Opinion
NUMBER 2016 CA 07162
08-16-2017
SUCCESSION OF Lawrence David ACHEÉ, Jr.
Richard A. Richardson, Anna K. Wong, Covington, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/3 party Defendant/Appellee Truitt Dain Miller Brenda Braud, Hammond, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Gladys Acheé
Richard A. Richardson, Anna K. Wong, Covington, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/3 rd party Defendant/Appellee Truitt Dain Miller
Brenda Braud, Hammond, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Gladys Acheé
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., GUIDRY, McDONALD, McCLENDON, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.
GUIDRY, J.
In this succession proceeding, Gladys Achee, appeals from a trial court judgment dismissing her petition to annul her deceased husband's probated testament. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lawrence Acheé, Jr. (decedent) was married to Gladys Acheé on August 1, 1987. Decedent and Gladys separated in 2009 and lived separate and apart until the decedent's death on November 3, 2014. At the time of his death, decedent had no children and was survived by his estranged wife, Gladys.
Thereafter, decedent's nephew, Truitt Dain Miller (Truitt), filed a petition for probate of olographic testament and for confirmation of executor on July 28, 2015. In conjunction therewith, Truitt filed a testament written in the decedent's handwriting as well as a typed testament. Both testaments were executed by the decedent on September 4, 2013; however, the typed testament was not signed by a notary until September 28, 2013. Because the typed testament was presumptively invalid, Truitt only requested that the handwritten testament be probated by the court. In addition to the testaments, Truitt also filed affidavits for probate of the olographic testament executed by himself, Marie Antoinette Achee Miller, and Jon Marie Acheé Souquet; and an agreement to independent administration of succession—Designation of Truitt to serve as dative independent executor and verification.
On July 30, 2015, the trial court signed an order finding that the handwritten testament was a valid olographic testament, drawn in accordance with La. C.C. art. 1575, and in accordance with La. C.C.P. arts. 2883 and 2890, it need not be further proved. The court also ordered that the olographic testament be filed, admitted to probate, and executed according to law and further ordered that Truitt be confirmed as dative independent executor.
Thereafter, on October 15, 2015, Don Lewis Achee, decedent's brother, and Gladys filed a petition to annul the probated testament, naming Truitt, Marie and Jon as defendants. The petition asserted that the purported olographic testament did not qualify as a testament because it did not contain any language that could be interpreted as a bequest to any party and therefore should be annulled. The petition also asserted that the typed instrument was not in valid form because the notary signed the instrument twenty-four days after the decedent signed it and therefore, it also should be annulled.
Marie and Jon did not file the petition for probate and are not named as legatees in the olographic testament.
Following a hearing on the petition to annul, the trial court signed a judgment denying the motion to annul the olographic testament. Gladys now appeals from the trial court's judgment.
DISCUSSION
There are two forms of testaments: olographic and notarial. La. C.C. art. 1574. An olographic testament is one entirely written, dated, and signed in the handwriting of the testator. La. C.C. art. 1575.
In addition to the form requirements, an olographic testament must contain testamentary intent, which is to say, it must, by its own language, show on its face that it purports to dispose of the property of the testator on his death. In re Succession of Cannon, 14-0059, p. 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/25/15), 166 So.3d 1097, 1101–1102, writ denied, 15-0816 (La. 6/5/15), 171 So.3d 948 ; see also Succession of Shows, 158 So.2d 293, 295 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), aff'd, 246 La. 652, 166 So.2d 261 (1964). A valid olographic testament must do more than express or explain the wishes or desires of a decedent; the document must show intent to convey the decedent's property by the instrument itself. In re Succession of Cannon, 14–0059 at p. 5, 166 So.3d at 1102. A paper is not established as a person's will merely by proving that he intended to make a disposition of his property similar to or even identically the same as that contained in the paper. It must satisfactorily appear that he intended the very paper to be his will. In re Succession of Cannon, 14–0059 at p. 5, 166 So.3d at 1102. Simply stated, not every instrument one writes, signs, and dates is a last will and testament; the author must intend for the instrument to serve that purpose, and that intent must be evident on the face of the document. In re Succession of Cannon, 14–0059 at p. 6, 166 So.3d at 1102. Extrinsic or parol evidence cannot be used to establish testamentary intent. In re Successions of Lain, 49,261, p. 9 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 8/20/14), 147 So.3d 1204, 1210.
The plaintiff in an action to annul a probated testament has the burden of proving the invalidity thereof, unless the action was instituted within three months of the date the testament was probated. In the latter event, the defendants have the burden of proving the authenticity of the testament, and its compliance with all of the formal requirements of the law. La. C.C.P. art. 2932(A) ; see also Succession of Wadsworth, 152 La. 131, 92 So. 760 (1922). In reviewing a trial court's factual findings when ruling on a petition to annul a testament, an appellate court applies the manifest error standard of review. See In re Succession of Theriot, 08-1233, p. 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/23/08), 4 So.3d 878, 882.
In the instant case, because Gladys filed her petition to annul the probated olographic testament within three months of the date that the testament was probated, Truitt bore the burden of establishing the authenticity of the testament and its compliance with all of the formal requirements of law. The parties do not dispute that the handwritten document at issue complies with the statutory requirements for an olographic testament, namely that it is entirely written, dated, and signed in the handwriting of the testator. See La. C.C. art. 1575. As such, the issue before the trial court was whether the document, on its face, evidences testamentary intent.
The handwritten document at issue provides:
Sept /4/13
to whom it may concern about the estates of Lawrence David Acheé, Sr. & Vergie ola Martin Acheé
I want to leave whatever is passed on to Lawrence David Acheé Jr. to truitt Dain Miller
I want to leave all of my firearms to truitt Dain Miller
I want to leave all of my knife collection to truitt Dain Miller
I want to leave all Chevrolet, ford, and international trucks to truitt Dain Miller
I want to leave all tools, welders, torches, grinders, weedeaters, chain saws, circular saws
Lawrence D Acheé Jr.
(Larry D. Acheé)
Gladys asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that the decedent intended for the handwritten document to be his last will and testament because it contains precatory language, does not show testamentary intent, and does not show that it is the instrument the decedent intended to be his last will and testament.
Gladys also asserts that the trial court erred by requesting and relying upon the testimony of a witness to determine whether the decedent intended for the handwritten document to be his last will and testament. However, we find Gladys' assignment of error in this regard to be without merit for several reasons. First, Gladys failed to object to the introduction of the witness's testimony at the hearing, and as such, may not complain of the inadmissibility of the evidence on appeal. See Succession of Davisson, 50,830, p. 8 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 12/22/16), 211 So.3d 597, 604, writ denied, 17-0307 (La. 4/7/17), 218 So.3d 111. Additionally, the record makes clear that the trial court requested witness testimony for the limited purpose of "making the record clear" as to the timing of the execution of the typewritten document, which was executed the same date as the handwritten document. The witness, although acknowledging when asked by counsel that she was present when the "handwritten will" was prepared by decedent, offered no testimony regarding the execution of the handwritten document and limited her testimony to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the typewritten document. Furthermore, contrary to Gladys' assertion on appeal, the trial court's oral ruling clearly states that "the olographic will, although it might not say everything that we would want it to say, I think it certainly exhibits the intent of the testator," indicating that the trial court properly made its determination based on the language of the testament. Accordingly, we find no merit to Gladys' argument that the trial court erred in requesting witness testimony or that the trial court impermissibly relied on witness testimony in making its factual determination regarding testamentary intent.
Gladys asserts that the use of "I want to leave" in the handwritten document is not dispositive but is precatory. Precatory expressions are words requesting or praying that a thing be done. Succession of Diaz, 617 So.2d 34, 36 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993). The law is clear that a testator's mere wishes and requests are viewed as precatory suggestions, which are not binding in law. Succession of Diaz, 617 So.2d at 36. However, the determination of testamentary intent does not rest solely on the testator's choice to use the words "would like," "want to," or "wish." See In re Succession of White, 06-1002, p. 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 439, 442. There is no fixed rule that the use of particular words should be interpreted as precatory suggestions rather than as dispositions of property. See In re Succession of White, 06–1002 at p. 5, 961 So.2d at 442 ; Succession of Diaz, 617 So.2d at 36. Rather, the entire document must be read as a whole to determine whether the expression was intended to be merely precatory or was intended by the testator to actually dispose of the property. See In re Succession of White, 06–1002 at p. 5, 961 So.2d at 442 ; Succession of Diaz, 617 So.2d at 36.
The handwritten document detailed above contains five separate sentences detailing assets or property of the decedent and how the assets or property are to be disposed. Although the decedent did not use legal terms such as "bequest" or "bequeath," or otherwise state that the document was a will or testament, the language of the document, when read as a whole, demonstrates more than mere wishes, requests, or hopes. See In re Succession of White, 06–1002 at p. 6, 961 So.2d at 442. Furthermore, there is no indication in the language of the handwritten document that the decedent intended it to be a mere listing of assets or notes to be used by an attorney in drafting a will, see e.g. In re Succession of Rhodes, 39,364, pp. 4–7 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 3/23/05), 899 So.2d 658, 660–662, writs denied, 05–0936, 05–1044 (La. 6/3/05), 903 So.2d 459, 460 and Hendry v. Succession of Helms, 557 So.2d 427, 429 (La. App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 560 So.2d 8 (La. 1990) ; that it was a direction or request to a third party with discretion, see e.g. In re Succession of Plummer, 37,243, pp. 10–12 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 5/14/03), 847 So.2d 185, 190–191, writ denied, 03-1751 (La. 10/10/03), 855 So.2d 323 and Succession of Diaz, 617 So.2d at 35 ; or that it contained vague instructions, see e.g. In re Succession of Bernstine, 04–739, p. 6 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 12/22/04), 890 So.2d 776, 780. Rather, contrary to Gladys' assertion on appeal, a plain and unstrained reading of the handwritten document demonstrates that the decedent's use of the phrase "I want to leave" indicates his intent to dispose of his assets and property upon his death.
We note that the fifth sentence details property and that the decedent wants to dispose of that property, but the legatee is not mentioned in the sentence. While this may result in an ambiguity in the testament as to this particular disposition, for which competent evidence may be submitted to resolve any ambiguity, it does not conclusively defeat testamentary intent as to the document as a whole. See La. C.C. art. 1611 (intent of the testator controls interpretation of testament).
Furthermore, the fact that a typewritten document was executed later the same day as the handwritten document, and that the typewritten document was subsequently notarized weeks after its execution is irrelevant to the determination of the intent of the testator at the time he executed the handwritten document. See In re Succession of Rhodes, 39,364 at p. 3, 899 So.2d at 660 (noting that intent must exist when the instrument is executed). As previously stated, testamentary intent must be found from the document itself, and nothing on the face of the handwritten document supports the inference that the decedent contemporaneously with its execution intended to make a more formal will. See Hendry, 557 So.2d 427, 430 (Yelverton, J., dissenting).
Finally, we find no merit in Gladys' assertion that the handwritten document had clearly been altered, and that Truitt failed to establish what had been removed from the bottom of the handwritten document. As the proponent of the testament, Truitt was only required to establish that the handwritten document was entirely written, dated, and signed in the handwriting of the testator. La. C.C. art. 1575. The handwritten document submitted by Truitt undisputedly meets the statutory criteria for a valid olographic testament. Furthermore, Truitt submitted the affidavits of two witnesses as required by La. C.C.P. art. 2883, wherein one of the witnesses, Marie, stated that she reviewed the document beginning "To whom it may concern about the estate..." and ending with "I want to leave all tools, welders, torches, grinders weedeaters, chain saw, circular saws[.] Lawrence D. Acheé (Larry D. Acheé)" and was present and personally saw decedent write the document with his own hand. The content described in the affidavit is the same as that submitted to the court. Accordingly, while Gladys asserts that the document was altered and something unknown was written below the decedent's signature, there is no evidence to refute the evidence offered by Truitt as to the document's completeness and authenticity.
Therefore, after a thorough review of the record, we find no manifest error in the trial court's finding that the handwritten document evidences the intent of the decedent and as such, is a valid olographic testament.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying Gladys Achee's motion to annul the probated testament. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Gladys Achee.
AFFIRMED.
McDonald, J. concurs and assigns reasons.
Whipple, C.J. dissents for the reasons assigned by J. McClendon
McClendon, J dissents and assigns reasons.
Holdridge J. concurs for the reasons assigned by J. McDonald.
McClendon, J., dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the handwritten document at issue is a valid olographic will. The document contains nothing to establish that Mr. Achee intended it as his last will and testament. The precatory language "I want to" is used throughout in addressing specific items for disposition. When such precatory terms are utilized in a document purporting to be a will, the precatory language itself must be considered in light of the document in its entirety. See Succession of White, 06-1002 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 439, 442. In considering the entire document, I note that the introductory paragraph addresses the estates of Mr. Achee's parents, providing "to whom it may concern about the estates of Lawrence David Achee Sr & Virgie Ola Martin Achee." Additionally, in subsequent paragraphs, while Mr. Achee lists some specific items that he wants to leave to Mr. Miller, there is no language disposing of the residual estate. In fact, the final provision of the document references various tools, but is incomplete in that it provides no legatee with regard to said tools. The document also lacks a revocation clause.
Of further concern are the markings below Mr. Achee's signature in the original handwritten document. From said markings one might infer that further writings were below the signature. However, that section has been removed in the document produced to the court.
Further, we cannot ignore that the typewritten document prepared later the same day incorporated all of the substance of the handwritten document, but was more complete. In the introductory paragraph, it provided "that this document is my last will and testament" and included a revocation clause revoking all prior wills and codicils. Also, the language utilized therein was dispositive insofar as it used the term "I give" rather than the precatory "I want to." Additionally, the purported notarial testament addressed Mr. Achee's entire estate and indicated that Mr. Miller was to be a universal legatee. As such, one might conclude that the handwritten document was prepared as an outline or a guide for the drafting of a notarial testament.
Under these facts, I cannot conclude that Mr. Achee intended the handwritten document as his last will and testament. Therefore, I dissent and would reverse the trial court's judgment.
McDONALD, J. Concurring:
I respectfully concur with Judge Guidry's opinion for the following reasons. I agree that Truitt proved that Mr. Achee's handwritten will is a valid olographic testament. As to its form, the olographic testament is valid, because it is entirely written, dated, and signed by Mr. Achee, and his signature appears at the end of the testament. Under the express provisions of LSA–C.C. art. 1575(A), an "olographic testament is subject to no other requirement as to form." I disagree with Chief Judge Whipple and Judge McClendon to the extent they think additional clauses are needed.
Next, I agree that Mr. Achee's testamentary intent that the handwritten document dispose of his property upon his death is evident on the face of the document. Admittedly, the document is not artfully drafted. But, the testator's intent controls the interpretation of his testament. LSA–C.C. art. 1611(A). A testament should be interpreted to give it effect, rather than to give it no effect. See LSA–C.C. art. 1612. The law is indulgent with documents written without the aid of counsel and obeys the testator's clear intention however informally conveyed. See In re Succession of White, 06-1002 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 439, 441. Here, Mr. Achee references the estates of his parents in the first clause and, then, in the next sentence, indicates "I want to leave whatever is passed on to [me] to [T]ruitt Dain [M]iller[.]" Then, Mr. Achee writes three more sentences plainly showing his intent to give Truitt specific items. Although Mr. Achee's testamentary intent is "informally conveyed," LSA–C.C. art. 1611(A) makes it clear that his intent controls the interpretation of the document. If more than one interpretation presents itself, a document must be read to carry out the testator's wishes, not defeat them; to support testacy, not intestacy. Succession of White, 961 So.2d at 441. In this case, I think Truitt carried his burden of proving the olographic testament's validity as to form as well as to Mr. Achee's testamentary intent.
Even if the face of the handwritten document does not convince one of Mr. Achee's testamentary intent to leave Truitt his separate property, I think Marie Miller's testimony regarding her brother's execution of both the handwritten and typed testaments certainly does. Notably, we are not limited to the face of the handwritten document to determine testamentary intent, because Marie testified to such at the hearing to annul the probated testament, and, as Judge Guidry points out in a footnote, Gladys did not object to the trial court's consideration of her testimony.
In this regard, I disagree with footnote two of Judge Guidry's opinion to the extent it states that Marie "offered no testimony regarding the execution of the handwritten document and limited her testimony to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the typewritten document."
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Marie clearly testified that Mr. Achee handwrote his will in her presence. She then explained that, after he handwrote the will, one of her coworkers came to visit, that Mr. Achee told the coworker about his will, the coworker offered to take the will to her office and "type it up for [him] and spiff it up ... and make it look nice." In response, Mr. Achee asked "do you think I really need to do that?" After further discussion, the coworker went and typed the will with wording clearly showing Mr. Achee's testamentary intent to leave his "personal property" to Truitt, returned with the will, and Mr. Achee signed it. I think Marie's testimony regarding these events establishes Mr. Achee's testamentary intent that the handwritten document serve as his will. I do not think Mr. Achee's later act, allowing the coworker to type a document to "spiff up" the handwritten document, negated his earlier intent that the handwritten document serve as his will.
Thus, I think the trial court correctly found that the handwritten document, on its face, is a valid olographic will. And, if that is not enough, Marie's testimony, admitted without Gladys's objection, shows Mr. Achee's testamentary intent. Because Mr. Achee's intent controls the interpretation of his testament, and I think it is plainly clear he wanted Truitt to have his separate property upon his death, I agree with Judge Guidry that the trial court's judgment, denying Gladys's motion to annul the probated testament, should be affirmed. I note, however, that the proper interpretation of the testament's provisions will have to be determined by the trial court.