Opinion
No. 06-20-00040-CV
11-05-2020
In the MATTER OF A.R.G., Jr.
Jeff Harrelson, Harrelson Law Firm, PA, P.O. Box 40, Texarkana, AR 75504, for Appellant. J. Randle Smolarz, Assistant District Attorney, 601 Main Street, Texarkana, TX 75501, for Appellee.
Jeff Harrelson, Harrelson Law Firm, PA, P.O. Box 40, Texarkana, AR 75504, for Appellant.
J. Randle Smolarz, Assistant District Attorney, 601 Main Street, Texarkana, TX 75501, for Appellee.
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
OPINION
Opinion by Justice Burgess
A.R.G., Jr., appeals the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction and discretionary transfer to a criminal district court. On appeal, A.R.G. argues that the trial court erred in considering "numerous written reports and documents over [his] confrontation objections." Because A.R.G.'s global objection to voluminous documents was insufficient to preserve error, we affirm the juvenile court's order.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The State alleged that A.R.G., who was fifteen, intentionally caused the shooting death of A.K.J. while in the course of committing a robbery. Seeking to try A.R.G. as an adult, the State petitioned the juvenile court for waiver of its jurisdiction and for transfer to a criminal district court. Section 54.02 of Texas Family Code, which authorizes such a transfer, states, in relevant part:
(a) The juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child to the appropriate district court or criminal district court for criminal proceedings if:
(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of felony;
(2) the child was:
(A) 14 years of age or older at the time he is alleged to have committed the offense, if the offense is a capital felony, an aggravated controlled substance felony, or a felony of the first degree, and no adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning that offense; or
(B) 15 years of age or older at the time the child is alleged to have committed the offense, if the offense is a felony of the second or third degree or a state jail felony, and no adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning that offense; and
(3) after a full investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the child before the court committed the offense alleged and that because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.
....
(c) The juvenile court shall conduct a hearing without a jury to consider transfer of the child for criminal proceedings.
(d) Prior to the hearing, the juvenile court shall order and obtain a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the child, his circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense.
(e) At the transfer hearing the court may consider written reports from probation officers, professional court employees, or professional consultants in addition to the testimony of witnesses....
(f) In making the determination required by Subsection (a) of this section, the court shall consider, among other matters:
(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person;
(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
(3) the record and previous history of the child; and
(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.
At the hearing, the State sought to admit several of the items contemplated by Section 54.02(d) and (e), including (1) a "75-page packet of documents" about the investigation; (2) a fifteen-page report of A.R.G.'s grades and school disciplinary records; (3) a twenty-eight-page packet comprised of prior juvenile referrals, incident reports, and police reports; (4) a forty-one-page report from the Harris County Detention Center; and (5) nine pages of A.R.G.'s social history (collectively referred to as "the Reports"). With respect to each document, A.R.G. objected on the grounds that he had not been able to confront his accusers. The trial court overruled A.R.G.'s global objection.
II. Analysis
On appeal, A.R.G. does not argue that the juvenile court erred in its findings under Section 54.02(a) of the Texas Family Code. Instead, A.R.G. argues that it should not have considered the Reports in making its Section 54.02(a) determination because the Confrontation Clause "should be applicable to juvenile certification/transfer hearings." Yet, while a "ruling in admitting or excluding evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion," A.R.G.'s brief does not argue that the trial court's admission of the Reports was an abuse of discretion. Singleton v. Bowman , 557 S.W.3d 711, 713–14 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. denied) (quoting Jones v. Quiroga , No. 06-17-00016-CV, 2017 WL 3382452, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 3, 2017, no pet.)) (mem. op.) (citing Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen , 15 S.W.3d 525, 527–28 (Tex. 2000) ). Instead, A.R.G. acknowledges the existence of Texas caselaw holding that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to hearings under Section 54.02 of the Texas Family Code but argues that we should hold otherwise. See In re S.M. , 207 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied) ; Matter of S.J.M. , 922 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) ("The Sixth Amendment right applies specifically to criminal prosecutions and does not apply to a waiver of jurisdiction hearing.") (citing In re G.B.B. , 638 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ) ; In re R.G.S. , 575 S.W.2d 113, 117–18 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ); see McKaine v. State , 170 S.W.3d 285, 289 n.5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.) ; Alford v. State , 806 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991) ("No constitutional right to confrontation exists in a dispositional hearing."), aff'd , 866 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ; but see Matter of P.M. , 543 S.W.3d 365, 378 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). Even assuming, without deciding, that the Confrontation Clause applies to Section 54.02 proceedings, we cannot address the point of error raised by A.R.G. in his brief on the merits because he did not properly preserve his complaint.
See also In re J.A.W. , 976 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (finding that "Section 54.02(e) of the Family Code ... provides an explicit exception to the hearsay rule in a transfer to criminal court proceeding"); In re Q.D. , 600 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1980, no writ) ("Section 54.02 of the Family Code is a statutory exception to the hearsay rule and authorizes the introduction of specified reports that would otherwise be objectionable."); R.G.S. , 575 S.W.2d at 119 ("A juvenile court may consider certain hearsay reports at a transfer ... hearing that would not be admissible at an adjudication hearing.").
In order to present "a complaint for appellate review," A.R.G. was required to make a timely objection that "stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context." TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). "When an exhibit contains both admissible and inadmissible evidence, the burden is on the objecting party to specifically point out which portion of the evidence is inadmissible." Alberty v. State , 528 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (citing Whitaker v. State , 286 S.W.3d 355, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ); see Martinez v. Kwas , 606 S.W.3d 446, 456 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied) (citing Speier v. Webster Coll. , 616 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. 1981)) ("A general objection to a unit of evidence as a whole, ... which does not point out specifically the portion objected to, is properly overruled if any part of it is admissible."). This rule applies to juvenile proceedings. In re L.D.T. , No. 10-05-00016-CV, 2006 WL 301073, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 8, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Here, as in L.D.T. , A.R.G.'s global objections were "insufficient to make the court aware of which statements in or portions of the documents he believed violated the Confrontation Clause." Id. At no point did A.R.G.'s objections "specifically refer to the challenged material to apprise the trial court of the precise objection." Id. Our review of the record here shows that portions of each exhibit were admissible. "The trial court should never be required to sift through challenged evidenced to segregate admissible evidence from excludable evidence." Id. "In those instances where an exhibit contains both admissible and inadmissible evidence, a trial court may ‘safely admit it all or exclude it all, and the losing party, no matter who he is, will be made to suffer on appeal the consequences of his insufficiently specific offer or objection.’ " Id. (quoting Jones v. State , 843 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Maxwell v. State , 48 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ).
Because A.R.G.'s global Confrontation Clause objection to voluminous documents did not preserve error, we overrule his sole complaint on appeal.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the juvenile court's order.