Opinion
8909
04-04-2019
IN RE ARIEL P., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant. Presentment Agency.
Dawne A. Mitchell, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Raymond E. Rogers of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Rebecca L. Visgaitis of counsel), for presentment agency.
Dawne A. Mitchell, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Raymond E. Rogers of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Rebecca L. Visgaitis of counsel), for presentment agency.
Friedman, J.P., Gische, Kapnick, Webber, Gesmer, JJ.
Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Gayle P. Roberts, J.), entered on or about August 31, 2017, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent upon a fact-finding determination that he committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of forcible touching and sexual abuse in the third degree, and imposed a conditional discharge for a period of 12 months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Appellant argues that the Family Court should have suppressed both the oral and written statements that he made to a detective. Regardless of whether both statements should have been suppressed, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence that appellant committed the charged offenses was overwhelming, and there is no reasonable possibility that the court's finding would have been any different if appellant's "essentially exculpatory" statement, in which he offered an innocent explanation for his presence at the scene, had been suppressed ( Matter of Jahmeka W., 130 A.D.3d 437, 437, 13 N.Y.S.3d 372 [1st Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 909, 2015 WL 6182321 [2015] ). Although the statement tended to establish the element of identity, that element was established by compelling circumstantial evidence, notwithstanding the absence of an in-court identification by the victim.
As to appellant's arguments regarding the order of disposition, a conditional discharge was the least restrictive alternative consistent with appellant's needs and the community's need for protection. Appellant was in need of treatment for longer than six months, which would have been the maximum period available under an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (see e. g. Matter of Steven F., 127 A.D.3d 536, 537, 8 N.Y.S.3d 71 [1st Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 906, 2015 WL 5445705 [2015] ).