Opinion
No. 04-18-00056-CV
05-09-2018
IN THE INTEREST OF A.J.R., a Child
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 407th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2017-PA-00428
Honorable Richard Garcia, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice AFFIRMED
Jesse appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights to his child, A.J.R. (born in 2012). He argues there is legally and factually insufficient evidence that termination of his parental rights is in A.J.R.'s best interest. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
To protect the identity of minor children in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, parents are referred to by their first names and children are referred to by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West 2014); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
BACKGROUND
The Department of Family and Protective Services filed an original petition for conservatorship of A.J.R. and to terminate Jesse's parental rights to A.J.R. The Department also sought to terminate the rights of A.J.R.'s mother, Aurora. The Department obtained temporary conservatorship of A.J.R. based on allegations of neglect. The Department's affidavit in support of removal stated Aurora and Jesse were using heroin, Jesse was using "ice," and there was physical violence between Jesse and Aurora in front of A.J.R.
The case proceeded to a bench trial at which Department caseworker Lesley Oxendine was the sole witness. Oxendine testified Aurora had addressed the Department's concerns, completed her family service plan, remained in counseling, and avoided her "trigger," which was being involved with someone who was going to be "violent with her and put her back into [a] drug use environment." Oxendine recommended that Aurora be appointed A.J.R.'s managing conservator; however, she recommended that the trial court terminate Jesse's parental rights, opining that termination of Jesse's parental rights is in A.J.R.'s best interest. Oxendine testified Jesse used "ice," was incarcerated, did not complete his family service plan, failed to support A.J.R. during the case, and had only four visits with A.J.R. during the case.
The trial court signed a judgment appointing Aurora as A.J.R.'s sole managing conservator and terminating Jesse's parental rights to A.J.R. The trial court found Jesse had constructively abandoned A.J.R.; failed to support A.J.R. in accordance with his ability for one year; failed to comply with court-ordered provisions of his family service plan; and knowingly endangered A.J.R. based on his drug use and either continued to use drugs or failed to complete a substance abuse treatment program. The trial court also found that termination of Jesse's parental rights is in A.J.R.'s best interest. Jesse timely appealed. He argues only that there is legally and factually insufficient evidence that termination of his parental rights is in A.J.R.'s best interest.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2017). To determine whether this heightened burden of proof was met, we employ a heightened standard of review to determine whether a "factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations." In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). "This standard guards the constitutional interests implicated by termination, while retaining the deference an appellate court must have for the factfinder's role." In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d 681, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). We do not reweigh issues of witness credibility but defer to the factfinder's reasonable credibility determinations. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005).
A legal sufficiency review requires us to examine the evidence "in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true." In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found incredible. Id. When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we evaluate "whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding." Id. The evidence is factually insufficient "[i]f, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction." Id.
BEST INTEREST
The best-interest determination is a wide-ranging inquiry, and the Texas Supreme Court has set out some factors relevant to the determination:
• the desires of the child;
• the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;
• the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
• the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
• the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child;
• the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;
• the stability of the home or proposed placement;
• the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; andHolley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976). The list is not exhaustive, and not every factor must be proved to find that termination is in the child's best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Evidence of only one factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child's best interest—especially when undisputed evidence shows that the parental relationship endangered the child's safety. Id. "A factfinder may infer that past conduct endangering the well-being of a child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the parent." In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 471 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.).
• any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
There is no direct evidence regarding A.J.R.'s desires, but not every factor must be proved to find that termination is in the child's best interest. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Oxendine's testimony shows Jesse used drugs, specifically "ice," and she sent Jesse to be drug tested but did not remember that he actually went. See In re L.G.R., 498 S.W.3d 195, 204 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) ("A parent's drug use supports a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child."). Oxendine also testified both Jesse and Aurora admitted there was physical violence between them. See In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d at 685 (considering evidence of domestic violence as relevant to a child's best interest). She further testified Jesse failed to complete his family service plan and failed to support A.J.R. See In re A.T.L., No. 04-15-00379-CV, 2015 WL 6507807, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 28, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering evidence of the failure to support a child as relevant to a child's best interest); In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 887-88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (considering the failure to comply with a family service plan as support for finding that termination is in child's best interest). Oxendine also stated Jesse was incarcerated at the time of trial for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (considering a parent's inability to maintain a lifestyle free from arrests and incarcerations in best-interest determination). The evidence further showed A.J.R. was placed back with Aurora, who had addressed the Department's concerns about her parenting.
Having reviewed the evidence admitted at trial, we hold a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Jesse's parental rights is in A.J.R.'s best interest. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We therefore conclude there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's best-interest finding.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice