Opinion
No. COA10-902
Filed 18 January 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by respondent-mother from adjudication order entered 14 April 2010 and disposition order entered 19 April 2010 by Judge Michael A. Paul in Beaufort County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 December 2010.
Alice Anne Espenshade, for petitioner-appellee Beaufort County Department of Social Services. Pamela Newell, for the guardian ad litem. Wyrick Robbins Yates Ponton, LLP, by Tobias S. Hampson, for respondent-appellant, mother.
Beaufort County No. 09 JA 55/59, Hyde County No. 10 JA 1.
The juvenile case in Beaufort County was originally assigned the number 09 JA 55, but was subsequently changed to 09 JA 59.
Respondent-mother appeals from an order adjudicating her son, I.S. ("Ian"), a neglected and dependent juvenile, and a disposition order granting custody of Ian to his maternal grandfather. Respondent-father did not appeal from the trial court's orders, and therefore is not a party to the instant appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading.
I. BACKGROUND
Respondent-mother and her husband, respondent-father, (collectively "respondents") are the parents of Ian. Respondents and Ian lived in a mobile home in Washington, North Carolina, when the Beaufort County Department of Social Services ("DSS") became involved with the family. On 20 June 2008, DSS received a report that respondents were not properly supervising Ian, that their home was filthy, that respondents had no income, and that respondents abused alcohol and drugs. DSS also received a report from local law enforcement that an officer responded to a "domestic disturbance in progress" at respondents' home on 28 June 2008. Upon arriving at the mobile home, the officer found respondents arguing in front of Ian. Respondent-father was holding a knife, which he claimed was for cooking. The officer observed that respondents' home was "filthy and in disarray." While the officer was at the mobile home, Ian's maternal grandmother arrived, and the officer persuaded respondents to allow the grandmother to take custody of Ian.
On 30 June 2008, a DSS social worker visited respondents at their mobile home. Although the visit was in the middle of the day, respondents appeared groggy, ungroomed, and in their pajamas. The social worker observed clutter and filth in the home and tried to impress upon respondents the danger such conditions posed to a toddler like Ian.
Another investigation revealed that respondent-mother suffered from muscular dystrophy and required the use of a wheelchair. A psychological assessment showed that respondent-mother was chronically depressed, had a full scale IQ of 80, and read on a third grade level. Respondent-mother refused to take medication for depression because she felt it had "no positive effect." Respondent-mother denied abusing substances; however, in July 2008, respondent-mother tested positive for benzodiazepines, for which she had no prescription. Respondent-mother was also on probation for a conviction of misdemeanor cruelty to animals. (R pp. 7, 37)
DSS's investigation also revealed that respondent-father suffered from hepatitis and high blood pressure. Respondent-father's psychological evaluation showed that he was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and polysubstance abuse. Respondent-father admitted to using marijuana, narcotics, and anti-anxiety medication for which he had no prescription.
DSS found the family to be in need of services and attempted to provide treatment. Respondents entered into a safety plan with DSS in which Ian was placed with his maternal grandfather ("Mr. Smith") and his wife ("Mrs. Smith") (collectively "the Smiths"), who lived in Craven County, North Carolina. DSS determined that respondents needed to correct their domestic violence issues, alcohol and substance abuse, and unsanitary living conditions before Ian would be allowed to return to their home.
In October 2008, respondents entered into a case plan with DSS. As required by the case plan, respondents attended a parenting course and most of their scheduled visits with Ian. Respondents cooperated with psychological evaluations, but did not complete recommended therapy. In addition, respondent-father submitted positive drug screens in March and April 2009. As part of DSS's services, a social worker went to respondents' mobile home on a regular basis to provide instruction on household hygiene. Respondents briefly maintained their home, then allowed it to revert to its former condition.
In May 2009, a social worker visited respondents' mobile home and encountered a man who called himself "the landlord[.]" He indicated that respondents had fallen behind in their rent, that respondents had left the mobile home in "deplorable condition," and that he was "taking the trailer back." A month later, when a social worker visited respondents at another mobile home, the social worker found the home was in poor condition, and the interior and the yard were already cluttered. Respondent-father reported to the social worker that he had not found employment and had attended only one therapy session.
In July 2009, respondents moved to Hyde County and briefly lived with family members before they rented a mobile home of their own. When a social worker visited the new mobile home on 23 July 2009, the yard was filled with trash. The social worker also observed that the interior of the home was cluttered and the counter surfaces were strewn with trash and decaying food.
The social worker reminded respondents that their case plan required individual therapy and substance abuse treatment. She offered to refer respondents to a local therapist, but respondent-mother refused and stated she preferred to see a therapist of her choice in another town.
On 4 September 2009, DSS filed a juvenile petition in Beaufort County alleging that Ian was a neglected and dependent juvenile in that: (1) he did not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from respondents; (2) he lived in an environment injurious to his welfare; and (3) respondents were unable to provide for his care or supervision and lacked an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. In the petition, DSS noted the mental and physical health issues of respondents, and alleged that respondents had not engaged in any needed therapy for several months. DSS also noted the poor living conditions of respondents over the past months. DSS asked the court to enter a nonsecure custody order with DSS, allowing physical placement to continue with Mr. Smith. DSS also asked the trial court to determine the proper venue for the case to be heard since respondents "now reside in Hyde County, and [Ian] is actually present in Craven County, under an agreement between the parents and [DSS]." On 4 September 2009, the trial court entered an order giving DSS nonsecure custody of Ian with physical placement continuing in the home of Mr. Smith.
On 15 October 2009, respondents filed a "Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Change Venue." Respondents requested the matter be dismissed for improper venue under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-400 (2009) because Ian was not in Beaufort County when the petition was filed. In the alternative, respondents asked for the matter to be transferred to Craven County where Ian was living with Mr. Smith.
On 15 September 2009, respondents signed a new case plan in which they were required to: (1) support Ian "in accordance with their abilities;" (2) cooperate with a Family Reunion Specialist; (3) obtain case management and community support services; (4) participate in therapy and marital counseling; (5) address substance abuse and submit to random drug screens; (6) maintain safe and stable housing; and (7) stay in contact with DSS. DSS established a schedule for weekly supervised visits for respondents. However, respondents missed several visits and called after the fact to report that respondent-mother was sick. DSS offered transportation to respondents on one occasion, and respondent-mother attended that visit without respondent-father. By the end of November 2009, the scheduled visits were reduced to every other week due to respondents' poor rate of attendance at the visits.
On 29 September 2009, a social worker visited respondents, who had moved from their mobile home to a camper in rural Hyde County. During the visit, the social worker observed trash and ant-infested mattresses littering the yard. She also observed an upholstered recliner on the front porch and a stove in the back yard. Although the interior of the camper was clean and neat, it was full of fruit flies. The only sources of heat for the camper were two space heaters.
DSS returned to respondents' camper on 7 January 2010, but respondents were not present. The social worker observed trash, furniture, mattresses, and clothes on the ground. A metal ramp which had been secured to the porch for respondent-mother's wheelchair was broken and unusable, and the wheelchair sat in the yard. A broken refrigerator was on the front porch, and one of the camper's windows was broken and covered with plastic.
DSS eventually located respondents at the home of respondent-mother's stepfather. Respondents stayed there because the camper was too cold. Respondent-mother claimed that the stay at her stepfather's house was temporary, but stated that respondents were "not able to return" to the camper and had to move their belongings out soon. Respondent-mother reported that she had applied for an apartment in Hyde County, but that there was a long waiting list. Respondent-father reported that he had recently been shot while walking along a road in Hyde County. Respondent-father claimed a man exited a vehicle and approached him before shooting him. Respondent-father claimed he was seeking "temporary disability" as a result of the gunshot wound to his hand, and that he could not work. DSS again referred respondents to a local therapist.
On 10 February 2010, following a hearing, the Beaufort County District Court concluded that DSS had standing to file the juvenile petition; that Craven County was where Ian was "presently found" and Hyde County was his "place of legal residency" by virtue of his parents' move; and that Hyde County, a member of the Second Judicial District, was the court most convenient to respondents. The trial court transferred the matter to the Hyde County District Court for hearing. The matter was transferred and given the Hyde County file number 10 JA 1.
On 14 April 2010, following an adjudicatory hearing in Hyde County District Court, the trial court entered an order in Beaufort County District Court in which it concluded Ian was a neglected and dependent juvenile "in that he resided in an environment injurious to his welfare in his parent's [sic] care, and [his] parents have failed to establish a home environment in which he could be safe, despite the diligent efforts of [DSS] to assist them in doing so for over a year." The trial court further concluded, "although the child had been actually safe in grandfather's care under the safety plan prior to the filing of the juvenile petition, this placement was intended to be temporary and was not legally secure such that it did not arise to an appropriate alternative child care arrangement." The trial court continued legal custody of Ian with DSS and continued physical placement with Mr. Smith. The court ordered the matter to proceed to disposition on 12 March 2010 in Beaufort County District Court.
This order was filed in Hyde County District Court on 28 April 2010.
On 19 April 2010, following the dispositional hearing, the trial court entered an order in Beaufort County District Court in which it concluded that it was not in Ian's best interests to be returned to respondents; that Ian was receiving adequate care and supervision in his placement with Mr. Smith; that DSS had made reasonable efforts aimed at reunification; that reunification was futile; and that it was no longer necessary for DSS to be responsible for Ian's placement and care. The trial court granted legal custody of Ian to Mr. Smith and designated him as Ian's permanent caregiver. The court relieved DSS and the guardian ad litem of any further duties, and ordered no further review of the matter. The trial court also ordered that respondents were entitled to at least two visits per month at Mr. Smith's home. Respondent-mother appeals.
II. VENUE
Respondent-mother contends that the trial court erred when it transferred venue for adjudication to Hyde County when Ian was neither present nor residing in Hyde County. We disagree.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-400 (2009) states, "A proceeding in which a juvenile is alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent may be commenced in the district in which the juvenile resides or is present." Venue is not jurisdictional and may be waived. Jones v. Brinson, 238 N.C. 506, 510, 78 S.E.2d 334, 338 (1953). "The right to have a case tried in the proper venue, though ancient and valuable, may be waived. A party may expressly waive venue rights by clear, overt acts evidencing an intent to waive, or impliedly, by taking some action inconsistent with an intent to pursue the venue choice." 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 10 (2010) (emphasis added).
In the instant case, although respondents filed a motion to change venue to Craven County, they did not challenge venue at the adjudication hearing in Hyde County. At the beginning of the hearing, the court asked, "So the court does have jurisdiction and proper venue and the case is Hyde County; correct?" Counsel for DSS responded, "Yes, sir." The court then asked, "Is there anything on the record anybody wants to say to that before we proceed on with evidence?" Respondent-mother's counsel did not object and the adjudication hearing proceeded. Since respondent-mother failed to object, she impliedly waived any defense of improper venue because she acted inconsistent with her intent to pursue her venue choice. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hampton Indus., Inc., 83 N.C. App. 157, 158, 349 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1986). Further, by failing to object at the hearing, respondent-mother did not preserve the question of venue for appellate review. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1)(2009). Respondent-mother's issue on appeal is overruled.
III. ADJUDICATION
Respondent-mother contends the trial court erred in concluding Ian was a neglected and a dependent juvenile. Review of a trial court's adjudication of neglect and dependency requires an examination of (1) the findings of fact which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) the conclusions of law which must be supported by the findings of fact. See In re Gleisner, 141 N.C. App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2000). The allegations in a petition alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency shall be proved by clear and convincing evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-805 (2009). "The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal." In re J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 151, 154, 628 S.E.2d 387, 389 (2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, respondent-mother does not challenge any of the findings of fact. Therefore, all of the findings of fact are binding on appeal. In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 424, 610 S.E.2d 403, 404-05 (2005) (holding that the respondent's factual assignments of error were abandoned and the trial court's findings of fact were binding on appeal because the respondent failed to "specifically argue in her brief that they were unsupported by the evidence").
A. Neglect
Respondent-mother argues Ian was not a neglected juvenile because he was safe in the home of Mr. Smith at the time DSS filed the petition. We disagree.
A neglected juvenile is defined as:
A juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare; or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15)(2009). This Court has "`required that there be some physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a consequence of the failure to provide proper care, supervision, or discipline in order to adjudicate a juvenile neglected.'" In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997) (internal quotation and citations omitted); see also In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. 747, 752, 436 S.E.2d 898, 901-02 (1993) (listing cases holding that a substantial risk of impairment is sufficient to show neglect). Furthermore, "evidence of substance abuse and a parent's progress in treatment may be relevant in determining whether a child meets the definition[] of neglect. . . ." In re E.P., 183 N.C. App. 301, 305, 645 S.E.2d 772, 774 (2007).
Here, the uncontested findings of fact demonstrate that Ian was taken out of respondents' home because of domestic violence, alcohol and drug abuse, and unsanitary living conditions. The findings show that when respondent-mother was assessed for substance abuse in July 2008, she: (1) reported that she used cocaine since age 7, marijuana since age 8, and alcohol since age 10; and (2) admitted using marijuana and alcohol in June 2008. The court found that respondent-father tested positive for marijuana, benzodiazepines, and opiates in March 2009, and tested positive for marijuana in April 2009. In addition, the court found that respondents failed to comply with the requirements of their case plan, including individual therapy and substance abuse treatment. Moreover, the findings show that respondents' residences in Beaufort and Hyde Counties were in poor condition, cluttered, and at times strewn with trash; and that despite DSS's efforts, respondents were unable to correct their unsanitary living conditions, which impacted Ian's safety. These findings support the conclusion that Ian was a neglected juvenile. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15).
B. Dependent
Respondent-mother asserts the trial court's findings of fact are insufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that Ian is a dependent juvenile. We agree.
A finding of neglect alone is sufficient to support the trial court's decision to divest a parent of custody of their child. In order to remove a juvenile from the parents' custody the trial court must determine that the juvenile is "abused, neglected, or dependent." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-503(a) (2003) (emphasis supplied). Throughout Chapter 7B of the Juvenile Code, the phrase "abused, neglected, or dependent" is stated in the disjunctive, not the conjunctive. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-200, § 7B-406, § 7B-500, § 7B-602, and § 7B-805. "In its elementary sense the word `or,' as used in a statute, is a disjunctive particle indicating that the various members of the sentence are to be taken separately[.]" Grassy Creek Neighborhood Alliance, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 142 N.C. App. 290, 297, 542 S.E.2d 296, 301 (2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Giving the statute its natural and ordinary meaning, a finding of any of the three grounds by the trial court will support its decision to continue custody of the child with [the custodian]. See id. However, respondent appeals from an adjudication of neglect and dependency and not a termination of her parental rights on either ground. Since these adjudications may serve as the basis for future adjudications, we address this issue.
In re E.C., 174 N.C. App. 517, 525, 621 S.E.2d 647, 653 (2005).
A dependent juvenile is defined as one "in need of assistance or placement because the juvenile has no parent, guardian, or custodian responsible for the juvenile's care or supervision or whose parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9) (2009). In determining whether a juvenile is dependent, the trial court is required to "address both[:] (1) the parent's ability to provide care or supervision, and (2) the availability to the parent of alternative child care arrangements." In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. at 427, 610 S.E.2d at 406. "Findings of fact addressing both prongs must be made before a juvenile may be adjudicated as dependent, and the court's failure to make these findings will result in reversal of the [trial] court." In re B.M., 183 N.C. App. 84, 90, 643 S.E.2d 644, 648 (2007).
In the instant case, the trial court did not make a finding as to the second prong, that the parents lacked an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. The trial court's findings of fact show that respondents entered into two safety plans for Ian. In finding of fact 4, the trial court found that "[u]nder [DSS's] first safety plan with the family, [Ian] went to stay in the home of his maternal grandmother." In finding of fact 17, the trial court found that "[i]n November of 2008, the child [Ian] was taken from the home of maternal grandmother, and placed in the home of maternal grandfather and his spouse[.]" The trial court only concluded that "although the child had been actually safe in grandfather's care under the safety plan prior to the filing of the juvenile petition, this placement was intended to be temporary and was not legally secure such that it did not arise to an appropriate alternative child care arrangement." Without a finding that respondents lacked an appropriate alternative child care arrangement, the trial court erred in adjudicating Ian to be dependent and we vacate and remand on this ground "for entry of findings as to the ability of the parent to provide care or supervision and the availability of alternative child care arrangements." B.M., 183 N.C. App. at 90, 643 S.E.2d at 648.
IV. DISPOSITION
Respondent-mother asserts that the trial court erred in granting custody of Ian to Mr. Smith and in releasing DSS of any further responsibility without establishing a civil custody action pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-911. Respondent-mother argues that without a civil custody order, the trial court "failed to provide Respondent-Parents with the required avenue of being able to seek a return of custody, when they are able[.]" We disagree.
Section 7B-911 provides in relevant part:
(a) After making proper findings at a dispositional hearing or any subsequent hearing, the court on its own motion or the motion of a party may award custody of the juvenile to a parent or other appropriate person pursuant to G.S. 50-13.1, 50-13.2, 50-13.5, and 50-13.7, as provided in this section, and terminate the court's jurisdiction in the juvenile proceeding.
(b) When the court enters a custody order under this section, the court shall either cause the order to be filed in an existing civil action relating to the custody of the juvenile or, if there is no other civil action, instruct the clerk to treat the order as the initiation of a civil action for custody.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-911(a), (b) (2009).
Contrary to respondent-mother's assertion, section 7B-911 does not require the trial court to enter a civil custody order when it orders custody of the juvenile to be with a parent or relative and terminates its jurisdiction over the juvenile proceeding. Instead, section 7B-911 grants the trial court the authority to do so and establishes the procedures the trial court must follow if the court does so. In addition, we have explained that "section 7B-911 governs `[c]ivil child-custody order[s]' and the transfer of Chapter 7B juvenile cases to Chapter 50." In re J.B., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 677 S.E.2d 532, 534 (2009) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-911 (2007)).
In the instant case, the trial court's order is not a civil custody order and the order does not transfer the matter from Chapter 7B to Chapter 50 of our General Statutes. Rather, the trial court's order is a dispositional order entered pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-903(a)(2)b (2009) (authorizing alternatives for disposition, which include permitting the court to "[p]lace the juvenile in the custody of a parent, relative, private agency offering placement services, or some other suitable person."). More importantly, the trial court did not terminate its jurisdiction of the matter, but merely stated that further review was not required. Thus, respondent-mother may file a motion for a review hearing in the trial court to address issues concerning Ian. Accordingly, we conclude section 7B-911 is inapplicable to the present case and respondent-mother's argument is without merit.
V. VISITATION
Finally, respondent-mother contends the trial court erred by "failing to establish an appropriate outline of visitation for the parents." We agree.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905(c) provides:
Any dispositional order under which a juvenile is removed from the custody of a parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker, or under which the juvenile's placement is continued outside the home shall provide for appropriate visitation as may be in the best interests of the juvenile and consistent with the juvenile's health and safety.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905(c) (2009).
When the custody of a child is awarded by the court, it is the exercise of a judicial function. In like manner, when visitation rights are awarded, it is the exercise of a judicial function. We do not think that the exercise of this judicial function may be properly delegated by the court to the custodian of the child. Usually those who are involved in a controversy over the custody of a child have been unable to come to a satisfactory mutual agreement concerning custody and visitation rights. To give the custodian of the child authority to decide when, where and under what circumstances a parent may visit his or her child could result in a complete denial of the right and in any event would be delegating a judicial function to the custodian.
In re Custody of Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 552, 179 S.E.2d 844, 849 (1971) (internal citation omitted); see also In re E.C., 174 N.C. App. at 522, 621 S.E.2d at 652 ("The awarding of visitation of a child is an exercise of a judicial function, and a trial court may not delegate this function to the custodian of a child."). "If the court does award visitation to a parent, the order must include an appropriate visitation plan that sets out at least a minimum outline, such as the time, place, and conditions under which visitation may be exercised." In re W.V., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 693 S.E.2d 383, 387 (2010).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905(c) further provides, in pertinent part:
If the juvenile is placed in the custody or placement responsibility of a county department of social services, the court may order the director to arrange, facilitate, and supervise a visitation plan expressly approved by the court. If the director subsequently makes a good faith determination that the visitation plan may not be in the best interests of the juvenile or consistent with the juvenile's health and safety, the director may temporarily suspend all or part of the visitation plan.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905(c) (emphases added).
In the instant case, the trial court placed Ian in the legal and physical custody of Mr. Smith. However, the trial court's order failed to include the terms for respondent-mother's visitation. Instead, the trial court made only one finding regarding visitation, stating in pertinent part:
12. [Mr. Smith] is [Ian's] current caregiver. . . . [Mr. Smith] has always been open to having [respondents] visit with [Ian] in his home, and [respondent-]mother confirmed that [respondents] visited there on three or four occasions.
The trial court then ordered:
3. It is in the child's best interest to have ongoing contact with [respondents]. Therefore, [respondents] shall be entitled to at least two visits per month, to take place in the home of [Mr. Smith]. [Respondents] shall be permitted to call and speak to the child by phone once per week, and are encouraged to consult with the child's caregiver to schedule these calls in order to cause minimal disruption to the wholesome routines established for the child.
Under the statutory mandate of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905, if the trial court had placed Ian in the custody of DSS rather than Mr. Smith, then DSS would "arrange, facilitate, and supervise a visitation plan" that was "expressly approved by the court." DSS would then have the discretion to make a good faith determination whether the visitation plan was in the best interests of Ian or consistent with Ian's health and safety. If the plan was not in the best interests of Ian or consistent with his health and safety, the DSS director may temporarily suspend all or part of the visitation plan.
However, in the instant case, the trial court placed Ian in the custody of Mr. Smith. Therefore, the trial court's single finding that delegated the arrangement of the visitation to Mr. Smith was an improper delegation of a judicial function to Ian's custodian because it does not adequately define the parameters of respondent-mother's visitation rights. The trial court gave Mr. Smith the discretion to arrange all the details of respondent-mother's visitation plan rather than a minimum outline of a visitation plan such as the time, place, and conditions of the visitation.
Therefore, the trial court's single finding regarding visitation does not support the decretal portion of its order regarding visitation. Accordingly, we vacate the portions of the order related to respondent-mother's visitation and remand the matter for the trial court to make additional findings for an appropriate visitation plan that provides a minimum outline of visitation such as the time, place, and conditions of visitation. See, e.g., W.V., ___ N.C. App. at ___, 693 S.E.2d at 387 (remanding order to trial court to clarify the respondent's visitation rights because order only stated that the respondent "shall have weekly visitations supervised by petitioner"); In re T.B., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 692 S.E.2d 182, 190 (2010) (remanding order to trial court to clarify the respondent's visitation rights because order "left the scope and extent of [the respondent's] visitation to `the discretion of the treatment team'").
VI. CONCLUSION
Proposed issues on appeal not addressed in respondent-mother's brief are abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2009). Since the trial court's findings in its adjudication order do not support its conclusion that Ian was a dependent juvenile, we vacate and remand that portion of the order. Since the dispositional order does not adequately address respondents' visitation rights, we vacate the portion of the order regarding visitation and remand for further consideration of that issue. We affirm the order in all other respects.
Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part.
Judges HUNTER, ROBERT C., and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).