Opinion
No. 10-06-00212-CV
Opinion delivered and filed August 29, 2007.
Appeal from the County Court Hill County, Texas, Trial Court No. 1412.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
M.W. pleaded true to allegations of delinquent conduct consisting of two counts of indecency with a child. The court placed him on probation, requiring him to participate in a sex offender treatment program. Based on repeated probation violations, the court modified the disposition and placed M.W. in a different sex offender treatment program at a youth ranch. Two months later, the court heard another motion to modify the disposition based on M.W.'s misconduct at the youth ranch. The trial court found the allegations to be true and committed M.W. to the Texas Youth Commission. M.W. contends in a single point that the court abused its discretion by committing him to TYC. We will affirm.
We review a court's decision to modify a juvenile disposition under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See In re M.A., 198 S.W.3d 388, 390-91 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.); In re E.D., 127 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, no pet.); In re D.S.S., 72 S.W.3d 725, 727 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, no pet.). A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable fashion or without reference to guiding rules or principles. M.A., 198 S.W.3d at 391; E.D., 127 S.W.3d at 863.
[A] disposition based on a finding that the child engaged in delinquent conduct that violates a penal law of this state or the United States of the grade of felony or, if the requirements of Subsection (k) are met, of the grade of misdemeanor, may be modified so as to commit the child to the Texas Youth Commission if the court after a hearing to modify disposition finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.05(f) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
Here, M.W. was found to have engaged in delinquent conduct that violates a felony-grade penal law of this state, namely, two counts of indecency with a child. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.11(d) (Vernon 2003). Thus, the court could modify the disposition and commit him to TYC if it found by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated any condition of probation. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.05(f).
M.W. contends that the court abused its discretion by committing him to TYC because: (1) his infraction at the youth ranch was not so serious as to warrant commitment to TYC; and (2) there were adequate local resources available for his rehabilitation.
M.W. was originally found to have engaged in delinquent conduct by touching the genitals of two children, one of whom is his step-sister. The court placed him on probation and required among other conditions of probation that he participate in a sex offender treatment program at the Rockdale Regional Juvenile Justice Center. The first motion to modify alleged that M.W. had committed 47 violations of the rules for the Rockdale program, beginning within a week after he was placed on probation. M.W. pleaded "true" to these allegations, and the court modified his probation by requiring him to participate in a sex offender treatment program at Brookhaven Youth Ranch.
About one month after the court signed this modification order, M.W. again violated his probation by engaging in sexual contact with another juvenile at the Brookhaven facility.
M.W. does not dispute that he engaged in the conduct alleged or that this constituted a violation of Brookhaven's rules and of his probation. Instead, he contends that this single incident does not warrant a commitment to TYC. We do not agree that the appropriate disposition in a modification proceeding under section 54.05 is determined solely by the nature of the probation violation.
When a court finds that a juvenile has violated a condition of probation, section 54.05(e) of the Family Code authorizes the court to consider a wide range of evidence in determining the appropriate disposition, including in particular a report prepared by the juvenile probation officer which is commonly referred to as a social history. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.05(e) (Vernon Supp. 2006); In re J.K.N., 115 S.W.3d 166, 171-72 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); D.S.S., 72 S.W.3d at 728-29.
Here, having found that M.W. had violated a condition of his probation, the court was well within its discretion to consider: (1) the nature of the offenses for which he was found to have engaged in delinquent conduct; (2) his admitted commission of a similar extraneous offense for which he was not adjudicated; and (3) his failure to comply with the rules of two different sex offender treatment programs while on probation. See In re J.P., 136 S.W.3d 629, 633 (Tex. 2004); M.A., 198 S.W.3d at 391; J.K.N., 115 S.W.3d at 171-73. In addition, the court was within its discretion to consider the nature of the violation (sexual misconduct with another juvenile) in relation to the underlying offenses (indecency with a child) and the timing of that violation (only a month after being placed at the youth ranch). See J.P., 136 S.W.3d at 633; M.A., 198 S.W.3d at 391.
M.W. refers to testimony of his juvenile probation officer that M.W. was discharged from Rockdale for lack of funding and not because of the 47 violations for which his probation was modified the first time. While this testimony may be viewed as mitigating evidence, it does not change the fact that M.W. failed to comply with Rockdale's rules on a frequent basis.
M.W.'s case manager from Brookhaven testified that the facility had never removed a juvenile for sexual misconduct and would be willing to have M.W. return. Based on this testimony, M.W. argues that Brookhaven necessarily constitutes a "local resource" available for his rehabilitation. However, the court found that "[l]ocal resources of the Court are inadequate to properly rehabilitate the child."
M.W. is correct that the Brookhaven program was an available local resource. However, based on M.W.'s history of non-compliance with the rules of two different sex offender treatment programs and the nature of M.W.'s violation at Brookhaven, it was within the court's discretion to conclude that Brookhaven could not provide effective rehabilitation services for M.W. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion by committing M.W. to TYC. See J.P., 136 S.W.3d at 633; M.A., 198 S.W.3d at 391-92; J.K.N., 115 S.W.3d at 171-73.
Accordingly, we overrule M.W.'s sole issue and affirm the judgment.
Affirmed