her parental duties by engaging with parenting skills services." Id. at 14. In support, Mother primarily relies upon the TPR hearing testimony of counselor Bonnie Wilson. Id. at 15.
Ms. Wilson testified that she supervised seven visits between Mother and Children, in Ms. Wilson's role as Mother's "parents as teachers" counselor. N.T., 5/19/23, at 183-85. According to Ms. Wilson, Mother has made progress over the visits and has expressed a willingness to employ new parenting skills. Id. at 185; see also id. at 186 (Ms. Wilson testifying that Mother "has been one of the easiest parents to work with."). On cross-examination, however, Ms. Wilson conceded that she has only been involved with Mother since January 2023. Id. at 186-87.
CYS counters it proved the requirements of Section 2511(a)(1) by clear and convincing evidence. See CYS Brief at 13-15. According to CYS, at the time it filed the TPR petitions,
the [C]hildren had been out of Mother's care for a few days less than two years. For most of the first year following the removal of the [C]hildren[,] Mother had no contact with them. While during the second year[,] Mother made progress with respect to her drug use, she failed to make progress with her mental health[,] which negatively impacted her parenting ability.Id. at 14-15 (footnote omitted). Likewise, Legal Counsel agrees with CYS and emphasizes that the orphans' court
had the opportunity to examine Mother's conduct … for almost two years. Over the course of those two years, Mother failed to perform parental duties as a result of her various incarceration[s], repetitive drug use, and failure to treat significant mental health diagnoses.Legal Counsel Brief at 12.
The orphans' court determined CYS met the requirements for termination under Section 2511(a)(1) by clear and convincing evidence:
Since January of 2021[,] when … [the Children] were removed from Mother's care, she has refused to follow her mental health treatment plan. [Mother] cannot accept that she put the Children at risk when they were in her care and she needs to improve her parenting skills[. Thus], she remains unable to provide the Children with proper parental care. She is unable and[]/or unwilling to make any meaningful change.Memorandum and Order (B.J.B.), 8/2/23, at 34 (some capitalization modified); see also id. (orphans' court finding, "the record demonstrates that Mother has made no progress regarding her parenting skills. She still reverts to physical assault and threats of assault.").
The orphans' court further elaborated:
In 2022[,] Mother made progress regarding her addiction to non-prescribed controlled substances. She had been incarcerated in Warren County and, after it was discovered she had methamphetamine concealed on her person, she was transferred to inpatient treatment to address a mental health crisis and her addiction. She was discharged in January of 2022. She obtained a "CRNP Evaluation" at the Guidance Center. Previously, and on 4 occasions, she had been discharged from treatment at the Guidance Center for lack of attendance and follow through. On this fifth occasion[, Mother] remained in treatment and attended her appointments. After February of 2022, she had negative drug screens. Mother's progress and her abstinence from drug use is a positive factor. However, the mental health issues and diagnosis Mother has, and[] her consistent refusal to accept that her parenting skills are inadequate and refusal to recognize the need for change and improvement, as well has her inability to control the Children and their behaviors, outweigh Mother's progress regarding her substance use and addiction….
Although Mother has made progress regarding her addiction, she has not made progress addressing her mental health condition and the negative impact it has on her parenting. As Dr. [Peter] von Korf[f] found, Mother has a "rigid, self-assured state. She has difficulty getting over that." The dependency case commenced due to Mother being unable to provide proper parental care and control for … [the Children]. She had hit one of the Children with a sippy cup causing injury[,] and several of the other Children had injuries. [Mother] would not allow CYS into her home and placed the Children in front of the door to prevent the police from entering. She was found to need mental health treatment and counseling and ordered to follow through with treatment. She has failed to do so.
At least 4 times[, Mother] was evaluated, began treatment and was then discharged due to lack of follow through. The past trauma the Children have been through, including seeing Mother and Father repeatedly verbally and physically attack one another, has had bearing on their behavior and stability. The[ Children] all have serious behavioral issues and need treatment. Their behavior has improved in their foster homes, but they still have significant struggles. Mother cannot handle the Children. They do not respect her authority and visits have always been extremely chaotic. Mother, due to her own mental health issues and traumatic past, cannot comprehend and implement new skills to improve her parenting and control of the Children. Instead, she reverts to engrained approaches, such as threatening the Children with physical discipline[,] which has not worked. Again, her use of her shoe to try and get … [B.J.B.] to say something damaging about [her] foster parents is very troubling as it shows that Mother will physically assault the Children in the future and her focus is always on her needs and not on the Children.Memorandum and Order, 8/2/23, at 31-34 (footnote and emphasis added; some capitalization modified).
The orphans' court detailed the volatile relationship between Mother and Father and traumatic incidents the Children witnessed. See Memorandum and Order (B.J.B.), 8/2/23, at 1-3.
Our review confirms that the orphans' court's findings are amply supported by the record. Thus, we discern no error in the orphans' court's determination that CYS proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was warranted under section 2511(a)(1), where Mother failed to perform parental duties for at least six months prior to CYS's filing of the TPR petition in January 2023. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (stating appellate courts "must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record," and "as is often the case in … termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court" and disturb its ruling absent an error of law or an abuse of discretion). Mother's challenge to termination of her parental rights as to each of the Children, under section 2511(a)(1), is without merit.
Before reaching Section 2511(b), we address Mother's issue "V," wherein she claims that the orphans' court "failed to appropriately consider Mother's progress in alleviating the conditions giving rise to dependency from January 20, 2022," until CYS filed its TPR petitions one year later. Mother's Brief at 23-24.
CYS and Legal Counsel counter the orphans' court, in fact, explicitly considered Mother's progress. See CYS Brief at 27-29; Legal Counsel Brief at 18 (claiming the orphans' court considered "that Mother had negative drug screens, attended visits, and had maintained contact with CYS."). According to CYS,
[g]iven that the same [orphans' court] judge presided over the permanency review hearing[s] in the dependency case and the termination case[,] and that the record is replete with the [orphans'] court's findings regarding its consideration of Mother's progress over the last two years, the [orphans'] court had the opportunity to fully consider [Mother's] progress.CYS Brief at 28 (some capitalization modified).
The record belies Mother's claim and supports the position of CYS and Legal Counsel. It is undisputed that Mother has admirably made some recent progress regarding drug/alcohol treatment and her abstinence from those substances. The orphans' court repeatedly and expressly acknowledged the progress that Mother had made after the TPR petitions were filed. See, e.g., Memorandum and Order (B.J.B.), 8/2/23, at 6 (finding, "Mother had made some progress. She had negative drug screens, had attended visits and had maintained contact with CYS."), id. ("Since Mother had made some progress, CYS recommended that visits with Mother be increased."), and id. at 31 ("Although Mother has made some progress regarding her addiction, she has not made progress addressing her mental health condition and the negative impact it has on her parenting."). Accordingly, this claim lacks merit.
Having found that the orphans' court did not abuse its discretion in determining that CYS proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother's parental rights was warranted pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), we address Mother's final issue: whether the involuntary termination of her parental rights was in the Children's best interests, pursuant to Section 2511(b). See Mother's Brief at 22-23; see also In re T.S.M., supra. When the court finds grounds for termination under Section 2511(a), it must separately consider the child's needs and welfare:
The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. ...23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
Our Supreme Court has stated that "to meet its burden, the party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination best serves the child's needs and welfare" under subsection 2511(b). In the Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1114. The K.T. Court emphasized that "courts should consider the matter from the child's perspective, placing [their] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent." Id. at 1105. "Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child." In re A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 444 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).
"Courts must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond." K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also A.H., 247 A.3d at 444 (stating the "extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case." (citation omitted)). However, "the parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b) analysis." K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113 (emphasis added); see also In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (a parent's bond with a child is "only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the termination of parental rights." (citations omitted)). The subsection (b) analysis "includes a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child's developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare." K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113 (emphasis added). The question is not merely whether a bond exists, but whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary, and beneficial relationship. Id. at 1109-11 (collecting cases and stating that "[i]t is only a necessary and beneficial bond … that should be maintained when Section 2511(b) mandates the child's needs and welfare are of 'primary' importance.").
In analyzing Section (b), courts must also consider important factors such as: (1) "the child's need for permanency and length of time in foster care"; (2) "whether the child is in a pre-adoptive home and bonded with foster parents"; and (3) whether the foster home meets the child's needs, "including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability." Id. at 1113. Finally, this Court has stated that a child "has a right to a stable, safe, and healthy environment in which to grow, and the child's life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting." In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, Mother claims the orphans' court abused its discretion in determining that CYS met its burden of proving termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests. See Mother's Brief at 22-23. According to Mother, the orphans' court "wrongfully concluded that there were not sufficient bonds worth preserving between Mother and [the Children], and failed to adequately weigh the effects of their severance." Id. at 22. Mother claims that the "testimony at the [TPR] hearing demonstrates that the [C]hildren and their Mother share close parental ties." Id. at 23.
CYS counters the orphans' court properly determined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests. See CYS Brief at 22-26. CYS claims the orphans' court "correctly equally emphasized the safety needs of the [C]hildren, and also considered the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability" that the Children have in their respective kinship and foster placements. Id. at 26.
Legal Counsel agrees with CYS. See Legal Counsel Brief at 16-18. With respect to B.J.B. (age 8), Legal Counsel asserts the orphans' court "correctly concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights as to B.J.B. is in the child's best interest…." Id. at 18. Legal Counsel argues, "Even assuming that B.J.B's bond with Mother existed and was positive, … the loss of that parental bond does not trump the need for stability and permanency that the foster family can give B.J.B." Id.
With respect to B.D.B., the orphans' court found the clear and convincing evidence established that termination of Mother's parental rights was in his best interests. See Orphans' Court 1925(a) Statement (B.D.B.), 9/13/23, at 6-11. The orphans' court competently analyzed the factors discussed in K.T. and found the "facts in this case are similar to those in … K.T." Id. at 8-9; see also id. at 2-6 (discussing the particular facts of K.T.). The record supports the orphans' court's findings, and we discern no error in its conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of B.D.B. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orphans' court's termination of Mother's parental rights as to B.D.B. See id. at 6-11.
With respect to B.J.B., the orphans' court found termination of Mother's parental rights was in her best interests, and CYS proved the requirements of Section 2511(b) by clear and convincing evidence. See Orphans' Court 1925(a) Statement (B.J.B.), 9/13/23, at 6-11. The record supports the orphans' court's reasoning and legal analysis that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of B.J.B. We adopt the orphans' court's reasoning and conclusion, as stated in its opinion, and affirm the termination of Mother's parental rights as to B.J.B. See id.
With respect to B.P.B. (born 6/18), the orphans' court found termination of Mother's parental rights was in his best interests, and CYS proved the requirements of Section 2511(b) by clear and convincing evidence. See Orphans' Court 1925(a) Statement (B.P.B. - born 6/18), 9/13/23, at 6-11. The record supports the orphans' court's reasoning and legal analysis that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of B.P.B. We adopt the orphans' court's sound reasoning and conclusion, as stated in its opinion, and affirm the termination of Mother's parental rights as to B.P.B. See id.
With respect to B.P.B. (born 4/16), the orphans' court found termination of Mother's parental rights was in his best interests, and CYS proved the requirements of Section 2511(b) by clear and convincing evidence. See Orphans' Court 1925(a) Statement (B.P.B. - born 4/16), 9/13/23, at 6-11. The record supports the orphans' court's reasoning and legal analysis that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of B.P.B. We adopt the orphans' court's sound reasoning and conclusion, as stated in its opinion, and affirm the termination of Mother's parental rights as to B.P.B. See id.
In sum, the record confirms that the Children are bonded with their respective foster/kinship families, who have been providing for all of the Children's needs for over 2½ years. Even if, arguendo, any of the Children have a bond with Mother, such bond is not necessary and beneficial to the Children. K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. Our review reveals no abuse of discretion or error by the orphans' court in terminating Mother's parental rights under
Section 2511(b). For the above reasons, we affirm the orders terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children.
Orders affirmed.