Opinion
2022–02121 Docket No. D–403–22
03-22-2023
In the MATTER OF ALQUAN J.-H. (Anonymous), appellant.
Ronna L. DeLoe, Larchmont, NY, for appellant. Sylvia O. Hinds–Radix, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Jane L. Gordon and Lauren L. O'Brien of counsel), for respondent.
Ronna L. DeLoe, Larchmont, NY, for appellant.
Sylvia O. Hinds–Radix, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Jane L. Gordon and Lauren L. O'Brien of counsel), for respondent.
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, JOSEPH A. ZAYAS, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Alquan J.-H. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Alan Beckoff, J.), dated March 15, 2022. The order of disposition, upon an order of fact-finding dated January 28, 2022, made upon the admission of Alquan J.-H., finding that he committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and after a dispositional hearing, adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent and directed his placement in a nonsecure detention facility with the Administration for Children's Services for a period of up to 18 months, less the period spent in detention pending disposition.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, the Family Court issued an order of fact-finding, made upon the appellant's admission, finding that he had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. After a dispositional hearing, the court issued an order of disposition which adjudicated the appellant a juvenile delinquent and directed his placement in a nonsecure detention facility for a period of up to 18 months, less the period spent in detention pending disposition. The Family Court has broad discretion in determining the proper disposition in a juvenile delinquency proceeding (see Family Ct Act § 141 ; Matter of Yaakov K., 162 A.D.3d 1028, 1028, 80 N.Y.S.3d 146 ), and its determination is accorded great deference (see Matter of Shalar N., 162 A.D.3d 882, 883, 80 N.Y.S.3d 103 ). "[T]he least restrictive alternative test does not require the court to actually try the lowest form of intervention, have it fail, and then try each succeeding level of intervention before ordering ... placement" ( Matter of Sharice B., 149 A.D.3d 833, 833, 51 N.Y.S.3d 620 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in placing him in the custody of the Administration for Children's Services for a period of up to 18 months, less the period spent in detention pending disposition (see Matter of Jayla K., 165 A.D.3d 1259, 1260, 84 N.Y.S.3d 895 ; Matter of Jovan B., 151 A.D.3d 842, 842, 56 N.Y.S.3d 567 ). The record establishes that this disposition was the least restrictive alternative consistent with the appellant's best interests and the need for protection of the community (see Family Court Act § 352.2[2][a] ), particularly in light of, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, his need for increased supervision, his poor school attendance, and the recommendations of the Department of Probation and a Mental Health Services psychologist (see Matter of Jovan B., 151 A.D.3d at 842, 56 N.Y.S.3d 567 ; Matter of Nysaiah L., 125 A.D.3d 776, 777, 4 N.Y.S.3d 76 ).
BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., RIVERA, ZAYAS and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.