Opinion
Nos. 05-CP07-016590-A, 05-CP07-016591-A, 05-CP07-016592-A
November 18, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTIONS TO REVIEW PERMANENCY PLANS; TRANSFER OF GUARDIANSHIP; and TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEEDINGS
The captioned matter is a child protection proceeding in which the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (hereinafter DCF) has petitioned the court to terminate the parental rights of the mother, Maria V. (hereinafter Ms. V. or mother), as to her three children, and to terminate the parental rights of the unknown fathers of two of the children, Alejandro and Reynaldo. In addition, the petitions seek termination as to Jose A. regarding the youngest child, Anais, and to John Doe for that child as well, in light of the fact that, Mr. A.'s paternity of the child has not been established.
Mother has moved the court to transfer guardianship of Anais to mother's sister, Ivonne V., and that motion was consolidated for trial with the termination petitions, as were DCF's 2008, 2009 and 2010 motions to review permanency plans and the objections thereto.
DCF executed a 96-hour hold on all three children on February 8, 2007, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-101g, on several bases, including claims of sexual abuse of the oldest child by mother's boyfriend; sexual behavior of the oldest child at school; sexual contact by the oldest child with one or both of his younger siblings; and, mother's apparent inability to comprehend and address these issues. An ex parte order of temporary custody (OTC) was issued for all three children on February 9, 2007, and the OTC was sustained on February 16, 2007, without prejudice to the results of a competency evaluation of mother ordered on the same day. On April 4, 2007, mother was declared incompetent and non-restorable, due to cognitive deficits, and a guardian ad litem was appointed for her. On June 15, 2007, the court adjudicated the children neglected in that they had been denied proper care and attention and were living under conditions injurious. Specific steps were ordered, requiring, inter alia, that mother learn how to protect her children from further sexual abuse, learn to be able to supervise the children, and procure adequate housing. The children were committed to the care and custody of DCF.
On August 5, 2009, after a subsequent examination and hearing, mother was again determined to be incompetent and non-restorable.
The initial permanency plan for each of the three children, filed with the court on November 7, 2007, and approved by the court on December 13, 2007, called for reunification of the children with their mother. The amended motion for review of a second permanency plan, filed on October 16, 2008, revealed that the proposed plan had changed to termination of parental rights and adoption. That motion, and the motions for review of the 2009 and 2010 permanency plans of termination and adoption, as well as the objections thereto, are before the court at this time.
Petitions for termination of parental rights were filed on January 6, 2009, but were withdrawn on June 23, 2009. As to mother, specific steps were ordered a second time on September 2, 2009. These paralleled the initial steps and also added the need to cooperate with four specific service providers. Three of these had already been started or completed, and mother had complied to the extent that she had cooperated with the providers. Termination petitions were again filed on November 9, 2009, as to mother, the "John Doe" fathers of Alejandro and Reynaldo, and the putative father of Anais, Jose A. As to mother, regarding all three children, and as to Jose A., the petitions allege that the children had previously been adjudicated neglected or uncared for and that mother and Jose A. had not achieved timely and sufficient rehabilitation. As to the "John Doe" fathers, the petitions allege abandonment and the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship. Petitions for termination were again filed on May 28, 2010, as to all three "John Doe" fathers and Jose A. These petitions allege abandonment and no ongoing parent-child relationship to all four of the putative fathers, and, as to Jose A. and the "John Doe" father of Anais, they also allege failure to rehabilitate.
Service on all of the respondents has been confirmed.
Trial on the motions to review the three permanency plans and the objections thereto, the termination petitions and the transfer of guardianship motion proceeded on September 13, 14, and 15, 2010. The proceedings remained open until October 12, 2010, for the parties to file their proposed findings as to the timeframes of DCF services. Mother was present throughout the trial, as was her guardian ad litem and her counsel. Also present at trial were counsel for Alejandro, a separate counsel representing Reynaldo and Anais, a DCF representative and counsel for DCF. DCF presented the testimony of ten witnesses, including two psychologists, a therapist/counselor, a case manager and family support worker from the Department of Developmental Services (DDS), an in-home worker from the Institute of Professional Practice, the foster parents with whom Reynaldo and Anais have been residing, two DCF social workers, and a clinician from the Clifford Beers Clinic. The only other testimony at trial was that of Ivonne V., mother's sister, who was called on behalf of mother. Counsel for the children participated in the trial but did not call any witnesses or introduce any documentary evidence. There were numerous exhibits introduced at trial by DCF and the mother, and these will be identified to the extent that the findings and discussion below so warrant.
On motion by DCF filed at the commencement of the trial and unopposed by the other parties, the court took judicial notice of certain filings, dates, hearings and decisions in these matters.
This court has jurisdiction. This court is not aware of any other pending court proceedings affecting the custody of these children. There are no claims of Indian tribal affiliation.
FACTUAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL The Children Alejandro
Alejandro is a ten-year-old boy who has consistently reported sexual abuse by his mother's boyfriend, Jose A., with his mother's knowledge and lack of intervention. In the course of addressing these matters, DCF was also alerted to exposure of Alejandro and his siblings to domestic violence in their home, exposure to pornography in that home, and the fact that mother's live-in boyfriend was frequently under the influence of alcohol. One of the factors that originally brought the situation to the attention of DCF was the report of Alejandro's sexually inappropriate behavior toward other children at school and it was subsequently learned that Alejandro may have had sexual contact with his younger sister, on more than one occasion, about which mother had knowledge but did not intervene. The evidence also suggests the possible sexual abuse of this child, prior to the above, by a boyfriend of the maternal grandmother.
Psychologist Nelson Rivera has diagnosed Alejandro as a child who has suffered from sexual abuse, with residual post-traumatic stress disorder. The doctor has also diagnosed mild mental retardation, as well as a mixed-receptive expressive language disorder.
Initially, DCF had difficulty placing Alejandro, but it provided therapy in the interim. DCF arranged for placement at Kids' Cottage and also for Alejandro to be evaluated. Recommendations made as a result of the evaluation were implemented at the Clifford Beers Clinic. In August 2008, DCF was able to place Alejandro with professional foster parents in a comfortable home in a pleasant neighborhood. At first Alejandro experienced behavioral issues both in the home and at school. However, he has become adjusted; his behavioral issues have decreased; he has developed a strong connection with his foster family; he is comfortable living in that home; and, otherwise he is also doing well. While this foster home is not an adoptive resource, the family has expressed a willingness to serve as long-term residential care providers. Alejandro is a special education student, receiving additional assistance in math, reading and language. He has made much improvement in his studies and in his behavior at school and in the foster parents' home. He has become more social, more confident, more understanding and more communicative. He responds well to the structured environment provided by his foster parents.
DCF has provided treatment services to Alejandro, but those services ended last December due to lack of progress and the need for more stimulating services. DCF made additional referrals, and since May 2010, the child is again receiving therapeutic assistance at the Clifford Beers Clinic. Alejandro has been diagnosed as being extremely hyper-sexualized. He is very angry and confused and has only a minimum of skills to address these problems. Alejandro has limited intellectual abilities, having been evaluated to be in the low to moderately low intelligence range. Because of Alejandro's past experiences, as well as his cognitive limitations and his limited abilities to address internal and external issues, he frequently feels overwhelmed and distressed. He requires care, attention, and protection on an even greater level than most children his age.
Reynaldo
Reynaldo is ten years of age. He has experienced speech and language delay, for which he is receiving therapy. Reynaldo has disclosed his knowledge of Alejandro's sexual abuse by Jose A., but Reynaldo denies that he has been a victim of Mr. A. Reynaldo does recall, however, threats by Mr. A to burn down the house.
Reynaldo has been living with his foster family for the entire three and one-half years that he has been in the care and custody of DCF. He has developed a strong attachment to his foster family, including his foster brothers. He is very fond of his sister, who lives in a different foster home, and he enjoys spending time with her. In addition to everyday family and school activities, Reynaldo plays soccer and regularly swims with his foster family.
Reynaldo is a special education student, receiving additional assistance in reading, language, speech and math. He has been in therapy for three years, and, although he has some behavioral problems, he has made much progress and continues to improve on many levels — socially, mentally, developmentally and educationally. His foster family would like to adopt him.
Anais
Anais, who is five years of age, has been living with her foster family since she was two, for almost three years. She was developmentally delayed, but has made progress with the help of her foster parents and the special education, speech and language services that have been provided to her through DCF. She has changed from a very quiet, shy, retiring little girl to one who plays with others, is outgoing, talks a lot and enjoys engaging with others. She lives with three foster siblings and has adult foster siblings who visit with her. She is in kindergarten and has been identified as potentially needing special education in the future. Anais suffers from ear infections, presently has tubes in her ears, and her foster family has made sure that she is medically followed for these difficulties. Her foster family would like to adopt her.
The Fathers
The identities of the biological fathers of Alejandro and Reynaldo are unknown and these fathers have never been present, physically, emotionally, financially, or otherwise for the two boys.
Jose A. has been identified by mother as the biological father of Anais, however, his paternity of the child has never been established, and because his whereabouts have been unknown since November 2008, efforts to establish paternity could not be made. Jose A. has not had contact with DCF or the family for almost two years; he has not provided support for Anais in any way during that time; he has not attempted to do anything to reunify, and, he is believed to have returned to his birth homeland, Mexico. The "John Doe" putative father of Anais has never been present in the child's life in any way whatsoever.
The Mother
Mother is forty years of age. She was born in Puerto Rico. She lived with her father until she was thirteen, and was then returned to her mother's care because of domestic violence between her father and her stepmother. Ms. V. denies any history of sexual or physical abuse as a child.
Ms. V. began to receive special education at the age of six. Her education continued after her move to Brooklyn, New York, at the age of fifteen, and her move to New Haven, Connecticut, at the age of nineteen. She dropped out of school (level of education unknown) at about the age of twenty-one. In January 2008, psychologist Nelson Rivera evaluated Ms. V. as having poor attention and concentration skills, as well as a poor memory. He further evaluated her to be mentally and intellectually deficient, and concluded that her test scores place her in the classification of mild mental retardation. In addition, the psychologist reports significant coping deficits, including a tendency to hastily and haphazardly evaluate information, causing her to neglect critical pieces of information or cues. Mother also suffers from being self-focused, but without a positive self-image, and prone to denial, rationalization and defensiveness. In his second evaluation in July 2009, Dr. Rivera noted a slight increase in mother's test scores, but he remained constant in his evaluation of her mental and intellectual limitations and abilities, as well as her personality traits. Dr. Rivera noted that mother's depression level had increased, however, he opined that the depression did not affect mother's functioning abilities.
According to Dr. Rivera, mother's cognitive deficits reflect a capacity to learn, but at a very slow rate. In addition, mother's deficits negatively affect any potential for her to understand certain concepts, and also interfere with basic functional skills of daily living.
Ms. V. met Jose A. about five years ago. She has asserted that this was a time during which she was experiencing emotional and financial difficulties, and Mr. A. helped her raise her two boys. She has further reported that, although Mr. A. and she argued from time to time about his alcohol consumption, there were no other problems in the relationship. Mother also reported that she never witnessed Mr. A. ever inappropriately touch any of her children, and, she has also contended that she does not believe Jose A. would do anything to hurt her children. As to Alejandro's allegations of sexual abuse by Jose A., mother has, until recently, steadfastly stood by the position that the child is not telling the truth. In addition, contrary to her children's assertions, mother denies any domestic violence during Jose A.'s residency with the family.
After his initial evaluation in 2008, Dr. Rivera recommended that Ms. V. consider counseling to address her depression, her son's alleged sexual abuse, her dependency issues, and her poor choices in male companions. He also suggested that Ms. V. might want to consider a psychiatric consultation to ascertain if she would benefit from medication. Finally, he recommended that DCF continue to assist in procuring records so as to qualify Ms. V. for mental rehabilitation services and that DCF and the court should take into account the cognitive deficits of Ms. V. in setting expectations and providing interventions.
DCF did not immediately refer Ms. V. to a psychiatrist. At the time of trial, Ms. V. had only been seeing such a physician for medication for about five or six months, however, the evidence revealed that Ms. V. may have been taking medication for depression before that time, or had it available to her.
At the time of Dr. Rivera's second evaluation in 2009, mother had been in therapy for over a year. She still had not accepted her son's accounts of the abuse that he had suffered, and she continued to contend that her son "lied." Dr. Rivera's prognosis at that time was "very guarded." In each of her evaluation sessions with Dr. Rivera (January 2008 and July 2009), mother was adamant that Jose A. did not sexually abuse Alejandro and that the child must be confused or not telling the truth. Dr. Rivera testified that this position was maintained despite consistent reports by the child of repeated abuse by the stepfather as well as other reported risk factors in the home, including domestic violence, excessive drinking by the stepfather, and exposure of the children to pornography in the home, all of which mother also denied.
At trial, Dr. Rivera testified that, although mother may now be beginning to show signs of considering that her son was abused, this should be viewed with caution in light of the length of time that it has taken for mother to begin to realize that there is a danger and a problem (more than three and one-half years). In addition, mother's short-term memory problems, as well as mother's aptitude to frequently change her mind, counsel strongly against trusting that she is actually accepting the reports of abuse, or that she will continue to do so. Consequently, at present there is no firm basis on which to premise a belief that mother could or would protect against these dangers in the future.
Dr. Rivera concluded that Ms. V. suffers from mild mental retardation, psychological defensiveness and cognitive rigidity, the combination of which prevents her from appropriately and safely caring for her children and protecting them from future sexual abuse. He opined that mother's inability to believe her son creates confusion and hurt in the child, as well as a sense of "parental betrayal" for the child who already has limited capabilities to deal with the traumas he has experienced.
Mother has not been able to maintain housing for herself and her children. At the time of the intervention by DCF in 2007, Mrs. V. was involved in eviction proceedings. The DCF caseworker assisted Mrs. V., including accompanying her to housing court. Ms. V. decided to move in with her mother, but she only stayed there a few weeks, claiming that she needed privacy. Ms. V. then decided to take the option of a shelter and DCF assisted by bringing her and her belongings to a shelter in New Haven, at which Ms. V. stayed for two months. DCF assisted mother in completing an application for Section 8 housing. Mother then moved into a room in New Haven, for which DCF provided a security and a rent deposit. That residence lasted only three months — Ms. V. was asked to leave because she was not maintaining cleanliness of the accommodations. Ms. V. then moved in with her sister, Maria, for one month, and then with her mother for two more months. Another apartment was found. DCF paid the security deposit, and Ms. V. paid rent with her social security benefits. This, her longest time in residence, lasted for six months, at which time she moved in with her mother again. Some time thereafter, Ms. V. moved again, this time with an "undocumented" family. When that family moved, Ms. V. moved in again with her mother.
Ms. V. is not employed. She is presently receiving social security benefits for her cognitive disabilities and is residing with her mother in her mother's subsidized elderly housing unit.
Support/Reunification Efforts by DCF
Early on, DCF assisted mother in making application for benefits and services from the Connecticut Department of Developmental Services and mother became eligible for same in September 2008. Ms. V. has had DDS caseworker services, assisting her in the procuring of housing and translation services, as well as looking into services and providing or arranging transportation to appointments and meetings. Other personal-needs help was also provided, such as assisting Mrs. V. in opening a bank account.
As noted above, DCF has repeatedly assisted mother with housing. DCF has also provided transportation to mother by means of actually driving her to appointments and visits, regularly providing bus passes, and providing assistance in helping mother take advantage of public transportation.
In May 2007, DCF made a referral of mother to the 4Cs domestic violence program and mother participated in this program from early September 2007 through the end of January 2008. Ms. V. was not able to benefit from these services, more likely than not, because of her cognitive limitations, and, although DCF has looked into other possibilities, no unique domestic violence training program has been found. However, the issue of domestic abuse has been addressed in counseling that DCF has provided for mother — psychologist Marlene Baldizon de-Naclerio clearly has addressed this issue with mother, concluding that, before defenses can be taught, mother must first admit to the abuse.
DCF has provided mother with regular visitation with the children. In addition DCF has provided transportation, reminders of days of visitation, and has assisted mother in establishing a relationship with one of the foster parents so as to allow visitation with the children in that home. Mother has been consistent in attending visitation and has also been attentive to advising when she has had to cancel. The visitation originally took place on a supervised basis at the DCF offices. Later, visits at the foster homes were arranged, as was visitation in the community. According to the supervising DCF caseworker, mother's interaction with the children was, and still is, very limited. At first, mother would simply sit back and observe. She would not do much with the children, even after she was prompted to do so. At the repeated suggestions of the social worker, mother sometimes remembered to bring games, but she did not engage the children with them. Mother would bring food for the children, but needed to be reminded repeatedly to not bring "junk" food, and, when she was reminded, she sometimes would become upset, indicating that she did not understand, and at other times would say, "I forgot." From time to time, the social worker would arrange for the mother and children to eat out, with mother's assurances that she could pay for same. However, that was not always the case.
For the most part, at the visitations the children interacted well with each other, however, when they did not, or when intervention was otherwise necessary, mother would not attempt to resolve the situation and the caseworker would have to do so.
From early December 2007, through the end of June 2008, therapeutic supervised visitation was provided by Georgette Quackenbush of the Hill Health Center. Ms. Quackenbush was born and raised in Latin America and indicated in her testimony that she believes this to be important to her work because of her appreciation of the potential cultural differences and nuances in parenting norms. Although the plan was for Ms. V. to be part of a group parenting session, the therapy provided by Ms. Quackenbush was on an individual basis, once a week during this period. Ms. Quackenbush again worked with Ms. V. on parenting through Integrated Health/New Connections commencing in April 2010. These are weekly sessions designed to assist in discipline techniques, to provide structured activities in order to foster attachment and bonding, and to provide generalized parenting skills that need to be addressed. The sessions are in two parts. The first hour is set aside for visitation with the children at which assistance is provided by coaching, explanation and advice. The second hour is a "debriefing" session between the therapist and mother to ascertain mother's reactions, to ask and to answer questions, and to provide further assistance.
Mother has experienced difficulty in understanding the goals of the programs and in forming her own goals. She is frequently frustrated, displaying agitation, and she leaves early from the second portion of the sessions. Mother has had difficulty addressing the children's needs in a non-punitive manner and does not appear to be able to understand the importance of attempting to address this. For example, when Reynaldo was becoming upset by questions mother was posing to him, mother did not attempt to address the situation at all and later related to the therapist that it was Reynaldo's problem, not hers. Despite the provision of many different cues during the visitation sessions to prompt nurturing parental behavior, such as praising the child when appropriate, mother has not done so and later has advised the therapist that children should not be praised for good behavior and should always be told the truth, such as when she told one of the children that his haircut was "ugly." Mother has expressed a belief in corporal punishment and has further advised that she believes that there is a great deal of disrespect for parents because of the lack of this type of discipline.
Mother continues to need significant prompting and redirection, but she frequently rejects the suggestions. She appears incapable of addressing the children's emotional needs and has indicated that she does not believe she should do so as a parent, which is especially troubling in light of the special needs of these children. Mother is unable to focus on more than one child at a time, and this negatively affects her ability to address both the emotional and the physical needs of the children. The goals of bonding, attachment, and finding ways of addressing the challenging behavior of the children have not been reached in the parenting therapy. According to Ms. Quackenbush, despite all of the sessions, there has only been limited progress toward any goals and mother's parenting skills level has been at a plateau for some time. Ms. Quackenbush does not see the possibility of mother ever becoming capable of parenting independently and is most concerned as to how mother would monitor behavioral problems.
Ms. Quackenbush had recommended to DCF that Ms. V. see a therapist, and she assumed that Ms. V. was seeing a psychologist. Ms. Quackenbush was not made aware of the 2008 evaluation by Dr. Rivera.
Psychologist de-Naclerio began working with Ms. V. in July 2008, to address development of more solid and productive coping skills and to also address traumatic experiences. As to the first of these goals, the progress was minimum and moderate. By the end of the sessions, Ms. V. was better at calming herself when she began to become upset. As to the second of the goals, again progress was minimal, with Ms. V. only beginning to take "another view" toward her abuse, in other words, beginning to acknowledge it. Sessions with this treatment provider were interrupted from September through November 2009 because of "insurance" issues, and again from January through August 2010, because of the therapist's need to abruptly and unexpectedly take a leave of absence. The lack of significant progress was not attributable to lack of attendance on the part of Ms. V. and Dr. de-Naclerio opined that mother may have made more progress if Dr. de-Naclerio had been able to spend more time with mother. However, the progress was slow and it was not until very recently that mother acknowledged that maybe she "missed something," making reference to the sexual abuse of her son.
At the end of 2008, and again in the beginning of 2009, Dr. de-Naclerio requested a copy of the report of the psychological evaluation that had been done in order to better understand Ms. V.'s cognitive skills and deficits so that she could more effectively work with Ms. V. Dr. de-Naclerio testified that, after reviewing the evaluation, in May 2009, she realized that mother's abilities were so limited that parenting classes for her should have been more "hands-on." Dr. de-Naclerio also believes that a different approach should have been taken as to domestic violence counseling in light of mother's cognitive limitations. Despite these statements, however, Dr. de-Naclerio did not opine that mother was capable of overcoming her parental deficits. It would be surprising if Dr. de-Naclerio, a trained, licensed and experienced psychologist, were unable to recognize Ms. V.'s limitations without the benefit of Dr. Rivera's report. In addition, it appears that everyone, including Dr. de-Naclerio, believed that the doctor's leave of absence would be a short one, and the court was left with the distinct impression, during the doctor's testimony, that she may have felt responsible for the delay in the continuing therapy of Ms. V. Moreover, Dr. de-Naclerio reported to Dr. Rivera as late as September 2009, that mother was still strongly denying that Jose A. had sexually abused her son, and Dr. de-Naclerio also reported her conclusion that mother has a strong denial system and suffers from cognitive rigidity. Dr. de-Naclerio concluded that mother's difficulty in acknowledging abuse to herself stood in her way of addressing it and recognizing that her children had been abused.
MOTION TO TRANSFER GUARDIANSHIP
The children have two maternal aunts, whose names are Maria and Ivonne, and mother has moved this court to transfer guardianship of her five-year-old daughter, Anais, to Ivonne. Maria had initially expressed an interest in caring for Alejandro and Ivonne had initially expressed an interest taking on the guardianship of Reynaldo. Maria is no longer interested in serving as a resource. Ivonne has maintained contact with Reynaldo and his foster family and she now believes that it would be better for Reynaldo to remain with that family, rather than under her guardianship. However, Ivonne is presently interested in assuming the guardianship of Anais.
Ivonne is a licensed daycare provider, presently providing such services for seven children. She testified credibly that she loves Anais, that the child would have her own room in the new home that Ivonne is building; that Ivonne would engage the child in special therapy, training, and social activities; and, that the child would attend the private school that Ivonne's eight-and fifteen-year-old children attend. Ivonne has visited with Anais in the past for birthdays, holidays and on other occasions, and, for approximately the last eight to ten months, Ivonne has been visiting with Anais once a month for two hours in her home.
In deciding the most appropriate custodial placement of the child, the court must focus on many issues, especially the child's need for sustained and steady growth, development, and well-being, as well as the continuity and stability of the child's environment. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559 (2000).
While the court recognizes that Ivonne has a fondess for Anais, the court has concerns about this transfer of guardianship. According to DCF, Ivonne changed her mind on more than one occasion while she was considering guardianship of Reynaldo. Ivonne is taking care of seven daycare children and her own two children, thus time for attention to Anais is limited. Ivonne testified at trial that she never had any concerns about the children while the children were in mother's care. In light of the evidence presented at trial, this is a disturbing revelation. Moreover, the best interests of Anais are served by her continued care in the home of the family of which she has been an integral part for the past three years — a family which attends to all of her needs. In addition, it would appear that this family will strive to maintain open channels for Anais to maintain relationships her biological relatives.
For these reasons, the motion to transfer guardianship is denied.
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW OF PERMANENCY PLANS CT Page 22555
There are three permanency plans for each of the three children at issue in these proceedings. At the commencement of the trial in this matter, there was some confusion as to the status of these motions. The court reviewed the file and prior hearings and reported to the parties and their counsel that the record was not clear as to the status. The court offered that the parties were free to move that prior rulings be clarified by the judge who ruled upon them at the local court or to consider going forward at this time. The parties, through counsel, stipulated that the 2008, 2009, and 2010 motions and the objections thereto be consolidated with the termination trial proceedings and should be decided by this court.
The first of these was comprised of amended motions filed with the court on October 16, 2008, for each of the children, setting forth a plan of termination of parental rights and adoption. The original motions had been filed on September 12, 2008, and although the actual motion forms indicated the plan to be reunification of the children with the mother, the study in support of the plans, filed on the same date, reflected that DCF was seeking termination and adoption. Mother's objection to these plans was timely filed.
The second set of motions and the supporting study were filed on July 30, 2009, and set forth plans for termination and adoption for each of the three children. Mother's objection thereto was timely filed.
The third set of motions and the study in support were filed on June 2, 2010, again seeking approval of plans for termination and adoption. The mother's objection was timely filed.
General Statutes § 46b-129(k) and Practice Book § 35a-14 provide the following directives to ensure relatively timely and expeditious permanent resolution of the situations of children in DCF's custody. The commissioner is obliged to devise a permanency plan and file a motion for review thereof no later than nine months after a child has been placed in the department's custody, and annually thereafter. Parties have thirty days from the filing of the motion to submit any objection, and the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing at which the commissioner has the burden of proving, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the plan is in the child's best interests. In deciding whether or not to approve a permanency plan, the court must consider the child's best interests, taking into consideration the child's need for permanency and further considering that the child's health and safety are paramount in the formulation of any permanency plan.
Having considered the evidence presented at the consolidated trial, the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 2008, 2009, and 2010 permanency plans for termination of parental rights and adoption are appropriate and in the best interests of the children. This court approves those plans and overrules the objections thereto. In addition, the court finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the plans.
DISCUSSION and ADJUDICATORY FINDINGS RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A hearing addressing the issue of termination of parental rights consists of two phases. The initial adjudicatory phase addresses whether grounds for termination exist and, if that is decided in the affirmative, the court moves on to the dispositional phase in which the court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Lukas K., 120 Conn.App. 465, 486 (2010), cert. granted on other grounds, 297 Conn. 914 (2010).
The applicable statutory language as to termination of parental rights on the bases alleged in this matter is:
(1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at the hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, and
(2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and
(3)
(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;
(B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;
***
(D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child; . . .
General Statutes § 17-112(j).
Conduct that demonstrates a parent's lack of continuing interest in the child and a lack of concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare constitutes abandonment. In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 732 (2010), cert. granted on other grounds, 297 Conn. 915 (2010). Indicia of interest include relatively regular and continuing, rather than sporadic, attempts to maintain contact with the child in person or through telephonic, postal or electronic means. Id.; In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 514 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 911 (2009). In addition, parental responsibility includes attention to the physical, educational, and emotional needs of the child. In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App., 307, 315 (2001), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 910 (2001).
As to the basis of "no ongoing parent-child relationship," this court is required to engage in a two-pronged evaluation, determining first whether a parent-child relationship exists, and if it does not, whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interests to permit time for the development of such a relationship. In re Megan M., 24 Conn.App. 338, 340 (1991). The statutory language has been interpreted to apply to situations in which, regardless of fault, the parent-child relationship has been lost or never existed at all. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670 (1979). An ongoing parent-child relationship is one that ordinarily and naturally develops as a result of a parent being involved in the child's life, addressing the child's physical, emotional, moral, and educational needs. In re S.D., 115 Conn.App. 111, 123-24 (2009).
The clear and convincing evidence establishes that, as of the date of the filing of the termination petitions, the "John Doe" fathers of the three children and Jose A., the putative father of Anais, had abandoned the children and had no ongoing parent-child relationships with the children. The "John Does" were never identified by the mother, nor did any of them come forward to act as fathers or assert paternity. Putative father, Jose A., has completely and absolutely disappeared from the life of Anais and his whereabouts are unknown. Not only is there no ongoing parent-child relationship of any of the children with any of these "fathers," there does not appear to be any hope of establishing any such relationships. The clear and convincing evidence as to the children's situations, their difficulties and progress to date, their attachment to their foster families and day-to-day caregivers, the length of time that they have been without their fathers, and their needs for security and permanency firmly establish that it would be detrimental to the children's best interests to allow time for the development of a relationship between any of these children and any the "John Doe" fathers or Jose A.
In its last petition, DCF alleged an additional termination ground as to Jose A. and the John Doe father of Anais, namely failure to rehabilitate. The court's findings as to abandonment and lack of a parent-child relationship suffice to terminate parental rights, without the need to further discuss the failure-to-rehabilitate basis for termination. In re S.D., 115 Conn.App. 111, 117 (2009).
In light of the lack of identification of the "John Does," DCF could not make any efforts at reunification. As to Jose A., although DCF accommodated visitation for him after the temporary custody orders, Jose A. indicated that he did not want to participate in any reunification efforts and then he became "whereabouts unknown" as of November 2008. DCF could not make any more efforts for him than it already had made. The clear and convincing evidence reveals reasonable efforts on the part of DCF as to the fathers and that, because of these children's needs for stability and permanency, it is in the best interests of the children that the parental rights of all of the fathers be terminated.
Mother claims that DCF did not make reasonable efforts in attempting to reunify her with her children. She contends that the services provided were inappropriate in light of her cognitive deficits, specifically pointing out that the domestic violence training failed because it was not tailored to meet her limitations and no other domestic violence education was provided. Mother also faults DCF for failure to timely distribute to providers Dr. Rivera's report and implement all of Dr. Rivera's recommendations, pointing specifically to psychiatric intervention for medication on a more timely basis. It cannot go unnoted that hindsight will often permit a finding that prior efforts were not picture-perfect and that more attention might have been paid to certain details. However, the statutory requirement of a finding of reasonable efforts on the part of DCF does not mandate that the evidence reveal that DCF did everything that it could possibly have done in order to reunify the parent with the child or children, or that the efforts of DCF be determined to be unassailably comprehensive. In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 147 (2009). In the instant matter, the clear and convincing evidence reveals that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their mother.
As an alternative ground to the "reasonable efforts" finding, DCF argued at the close of trial that the evidence in this matter reveals that mother is unable to benefit from reunification efforts. In its petitions, DCF has not checked the box entry for this finding and failure to do so could serve as a basis precluding the court from premising its decision on this basis. In re Christian P., 98 Conn.App. 264, 267-68 (2006). However, failure to check a box on the petition is not fatal if the study in support of the petition provides notice of the basis for a finding. In re Felicia D., 35 Conn.App. 490, 495 (1994), cert denied, 231 Conn. 931 (1994); In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 119-20 (1992). The studies in support of termination clearly set forth DCF's belief, despite mother's efforts, that she was, and would continue to be, unable to progress so as to make reunification possible. The clear and convincing evidence supports the contention that mother was at the time of the petition, and continues to be, unable to benefit from reunification efforts.
Most certainly, mother has been compliant with the steps that she attend visitation offered by DCF and cooperate with and attend parenting and therapy sessions. That alone, however does not suffice as a basis for a finding of personal rehabilitation. The clear and convincing evidence reveals that Ms. V. is not capable of appropriately interacting with her children and more importantly, safely parenting and protecting them. This situation is indeed sad, however, child protection requires the recognition of the distinction between parental love and parental competence. In re Christina M., 90 Conn.App. 565, 575 (2005); aff'd. 280 Conn. 474 (2006). In addition, a parent's efforts, and even a parent's improvement as a result of those efforts, does not preclude the termination of parental rights if the parent continues to be incapable of providing a safe and nurturing home for the child. In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477 (2008), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376 (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902 (1999).
Mother's rejection of her son's reports of abuse is troubling on more than one level. The initial concern is for the welfare of the child, who is clearly disturbed by something that has occurred, and who is disregarded, or labeled a "liar" for reporting the events to his mother. This substantially and negatively affects the child's self-esteem and the child's need for maternal support and it precludes the procurement by mother of potentially necessary protection and help for the child. In order to move to a healthier parent-child relationship, a parent must be able to acknowledge responsibility for the acts of omission or commission which may have contributed to the alleged abuse. This is a fundamental reunification step. In re Allison, 276 Conn. 146, 161 (2005). It is also an important factor in assuring that the parent will diligently attend to protecting the child in the future from potential abuse. In the instant case, the evidence does not support this assurance. As Dr. Rivera testified, a parent's refusal to acknowledge her child's sexual abuse presents a clear warning that the parent will not be able to protect the child from future abuse. Dr. de-Naclerio also underscored the necessity of accepting the fact of abuse as a prerequisite to the potential of addressing it and its residual effects, and this court has placed great weight on the testimony of these experts. In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. 127 n. 12; In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 781 (1999).
The clear and convincing evidence establishes that, as of the date of the filing of the termination petition, the children had been found to be uncared for, had been in the custody of DCF for a period of two and one-half years, and that mother had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage a belief that within a reasonable time she would be able to assume a responsible position in the lives of the children considering the needs and circumstances of the children.
Having so found, the court must now consider whether termination of mother's parental rights is in the best interests of the children, which interests encompass sustained growth and development, well-being, and stability and continuity, on both environmental and personal, interactional bases. In re Jaime S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 733-34; In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 763-64 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920 (2008). The clear and convincing evidence, including the experts' recommendations, confirms that termination of mother's parental rights is in the best interests of the children because of the needs of these children for continued appropriate parenting and protection, nurturing, stability, guidance, and permanency, as they have begun to experience in the last several years.
DISPOSITION RE TERMINATION PETITIONS
The following findings, supporting that termination of parental rights of all of the respondents to all of the children, is in the best interests of the children, are made in accordance with the directives of General Statutes § 17-112(k).
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of the services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children to facilitate reunion.
As to the "John Doe" fathers, DCF could not provide any services.
As to Jose A., visitation was provided, but Mr. A. refused any other reunification services before his disappearance in November 2008. DCF could not have done anything more for him.
As to mother, DCF has provided timely and reasonable services. In addition to the services detailed at pages thirteen through nineteen this memorandum, DCF provided therapy for each of the children, but has been unable to include mother in the children's therapy because the children's therapists do not believe any of the children is ready for that, even after the extended period of time that has passed. As the prior recitation reveals, mother has been provided with assistance in housing, transportation, and visitation. She has also been provided individual therapy, and parental therapy and training.
2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.DCF could not make efforts as to the "John Does" and has done all it could possibly do for Jose A.
Through all of the assistance provided to and for mother, as well as the children, DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to this legislation.
3. The feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardians of such children's persons and any person(s) who has (have) exercised physical care, custody or control for at least one year and with whom the children have developed significant emotional ties.The children have all adjusted well to their foster family placements, and have developed strong attachments to the foster parents, as well as other members of the foster families. As for the two younger children, the foster parents look forward to the opportunity for adoption. There are absolutely no ties of the children to the "John Doe" fathers, and there is no evidence of any connection whatsoever between Anais and putative father, Jose A. While the children do not balk at visiting with mother, they do not engage in any demonstrable way with mother during the visits and are not upset at the end of visits. Furthermore, the evidence does not reveal overwhelmingly strong emotional ties or feelings. In the very difficult balancing that is necessary in these matters, this court finds that the needs of these children for stability and permanency dictate against maintaining their legal connection with their mother.
4. The terms of any applicable court order(s) entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parents, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order(s).Not applicable as to the "John Doe" fathers or Jose A.
Except for housing, mother has been compliant with the letter of most of the court orders and DCF has provided the services promised. Despite those efforts, mother has not been able, and continues to be unable, to provide the necessary parenting and protection for the children.
5. The ages of the children.
The children's ages are: Alejandro — 10 (date of birth: January 19, 2000); Reynaldo — 8 (date of birth: January 6, 2002); and, Anais — 5 (date of birth: September 29, 2005).
6. The efforts the parents have made to adjust such parents' circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parents have maintained contact with the children as part of an effort to reunite the children with the parents, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardians or other custodians of the children.No efforts have been made by the fathers. Mother has maintained regular visitation with the children but has been unable to develop bonds and adequate parenting skills.
7. The extent to which the parents have been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable acts or conduct of the other parent(s) of the children, or the unreasonable acts of any other person(s) or by the economic circumstances of the parent(s).This is not applicable to the fathers or to the mother.
CT Page 22564
ORDERS
Having found by clear and convincing evidence that: grounds exist to terminate the parental rights of the three "John Doe" fathers, the parental rights of the putative father of Anais, Jose A., and the parental rights of mother; that termination would be in the children's best interests; and that the children have a need for a secure and permanent placement, with a focus on adoption, the court grants DCF's petitions and orders the termination of parental rights of John Doe as to Alejandro, of John Doe as to Reynaldo, of John Doe and Jose A. as to Anais, and of mother, Maria V., as to Alejandro, Reynaldo and Anais.The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed the statutory parent of each of these children.
The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families shall file, within thirty days hereof, a report as to the status of each of these children and shall also timely file any additional reports as is required by law.
The clerk of the Probate Court which has jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of any of these children shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at New Haven of the date that each adoption is finalized.
Judgment is entered accordingly.