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concluding that it would be unwise to and inappropriate to review voluntary reaffirmation agreements when they are accompanied with an attorney declaration
Summary of this case from In re MelendezOpinion
Case No. 97-13034-SSM
November 12, 1997
Barry R. Lenk, Leckey, Lenk Luketina, McLean, VA, for the debtor
Scott A. Surovell, Fairfax, VA, for Sally W. Bauer and Michael Bauer
Graham Huston, Huston Angus, Arlington, VA, for Apple Federal Credit Union
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on the objection of Sally W. Bauer and Michael Bauer, the debtor' former wife and minor child, to the debtor's reaffirmation agreements with Apple Credit Federal Credit Union ("Apple") and Countrywide Home Loans ("Countrywide".). A hearing was held on October 28, 1997 at which evidence was presented and argument was heard. Present at the hearing were counsel for the debtor, counsel for the objecting parties, and counsel for Apple.
Apple filed a response to the Bauers's objection that simply states that "[t]he Reaffirmation Agreement executed by the parties is secured by an asset owned by the debtor. There is no basis to invalidate the Agreement." Countrywide neither filed a response to the objection nor appeared at the hearing.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement to consider whether persons entitled to support from the debtor have standing to object to the debtor's reaffirmation agreements, and if so, whether the reaffirmation agreements in this case should be disapproved as not being in the debtor's best interest and imposing a hardship on the debtor's dependents. Because the Bankruptcy Code does not require court "approval" where a debtor reaffirms a consumer debt secured by real estate, and because the facts do not otherwise present the type of extraordinary circumstances that would justify exercise of the court's equitable powers to prevent an abuse of the bankruptcy system or to protect rights arising under the Bankruptcy Code, the objection will be overruled.
Facts
Thomas G. Bauer (the "debtor"), filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in this court on April 23, 1997. The meeting of creditors under § 341, Bankruptcy Code, was held on May 21, 1997, and on June 6, 1997, the trustee filed a report of no distribution. The debtor has not yet been granted a discharge.
The debtor's schedules reflect that he has an ownership interest, as tenant by the entireties, in real property that is his principal residence located at 3214 Valley Lane, Falls Church, Virginia, which he values as $550,000. His schedule — ("Creditors Holding secured Claims") reflects that Countrywide Home Loans holds a first lien deed of trust against that property in the amount of $460,000. The debtor's schedules reflect that he also owns a townhouse located at 6179 Vine Forest Court, Falls Church, Virginia, again held as tenants by the entireties, which he values as $190,000. The debtor's schedules reflect that Apple holds a first lien deed of trust against this property in the amount of $142,000, and that Commerce Funding Corporation holds a second lien deed of trust in the amount of $31,000 Both properties were claimed exempt on Schedule C ("Property Claimed Exempt"). Neither creditor has filed a proof of claim. Finally, the debtor's schedule I ("Current Income") reflects $0 in monthly income while schedule J ("Current Expenditures") reflects monthly expenses of $5,494.
At the hearing, counsel for the debtor informed the court that the property located at 6179 Vine Forest Court, Falls Church, Virginia, is a rental property and that the income and expenses generated by the property" approximate — each other. The debtor's schedules I ("Current Income") and J ("Current Expenditures"), however, do not list any income or expenses on this property. The debtor lists a monthly mortgage payment of $1,934, which is exactly one-half of $3,868, the monthly mortgage payment on the 3214 Valley Lane, Falls Church, Virginia, property. The amount listed as a mortgage payment "$1,934" is consistent with the schedules since the debtor did not file jointly with his current wife — who the court assumes to be the co-owner of the property and co-obligor on the debt D and does not list her income on his schedules.
The debtor has not entered into a reaffirmation agreement with Commerce Funding.
The debtor is president and sole shareholder of tgB, Inc., a chapter 11 debtor in this court.
On July 15, 1997, a reaffirmation agreement between the debtor and Countrywide was filed, reaffirming a debt in the principal amount of $455,614.54, payable in monthly installments of $3,868. On August 8, 1997, a reaffirmation agreement with Apple was filed that reaffirmed a debt in the principal amount of $141,528.74, to be paid in semi-monthly installments of $478.98. Both reaffirmation agreements contained a declaration by the debtor's attorney that, among other things, certified that the agreement was in the debtor's best interest and would not impose a hardship on the debtor or the debtor's dependents. At the hearing, debtor's counsel represented that the debtor's present wife was currently making the payments on both loans, and that the debtor wanted to enter into the reaffirmation agreements to be in a "legal position to deal with the debt" if his current wife's job were to falter and "to maintain a good relationship with the bank."
As noted above, the objecting parties, Sally W. Bauer and Michael Bauer, are the debtor's former wife, and his son, respectively. The debtor's schedules list Ms. Bauer as owed two separate debts, one in the amount of $87,324 for "alimony from 8/96 through 5/01," and the other in the amount of $18,150 for an" agreement incident to divorce "child support from 8/96 through 5/99." The debtor's son is not separately listed as a creditor.
Both debts are listed as non-priority unsecured debts. However, this is plainly wrong, as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 conferred priority status on debts for alimony and child support. See, § 507(a)(7), Bankruptcy Code. Ms. Bauer has filed an adversary proceeding, No. 97-1245, seeking a determination that these amounts are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5) and (a)(15), Bankruptcy Code. A trial of this action has been set for February 5, 1998.
On September 24, 1997, Ms. Bauer and her son filed the objection that is presently before the court. In their objection, they assert that the debtor is obligated to make monthly payments of $450 for child support and $1,532 for spousal support and that the debtor has failed to make these payments since August 1996. They further allege that they are owed $32,248 in support arrearages. They object to the debtor reaffirming debts totaling $4,825.96 per month while failing to pay them or to make up the arrears owed them.
No evidence was offered as to the actual amount of the arrearages, and the court expressly makes no finding.
At the hearing, Sally Bauer testified that she is the debtor's former wife, and that he ceased making the spousal and child support payments in September 1996. She also testified that she and the debtor have joint custody of their son Michael, but that Michael lives with her "100% of the time." She added that she currently makes approximately $65,000 annually and that she presently provides health insurance for her son because she was having difficulties being reimbursed by the debtor when he provided the health insurance. She testified that her son has very significant health problems that have caused her to incur approximately $53,000 in medical expenses.
Conclusions of Law A.
This court has jurisdiction of this controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 157(a) and the general order of reference entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on August 15, 1984. Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), this is a core proceeding in which final orders and judgments may be entered by a bankruptcy judge, subject to the right of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
B.
A discharge granted under § 727(a), Bankruptcy Code "operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any [discharged] debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived" § 0524(a)(2), Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added). Thus, actions to collect a pre-petition debt as a personal liability of the debtor are barred after the granting of a discharge by the discharge injunction, unless the debt is one of a limited category of debts excepted from discharge. Discharge of an otherwise dischargeable debt, however, may be effectively "waived" if the debtor enters into a reaffirmation agreement with the creditor which satisfies the requirements of §§ 524(c) and (d), Bankruptcy Code. In re Turner, 208 B.R. 434, 437 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1997); In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. 382, 386 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996). Strict compliance with the requirements of § 524 is necessary because of the concern that creditors will improperly coerce debtors into making unwise reaffirmation agreements that could compromise the debtor's fresh start. Hovestadt, 193 B.R. at 386; In re Pendlebury, 94 B.R. 120, 124 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988); In re Roth, 38 B.R. 531, 535 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 43 B.R. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1984); In re Jenkins, 4 B.R. 651, 652 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980) (Bonney, J.); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy § 524.04, at 524-29 to 30 (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th ed. rev. 1997). Briefly, the requirements for an enforceable reaffirmation agreement are as follows:
1. The agreement was entered into before the debtor was granted a discharge. § 523(c)(1).
2. The agreement contains a "clear and conspicuous" statement advising the debtor that it may be rescinded any time prior to discharge or within sixty days after it is filed with the court, whichever occurs later. § 523(c)(2)(A).
3. The agreement contains a [c]lear and conspicuous' statement that the agreement is not required by the Bankruptcy Code, by nonbankruptcy law, or by any agreement not meeting the requirements of § 523(c). § 523(c)(2)(B).
4. The agreement has been filed with the court. § 523(c)(3).
5. The debtor has not rescinded the agreement within the rescission period. § 523(c)(4).
6. If the debtor was represented by an attorney during the course of negotiating the agreement, the agreement is accompanied by the attorney's declaration or affidavit stating that the agreement represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the debtor; that it "does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor" (emphasis added); and that the attorney has fully advised the debtor of the legal effect and consequences of the agreement and of any default under the agreement. § 523(c)(3).
7. If the debtor was not represented by an attorney during the course of negotiation the agreement, the court has held a hearing at which the debtor has appeared in person, and the court has properly advised the debtor concerning the voluntary nature of such agreements and the legal consequences of the agreement and of any default, and "but only" the consideration for such agreement is based in whole or in part on a consumer debt that is not secured by real property of the debtor" (emphasis added) "the court also determines that the agreement does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and is in the best interest of the debtor. §§ 524(c)(5), (c)(6) and (d).
Perhaps because it has been many times amended, § 524, Bankruptcy Code, is not an example of clear legislative draftsmanship. In particular, some of the language in § 523(c), with respect to the requirement of court approval, duplicates similar language in § 523(d), albeit with slightly different emphasis. The full text of the relevant provisions is as follows:
(c) An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title is enforceable only to any extent enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived, only id
* * *
(5) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section have been complied with; and
(6)(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not represented by an attorney during the course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, the court approves such agreement as —
(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor.
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the extent that such debt is a consumer debt secured by real property.
(d) In a case concerning an individual, when the court has determined whether to grant or not to grant a discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, the court may hold a hearing at which the debtor shall appear in person. At any hearing, the court shall inform the debtor that discharge has been granted or the reason why a discharge has not been granted. If a discharge has been granted and if the debtor desires to make an agreement of the kind specified in subsection (c) of this section and was not represented by an attorney during the course of negotiating such agreement, then the court shall hold a hearing at which the debtor shall appear in person and at such hearing the court shall D
(1) inform the debtor —
(A) that such an agreement is not required under this title, under nonbankruptcy law, or under any agreement not made in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c)(6) of this section; and
(B) of the legal effect and consequences of —
(i) an agreement of the kind specified in subsection (c) of this section; and
(ii) a default under such an agreement; and
(2) determine whether the agreement that the debtor desires to make complies with the requirements of subsection (c)(6) of this section, if the consideration for such agreement is based in whole or in part on a consumer debt that is not secured by real property of the debtor.
(emphasis added).
Under the plain language of the statute, the only circumstance under which bankruptcy court approval, as such, is required in order for a reaffirmation agreement to be legally binding is when the debtor "was not represented by an attorney during the course of negotiating [the] agreement," and even then, approval is not required "to the extent that such debt is a consumer debt secured by real property," although the court is still required to advise the debtor of the voluntary character of the agreement and of its legal effect and consequences. § 524(c)(6) and (d)(1).
C.
The threshold issue the court must reach is whether a person other than the debtor has standing to be heard on the issue of reaffirmation. The courts have consistently held that the creditor whose claim the debtor proposes to reaffirm has no standing to request, contest, or impose a reaffirmation agreement on the debtor, since the execution of a reaffirmation agreement is purely a voluntary choice on the part of the debtor. See McClellan Federal Credit Union v. Parker (In re Parker), 193 B.R. 525, 527-28 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the creditor has no standing to prosecute an appeal of a bankruptcy court's order denying approval of the debtor's reaffirmation agreement with that creditor); In re Farmer, 13 B.R. 319, 319-20 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (holding that the creditor has no standing to present evidence at a hearing on approval of reaffirmation agreement); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy § 524.04, at 524-30. If the creditor whose claim the debtor is thinking of reaffirming lacks standing to be heard, it is hard to see how some other creditor could have standing, even if that other creditor's claim would survive discharge, and the reaffirmation of the one debt might adversely affect the debtor's ability to pay the other.
Here, though, the objecting parties, if they have standing at all, have it not because they are creditors but because they are "dependents" of the debtor. Under both § 524(c)(3)(B) (if the debtor is represented by an attorney) or § 524(c)(6)(A)(i) (if the debtor is pro se), a reaffirmation agreement is enforceable only if the attorney certifies, or the court determines, that it does not impose "an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor[.]" (Emphasis added). The term "dependent" is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code.
Oddly enough, as the statute is drafted, the attorney's certification that the agreement will not impose a hardship is required for the reaffirmation of any debt, while court determination that the agreement will not impose a hardship is required only where the debt is not a consumer debt secured by real property.
If the court had to reach the issue of whether Congress intended the term "dependent," as used in § 524, to encompass a former spouse or a child to whom the debtor owes a duty of support, the court could look to see how it is defined in other statutes, or could simply infer that Congress intended the term to have its normal, everyday meaning. See Field v. Mans, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 437, 443, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) ("It is . . . well established that" [w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.'") (original sources omitted) (alteration and omission in original); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2054, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993) ("When a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning."), reh'g denied, 509 U.S. 940, 114 S.Ct. 13, 125 L.Ed.2d 765 (1993).
For example, the Internal Revenue Code defines a "dependent" as any of a certain list of enumerated individuals "over half of whose support . . . was received by the taxpayer." I.R.C. § 152(a). This definition is expressly incorporated by reference in various other statutes, at least suggesting that Congress intended the term to have the same meaning under a broad spectrum of statutory contexts. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7342(a)(1)(G) (Receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations); 33 U.S.C. § 909(d) (Death benefits under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers "Compensation Act); 43 U.S.C. § 390bb(4) (Reclamation and irrigation of lands by Federal Government). In this connection, the court notes that under the Internal Revenue Code, any payments to a spouse that is alimony or falls under a "divorce or separation instrument" "shall not be treated as a payment by [the spouse] for the support of any dependent." See I.R.C. § 152(b)(4) (incorporating I.R.C. § 71, which includes in gross income amounts received as alimony or separate maintenance payments). However, it could be argued with equal force that since no reference to I.R.C. § 152(a) is made in § 524, Bankruptcy Code, Congress intended the term Diependent "to have its nontechnical, everyday meaning of Ha person who relies on another for support." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 340. Fortunately, the court need not reach the issue.
D.
Even assuming that a debtor's former spouse and minor child are "dependents" within the meaning of the statute, and that, as dependents, they have standing to be heard, the court nevertheless concludes that a plain reading of § 524 precludes this court from disapproving the two reaffirmation agreements on the ground that they might hinder the debtor from paying court-ordered support. When a debtor is represented by an attorney, the language of the statute plainly makes a reaffirmation agreement enforceable without court approval if the debtor's attorney signs a declaration or affidavit complying with § 524(c)(3), and all other requirements are met. See In re Grinnell, 170 B.R. 495, 495-96 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1994); In re Wallace, 102 B.R. 54, 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) (noting that court approval need not be given for a reaffirmation agreement negotiated by debtor's attorney to make it binding, even if the court disagrees with it); see also In re Carey, 51 B.R. 294, 294-95 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1985) (noting in dicta that court approval is not necessary, but then denying approval of the agreement because of the debtor's right to retain the collateral if payments are current). But see In re Izzo, 197 B.R. 11, 12 n. 2 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1996) (concluding that the court may conduct an independent review of reaffirmation agreements, notwithstanding the clear language of statute, due to a "perversion of the reaffirmation provisions of the Code"); In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. 382, 386 (Bankr. D. Mass 1996) (finding an independent obligation to review all reaffirmation agreements); In re Pendlebury, 94 B.R. 120, 124 (Bank. E.D. Tenn. 1988) (stating that the court would not hesitate to "interject itself into the reaffirmation process" in appropriate circumstances).
Subsections 524(c)(2), (3) and (4) were added by The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, effective with respect to cases filed after July 7, 1984. Before that time, the court was required to hold a hearing any time the debtor wished to reaffirm a debt, regardless of whether he or she was represented by counsel.
If the debtor is not represented by an attorney and wishes to enter into a reaffirmation agreement, the court must hold a hearing at which, among other things, it finds that the agreement will not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. § 524(c)(6) and (d)(2), Bankruptcy Code. However, the requirement that the court make such finding is expressly not applicable when the "debt is a consumer debt secured by real property." Thus, judicial inspection of such agreements is limited by the statute's very terms. § 524(c)(6)(B) and (d)(2), Bankruptcy Code; see Midlothian State Bank v. Roth (In re Roth), 43 B.R. 484, 488 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("In cases like this one where the consumer debt is secured by real property, although the Court does not have the power to disapprove the reaffirmation, it must nevertheless admonish the debtor[.]); In re Moore, 50 B.R. 301, 302 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (applying the exception for a consumer debt secured by real property under § 524); In re Smith, 35 B.R. 95, 96 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (same); In re Coots, 4 B.R. 281, 283 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (same); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy § 524.04, at 524-30 ("if the debt is a consumer debt secured by real property, section 524(c)(6)(B) provides that court approval is not required even in cases of individuals not represented by an attorney during the course of negotiating the reaffirmation agreement"); Local Rule 4008-1(C) ("[i]f the reaffirmation agreement is based on a consumer debt not secured by real property of the debtor, the reaffirming debtor or the creditor may, or if the debtor is not represented by an attorney, must request that a reaffirmation hearing be scheduled[.]"); see also In re Jackson, 49 B.R. 298, 302 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985) (applying the same reasoning in dicta). But cf. In re Roth, 38 B.R. 531, 540 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (concluding that court approval is required to affirm the unsecured portion of the claim of an under secured creditor secured in the debtor's real property because the debt is secured by real property under § 506(a) only to the extent of the value of the property), aff'd, 43 B.R. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1984). It is clear that the policy underlying this provision is to remove from court oversight a pro se debtor's personal decision that reaffirming a mortgage debt is in the debtor's best interest and will not interfere with his or her "fresh start." Moore, 50 B.R. at 302; Smith, 35 B.R. at 96.
No argument has been made that the agreements do not comply with the procedural requirements of § 524(c)(1) through (4). Because court approval is not required for any reaffirmation agreement when the debtor is represented by an attorney, the court concludes that it would be unwise and inappropriate to impose its own judgment "where Congress has expressly chosen not to provide for such review" on a reaffirmation agreement that the debtor has freely entered into on the advice of his counsel. This is not to say that, simply because Congress has not required court approval of mortgage reaffirmations, court review is altogether precluded. There well may be exceptional or egregious circumstances where the exercise of the court's equitable powers under § 105(a), Bankruptcy Code, would be appropriate to prevent an abuse of the bankruptcy system or an undermining or circumventing of specific protections provided by the Bankruptcy Code. See Kestell v. Kestell (In re Kestell), 99 F.3d 146, 148-49 (4th Cir. 1996) (Section 105 allows bankruptcy court to issue any order to further or carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code or prevent the use of the Code in an illicit or abusive manner). However, Section 105(a) is not a roving commission to do equity, and the court "equitable powers must be exercised within the framework that Congress has established in the Bankruptcy Code. Stokes v. Firestone (In re Stokes), 198 B.R. 168, 175 (E.D. Va. 1996), citing Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1983). Particularly in light of the fact that Congress chose to require only court advice, but not court approval, for mortgage reaffirmations by pro se debtors, it would be anomalous, to say the least, for the court to inquire" absent the most extraordinary circumstances "into the wisdom of mortgage reaffirmations where the debtor is represented by counsel. Accordingly, the court is constrained to conclude that since the agreements comply with the formal requirements of § 524(c), Bankruptcy Code, and since the requirements of §§ 524(c) and (d) for court approval do not apply and there are no extraordinary circumstances justifying exercise of the court's equitable powers to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy system, this court may not disapprove the reaffirmation agreements simply because the court might think them unwise.
This is not to say that the court has no concern over the possibly too-easy readiness of some attorneys to execute § 524(c)(3) declarations. Obviously, Congress intended that counsel, before signing such a declaration, make a reasonable inquiry into the debtor's financial circumstances and exercise an informed judgment. The duty of inquiry would appear to be especially strong where, as here, the debtor has no current income and very substantial expenses. The court does note, however, that the debtor has earned a good income in the past, and there is no apparent reason he will not again be able to do so in the future. Nevertheless, counsel must consider whether simply maintaining a "good relationship" with the lender, and perhaps being in an improved position to "Heal" with the lender in the future, outweighs the benefit of a chapter 7 discharge with respect to the debt. The debtor in this case is personally obligating himself on almost $600,000 of debt, for which he must pay $4,825.96 per month. Although his current wife is the person actually making those payments at the present time, she could lose her job or become disabled, in which event the lender could proceed against him for the entire amount. In advising a debtor concerning the wisdom of reaffirming a secured debt, counsel should certainly take into account that, although there is a major split of authority among the circuits, controlling Fourth Circuit law holds that a chapter 7 debtor may retain collateral after receiving a discharge without either reaffirming the debt or redeeming the collateral merely by being current and maintaining the monthly installment payments. Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 348-49 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Capital Communications Federal Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), — F.3d —, 1997 WL 564226, at * 10 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 1997); Lowry Federal Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Doss, 203 B.R. 57, 60 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1996); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy § 521.10, at 521-34 to 35, § 524.04[2], at 524-33. But see Johnson v. Sun Finance Co., 89 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. AGE Federal Credit Union, 3 F.3d 1512, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983) (same, but decided before § 521(2) was added to the Code).
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED:
1. The objection by Sally W. Bauer and Michael Bauer to the debtor's reaffirmation agreements with Apple Federal Credit Union and Countrywide Home Loans is OVERRULED.
2. The clerk will mail a copy of this order to counsel for the debtor, counsel for Sally W. Bauer and Michael Bauer, counsel for Apple Federal Credit Union, Countrywide Home Loans, the chapter 7 trustee, and the United States Trustee.