Opinion
358325
03-10-2022
In re ALADICS, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED
Barry Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 21-009437-NA.
Before: Michael J. Riordan, P.J., and Kirsten Frank Kelly and Brock A. Swartzle, JJ.
Per Curiam.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to two minor children, WA and AA, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), and (m). The children's mother is not a respondent in this case. Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination was in the children's best interests because it relied on information that was not factually supported in the record and failed to properly consider the children's placement with their mother. As explained, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Respondent has a long criminal history and has repeatedly sexually abused his relatives from a young age. When respondent was a minor he sexually abused his sister and half-brothers when they were minors; he also had various encounters with the criminal-justice system that resulted in multiple convictions. Then, as an adult, respondent had a child in Florida for whom he failed to care. Florida eventually terminated respondent's parental rights to that child because of his lack of involvement in her life. Respondent then had two more children, WA and AA. He sexually abused WA and physically abused the children's mother. Respondent pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a), stemming from his sexual abuse of WA. Respondent was sentenced to 14 to 32 years of imprisonment for that conviction. Respondent contended at the trial-court level that he was appealing his conviction. We are unaware of any such appeal.
The Department of Health and Human Services then filed a petition to remove the children from respondent's care. The petition was based on respondent's sexual abuse of WA, his physical abuse of the children's mother, his neglect of his first child, and his criminal history for sexually abusing his siblings. Those proceedings eventually culminated in a termination hearing. During the hearing, witnesses testified about respondent's history described earlier. They also testified that respondent was harassing the children's mother from prison and that respondent did not adequately care for the children. A Children's Protective Services investigator testified that she believed the children were at a substantial risk of harm while in respondent's care because of his sexual- and physical-abuse history. The investigator opined that it was in the children's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights. The trial court agreed and terminated respondent's parental rights, finding, in part, that termination was in the children's best interests because it would psychologically benefit them and their mother. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
"Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich.App. 35, 40; 823 N.W.2d 144 (2012). "[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich.App. 76, 90; 836 N.W.2d 182 (2013). The trial court's ruling regarding best interests is reviewed for clear error. In re Schadler, 315 Mich.App. 406, 408; 890 N.W.2d 676 (2016).
"The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children's best interests." In re White, 303 Mich.App. 701, 713; 846 N.W.2d 61 (2014). In considering the child's best interests, the trial court's focus must be on the child and not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich.App. at 87. "In deciding whether termination is in the child's best interests, the court may consider the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich.App. at 41-42 (citations omitted). "The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich.App. at 714. When the trial court makes its best-interests determination, it may rely upon evidence in the entire record, including the evidence establishing the statutory grounds for termination. In re Trejo, 462 Mich. 341, 353-354; 612 N.W.2d 407 (2000), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in In re Moss, 301 Mich.App. at 83. In cases concerned with multiple children, the trial court must determine each child's interests individually. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich.App. at 43-44. But a trial court is not required to make redundant best-interest findings for each child when the best interests of the children do not significantly differ. In re White, 303 Mich.App. at 715-716.
Respondent argues that the children's placement with their mother should weigh against terminating his parental rights because she should be considered a relative. Respondent is correct that "[a] child's placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is required to consider" when making its best-interests determination, In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich.App. 426, 434; 871 N.W.2d 868 (2015), and "a child's placement with relatives weighs against termination," In re Mason, 486 Mich. 142, 164; 782 N.W.2d 747 (2010). But "[r]elative" for termination-of-parental-rights purposes is defined by MCL 712A.13a(1)(j) as
an individual who is at least 18 years of age and related to the child by blood, marriage, or adoption, as grandparent, great-grandparent, great-great-grandparent,
aunt or uncle, great-aunt or great-uncle, great-great-aunt or great-great-uncle, sibling, stepsibling, nephew or niece, first cousin or first cousin once removed, and the spouse of any of the above, even after the marriage has ended by death or divorce.
Thus, a child's biological parent is not that child's "relative" for purposes of the statute. See MCL 712A.13a(1)(j); In re Schadler, 315 Mich.App. at 413. Consequently, the children's placement with their mother did not weigh against terminating respondent's parental rights because she is not considered a "relative" under MCL 712A.13a(1)(j).
Respondent is also correct that the trial court's conclusion that termination of respondent's parental rights would psychologically benefit the children and their mother was not supported by any expert testimony. But, although such expert testimony would have been beneficial, it was not necessary in this case. Respondent sexually abused WA and he had a long history of sexually abusing minors who were related to him. It does not take an expert to conclude that removing the source of such past and potential future trauma could psychologically benefit the children. Additionally, although the psychological benefit to the children's mother is not relevant to the best-interests determination, see In re Moss, 301 Mich.App. at 87, removing the source of domestic violence from the home would also psychologically benefit the children by providing them with a safer and more stable home. Thus, the trial court did not err by finding that the children would benefit psychologically by terminating respondent's parental rights.
Finally, respondent's history of sexual and physical abuse also weighs in favor of termination. Respondent's past actions showed that he had a propensity to sexually abuse minors who were related to him. He already sexually abused WA and, under the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, respondent's treatment of WA is probative of how he might treat AA in the future. See In re LaFrance Minors, 306 Mich.App. 713, 730; 858 N.W.2d 143 (2014). The children are undoubtedly physically safer without respondent than they would be with him. Thus, the trial court did not err by terminating respondent's parental rights.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the trial court's order terminating respondent's parental rights.