Opinion
11-24-00005-CV
05-16-2024
IN THE MATTER OF A.V., A JUVENILE
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Brown County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. J00010
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
A.V. has filed in this court a pro se "motion for emergency relief," a pro se "amended motion for emergency relief," and a pro se "second amended motion for emergency relief" related to his juvenile adjudication from 2016 in which he asks us to issue an order releasing him on personal bond for the pendency of his appeal. We abated this cause for the juvenile court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make a recommendation on the motions. After receiving the supplemental clerk's record and the supplemental reporter's records, we reinstated the appeal, and we now deny A.V.'s motion for release on personal bond.
On March 17, 2016, A.V. was adjudicated delinquent for committing aggravated robbery and engaging in organized criminal activity and received a thirty-year determinate sentence under Section 53.045 of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.045 (West 2022); In re A.V., No. 11-22-00361, 2023 WL 105214, at *1 (Tex. App.-Eastland Jan. 5, 2023, orig. proceeding). A.V. was committed to the custody of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department, with the possibility of transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, for a term of thirty years. Prior to turning nineteen, A.V. was transferred to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice following a hearing in the juvenile court. See In re A.V., No. 11-18-00135-CV, 2020 WL 2836432, at *1 (Tex. App.- Eastland May 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). On July 12, 2023, he filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the juvenile court, which was denied on October 20, 2023. A.V.'s appeal of that denial is currently pending before this court in this cause.
In his motions for "emergency relief," A.V. is requesting to be released on personal bond pending appeal under Section 56.01(g) of the Texas Family Code. See FAM. § 56.01(g) (West Supp. 2023). He likewise asserts, as he has in previous filings, that "the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings." See In the Matter of A.V., No. 11-23-00193-CR, 2023 WL 6884277, at *1 (Tex. App.-Eastland Oct. 19, 2023, orig. proceeding).
With respect to A.V.'s repeated attack on the trial court's jurisdiction, we reiterate that jurisdiction over his juvenile proceedings “lie[d] exclusively with the juvenile court,” specifically, the Brown County Court at Law. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 23.001 (West 2023) (“Each . . . statutory county court exercising any of the constitutional jurisdiction of either a county court or a district court has jurisdiction over juvenile matters and may be designated a juvenile court.”); GOV'T § 25.0003(a), (c) (West Supp. 2023) (concurrent jurisdiction of county courts); § 25.0272 (West 2019) (the Brown County Court at Law has jurisdiction concurrent with the district court in certain proceedings and cases, in addition to the jurisdiction provided by Section 25.0003); see also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 16 (“County court judges shall have the power to issue writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction.”); GOV'T § 26.042(b) (civil and juvenile jurisdiction of constitutional county courts), § 26.047 (writ powers for constitutional county courts); FAM. § 56.01(o) (the Juvenile Justice Code does not limit a juvenile's right to obtain a writ of habeas corpus). In its findings, the juvenile court found that “The Brown County Court at Law is designated as an alternate Juvenile Court and has concurrent jurisdiction with the District Court in addition to the jurisdiction provided by Section 25.0003 of the Texas Government Code.”
Additionally, we note the local rules of practice for Brown and Mills Counties designate the Brown County Court as the juvenile court for juvenile cases in Brown County, and the rules provide that the Brown County Court at Law shall serve as the juvenile court in the event the County Judge is not a licensed attorney. See BROWN AND MILLS (TEX.) LOC. R. 1.1(b)(1) (35th District Court and constitutional county courts of each county); FAM. 51.04(b) (one or more courts must be designated as the juvenile court). We note that A.V.'s adjudication occurred in the Brown County Court at Law, and the judge currently presiding over the Brown County Court was the county attorney at the time A.V. was adjudicated. See In re A.V., 2023 WL 6884277, at *2 n.1; A.V., 2020 WL 2836432, at *1; A.V., 2017 WL 2484348, at *1; see also In re K.E.M., 89 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2002, orig. proceeding).
Both juvenile and appellate courts have authority to release juveniles on bond pending appeal. See FAM. § 56.01(G); In re J.V., 944 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Tex. App.- El Paso 1997, no pet.); In re D.L.T., No. 07-22-00277-CV, 2023 WL 2473370, at *1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Mar. 6, 2023, no pet.). The burden is on the juvenile to show that he should be released on bond. J.V., 944 S.W.2d at 17; D.L.T., 2023 WL 2473370, at *1. And the "primary concern when deciding whether to grant bond in a juvenile proceeding is the welfare and best interest of the juvenile." In re J.G., No. 04-04-00699-CV, 2004 WL 2945705, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 22, 2004, orig. proceeding).
In considering A.V.'s motions for release, we have independently reviewed the hearing transcript and exhibits and the trial court's recommendation and findings of fact and conclusions of law. Having considered the entire record, we conclude that A.V. has failed to carry his burden to show that his release on personal bond is in his best interest. See id. At the hearing, A.V. called no witnesses. Instead, he asserted that it was in his best interest to be released because he was being "illegally confined" due to the trial court's purported lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The State called Lisa Ritter, the chief juvenile probation officer for Brown County. The Brown County Juvenile Probation Department supervised A.V. in 2015, prior to his adjudication for aggravated robbery. A.V. was detained from January of 2015 until October of 2015 when he was released, placed under house arrest at his parents' home in Elgin, and ordered to wear a GPS leg monitor. During his release, A.V. incurred "several violations on his GPS monitor" by leaving his parents' home without authorization. A.V. also tested positive for cocaine at least three times.
Ritter further testified that, in addition to A.V.'s adjudications for aggravated robbery and engaging in organized criminal activity, his criminal history includes arrests for unlawful carrying of a weapon, evading arrest or detention, terroristic threat, assault against a public servant, and possession of a controlled substance. While detained, A.V. exhibited "self-injurious behavior," "attempted to escape by pulling a fire alarm and taking keys from a detention staff," and causing injuries to detention staff on other occasions.
In its written findings, the trial court recommended that A.V.'s request for personal bond be denied, and that he remain in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice during the pendency of this appeal. The trial court found that it would neither serve to protect public safety, nor be in A.V.'s best interest to be released on personal bond. The trial court's findings, conclusions, and recommendation are not binding on this court, but we give them due deference. J.G., 2004 WL 2945705, at *2 (citing In re D.W.R., 990 S.W.2d 446, 448-49 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, orig. proceeding)).
We agree with the trial court and conclude that, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, it is not in A.V.'s best interest to be released on personal bond pending the disposition of his appeal. Accordingly, his request for release on personal bond is denied. His "motion for emergency relief," "amended motion for emergency relief, and "second amended motion for emergency relief" are denied. His motions for rehearing, for emergency relief filed on May 1, 2024, and "for attack on void order" are likewise denied.
It is so ordered.