Opinion
No. 04-05-00030-CV
Delivered and Filed: April 12, 2006.
Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2, Guadalupe County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2002-PC-13448, Honorable Frank Follis, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Marvin Jauer Soefje, Jr. appeals the trial court's judgment admitting his mother's will to probate as a muniment of title and ordering distributions of real property from his mother's trust. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
On November 23, 1996, E. Susan Soefje, the mother of Marvin and Peggy Christine Soefje (also referred to by her married name, Peggy Soefje Jones), created an inter vivos trust into which she conveyed certain assets. The trust document provided for specific distributions of real property upon Susan's death. Under the 1996 trust, Peggy was to receive all real property belonging to Susan south of Interstate 10, and Marvin was to receive all real property north of Interstate 10. In June of 2001, Susan amended her trust to provide for an additional specific distribution of real property to Peggy of two tracts of land, one consisting of 125 acres and the other consisting of 5 acres. On the same day, Susan also executed a will leaving her entire estate to the trustee of her trust. Susan died on February 20, 2002.
On May 8, 2002, Marvin sued Peggy in her capacity as trustee of the inter vivos trust in district court, seeking an accounting and Peggy's removal as trustee. On November 27, 2002, Marvin applied to the constitutional county court to have Susan's will admitted for probate. Marvin sought to be appointed as independent executor and to have Peggy declared unsuitable to serve in that capacity. Marvin also sought the issuance of letters testamentary. Peggy countered with an application to have the will probated as a muniment of title only.
Initially, the trust proceeding and the probate proceeding were consolidated by the district court, which exercised jurisdiction and entered various orders. In July 2004, the parties filed a joint motion to transfer the probate proceeding back to the constitutional county court, agreeing that the district court did not have jurisdiction with regard to the probate proceeding. The district court signed an order vacating its April 2003 consolidation order and transferred the probate proceeding back to the constitutional county court. The constitutional county court subsequently transferred the probate proceeding to the county court at law because the judge of the constitutional county court was related to Peggy's husband.
On December 2, 2004, after a two-day hearing, the presiding judge of the county court at law, the Honorable Frank Follis, orally rendered judgment disposing of the probate proceeding and acknowledging that the parties could go back to the district court on the trust matter, if they so chose. On December 13, 2004, Judge Follis signed a final judgment that appeared inconsistent with his verbal pronouncement recognizing the district court's continuing jurisdiction over the trust matter. The judgment stated that it was a final judgment for the district court matter. The judgment approved the final accounting in regard to the trust and further approved the termination of the trust. Judge Follis also signed a separate order admitting Susan's will to probate as a muniment of title.
On December 30, 2004, the Honorable Gus J. Strauss entered a final judgment in the district court cause recognizing that all issues and parties were disposed of by the county court at law's December 2004 judgment. Marvin filed a motion for new trial, asserting that the county court at law did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the trust issues. Judge Strauss granted the motion for new trial.
On March 9, 2005, Marvin filed a petition for writ of mandamus with this court. We conditionally granted mandamus relief, stating that "[d]istrict courts and statutory probate courts are the only courts with jurisdiction over trust proceedings." See In re Soefje, No. 04-05-00140-CV, 2005 WL 1277754 (Tex.App.-San Antonio June 1, 2005, orig. proceeding) (citing Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 115.001 (Vernon Supp. 2005)). Accordingly, we held that mandamus relief would "only issue if Judge Follis fail[ed] to withdraw those portions of the county court at law's judgment [that addressed] trust matters." In re Soefje, 2005 WL 1277754 at *4.
In this appeal from the county court at law's final judgment and order, both signed on December 13, 2004, Marvin contends that the court erred in: (1) probating Susan's will as a muniment of title; (2) finding Peggy qualified and not disqualified to serve as independent executrix; and (3) ordering Peggy to execute deeds to real estate or dispose of real property held by the trust.
Discussion
In his first issue, Marvin asserts that the trial court erred in probating Susan's will as a muniment of title only. Section 89C of the Texas Probate Code governs the probate of wills as muniments of title, providing:
In each instance where the court is satisfied that a will should be admitted to probate, and where the court is further satisfied that there are no unpaid debts owing the estate of the testator, excluding debts secured by liens on real estate, or for other reason finds that there is no necessity for administration upon such estate, the court may admit such will to probate as a muniment of title.
Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 89C(a) (Vernon 2003). "Probating a will as a muniment of title provides a means to probate a will quickly and cost-efficiently when there is no need for administration of the estate." In re Estate of Kurtz, 54 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, no pet.). One of the purposes of this limited form of probate is to provide continuity in the chain of title to real property owned by the estate by recording the will in the public records. Id.
In challenging a trial court's decision to admit a will to probate solely as a muniment of title, the appellant bears the burden of showing "a clear abuse of discretion" by the trial court. See Washington v. Law, 519 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Matter of Estate of Hodges, 725 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles or, whether the court's action was arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985).
Marvin has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Susan's will to probate as a muniment of title. In the "Order Admitting Will to Probate as Muniment of Title," the trial court found that all debts owed by the estate had been paid in full, that there was no fact or circumstance creating a need for administration, and that there existed no necessity of administration. In his brief, Marvin does not state that there were any debts owed by the estate or that an administration was necessary. Marvin's only argument is that because Susan's will provided for independent administration and named an executor, the trial court should have appointed an independent executor and issued letters testamentary. We disagree.
Section 89A of the Probate Code illustrates that the probate of a will as a muniment of title is permitted even in cases where an executor is named in the will. Section 89A(a)(5) provides in pertinent part that "[a]n application for probate of a will as a muniment of title shall state the name and residence of the executor named in the will, if any." Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 89A(a)(5) (Vernon 2003) (emphasis added). Clearly, the statute intended to allow for this limited form of probate even in instances where an executor is named in the will.
Because the will was properly admitted to probate as a muniment of title, letters testamentary cannot issue to Marvin. See Hodges, 725 S.W.2d at 271 (holding that even though appellant was named alternate independent executor under decedent's will, he was not entitled to letters testamentary because will was admitted to probate as a muniment of title); see also Kurtz, 54 S.W.3d at 355 ("[w]hen a court admits a will to probate as a muniment of title, the court does not issue letters testamentary to an executor or appoint an administrator"). Accordingly, Marvin's first issue is overruled.
Marvin's second issue, that the trial court erred in finding that Peggy was qualified and not disqualified to serve as independent executrix of Susan's will, is conditioned upon a finding that the trial court improperly admitted the will to probate as a muniment of title. Because we hold that the trial court properly admitted Susan's will to probate as a muniment of title, we do not address Marvin's second issue.
Finally, Marvin contests the portion of the judgment that authorizes Peggy, as trustee, to convey the 125-acre and 5-acre tracts of land to herself, and directs Peggy to execute and record deeds for such conveyances. Marvin contends that this provision of the judgment addresses trust matters and is therefore contrary to this court's mandamus opinion. See In re Soefje, 2005 WL 1277754 at *4 (directing the trial court to withdraw the portions of the judgment addressing trust matters). We take judicial notice of Judge Follis's order of June 6, 2005, which was filed in the mandamus proceeding. See Muller v. Leyendecker, 697 S.W.2d 668, 675 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that an appellate court can take judicial notice of its own records and judgments rendered in cases involving the same subject matter). Judge Follis's order states that any and all portions of the final judgment entered on December 13, 2004 that address trust matters are withdrawn and declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction. By this order, the trial court declared the portion of the judgment authorizing Peggy, as trustee, to convey the tracts of land to herself to be null and void. Marvin's third issue is therefore moot.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.