Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Martin W. Staven, Judge, Super. Ct. No. J515921B
IRION, J.
Armando N. appeals from a dispositional order directing him to submit to a psychological evaluation and to undergo random drug testing as part of his court-ordered family reunification plan under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (a). We affirm the order.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Armando N. and J.Z. are the parents of A.Z., born March 2007. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) detained A.Z. at birth and filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged A.Z. was at substantial risk of serious harm because J.Z. had serious mental health problems, including schizophrenia and paranoia, and Armando was unable to protect A.Z. The juvenile court previously had removed J.Z.'s two older children from her custody.
J.Z. is not a party to this appeal.
In reports prepared for the detention, jurisdiction and disposition hearings, the social worker stated A.Z. was at risk because Armando did not understand J.Z.'s mental health issues. Armando acknowledged he had a five-year history of drug addiction that included intravenous heroin use. He had a lengthy and extensive criminal history that included felony and misdemeanor convictions on charges related to grand theft, robbery, armed robbery, multiple charges of burglary, battery, petty theft, drug-related offenses and assault with a deadly weapon. Armando's drug-related offenses dated back to 1991. He was released on parole on March 1, 2005.
The social worker reported that Armando requested custody of A.Z. Armando informed the social worker that his family members were willing to care for A.Z. He would not provide the social worker with the information necessary to start the placement approval process because he was angered by the Agency's requirement for fingerprinting and evaluation of family members. A.Z.'s foster mother described Armando as demanding and rude, and the Agency made arrangements for visitation to take place at a center.
Armando was gentle with A.Z. during supervised visits. He showed J.Z. how to calm the baby by wrapping him in a blanket "burrito style."
At the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing on May 15, 2007, Armando and J.Z. did not contest jurisdiction or A.Z.'s placement in foster care. Armando objected to the Agency's recommendations that he undergo a psychological evaluation and participate in random drug testing as part of his case plan.
Armando testified he was willing to comply with a court-ordered psychological evaluation but did not believe one was necessary because he did not "show any mental illness." He was willing to drug test but he was already submitting to random drug tests as a condition of parole and was also required to undergo random drug tests as a condition of employment. Armando explained that he worked 12 hours a day, seven days a week, and his commute often added several more hours to his schedule. He was taking time off to comply with case plan requirements. Armando was concerned he might lose his job if he had additional absences.
Armando testified he and J.Z. had been together for approximately two years. He did not know she was diagnosed with schizophrenia; he believed she suffered from panic attacks. Armando knew J.Z. used drugs once during her pregnancy because he took her to the hospital after she suffered an adverse reaction.
Dennis Thomas, Armando's parole officer, testified Armando was required to undergo random drug testing at least once a month. He had never tested positive. Armando had completed a drug rehabilitation program, and maintained a stable residence and full-time employment. His performance on parole was "exemplary." Thomas did not require Armando to participate in a substance abuse aftercare program. Armando would complete his parole in October 2007.
The court modified the drug testing component of Armando's case plan and ordered the Agency to conduct random drug testing no more than once a month after the parole testing stopped. The court stated it was concerned by Armando's failure to recognize the extent of J.Z.'s mental health problems. It ordered Armando to undergo a psychological evaluation.
DISCUSSION
Armando contends the court erred when it ordered him to participate in random drug testing and a psychological evaluation. He argues there is no evidence to suggest he had a current drug problem or suffered from a mental illness.
The Agency asserts the court acted within its discretion when it fashioned Armando's case plan. Minor's counsel joins the Agency's argument.
Family reunification services play a "crucial role" in dependency proceedings. (In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 467; In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 545.) Unless a statutory exception applies, the juvenile court must provide services designed to reunify the family within the statutory time period. (§ 361.5; see § 16501, subd. (a); 42 U.S.C. § 629a(a)(7); In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 563-564.) The reunification plan must be tailored to fit the family. (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006; In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.)
Under section 362, the court may make " 'any and all reasonable orders to the parents or guardians' " to ameliorate the conditions that made the child subject to the court's jurisdiction. (In re Neil D. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 219, 224; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 172.) "This provision and others in the Welfare and Institutions Code 'have been broadly interpreted to authorize a wide variety of remedial orders intended to protect the safety and well-being of dependent children . . . .' (In re Carmen M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 478, 486.)" (In re Neil D., supra, at pp. 224-225.) "The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with this discretion. [Citations.]" (In re Jose M. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1103-1104.)
We review an order directing a parent to participate in services for abuse of discretion. (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006.) While the abuse of discretion standard gives the trial court substantial latitude, "[t]he scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the 'legal principles governing the subject of [the] action . . . .' Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an 'abuse' of discretion." (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297; Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 119.)
The court's order directing Armando to continue to submit to random drug testing after his parole ended was reasonably tailored to fit Armando's circumstances. (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006; In re Neil D., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 225.) Armando acknowledged he was a heroin addict. He stated he had been sober for the last two years, which was his longest period of sobriety. In 1991 and 1992 he was arrested four times on drug-related charges and was convicted on a misdemeanor drug charge in 1992. The record permits the reasonable inference Armando's substance abuse problems were long-standing and serious, and posed a potential risk of interfering with his ability to reunify with A.Z. (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007.)
In addition, Armando was living with J.Z., who had a continuing history of methamphetamine abuse. J.Z. tested positive for opiates, amphetamine, cocaine and other substances in July and September 2006 while pregnant with A.Z. She was arrested in December 2006 on drug charges. The court could reasonably infer Armando's environment was not consistently free from the negative effects of substance abuse. (§ 300.2.) In view of Armando's drug history, J.Z.'s drug use might tend to increase the risk to Armando of relapse.
When the court is aware of deficiencies that may impede the parent's ability to reunify with his child, the court may address them in the reunification plan. (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007.) Here, the court observed that substance abuse recovery is "a lifetime process." The court reasonably concluded that Armando's continued sobriety was a necessary component of his family reunification plan, and his participation in random drug testing would assist him in meeting his goal. (See § 300.2; see also In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 254 [the case plan should serve to put the parent on notice as to what must be accomplished to reunify the family].) The court tailored its order for random drug testing to avoid duplicative tests. It further limited drug testing to no more than once a month. In view of Armando's past and current circumstances and the court's broad discretion to fashion a disposition order to best serve and protect the child's interest, we conclude that the court reasonably exercised its discretion when it ordered Armando to participate in continued random drug testing.
We now address Armando's assertion the court-ordered psychological evaluation was not justified. Armando argues there was no evidence to show he suffered from psychological problems that presented a barrier to reunification, and it was unreasonable to conclude that his failure to recognize his partner's problems suggested he had mental illness.
After a finding the child is at risk from parental conduct, a parent's privacy and liberty interests yield to the demonstrated need to protect the child. (Laurie S. v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 195, 202-203.) Generally, psychological evaluations may be ordered as part of a reunification plan after the child is adjudicated a dependent. (Id. at p. 201; see In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 408.) A parent may be ordered to undergo an evaluation to determine whether the parent is mentally disabled and whether reunification services are likely to prevent continued abuse and neglect. (In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 560.)
We are not persuaded by Armando's argument there was no reasonable basis for a court-ordered psychological evaluation. The record shows Armando had an extensive criminal history that included arrests and convictions for violent acts during a 10-year period. At the outset of the dependency case, Armando was angry with the social worker and foster mother. His anger impeded the social worker's efforts to find a relative placement for A.Z. and the foster parent's efforts to facilitate visitation. The court could reasonably conclude Armando's history of violence and his angry, rigid reactions to the social worker and foster parent might implicate mental health concerns.
In addition, the social worker determined that one of the risk factors impeding reunification was Armando's failure to recognize and understand J.Z.'s mental condition. J.Z. suffered from psychosis and hallucinations. While pregnant, J.Z. heard voices and believed they were going to kill her and the baby. Armando was living with J.Z. during this time. The court had the opportunity over several hearings to observe Armando's demeanor and speech. In exercising its discretion to order Armando to participate in a psychological evaluation, we infer the court considered its own observations of Armando as well as the Agency's concerns about his capability to recognize erratic, psychotic or delusional behavior that would place A.Z. at risk.
It is the better practice to determine earlier rather than later whether a parent has any psychological or cognitive issues that might impede family reunification. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); 42 U.S.C. § 629a(a)(7); In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007; see e.g., § 366.21, subd. (g)(1) [If reasonable services are not provided, the court is required to continue the case for the period of time permitted by statute].) The Agency and court may then promptly tailor the case plan to help the parent ameliorate those issues. (§ 366.21, subd. (e); In re Dino E., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1777; In re Kristin W., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 254.) We conclude that the court exercised its reasoned judgment and acted within its discretion when it ordered Armando to participate in a psychological evaluation.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., NARES, J.