Opinion
F082179
10-27-2022
Estate of LONNIE LAMONT ASHLOCK, Deceased. v. CRABTREE SCHMIDT et al., Objectors and Appellants. GABRIEL ASHLOCK, as Administrator, etc., Petitioner and Respondent,
Crabtree Schmidt and Michael R. Dennis for Objectors and Appellants. Freeman Firm and Thomas H. Keeling for Petitioner and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. No. 445230 Timothy W. Salter, Judge. [*]
Crabtree Schmidt and Michael R. Dennis for Objectors and Appellants.
Freeman Firm and Thomas H. Keeling for Petitioner and Respondent.
OPINION
This appeal concerns a probate court's resolution of a dispute over proceeds from the sale of an estate asset, to wit, a $4 million parcel of land. The estate had established ownership of the land in prior litigation under Probate Code section 850 et seq. and other statutes. The opposing litigant, Stacey Carlson (Stacey), was found to have a lien against the property by virtue of a deed of trust and promissory note with a face value of $215,875.
Notwithstanding her security interest in the property, Stacey owed the estate millions of dollars in surcharges, penalties, and attorney fees. During the pending sale of the property, the estate sought to levy upon Stacey's lien documents and sell them to partially satisfy its judgment against her. In response, Stacey moved "for an order that the [note and deed of trust] be collected rather than sold." Although Stacey's motion was denied, the estate agreed that the face value of her lien (inclusive of accrued interest and fees) could be applied as a partial satisfaction of the judgment. Accordingly, the probate court ordered Stacey to execute a reconveyance of the deed of trust.
Next, Stacey's legal counsel, i.e., appellants herein, took steps to block the sale of the land by filing a separate lawsuit on their own behalf. It came to light that Stacey had ostensibly granted them a security interest in the promissory note and deed of trust to cover her legal bills. However, the attorneys' security interest was not documented until after the estate had already obtained a judgment lien against Stacey.
Further proceedings in the probate court led to the order from which this appeal is taken. The probate court ruled, inter alia, (1) the value of Stacey's lien was $424,117 (rounded) and (2) Stacey's attempt to grant a security interest to her attorneys was "presumed to be in fraud of creditors, and [no evidence] has been presented to overcome that presumption." The estate's judgment lien was found to have priority over any security interest Stacey's attorneys may have arguably acquired.
Appellants contend the probate court lacked authority to determine the value of Stacey's lien and the priority of rights as between their security interest and the estate's judgment lien. Appellants claim the dispositive issue is whether the probate court had in personam jurisdiction over them. We conclude the probate court's in rem jurisdiction encompassed issues regarding the estate's entitlement to proceeds from a court-ordered sale of an estate asset. Furthermore, Stacey was a party to the case and the one who placed those issues in dispute. The probate court did not need personal jurisdiction over her attorneys to determine whether the estate's judgment lien was superior to a putative encumbrancer claiming rights derived from and through Stacey's actions. The challenged order will be affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is the fourth appeal in a consolidated probate matter involving Gabriel Ashlock (Gabriel) and Stacey, both of whom claimed entitlement to the estate of Gabriel's deceased father, Lonnie Lamont Ashlock. Stacey was represented in the probate court and prior appeals by attorney Robert W. Crabtree (Crabtree) of the law firm Crabtree Schmidt, a California partnership (Crabtree Schmidt).
We previously affirmed the probate court's findings on the merits of a trust dispute, a will contest, and claims against Stacey for breach of fiduciary duty and financial abuse of a dependent adult. (Estate of Ashlock (Mar. 14, 2019, F074969) [nonpub. opn.] (Ashlock I)) The proceedings in Ashlock I resulted in a judgment against Stacey in the amount of $365,152.92. This figure represented aggregate surcharges for her wrongful use of funds generated by an estate asset known as the Snelling Ranch. At the conclusion of Ashlock I, the probate court imposed a constructive trust on all real property Stacey had misappropriated, including the Snelling Ranch.
The Snelling Ranch is a 268-acre parcel located in Merced County. During the relevant time period, it contained approximately 190 acres of income-producing almond trees. Gabriel's father bought the property in 2005 for $1,417,500. Stacey, who was a real estate broker, facilitated the transaction and contributed money toward the purchase price. However, the Snelling Ranch was titled in the name of "Lonni L. Ashlock, a single man." In Ashlock I, it was determined that Stacy recorded a valid deed of trust against the property in 2008. The deed of trust was security for a promissory note in the amount of $215,875.
The promissory note identified Stacey as the payee. The deed of trust identified the trustee as "Investwest Properties" and the beneficiary as "Little Hills Ltd." As explained in Ashlock I, the names on the deed of trust were aliases. "Little Hills Ltd." was not a legal entity, and "Investwest Properties" was a fictitious business name associated with Stacey's broker's license.
The Ashlock I judgment was entered in October 2016. It was in favor of Gabriel individually and as administrator of his father's estate. We thus refer to Gabriel and the estate interchangeably.
On November 3, 2016, Gabriel filed a notice of judgment lien with the Secretary of State based on the Ashlock I judgment. This created a judgment lien against Stacey's personal property. (Code Civ. Proc, § 697.510; Bluxome Street Associates v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1156.) Such liens generally remain effective "for five years from the date of filing." (§ 697.510, subd. (b).)
The judgment lien named Crabtree as an additional debtor, as well as decedent Lonnie Ashlock's father and sister. Gabriel's rationale was that they were the ultimate recipients of the misappropriated funds for which Stacey had been surcharged. In response, Crabtree and the relatives filed a separate lawsuit demanding cancellation and expungement of the judgment lien. Appellants' request for judicial notice of certain filings in that action, Stanislaus Superior Court case No. 2026657, is hereby granted. We note, however, that neither those documents nor the record on appeal provide any indication of what became of the lawsuit. Appellants argue the judicially noticed material is relevant because (1) the judge observed that attorney Crabtree was not a party to the consolidated probate matter and (2) the same judge presided over both cases.
On or about November 17, 2016, Stacey executed a document purporting to grant a security interest in her property to a law firm she had retained to appeal the Ashlock I judgment. The law firm, which was not Crabtree Schmidt, was eventually disqualified because of an ethical conflict. Independent of the disqualification, the document purporting to grant a security interest was later found to be "a sham" and "null and void." The probate court also found the document was "created to defraud creditors, mainly [Gabriel]."
On November 22, 2016, Stacey recorded a document with the Merced County Recorder's Office purporting to assign her promissory note to "Little Hills Ltd." Her attorneys would later say this was done to clarify that the beneficiary of the deed of trust and payee on the promissory note were one and the same.
In late 2016, Gabriel attempted to levy upon the promissory note and deed of trust. Stacey responded by obtaining the original documents from the probate court's case file, reportedly with Crabtree's assistance. She proceeded to re-record the documents and then shredded them. When asked why she destroyed them, she testified, "They had no value for me any longer." When pressed on the issue, Stacey said, "I didn't want [them] falling in the wrong hands." She later clarified it was her intention to prevent Gabriel from levying upon the documents and selling them "for pennies on the dollar" at an execution sale.
After learning Stacey had destroyed the lien documents, the probate court ordered copies of the same "be deemed duplicate originals" and "remain in the Court's file until further order." It also made a finding that Stacey destroyed the originals "to prevent [Gabriel] from obtaining them in the course of enforcing the judgment."
Stacey's admissions regarding the shredded documents were made during a judgment debtor's examination on February 1, 2017. As noted by Gabriel in briefing below, service of the order for an examination (OEX) created a separate lien on Stacey's personal property "for a period of one year from the date of the order unless extended or sooner terminated by the court." (Code Civ. Proc, § 708.110, subd. (d); accord, Shrewsbury Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1213, 1223.) Nevertheless, on February 2, 2017 (the day after the OEX), Crabtree Schmidt filed a UCC-1 financing statement with the Secretary of State claiming a security interest in multiple categories of Stacey's property, including "all promissory notes … and all rights to payment and performance."
UCC refers to the California Uniform Commercial Code. "In general, … a security agreement between two parties is effective to create a security interest in specified collateral as against purchasers of the collateral and creditors. [Citation]. However, in most cases, … a UCC-1 financing statement must be filed to perfect the security interest created by the security agreement." (Cassel v. Kolb (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 568, 573; see Cal. U. Com. Code, §§ 9310, subd. (a), 9312, subds. (a), (e).)
It appears Crabtree Schmidt's UCC-1 filing preceded execution of the actual security agreement by one day. In a document dated February 3, 2017, entitled "GRANT OF SECURITY INTEREST," Stacey granted Crabtree Schmidt a security interest "in and to all farm products, including without limitation, all (1) crops …, (2) all livestock …, (3) supplies used or produced in farming operations, (4) all products or proceeds of crops or livestock; all equipment, accounts, accounts receivable, chattel paper, instruments, including but not limited to all promissory notes, documents, investment property; any and all rights to payment and performance; general intangibles; all fixtures, all attachments, accessions, accessories, tools, parts and supplies …."
Stacey also attempted to foreclose on the deed of trust. On February 10, 2017, the probate court issued an order restraining her from proceeding with a foreclosure action. By that point, a dispute had arisen over whether the promissory note and deed of trust were estate assets or still belonged to Stacey.
During a hearing on February 28, 2017, Crabtree made the following statements on the record: "So there's the judgment against [Stacey] with enforcement proceedings against her. She has an asset that she can use to create cash to respond to the judgment, to pay for it. So she commenced a foreclosure proceeding on the note and deed of trust in order to do that very thing, to respond to the judgment by using her asset in which to respond." Crabtree later added:
"Obviously it's an asset that she can use to meet the judgment against her. And I think she's legally entitled to use her assets to do that. [¶] Now, we don't really want to sell the Snelling ranch. What we really want to do is get to a point where maybe we can agree, hey, okay, give us a credit against this and we will offset it instead of selling. We don't want to sell the Snelling ranch, because this is on appeal, and if it's reversed on appeal [referring to Ashlock I], she gets the Snelling ranch. She doesn't want it to go away."
The quoted text is part of the record in Estate of Ashlock (May 3, 2019, F076941) (Ashlock II) [nonpub. opn.]. On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the records in Ashlock I, Ashlock II, and Estate of Ashlock (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1066 (Ashlock III) [partial pub. opn.]. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a); see, e.g., People v. Bilbrey (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 764, 769, fn. 7 [taking judicial notice of the record in a related appeal on the court's own motion]; People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 426, fn. 1 [taking judicial notice of the record in the defendant's prior appeal].) The record in this appeal contains a declaration by Crabtree, filed in January 2020, discussing how he had challenged the probate court's jurisdiction to resolve issues pertaining to Stacey's lien during the hearing on February 28, 2017. The declaration makes no mention of him characterizing the lien documents as assets Stacey could "use to meet the judgment against her" despite the fact Crabtree Schmidt had filed its UCC-1 financing statement earlier that month.
It appears Stacey's foreclosure efforts were either abandoned or permanently restrained. The record further indicates Gabriel was denied permission to levy upon the lien documents at that time, i.e., circa 2017. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the Ashlock I appeal, the probate court conducted proceedings on various bifurcated issues.
In July 2017, Gabriel filed a motion to recover attorney fees under Probate Code section 21380 and former section 21350. The motion was granted, and Stacey was held liable for $1,867,983 (rounded). The ruling was affirmed in Ashlock II.
During 2018, the parties litigated issues concerning additional surcharges against Stacey and her monetary liability under Probate Code section 859. In July 2018, a judgment was entered against Stacey and in favor of Gabriel in the amount of approximately $12 million. Subject to minor recalculations, the judgment was affirmed in Ashlock III.
The remittitur in Ashlock I was issued on June 19, 2019. The remittitur in Ashlock II followed on July 3, 2019.
On December 31, 2019, Gabriel served Stacey with a notice of intention to sell her promissory note and deed of trust. Service of the notice would seem to imply the levying officer had taken possession of the documents by January 2020. However, other parts of the record indicate the probate court retained possession of the "duplicate originals."
A judgment creditor typically obtains, from the clerk of court, a writ of execution directing the sheriff or other levying officer to enforce the judgment. (Code Civ. Proc, §§ 699.510, 699.520.) The judgment creditor then provides written instructions to the levying officer describing the property to be levied upon (id., § 687.010, subd. (a)), and he or she "act[s] in accordance with the written instructions" (id., subd. (b)). The levy creates an execution lien on the property. (Id., § 697.710.) Once the levying officer has custody of the property, it may be sold pursuant to section 701.510 et seq.
On January 16, 2020, Stacey filed an objection to the sale of her lien documents and moved "for an order that the [documents] be collected rather than sold." The probate court referred to this filing as the "Motion to 'Collect' Promissory Note" (motion to collect). Stacey's argument, as articulated by Crabtree in the moving papers, was as follows:
"When [the Snelling Ranch is] sold, the Note and Deed of Trust will be fulfilled, the Estate will be paid, and then she can use the proceeds toward satisfying her debt to Gabriel and the Estate. But, if Gabriel is allowed to sell the assets, the assets become next to worthless because there is no market for them. Gabriel and/or the Estate will buy the assets themselves for pennies on the dollar. Thus, Stacey would receive pennies rather than the true value of the Note to use to satisfy her debt. A sale, as opposed to collection, will waste the assets and severely prejudice Stacey." (Italics added.)
As a secondary position, Stacey argued Stanislaus County was "not the proper venue" because the Snelling Ranch is located in Merced County. In a supporting declaration, Crabtree noted he had previously "argued that the matter was being heard in the wrong county."
On February 3, 2020, Gabriel filed an ex parte application for "instructions for the confirmation and order for the sale of" the Snelling Ranch. According to the application, the property had "proved to be an expense to the Estate with a net loss on an annual basis," and the estate had been trying to sell it since at least 2018. The property was encumbered by "a first deed of trust with Yosemite Farm & Credit … with the principal balance of $114,784.81; a $50,000.00 plus accrued interest tax 'agreement' which was entered into because of tax delinquencies; and, a contested $215,875.00 note and deed of trust [i.e., Stacey's lien]." The estate was in escrow with a qualified buyer for a purchase price of $4 million. Ex parte relief was requested pursuant to Probate Code section 1310 in light of the still pending appeal in Ashlock III.
"Notwithstanding that an appeal is taken from the judgment or order, for the purpose of preventing injury or loss to a person or property, the trial court may direct the exercise of the powers of the fiduciary, or may appoint a temporary guardian or conservator of the person or estate, or both, or a special administrator or temporary trustee, to exercise the powers, from time to time, as if no appeal were pending." (Prob. Code, § 1310, subd. (b).)
On February 5, 2020, the ex parte application was heard and granted. According to a verified pleading in the record, a discussion "took place to satisfy [Stacey's] concerns by having the Estate credit the value of the [promissory] note and issue a partial satisfaction of judgment," and Stacey's counsel "did not object to this procedure." However, the record does not contain a transcript of the hearing.
On March 10, 2020, Gabriel filed a verified response to Stacey's motion to collect. It said Stacey had personally e-mailed Gabriel, apparently without the involvement of counsel, and offered to accept $500,000.00 in satisfaction of her lien. It further stated, "Gabriel has agreed to give a partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of $500,000 for cancellation of the [promissory] note and a deed of reconveyance for the deed of trust. This avoids [Stacey's] concerns raised in the pending motion by allowing her to 'collect' more than the full face value of the note." (Some capitalization omitted.)
Addressing Stacey's position on jurisdiction, Gabriel noted the probate court had physical possession of the "duplicate originals" of the promissory note and deed of trust. As such, the lien documents and title to the Snelling Ranch were both located in Stanislaus County. Gabriel further argued the probate court had already exercised in rem jurisdiction over the estate's assets and liabilities.
Gabriel's filing of March 10, 2020, included a cross-motion "for an order confirming the estate, as judgment creditor, has satisfied payment of the [promissory] note … in full; and, for the reconveyance and cancellation of [the] deed of trust …, or in the alternative if not reconveyed forthwith, that the court determine that the deed of trust is null and void." (Some capitalization omitted.)
Stacey's motion to collect and Gabriel's cross-motion were scheduled for hearing on March 23, 2020. According to a verified pleading in the record, the hearing was held as scheduled. However, the record does not contain a transcript of the hearing. The trial court reportedly advised the parties to "meet and confer to determine the value of the [promissory note] or, alternatively, [to arrange] for an independent accountant to calculate the pay off amount." The hearing was then continued to June 5, 2020.
On June 3, 2020, the remittitur issued in Ashlock III.
On June 5, 2020, Stacey's motion to collect and Gabriel's cross-motion were heard and ruled upon. Parts of the appellate record say attorney Crabtree "argued extensively" at this hearing that the probate court lacked jurisdiction "to hear issues concerning the promissory note and deed of trust." (Some capitalization omitted.) Crabtree allegedly went on to assert, "for the first time," that Stacey's lien "was subject to his law firm's [Crabtree Schmidt's] 'security interest' and that only [the] Merced Superior Court had jurisdiction." But once again, the record does not contain a transcript of the hearing. The probate court's written order states, in pertinent part:
"Stacey Carlson's Motion To 'Collect' Promissory Note and Motion Objecting to Sale of Property was DENIED. Unless the parties agree to the amount of the note, the escrow company can depend on a C.P.A. or other neutral party to calculate the value of the note. The Court directs Stacey Carlson to execute a reconveyance of the Deed of Trust." (Boldface omitted.)
Two weeks later, on June 19, 2020, Crabtree Schmidt filed a quiet title action against Gabriel (and other nominal parties) in Merced Superior Court case No. 20CV-01814. The verified complaint alleged that the security interest Stacey granted to Crabtree Schmidt in February 2017 entitled it "to receive the proceeds of the [promissory note]" in the event of any sale of the Snelling Ranch. Citing Code of Civil Procedure sections 392 and 760.050, Crabtree Schmidt further alleged Merced County was the proper venue "because the subject of this action is real and personal property, and the county in which the real property is located is Merced County, California."
On June 24, 2020, Crabtree Schmidt filed a notice of pendency of action (lis pendens) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 405.20 and 405.22. In doing so, Crabtree Schmidt effectively blocked the pending sale of the Snelling Ranch.
"'While the lis pendens statute was designed to give notice to third parties and not to aid plaintiffs in pursuing claims, the practical effect of a recorded lis pendens is to render a defendant's property unmarketable ....'" (Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 642, 651; accord, Malcolm v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 518, 523, fn. 2 ["As a practical matter, the filing of a lis pendens usually clouds the title to the property and prevents its transfer until the litigation is resolved or the lis pendens is expunged"].)
On June 29, 2020, the probate court held a hearing on the status of the Snelling Ranch. Gabriel's counsel indicated the sale was proceeding "expeditiously" notwithstanding Crabtree Schmidt's quiet title action and the lis pendens. Counsel then requested "an ex parte application date for a hearing as soon as possible ... in order to bring an ex parte application to expunge the lis pendens and for orders to appoint an elisor." The probate court provided a date and set a briefing schedule. Since Crabtree Schmidt was the plaintiff in the quiet title action, the probate court allowed it to file an opposition to the forthcoming application.
"[A]n elisor is a person appointed by the court to perform functions like the execution of a deed or document. [Citation.] A court typically appoints an elisor to sign documents on behalf of a recalcitrant party in order to effectuate its judgments or orders, where the party refuses to execute such documents." (Blueberry Properties, LLC v. Chow (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1020.)
Gabriel filed a verified ex parte application. He alleged Stacey was refusing to stipulate to the value of her lien, despite having previously demanded $500,000, and that she and her counsel had refused to discuss the matter following the probate court's order of June 5, 2020. Gabriel alleged Stacey and her attorneys were intentionally "interfering with [the] sale of the Snelling Ranch" and trying "to thwart enforcement of [the probate court's] orders." Their actions were further characterized as spiteful, "malicious," and "intended to cause harm and damage to the Estate."
Gabriel argued the probate court had authority to grant relief based on its in rem jurisdiction and inherent power to prevent abuse of process and fraud, and to compel obedience of its orders. The relief requested included "instructions and direction for the appointment of an elisor to execute documents for: (1) the dismissal of [Crabtree Schmidt's quiet title action]; (2) the release of [the lis pendens]; [and] (3) confirmation of the payoff the deed of reconveyance [sic] for the promissory note and deed of trust … in the amount of $407,644.56 and for confirmation of the Estate credit bid payoff in that amount by a partial satisfaction of judgment in favor of Stacey …." (Some capitalization omitted.) An attorney declaration and attached exhibit showed the stated value of Stacey's lien had been calculated by a certified public accounting firm.
The record indicates Stacey filed an opposition to Gabriel's ex parte application. However, the opposition is not included in the record on appeal.
On July 10, 2020, Crabtree Schmidt filed a document entitled, "Special Appearance Denying Jurisdiction In Re: [Gabriel's Ex Parte Application]." The document stated, in relevant part: "Crabtree Schmidt is specially appearing in the above entitled ex parte hearing for the sole purpose of contesting the court's jurisdiction over it and any alleged power of the court to compel Crabtree Schmidt to perform any acts, or to have an elisor appointed to perform any acts in its stead."
On July 13, 2020, the ex parte application was heard and argued. Attorney Crabtree, appearing on behalf of Stacey, objected to the independently calculated value of the promissory note. An attorney named Michael Dennis made a special appearance on behalf of Crabtree Schmidt to contest jurisdiction. After hearing arguments, the probate court issued an oral ruling. It began as follows:
"I first want to express the primary concern of the Court, and that is to protect the sale of the ranch for $4 million. I'm going to make a finding, which I actually have already done, that this Court does have in rem jurisdiction over this matter because the note and, more importantly, the deed of trust is nothing but a lien on an asset of the estate. The assignment to Crabtree Schmidt has no more stature or importance than the note and deed of trust."
Accord, Monterey S.P. Partnership v. W.L. Bangham, Inc. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 454, 460 ("In practical effect, if not in legal parlance, a deed of trust is a lien on the property"); 4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2022) § 12:1, p. 12-3 ("A security device, such as a mortgage or a deed of trust, is an interest in land that does not convey any estate in real property. The interest conveyed by such a device is merely a lien or charge on the land encumbered").
The ruling continued:
"As a practical matter, because of the order I am going to make today, the whole controversy over whether Merced County has the only jurisdiction, or whether this Court has in rem jurisdiction, as well as whether we have a proper in personam jurisdiction over Crabtree Schmidt is moot."
The court went on to find the present value of Stacey's lien was $424,116.96. Gabriel's ex parte application was granted, including, "conditionally … the requested order as to Crabtree Schmidt."
The dispute over jurisdiction was supposedly mooted by an order "that the amount of the claimed [security interest], … $424,116.96, be the amount of a check from the escrow of the sale of the Snelling Ranch. That check shall be made payable to Stanislaus County Superior Court and deposited with the Clerk of the Court to be held pending the determination by this Court of the validity of and, if found to be valid, the priority of the [security interest]."
Further proceedings regarding the validity and/or priority of Crabtree Schmidt's security interest were scheduled for August 13, 2020. Crabtree Schmidt was given the opportunity to brief the issues and participate in the proceedings.
On July 16, 2020, Crabtree Schmidt filed a document entitled, "Notice of Motion and Motion To Objecting To Jurisdiction Over Crabtree Schmidt, a Partnership [sic]." (Some capitalization omitted.) The filing advised that Crabtree Schmidt would specially appear at the scheduled proceedings on August 13, 2020, "and object to the court's attempted jurisdiction over it and [seek] an order overturning all court orders as to Crabtree Schmidt based on said lack of jurisdiction." (Some capitalization omitted.) In reliance upon Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1), Crabtree Schmidt moved to quash Gabriel's prior ex parte application "on the grounds summons was not properly served on [it]."
Another document filed on July 16, 2020, was entitled "Declaration of Michael R. Dennis in Support of Peremptory Challenge." On July 23, 2020, the probate court issued an order denying the peremptory challenge and striking the declaration. (See Code Civ. Proc, § 170.4, subd. (c)(3) ["Repetitive statements of disqualification not alleging facts suggesting new grounds for disqualification shall be stricken by the judge against whom they are filed"].) The ruling explained, "If Objector Crabtree Schmidt is a late-joined party to these proceedings (and this is a question which the Court has yet to answer), it is clearly on the same 'side' of these proceedings as [Stacey]. And both [Stacey] and other parties aligned with her in these proceedings have already made several challenges to the court in this matter...."
On July 28, 2020, the trial court issued a written order confirming its oral rulings of July 13, 2020, on Gabriel's ex parte application. The order stated, in pertinent part, "This court will set a hearing with both sides being provided an opportunity to file briefs in this matter. After the hearing, this court will determine the validity and priority of [Crabtree Schmidt's alleged security interest in Stacey's lien]. If it is valid and has priority, Crabtree Schmidt will be awarded the amount on deposit. If it is invalid or does not have priority, then the amount will be awarded to the estate. [¶] … The trial of the hearing referenced above shall be set for August 13 and 14, 2020." (Some capitalization omitted.)
On August 3, 2020, Crabtree Schmidt petitioned this court for a writ of mandate, prohibition, or other relief as to the denial of its peremptory challenge. Crabtree Schmidt also requested a stay of the pending trial proceedings. The petition was denied on August 10, 2020.
On the same day its writ petition was denied, Crabtree Schmidt filed with the probate court a "notice of non-opposition" to its pending "motion objecting to jurisdiction." (Capitalization omitted). The filing alleged Gabriel had failed to oppose the motion and should be presumed to have conceded its merits. The probate court subsequently issued a tentative decision to treat the motion "as a motion for reconsideration of the Court's July 13, 2020, decision to grant [Gabriel's] ex parte application for relief related to the sale of the Snelling Ranch." As so construed, the motion would be denied pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 for failure to present "any new or different facts, circumstances or law."
Gabriel filed a trial brief addressing the probate court's jurisdiction and Crabtree Schmidt's claimed security interest in Stacey's lien against the Snelling Ranch. Crabtree Schmidt did not file a trial brief.
On August 13, 2020, Crabtree Schmidt's motion was heard and denied. The probate court adopted its tentative ruling and also made an oral finding that it had in personam jurisdiction over Crabtree Schmidt. The finding was based on attorney Crabtree having allegedly appeared in a personal capacity, at various times dating back to 2016, for "motions and proceedings concerning [Gabriel's] efforts to collect on the judgment [against Stacey] …."
Immediately following the motion ruling, a trial commenced on the issues regarding Stacey's lien against the Snelling Ranch. Neither Stacey nor Crabtree Schmidt participated in the trial.
The probate court expressed uncertainty as to whether a promissory note and deed of trust constitute personal property as contemplated by Crabtree Schmidt's UCC-1 financing statement and applicable laws. Gabriel argued it did not matter either way: "Because if it does, it does for both of us and [the estate's judgment lien was recorded prior to Crabtree Schmidt's financing statement]. If it doesn't, it doesn't for both of us and [Crabtree Schmidt's] has no validity …."
Gabriel produced evidence of the judgment lien. The probate court took judicial notice of Crabtree Schmidt's UCC-1 financing statement, which Crabtree Schmidt had previously attached to its filings in the probate matter and its separate quiet title action. At the conclusion of trial, the probate court orally ruled in favor of Gabriel.
On September 21, 2020, the probate court issued an "order following trial to determine competing lien claims and lien priority." (Capitalization omitted.) The relevant findings and rulings were as follows: (1) Crabtree Schmidt affirmatively waived its right to participate in the trial and/or to object to Gabriel's judgment lien; (2) the judgment lien, as filed on November 3, 2016, was valid and remained in effect at the time of decision; (3) it was unnecessary to "reach the validity of the purported Crabtree Schmidt lien filed on February 2, 2017 … [because] whatever validity the Crabtree Schmidt UCC lien may have, if any, [it] is inferior to the [judgment lien] filed three months prior, on November 3, 2016." (Some capitalization omitted.)
The probate court confirmed its prior finding as to the value of Stacey's lien ($424,116.96), "including all back interest, late charges and/or fees of any kind." The prior orders regarding sale of the Snelling Ranch were also confirmed. Crabtree Schmidt's UCC-1 financing statement was held to have "no effect on the promissory note in question, and/or the $424,116.96 ordered paid into court pending determination of lien priority." Crabtree Schmidt's alleged security interest was further "presumed to be in fraud of creditors, and nothing had been presented to overcome that presumption." (Boldface and some capitalization omitted).
On September 22, 2020, Crabtree Schmidt petitioned this court for a writ of mandate, prohibition, or other relief with regard to its "Motion Objecting to Jurisdiction."
On October 30, 2020, a notice of entry of the posttrial order was served upon Crabtree Schmidt. On the same date, escrow reportedly closed on the sale of the Snelling Ranch.
On November 19, 2020, Crabtree Schmidt's writ petition was summarily denied.
On December 11, 2020, a notice of appeal was filed by Crabtree Schmidt, attorney Crabtree, and Crabtree's law partner, Walter J. Schmidt (collectively, appellants). Appellants identify themselves as the real parties in interest vis-à-vis the probate court's posttrial order "and all other orders and rulings that are separately appealable." We will assume they have standing as nonparties claiming to be aggrieved by a decision of the probate court. (See In re FairWageLaw (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 279, 285 ["Nonparties who are aggrieved by a judgment may appeal from it"].)
Stacey did not file an appeal, and the parties report that she died in late 2020.
DISCUSSION
I. Issues Presented
The issues on appeal are not clearly delineated in appellants' opening brief. Two introductory paragraphs pose broad questions of personal jurisdiction: "First when an attorney makes an appearance on behalf of their client, are they also making a general appearance on their own behalf, becoming a party to the case? Second, if the attorney does become a party subject to the trial court's personal jurisdiction, is the attorney provided their own independent due process protections?"
Appellants' introduction is followed by a statement of the case in which they refer to the denial of "Crabtree Schmidt's motion objecting to personal jurisdiction." However, the last sentence of this section says, "Appellants are appealing the final judgment," which presumably means the posttrial order filed September 21, 2020.
Next, in the statement of appealability, there are citations to authorities regarding the denial of a motion to quash. However, appellants then state that, in light of their unsuccessful writ petitions, they "are not re-appealing the denial of Crabtree Schmidt's motion. Rather, they are appealing the final judgment entered by the trial court." Appellants then allude to the probate court's posttrial order, stating it constitutes "a final determination regarding the matters at issue: The value of a Note and, when the property the Note is attached to sells, the parties' priority as to those funds used to pay off the Note."
The statement of appealability is followed by a discussion about the standard of review and then a statement of facts. The statement of facts contains inappropriate commentary, legal argument, and claims of error. "We do not address claims interwoven in a statement of facts unless they are discussed [elsewhere] under an appropriate heading." (Schaeffer Land Trust v. San Jose City Council (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 612, 619, fn. 2; see Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 9:140, p. 9-41 ["Outright argument on the various issues should be reserved for the discussion portion of the brief"].)
Appellant's "Law and Argument" section begins with a four-page preamble. The first paragraph states:
"The questions being posed on appeal do not concern whether the trial court's ultimate decision regarding the value of Note and the parties' percentage interest in the Note was correct. The Court need not concern itself with those matters. Rather, of concern here is whether the court had the power, right or wrong, to even make those determinations. If the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Appellants, it lacked the power. As shown below, Appellants never made a general appearance in the case nor received any service of process, the two mandatory prerequisites for jurisdiction. Then, even if the trial court did have the power, it failed to provide due process protection."
Appellate briefs must state each point under a separate heading or subheading. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) "[Otherwise, the point will be forfeited." (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656; see Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1294 ["we do not consider all of the loose and disparate arguments that are not clearly set out in a heading and supported by reasoned legal argument"].) Appellants' opening brief contains five relevant headings:
"A. The motion objecting to jurisdiction should have been granted because it was unopposed. [¶]... [¶]
"B. The trial court had no personal jurisdiction over Appellants because they did not make a general appearance. [¶]... [¶]
"C. The trial court had no personal jurisdiction over Appellants because there was no service of process. [¶]... [¶]
"D. Appellants were never served with a summons nor a complaint that would confer the trial court with personal jurisdiction. [¶]... [¶]
"E. After the motion objecting to jurisdiction was denied, Appellants were denied due process because the trial court refused to allow them time to respond before conducting a trial." (Boldface omitted.)
As indicated above, appellants primarily focus on whether they made any general appearances, as opposed to special appearances, in the probate proceedings. "A special appearance does not confer jurisdiction on the court for any purpose other than determining the question of jurisdiction over the person." (In re Marriage of Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.) "The appearance will be considered 'general' in nature if the defendant acts in a manner 'showing of a "purpose of obtaining any ruling or order of the court going to the merits of the case""" (California Overseas Bank v. French American Banking Corp. (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 179, 184), and a general appearance "is equivalent to personal service of summons on such party" (Code Civ. Proc, § 410.50, subd. (a)).
Because we conclude the probate court's order should be affirmed based on its in rem jurisdiction over the subject property and jurisdiction over Stacey and Gabriel, we need not determine whether appellants made a general appearance below.
II. Standard of Review
"A ruling by a trial court is presumed correct, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance. [Citations.] The burden of demonstrating error rests on the appellant." (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631-632.) An appellate court defers to the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, and it applies independent review to questions of law. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916.) "We review questions as to the jurisdiction and authority of the probate court de novo." (Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 103, 112.)
"If the decision of a lower court is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, the judgment or order will be affirmed regardless of the correctness of the grounds upon which the lower court reached its conclusion. The rationale for this principle is twofold: (a) an appellate court reviews the action of the lower court and not the reasons given for its action; and (b) there can be no prejudicial error from erroneous logic or reasoning if the decision itself is correct." (Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 776.) "In short, we will affirm a judgment or order if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, even if it is right for the wrong reasons." (Id. at p. 777; accord, Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 443.)
III. Jurisdiction to Determine Entitlement to Snelling Ranch Sale Proceeds
"In its truest sense, jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to try the case before it. This is a court's jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, the competency or inherent authority to hear a case and render a valid judgment. [Citation.] 'Fundamental jurisdiction is, at its core, authority over both the subject matter and the parties.'" (Capra v. Capra (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1082.)
"Another layer of jurisdiction exists. For jurisdictional purposes, civil actions and proceedings are classified as '"in personam,"' '"in rem,"' or '"quasi in rem,"' depending on the nature of the judgment sought. [Citation.] An action that seeks to impose a personal liability or obligation on the defendant in the plaintiffs favor is an in personam action, and the court must have jurisdiction over the defendant." (Capra v. Capra, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1082.) "If the court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over property ..., the action is '"in rem"' or '"quasi in rem."'" (Ibid) "A court having jurisdiction in rem over property need not have in personam jurisdiction over the defendant in order to determine questions of title to that [property]." (In re Marriage of Leff (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 630, 645; see Mungia v. Superior Court (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 280, 284 ["In some cases 'in rem' jurisdiction is based upon the court's control over a 'res,' rather than control over the defendant as a person"].)
"An in rem action or proceeding seeks to affect the interests of all persons in a particular property or thing. [Citation.] A quasi in rem action is brought against someone personally, but the real objective is to deal with particular property." (Capra v. Capra, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1082.) "Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem." (Ibid; accord, Estate of Wise (1949) 34 Cal.2d 376, 382; Estate of Kampen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 971, 1003 ["The jurisdiction of the probate court is in rem and the res is the decedent's estate"].)
"The probate court has general subject matter jurisdiction over the decedent's property and as such, it is empowered to resolve competing claims over the title to and distribution of the decedent's property." (Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, 952.) "Once probate court jurisdiction attaches over a decedent's estate, the court may determine all claims in and to, for and against and affecting the estate ... even if those controversies would be beyond its jurisdiction if asserted independently." (Ross & Cohen, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 3:54, p. 3-18; see Prob. Code §§ 800, 7050.) The probate court's jurisdiction thus extends to claims regarding proceeds from the sale of estate assets. (See, e.g., Prob. Code, § 10361 [rules for the application of money received from the sale of encumbered property]; Estate of Silberman (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1535 [appeal taken from "an order establishing the relative priority of claims to the proceeds of the sale of real property owned by decedent"].)
To restate the key principle, "a superior court sitting in probate that has jurisdiction over one aspect of a claim to certain property can determine all aspects of the claim." (Estate of Baglione (1966) 65 Cal.2d 192, 197.) "'[T]he probate court, by reason of Baglione, has power to determine a stranger's claim to property if such determination is necessary and proper to a complete judgment, but only if the stranger's claim and relationship bear a particular relation to the estate.'" (Estate of Casella (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 312, 322; see Estate of Mullins (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 924, 929-930.) "The connection may arise out of the relationship between the parties … [or] out of the nature of the claim to the property." (Baglione, at p. 196.)
Appellants contend the probate court "hijacked the Merced County quiet title action." Their position ignores the chronology of events and established law. As with probate proceedings, quiet title actions invoke a superior court's in rem jurisdiction. (See Tsasu LLC v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 704, 715; Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. McGurk (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 201, 215.) "[W]here several courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a certain type of proceeding, the first one to assume and exercise such jurisdiction in a particular case acquires an exclusive jurisdiction. Thereafter another court, though it might originally have taken jurisdiction, is wholly without power to interfere …." (Browne v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 593, 597; accord, Princess Lida v. Thompson (1939) 305 U.S. 456, 466; County of Siskiyou v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 83, 91.) The issue appellants raise turns on whether the probate court exercised jurisdiction over the Snelling Ranch and Stacey's lien documents before the quiet title action was filed, which it most certainly did.
The probate court acquired jurisdiction over the subject property, Stacey, and Gabriel under, inter alia, Probate Code section 850 et seq. The statutory scheme "provides a mechanism for court determination of rights in property claimed to belong to a decedent or another person." (Estate of Kraus, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 111.) "Pursuant to section 855, '[a]n action brought under this part may include claims, causes of action, or matters that are normally raised in a civil action to the extent that the matters are related factually to the subject matter of a petition filed under this part.'" (Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62, 86.) During the Ashlock I proceedings, the probate court not only resolved Gabriel's and Stacey's competing claims to the Snelling Ranch, but also a dispute regarding the validity of Stacey's promissory note and deed of trust.
"As an incident of its function of settling the estates of deceased persons and passing upon final accounts, a court sitting in probate has continuing jurisdiction to determine any questions arising from controversies over the administration of estate property, in order to prevent fraud and waste." (Estate of Beard, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 772-773.) Here, further disputes arose over ownership of Stacey's lien documents and the propriety of Gabriel levying upon them as a judgment creditor. It was Stacey who implored the probate court, by and through Crabtree's legal representation, to prohibit an execution sale and instead allow the value of the promissory note to be applied "toward satisfying her debt to Gabriel and the Estate" upon sale of the Snelling Ranch. On June 5, 2020, the probate court effectively determined Gabriel was entitled to partial satisfaction of his judgment in the amount of the value of the promissory note. Stacey was thus ordered "to execute a reconveyance of the Deed of Trust." Crabtree Schmidt did not file its quiet title action until two weeks later, on June 19, 2020.
"A reconveyance is the instrument that clears title to property subject to a recorded deed of trust." (Ricketts v. McCormack (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1327, fn. 1.) Ordinarily, reconveyance "is accomplished by the beneficiary executing a request for reconveyance. When the trustee receives the request, the trustee executes and records a deed of reconveyance transferring the security interest to the current owner of the property. On recordation, the lien is extinguished." (5 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2021) § 13:140, p. 13-540, fns. omitted, citing Civ. Code, § 2941.) "Conversely, when the obligation secured by the deed of trust is satisfied, but it has not been reconveyed, the lien is extinguished as between the parties, but the beneficiary has the legal obligation to reconvey in order to remove the cloud on title." (Ibid., fn. omitted.) By ordering a reconveyance, the probate court in essence determined Gabriel's rights visà-vis Stacey's lien against the Snelling Ranch.
The reconveyance order is significant because it shows the probate court exercised jurisdiction prior to the filing of Crabtree Schmidt's quiet title action. Appellants are therefore incorrect in arguing "Merced County obtained jurisdiction" when the quiet title action was filed. Setting aside Gabriel's allegations of malicious intent, Crabtree Schmidt should have known its conduct was procedurally improper. "Under the doctrine of priority of jurisdiction, the first superior court to assume and exercise jurisdiction in the case acquires exclusive jurisdiction until the matter is disposed of." (Levine v. Smith (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1135.)
Appellants sat on whatever rights they had for more than three years before revealing or asserting them. Attorney Crabtree was aware of Gabriel's judgment lien, filed in November 2016, and of the separate lien created by the OEX in early 2017. As discussed, Crabtree Schmidt's UCC-1 financing statement was filed one day after the OEX and Stacey's admission to shredding the original promissory note and deed of trust. Crabtree was present during the OEX and continued to represent Stacey through 2020. "A partner's knowledge, notice, or receipt of a notification of a fact relating to the partnership is effective immediately as knowledge by, notice to, or receipt of a notification by the partnership, except in the case of a fraud on the partnership committed by or with the consent of that partner." (Corp. Code, § 16102, subd. (f).)
Appellants watched in silence as litigation ensued over Gabriel's efforts to levy upon Stacey's lien documents. By November 2017, the probate court had ruled that Stacey's granting of a security interest in her property to a different law firm was an invalid attempt to defraud a judgment creditor. Appellants said nothing about their own purported security interest at that time. Two years later, Crabtree was still arguing, albeit in a representative capacity, that Stacey's promissory note could and should be used "toward satisfying her debt to Gabriel and the Estate." The inescapable impression is that of gamesmanship and unclean hands.
The doctrine of unclean hands "'demands that a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he seeks a remedy. He must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of his claim.'" (Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110.)
For appellants to now claim they did not receive adequate notice of the proceedings regarding Gabriel's rights vis-à-vis Stacey's lien is not persuasive. Appellants could have sought to intervene or object after filing their UCC-1 financing statement in February 2017, but they did nothing. They were aware of Gabriel's levy efforts and, by January 2020, of the pending sale of the Snelling Ranch, but they waited until June 2020 before seeking relief in a different court. When given the opportunity to litigate the matter in the probate court, appellants declined to participate. Given the circumstances, we conclude the requirements of due process were satisfied. (See Benson v. California Coastal Com. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 348, 353 ["Actual notice satisfies due process"]; cf United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa (2010) 559 U.S. 260, 272 [actual notice of bankruptcy proceedings satisfied constitutional due process requirements]; Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds (9th Cir. 2008) 553 F.3d 1193, 1203 ["Because 'due process does not require actual notice,' [citation], it follows a fortiori that actual notice satisfies due process"]; In re Pence (7th Cir. 1990) 905 F.2d 1107, 1109 ["Creditors … must follow the administration of the bankruptcy estate to determine what aspects of the proceeding they may want to challenge. [Citations.] [Appellant] was not entitled to stick its head in the sand and pretend it would not lose any rights by not participating in the proceedings"].)
We agree with appellants that the merits of the probate court's final ruling are not at issue. However, reviewing the applicable law will help to explain why appellants were not indispensable parties. The probate court's jurisdiction over Stacey and Gabriel was sufficient for it to determine Gabriel's entitlement to a partial satisfaction of his judgment against Stacey, which is really the issue that was decided.
To recap the timeline, Gabriel's notice of judgment lien was filed with the Secretary of State on November 3, 2016. Stacey purported to grant a security interest in her personal property to Crabtree Schmidt three months later. Crabtree Schmidt's UCC-1 financing statement was filed on February 2, 2017, though the corresponding security agreement is dated February 3, 2017. The trial court found Gabriel's judgment lien to be valid and effective, and this finding is not at issue. We note, however, that Stacey never disputed the validity of the judgment lien. If anything, her shredding of the original promissory note and deed of trust, and her further efforts to prevent Gabriel from levying upon the "duplicate originals," show Stacey believed the judgment lien to be valid and enforceable.
"We begin by observing that, all things being equal, liens have priority among themselves according to the date of their creation." (Gilman v. Dalby (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 606, 617.) More specifically, "[c]onflicting interests rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection." (Code Civ. Proc., § 697.590, subd. (b).) "With respect to a judgment lien on personal property, [filing means] the filing of a notice of judgment lien in the office of the Secretary of State …." (Id., subd. (a)(1)(A).) Therefore, "[i]n the case of a judgment lien, priority dates from the time filing is first made covering the personal property." (Id., subd. (b).)
"A '"[s]ecurity interest"' is 'an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.'" (MDQ, LLC v. Gilbert, Kelly, Crowley & Jennett LLP (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 702, 709, quoting Cal. U. Com. Code, § 1201, subd. (b)(35).) "A '"[s]ecurity agreement"' is 'an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.'" (MDQ, LLC, at p. 710, quoting Cal. U. Com. Code, § 9102, subd. (a)(74).) "Under the California Uniform Commercial Code, with certain exceptions, 'a financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests ….'" (MDQ, LLC, at p. 711.)
"With inapplicable exceptions, [Code of Civil Procedure] section 697.590, subdivision (b) determines 'priority between a judgment lien on personal property and a conflicting security interest … in the same personal property.'" (MDQ, LLC v. Gilbert, Kelly, Crowley & Jennett LLP, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 710.) In other words, the first to file has priority of rights. It follows that Gabriel's priority of rights vis-à-vis Stacey's lien and the proceeds from the Snelling Ranch sale could be determined based entirely upon the conduct of Gabriel and Stacey. Gabriel's judgment lien was filed in November 2016, and Stacey did not attempt to grant a security interest until February 2017. It does not matter to whom she purported to grant the security interest because the putative grantee could not have filed or otherwise perfected their security interest prior to the filing of Gabriel's judgment lien. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 697.590, subd. (b); Cal. U. Com. Code, §§ 9310, subd. (a), 9312, subds. (a), (e).)
There is a shorter path to the same result. As noted, "a court sitting in probate has continuing jurisdiction to determine any questions arising from controversies over the administration of estate property in order to prevent fraud and waste[,] … to control the proceedings before it[,] and thereby protect the integrity of the estate." (Estate of Beard, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 772-773.) The probate court below was empowered to determine, as it did, that Stacey's attempts to grant security interests in her property subsequent to the filing of Gabriel's judgment lien were done in bad faith and to defraud the judgment creditor. (See Civ. Code, § 3439.04, subd. (a)(1) ["A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation ...[¶] [w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor"].) The focus is again on Stacey rather than any particular party claiming rights by and through her actions.
Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, the ruling as to Gabriel's priority of rights is not subject to reversal for lack of in personam jurisdiction over appellants.
IV. Jurisdiction to Determine Value of the Promissory Note
Appellants present an undeveloped claim regarding the value of the promissory note. They appear to be arguing the Merced Superior Court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine that issue based on their filing of the separate quiet title action. We have already explained the flaw in this argument. Moreover, Stacey litigated the issue of the note's value herself. Attorney Crabtree made arguments on her behalf in written oppositions and at the hearing on July 13, 2020. Appellants fail to demonstrate jurisdictional error.
V. Jurisdiction to Compel Appellants' Performance of Acts
Appellants' briefing sporadically references the order compelling them to, in their words, "dismiss the lis pendis" [sic]. They are referring to the ruling on Gabriel's July 2020 ex parte application that directed them to "duly sign and record in the Recorder's Office for the County of Merced, California, a Withdrawal of Notice of Action" in relation to their quiet title lawsuit. The record does not show the lis pendens was actually withdrawn, but we will assume it was since, by all indications, the Snelling Ranch was sold a few months later. Appellants contend such an order could not have been made unless they were parties to the case.
First, while they may not have been party litigants, appellants were officers of the court for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 128. (Lyle v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 470, 476; see Shenefield v. Shenefield (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 619, 633 ["An attorney is an officer of the court, 'generally subject to the court's control as a "person … connected with a judicial proceeding before [the court]"'"].) The statute recognizes the power of all courts in this state "[t]o control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto." (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(5).) A court also has the power to "compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process." (Id., subd. (a)(4).)
Second, as a court of general jurisdiction, a probate court has "broad equitable powers" to fashion remedies and grant necessary relief. (Estate of Kraus, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 114.) This includes the power to enforce the previously discussed priority of jurisdiction doctrine, also known as "the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction." (County of Siskiyou v. Superior Court, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 91.) "The established rule of 'exclusive concurrent jurisdiction' provides that where two (or more) courts possess concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over a cause, the court that first asserts jurisdiction assumes it to the exclusion of all others, thus rendering 'concurrent' jurisdiction 'exclusive' with the first court." (Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1175 (Franklin & Franklin).)
"Although the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is similar in effect to the statutory plea in abatement [(see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c)], it has been interpreted and applied more expansively, and therefore may apply where the narrow grounds required for a statutory plea of abatement do not exist." (Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 788.) "Unlike the statutory plea of abatement, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require absolute identity of parties, causes of action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions. [Citations.] If the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to bring before it all the necessary parties, the fact that the parties in the second action are not identical does not preclude application of the rule." (Ibid.) The rule is statutorily enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 526, which authorizes injunctive relief "[w]here the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings." (Id., subd. (a)(6).)
The probate court's order compelling appellants to remove the lis pendens is somewhat analogous to what occurred in the Franklin & Franklin case. There, the First Appellate District "considered whether a superior court that had approved a class action settlement had the authority to enjoin former class counsel from pursuing actions on behalf of individual class members before a different superior court." (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1062, discussing Franklin & Franklin, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1175-1176.) The Alameda Superior Court issued an order restraining several lawyers and their law firms "from prosecuting two civil actions for damages and declaratory relief filed in the San Diego Superior Court." (Franklin & Franklin, at pp. 1170-1171.) The appellate court held it was "squarely within the remedial powers of the first court to assert jurisdiction and protect its exercise with equitable powers by enjoining collateral litigation." (Id. at p. 1176.)
The present case is admittedly distinguishable from Franklin & Franklin in several respects. Nevertheless, in light of the probate court's broad equitable and statutory authority, and considering appellants' status as officers of the court, we are not convinced that a jurisdictional error occurred.
VI. Denial of Appellant's "Motion Objecting to Jurisdiction"
Appellants briefly argue "[t]he motion objecting to jurisdiction should have been granted because it was unopposed." (Boldface omitted.) The claim is based on (1) the assumption their filing constituted a motion to quash under Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 and (2) the assumption their claims regarding the necessity of in personam jurisdiction are meritorious. Appellants further rely on the following principle: "On a challenge to personal jurisdiction by a motion to quash, the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the factual bases justifying the exercise of jurisdiction." (ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198, 209-210.)
Appellants reason that by filing their motion, the burden shifted to Gabriel to show the probate court had personal jurisdiction over them. And because Gabriel did not file an opposition brief, the motion should have been granted. There are several problems with the argument.
Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 authorizes and governs motions "[t]o quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction." (Id., subd. (a)(1).) The provision upon which appellants relied is expressly designed for responding to a "summons" because a summons "is the process by which a court acquires personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil action." (MJS Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 555, 557.) But as appellants readily concede and emphasize, they were never served with a summons.
Appellants' motion requested "an order quashing [Gabriel's] purported service of an ex parte application on [Crabtree Schmidt]." The motion also alleged Crabtree Schmidt was never actually served with the ex parte application. Other parts of the motion requested the application itself be quashed. However, if there was no summons, there was nothing for the probate court to quash pursuant to the statutory authority upon which appellants relied.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the probate court construed the motion as one for reconsideration of its oral ruling on the ex parte application. The motion was denied pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 for failure to identify "new or different facts, circumstances, or law." (Id., subd. (a).) The motion ruling noted Crabtree Schmidt had already argued the issue of personal jurisdiction in a written objection to the ex parte application.
"When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).)
"The proposition that a trial court may construe a motion bearing one label as a different type of motion is one that has existed for many decades. 'The nature of a motion is determined by the nature of the relief sought, not by the label attached to it. The law is not a mere game of words.' [Citation.] … The principle that a trial court may consider a motion regardless of the label placed on it by a party is consistent with the court's inherent authority to manage and control its docket." (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 187, 193.)
Rather than explain how the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 may have been satisfied, appellants merely note their motion preceded the written order granting the ex parte application. It is true that an "oral ruling on a motion does not become effective until it is filed in writing with the clerk or entered in the minutes." (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1170.) But this only means the motion was premature. Filing a premature motion for reconsideration following the issuance of an oral ruling does not excuse the moving party's failure to state new facts, circumstances, or law.
VII. Appellants' Briefing Deficiencies
Gabriel argues at length about appellants' failure to comply with the California Rules of Court. Examples include omission of the probate court's register of actions (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.122(b)(1)(F), 8.124(b)(1)(A)); failure to provide record citations to support factual assertions (id., rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)); and failure to state each point under a separate heading and with citations to legal authority (id., rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)). These points are well taken but require no further discussion.
DISPOSITION
The challenged order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: DETJEN, Acting P. J., SMITH, J.
[*] Retired Judge of the Stanislaus Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.