Opinion
No. COA10-298
Filed 4 January 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by taxpayers from final decision entered 23 December 2009 by the North Carolina Property Tax Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 September 2010.
Guthrie, Davis, Henderson Staton, PLLC, by John H. Hasty, for Appellants. C.B. McLean Jr., for Appellee.
From the North Carolina Property Tax Commission, Wake County No. 08 PTC 276.
Taxpayers John H. and Melissa M. Hasty appeal from a final decision of the North Carolina Property Tax Commission affirming a determination made by the Lincoln County Board of Equalization and Review concerning the valuation of Taxpayers' real property and dismissing Taxpayers' challenge to the Board's decision. On appeal, Taxpayers argue that the Commission erroneously applied the applicable burden of proof rules, erroneously failed to find that Taxpayers had not satisfied their burden of presenting evidence that Lincoln County had valued their property at an amount that exceeded its true value, erroneously found that Lincoln County uniformly assessed the value of their property on the basis of appropriately adopted rules, and erroneously failed to find that Lincoln County used an unlawful and arbitrary method for purposes of valuing their property. After careful consideration of Taxpayers' challenges to the Commission's decision in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the Commission's decision should be affirmed.
I. Factual Background
Taxpayers own approximately seven tenths of an acre of property fronting on Lake Norman that features a garage containing quarters capable of accommodating two people, a pier, and a boat house. As part of a countywide revaluation conducted in early 2008 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-286, Lincoln County valued Taxpayers' property at $506,035.00, which represented a sixty per cent increase over the $195,463.00 valuation approved in 2004. On 3 March 2008, Taxpayers sought administrative review of the County's valuation decision. After receiving notice that the requested administrative review had confirmed the correctness of the County's initial valuation, Taxpayers sought review by the Lincoln County Board of Equalization and Review on 15 May 2008.
On 19 June 2008, the Board conducted a hearing at which it received evidence concerning Taxpayers' challenge to the valuation assigned to their Lake Norman property. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Board determined that the true value of Taxpayers' property was $508,303.00. Taxpayers noted an appeal from the Board's decision to the Commission on 3 July 2008.
Taxpayers' appeal came on for hearing before the Commission on 15 July 2009. On 23 December 2009, the Commission entered a Final Decision affirming the Board's valuation and granting a dismissal motion made by Lincoln County at the close of Taxpayers' evidence. In its decision, the Commission made the following findings of fact:
1. The property under appeal is a lot on Lake Norman located at 2692 Cherry Lane near Denver, North Carolina. The subject improvements are more particularly described as a garage consisting of 816 square feet that was built in 1986; a pier, boat house and improvements thereto that were built in the early 1970s. . . .
2. Effective January 1, 2008, Lincoln County assessed the subject real property at a total value of $506,035. [Taxpayers] challenged the assessment by filing an appeal with the County Board. After conducting a hearing, the County Board issued a decision on June 26, 2008 that increased the assessed value of the subject real property to $508,303.
3. At the hearing, Mr. Hasty testified that Lincoln County improperly included the valuation of the pier, boat house and improvements thereto in his property tax assessment because he believes that the improvements are located on property owned by Duke Energy. In his opinion, Lincoln County should assess Duke Energy for property taxes on the pier, boat house and improvement thereto. As such, he disagrees with the valuation of taxation of the subject property.
4. Lincoln County used its duly adopted schedule of values, standards and rules to determine the total property tax value for the subject property, effective January 1, 2008.
5. Lincoln County uniformly assessed the subject property consistent with its assessment of comparable properties in the county.
6. The pier, boat house and improvements thereto are part of the [Taxpayers'] real property, and the [Taxpayers] have access and use of [the] property. As such, Lincoln County included the valuation of the improvements in the assessment of the [Taxpayers'] property.
7. Based upon [] the assessment of the subject improvements ($27,574), and the land assessment of $480,729, the County Board determined that the total valuation of [Taxpayers'] property was $508,303, effective January 1, 2008.
In light of these findings of fact, the Commission concluded as a matter of law that:
1. When [taxpayers] challenge the county's assessment of their property, they are required to produce evidence that tends to show that the County relied on illegal or arbitrary valuation methods and that the assessment substantially exceeds [the] true value of the property.
In re Appeal of IBM Credit Corporation, 186 N.C. App. [223], 650 S.E.2d 828 (2007), aff'd per curiam, 362 N.C. 228, 657 S.E.2d 355 (2008) (citation in the original).
2. If the [taxpayers] produce such evidence as outlined above, the burden of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion that its methods would in fact produce true value then rests with the County; and it is the Commission's duty to hear the evidence of both sides, to determine its weight and sufficiency and the credibility of witnesses, to draw inferences, and to appraise conflicting and circumstantial evidence, all in order to determine whether the County met its burden.
Id. (citation in the original).
3. The [Taxpayers] did not satisfy their burden of proof by showing that Lincoln County employed an arbitrary or illegal method of appraisal and that the tax value was substantially greater than the true value in money of the subject property as of January 1, 2008.
Id. (citation in the original).
Based upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Commission ordered that "the decision of the 2008 Lincoln County Board of Equalization and Review is affirmed and Lincoln County's motion to dismiss [Taxpayers'] appeal is granted." Taxpayers noted an appeal to this Court from the Commission's decision.
II. Legal Analysis A. Standard of Review
The standard of review utilized in reviewing Commission decisions is spelled out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-345.2, which provides, in pertinent part, that:
(b) . . . The court may affirm or reverse the decision of the Commission, declare the same null and void, or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the appellants have been prejudiced because the Commission's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(2) In excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commission; or
(3) Made upon unlawful proceedings; or
(4) Affected by other errors of law; or
(5) Unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) Arbitrary and capricious.
(c) In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
"For appeals from administrative tribunals, `[q]uestions of law receive de novo review, whereas fact-intensive issues such as sufficiency of the evidence to support [an agency's] decision are reviewed under the whole-record test.'" In re Amusements of Rochester, Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 689 S.E.2d 451, 453 (2009) (quoting N.C. Dep't of Env't Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 659, 599 S.E.2d 888, 894 (2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted)), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 325, 700 S.E.2d 745 (2010), see also, In re Weaver Inv. Co., 165 N.C. App. 198, 201, 598 S.E.2d 591, 593 (stating that "[t]his Court reviews the Commission's decision[s] under the `whole record' test," that "[t]he `whole record' test `is not a tool of judicial intrusion,'" and that "this Court only considers whether the Commission's decision has a `rational basis in the evidence'") (citing In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 65, 253 S.E.2d 912, 922 (1979), In re Appeal of the Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 188, 606 S.E.2d 695 (2004). In reviewing Commission decisions, we may not "`replace the [Commission's] judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though [we] could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before [us] de novo.'" In re McElwee, 304 N.C. 68, 87-88, 283 S.E.2d 115, 127 (1981) (quoting Thompson v. Wake County Board of Education, 292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977), see also, Weaver, 165 N.C. App. at 201, 598 S.E.2d at 593 (stating that "[w]e may not substitute our judgment for that of the Commission even when reasonably conflicting views of the evidence exist") (citations omitted). Instead, the Commission is vested with the authority to "`determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, to draw inferences from the facts, and to appraise conflicting and circumstantial evidence.'" In re Appeal of Interstate Income Fund I, 126 N.C. App. 162, 164, 484 S.E.2d 450, 451 (1997) (quoting McElwee, 304 N.C. at 87, 283 S.E.2d at 126-27).
B. Basic Procedural Principles Applicable in Property Tax Cases
It is a "sound and a fundamental principle of law in this State that ad valorem tax assessments are presumed to be correct." In re Appeal of AMP, Inc., 287 N.C. 547, 562, 215 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1975). "A taxpayer may rebut this presumption by `produc[ing] competent, material and substantial evidence that tends to show that: (1) Either the county tax supervisor used an arbitrary method of valuation; or (2) the county tax supervisor used an illegal method of valuation; AND (3) the assessment substantially exceeded the true value in money of the property.'" In re Appeal of IBM Credit Corp., 186 N.C. App. 223, 225-26, 650 S.E.2d 828, 830 (2007) (quoting AMP, 287 N.C. at 563, 215 S.E.2d at 762 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff'd per curiam, 362 N.C. 228, 657 S.E.2d 355 (2008). In attempting to rebut this presumption, "the burden upon the aggrieved taxpayer . . . is one of production and not persuasion." Id. "[O]nce a taxpayer produces [sufficient competent, material and substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness], the burden of proof then shifts to the taxing authority." Id. As a result, the Commission should grant a dismissal motion made at the close of the taxpayer's evidence if the Commission determines that the taxpayer has failed to produce competent, material, and substantial evidence tending to show that (1) the county employed an arbitrary or illegal method of appraisal and (2) the tax value assigned to the property is substantially greater than the property's true value. AMP, 287 N.C. at 563, 215 S.E.2d at 762.
As a result of the fact that the Commission reviews the decisions of county boards of equalization and review, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-290(b), the issue before the Court in this case is the appropriateness of the manner in which the Commission reviewed the decision of the Board rather than the manner in which the Board reviewed the County staff's decision. For that reason, the applicable valuation that must be utilized for the purpose of our review in this case is the $508,303 valuation assigned by the Board rather than the $506,035 valuation assigned by the Lincoln County staff. Since, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Taxpayers have failed to adduce sufficient evidence tending to show that the Board substantially overvalued Taxpayers' property, we need not address the issues that Taxpayers attempt to raise stemming from the fact that the valuation adopted by the Board as a result of Taxpayers' appeal was slightly higher than that proposed by the Lincoln County staff.
C. Analysis of Taxpayers' Arguments 1. Burden of Proof
In their initial challenge to the Commission's decision, Taxpayers contend that the Commission erred by requiring them to assume a burden of persuasion instead of a burden of production in order to rebut the presumption of correctness applicable to the Board's decision. In support of this contention, Taxpayers point to the Commission's conclusions of law that, "[w]hen [Taxpayers] challenge the county's assessment of their property, they are required to produce evidence that tends to show that the County relied on illegal or arbitrary valuation methods and that the assessment substantially exceeds true value of the property;" that, "[i]f the [Taxpayers] produce such evidence," "the burden of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion that its methods would in fact produce true value then rests with the County;" that the Commission is required "to hear the evidence of both sides" to "determine whether the County met its burden;" and that Taxpayers "did not satisfy their burden of proof by showing that Lincoln County employed an arbitrary or illegal method of appraisal and that the tax value was substantially greater than the true value in money of the subject property as of January 1, 2008." After carefully studying the relevant portions of the Commission's decision, however, we are not convinced that the Commission placed the ultimate burden of persuasion on Taxpayers.
In IBM Credit Corp., we held that the Commission erred by requiring a taxpayer to shoulder a burden of persuasion rather than a burden of production. According to an analysis of the decision at issue in IBM Credit Corp., the Commission referred to the taxpayer's burden as one of proof on three separate occasions without making any mention of the controlling decisional law that explained the operation of the applicable burdens of production and persuasion. IBM, 186 N.C. App. at 227-28, 650 S.E.2d at 829-32. In IBM Credit Corp., the Commission concluded as a matter of law that the taxpayer "did not produce competent, material and substantial evidence to show that [the county] employed an arbitrary or illegal method of valuation" and " failed to show that . . . [the county's valuation] substantially exceeded the [property's] true value." Id. at 228, 650 W.E.2d at 831. Although we noted the ambiguous nature of this conclusion of law in discussing the lawfulness of the Commission's decisionmaking process, we ultimately held that, "given the prior three articulations improperly placing a burden of proof on [taxpayer], we cannot be assured by this single ambiguous statement that the Commission applied the burden-shifting framework . . ., especially given the Commission's failure to reference [controlling case law]." Id. As a result, in the event that the Commission imposed a burden of persuasion, as compared to a burden of production, on Taxpayers, it would have failed to correctly apply applicable law.
The Commission decision at issue in this case is easily distinguishable from the decision before this Court in IBM Credit Corp. In this case, the Commission's third conclusion of law simply states that Taxpayers failed to satisfy their burden of proof, while the first and second conclusions of law correctly and clearly explain the applicable burden-shifting scheme utilized in Commission proceedings. In fact, the Commission uses the word "produce" twice in the course of explaining that Taxpayers' burden is one of production rather than persuasion. In addition, the Commission's decision makes explicit reference to our decision in IBM Credit Corp., in which we explained the operation of the burden-shifting approach that must be employed in cases before the Commission. When viewed in context, we do not believe that the Commission's statement in its third conclusion of law to the effect that Taxpayers failed to meet their burden of proof reflects a Commission determination to refrain from utilizing the burden-shifting scheme set out in the very appellate opinion cited in the course of the Commission's analysis. Thus, we conclude that Taxpayers' initial challenge to the Commission's decision lacks merit.
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Show Overvaluation
Secondly, Taxpayers contend that they produced competent, material, and substantial evidence tending to show that Lincoln County used arbitrary and illegal methods in determining their property valuation and that their property was valued at substantially greater than its true value. For that reason, Taxpayers argue that they successfully rebutted the presumption that Lincoln County acted lawfully. We disagree.
"All property, real and personal, shall as far as practicable be appraised or valued at its true value in money." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-283. The "true value" of a tract of property is its "market value," which is the price a willing and financially able buyer would pay a willing seller for the property, "neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of all the uses to which the property is adapted and for which it is capable of being used." Id. The "market value" of a tract of property is the "highest market price [which the property] would bring for its most advantageous uses [at the time of taking] and in the foreseeable future[,] . . . contemplat[ing] the most productive and lucrative use of land given the applicable physical, legal and governmental constraints." In re Appeal of Parsons, 123 N.C. App. 32, 41, 472 S.E.2d 182, 188 (1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-317(a) provides that:
(a) Whenever any real property is appraised it shall be the duty of the persons making appraisals:
(1) In determining the true value of land, to consider as to each tract, parcel, or lot separately listed at least its advantages and disadvantages as to location; zoning; quality of soil; waterpower; water privileges; dedication as a nature preserve; conservation or preservation agreements; mineral, quarry, or other valuable deposits; fertility; adaptability for agricultural, timber-producing, commercial, industrial, or other uses; past income; probable future income; and any other factors that may affect its value except growing crops of a seasonal or annual nature.
(2) In determining the true value of a building or other improvement, to consider at least its location; type of construction; age; replacement cost; cost; adaptability for residence, commercial, industrial, or other uses; past income; probable future income; and any other factors that may affect its value.
The relevant statutory provisions do not require that any "particular method of valuation be used at all times and in all places." Greens of Pine Glen, 356 N.C. at 648, 576 S.E.2d at 320. On the contrary, "[i]n light of the innumerable possible situations that may arise, authorities that have the obligation of assigning a value to land sensibly are given discretion to apply the method that most accurately captures the `true value' of the property in question" and, in exercising that discretion, may choose between three generally accepted methods of valuation: the cost approach, the comparable sales approach, and the income approach. Id.
A review of the relevant decisional law reveals that, in many of the instances in which a taxpayer has successfully rebutted the presumption of correctness, he or she presented expert testimony addressing both the valuation methodology utilized by the county and the true value of the property at issue in the proceeding in question. In these cases, the expert testimony regarding the property's "true value," assuming it relied on one of the three generally accepted methods of valuation and enunciated an opinion of the property's value that was substantially less than the assessed valuation supported by the county, sufficed to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the county's valuation. See, In re Appeal of Lane Co., 153 N.C. App. 119, 121-22, 571 S.E.2d 224, 226 (2002) (holding that the taxpayer succeeded in rebutting the presumption of correctness when its expert witness testified that the sales comparison approach was the best method for valuing the particular property at issue, explained the reasoning behind this conclusion, and, in utilizing this valuation method, "cited eight representative sales, used these comparables with adjustments to determine the market value for the subject property, and opined [that] the fair market value [of the property was] $3.50 per square foot of building area"); Parsons, 123 N.C. App. at 42-43, 472 S.E.2d at 189 (holding that the taxpayer "presented substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness" by proffering evidence tending to show that the "best use of the property given its location, zoning, topography, and other characteristics was residential development" and by presenting the testimony of an expert witness who used two different valuation methods, both of which resulted in valuations that were more than one million dollars lower than the assigned tax value). It is clear from our decision in In re Appeal of Murray, 179 N.C. App. 780, 635 S.E.2d 477 (2006), however, that a taxpayer need not utilize the testimony of an expert witness in order to successfully rebut the presumption that the County acted lawfully. In Murray, a taxpayer successfully rebutted the presumption of correctness when she testified that the county valued her property in a manner that was clearly contrary to the relevant statutory provisions, resulting in a ninety per cent appreciation in the value of her property within the span of one year, and assessed her mobile home as having a value less than two thousand dollars below the original purchase price despite "years of previous depreciation." Murray, 179 N.C. App. at 787-88, 635 S.E.2d at 482. In affirming the Commission's decision to reduce the value assigned to the taxpayer's property, we emphasized "the role of the Commission," which is "`to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, to draw inferences from the facts, and to appraise conflicting and circumstantial evidence.'" Id. at 785, 635 S.E.2d at 480 (quoting McElwee, 304 N.C. at 87, 283 S.E.2d at 126-27). After "review[ing] the whole record," we concluded that, given the Commission's duty to "weigh[] the sufficiency of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses," the "[t]axpayer's testimony was reasonably accepted by the Commission" as sufficient competent, material and substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness. Id. at 785, 787-88, 635 S.E.2d at 480, 482. Thus, the ultimate issue that we must address is the substance of the evidence that Taxpayers offered in support of their challenge to the Board's valuation decision rather than whether their challenge took the form of lay or expert witness testimony.
The evidence presented by Taxpayers in the course of their attempt to demonstrate that the valuation approved in the Board's decision substantially exceeded the property's true value is not comparable to that before the Commission in Lane, Parsons, and Murray. Taxpayers did not present expert witness testimony in support of their appeal. Instead, Mr. Hasty testified before the Commission that:
. . . I feel the comparative sale analysis of land sales within a half a mile [of the property at issue] is the most accurate of the true value in money of the subject property, and that is $346,000. So, in answer to the third issue, did Lincoln County appraise and assess the subject property at a figure in excess of its true value in money, I would say the answer is "yes." The real value is around [$]346,000.
Mr. Hasty made this determination by averaging the 2007 sales prices of three tracts which, in his opinion, were comparable to his own. According to Mr. Hasty, each tract utilized in his analysis involved a waterfront lot located in Catawba Springs Township, was about the same size as Taxpayers' property, and had access to a paved road and water and sewer service. Mr. Hasty's attempt to conduct a comparable sales analysis fails, however, because none of the prices upon which he relied were adjusted for the fact that the underlying sales occurred before the valuation date used by the County; because the record does not establish the distance of the parcels in question from Taxpayers' property; because Mr. Hasty did not explain the reason that he chose these lots for inclusion in his analysis; and because Mr. Hasty did not compare his property with the other tracts included in his analysis on the basis of waterfront footage, access to deeper water, the attractiveness of the view from the lot, the desirability of the neighborhood in which each lot was located, or most of the other factors generally utilized to determine the value of lakefront property. Among other things, Mr. Hasty admitted that he was unsure of the location of each of the relevant tracts of property, that he did not know whether a particular tract was located on a "very narrow cove with a limited view of the water," that he had "no idea how deep the water" in front of each tract was, and that he did know that one tract "adjoin[ed] a common area of boat accessway." In addition, Mr. Hasty testified on cross-examination that:
As we understand the record, although Mr. Hasty studied information concerning thirteen tracts in the course of conducting his analysis, his ultimate valuation opinion was based on the average sales price of the three of those thirteen tracts that changed hands in 2007.
[Mr. McLean]: . . . Mr. Hasty, isn't it true that . . . you have made no adjustments for any differences whatsoever between lots; you have simply added them up and divided . . . you've arrived at a simple numerical average. Is that correct?
[Mr. Hasty]: And a [] median.
[Mr. McLean]: All right. A mean and a median?
[Mr. Hasty]: Right.
[Mr. McLean]: But without making any adjustments?
[Mr. Hasty]: Correct.
. . . .
[Mr. McLean]: Isn't that a necessary part of the sales comparison process?
[Mr. Hasty]: I don't think it's necessary, no, sir.
[Mr. McLean]: Do you think that simply adding them up and dividing by the number to get either a mean or a median is a valid appraisal method?
[Mr. Hasty]: I think it's an indication of value, yes, sir.
[Mr. McLean]: Without making any adjustments for differences between the sold properties and the subject?
[Mr. Hasty]: Well, the differences that you're describing are not, in my opinion, material differences. . . . [T]he material differences are the location, the access to the property, and its relative size.
[Mr. McLean]: So, what adjustments did you make to these sales for location, access, and relative size?
[Mr. Hasty]: I didn't make any.
. . . .
[Mr. McLean]: But you made no adjustments for neighborhood, access, size of lot, access to public water and sewer, view of the lake, deep water, or any other factor that might affect the value of these lots, have you?
[Mr. Hasty]: Well, the nature of the development, the paved road and access to sewer and water, and access to Highway 16, and so forth, is all the same.
[Mr. McLean]: So, these are all exactly the same as your lot?
[Mr. Hasty]: Well, substantially the same, I'd say.
At bottom, Mr. Hasty's testimony confirms that he did not use one of the three generally accepted methods of appraisal listed in Greens of Pine Glen in developing his proposed valuation and that his testimony rested on a simple average of the prices at which lakefront lots with road and utility access sold in the year prior to the valuation date the County utilized. In light of his failure to consider the factors delineated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-317(a), the non-granular nature of his analysis, and his failure to make any adjustments to reflect the factors that might have affected the value of the allegedly comparable tracts to account, Mr. Hasty's methodology was fatally flawed. For that reason, the Commission did not err by concluding that Taxpayers' evidence failed to adequately rebut the presumption of correctness afforded to the Board's decision.
In addition to Mr. Hasty's valuation analysis, Taxpayers have identified two additional pieces of evidence which they contend show that Lincoln County valued their property at an excessively high figure. Neither suffices to meet Taxpayers' burden of production.
First, Taxpayers point to the sale of a 2,585 square foot home positioned on a "similar sized lot on Lake Norman" for $505,000.00 in January 2007. According to Taxpayers, information concerning this single real estate transaction provides competent, material, and substantial evidence tending to show that their property was substantially overvalued by demonstrating that "one could purchase a large modern home on a similar sized lot on the lake for less than the [tax value assigned to their property]." However, the
sales price information relating to this 2,585 square foot dwelling is of limited value for purposes of this case because it suffers from the same deficiencies as affect Mr. Hasty's attempt to conduct a comparable sales analysis. For example, the record discloses the existence of several differences between Taxpayers' property and the tract containing the 2,585 square foot dwelling, suggesting that the two tracts have different values. In fact, Mr. Hasty admitted that he could not be certain if the two tracts were comparable.
[Mr. McLean]: . . . How far is the [other tract] from your property?
[Mr. Hasty]: . . . probably six or seven miles[.]
[Mr. McLean]: . . . And is it true that that property has a limited view of the lake and is located on shallow water in a narrow cove?
[Mr. Hasty]: It's located on a narrow cove. I can't tell you whether-about the depth of the water.
[Mr. McLean]: Is the view of the lake from that property comparable to the view from your property?
[Mr. Hasty]: I don't know what you mean by `comparable[.]' . . . I — really don't know. You know, as far as that sale is concerned, I — I'm not sure — it's like I told you. I don't think it's comparable to my lot.
Thus, in the absence of evidence tending to show that the tract upon which the 2,585 square foot dwelling was located was comparable to Taxpayers' property, the price at which the latter tract was sold has no bearing on a proper valuation of Taxpayers' property.
Secondly, Taxpayers claim that they introduced "clear evidence that Lincoln County had [] reached the opinion just six [] months prior to its $506,035.00 assessment that the property was only valued at $372,630" and that this fact satisfies their burden of producing evidence tending to show that Lincoln County both failed to utilize an appropriate valuation methodology and overvalued their property. Although evidence of such an increase in value in such a relatively short period of time might provide some indication that the second value is inflated, we do not believe that this fact, standing alone, required the denial of Lincoln County's motion. In the absence of evidence tending to show that similar valuation methods were used and that property values in the area had not substantially changed in the intervening period of time, the fact the County determined that Taxpayers' property was worth two substantially different figures at two different times does not tend to show that the valuation approved by the Board was excessive, particularly given the Commission's authority to make weight and credibility determinations.
As it made clear in its final decision, the Commission did not find the evidence presented by Taxpayers sufficient to rebut the presumption that Lincoln County valued Taxpayers' property in a lawful manner. Simply put, the Commission's determination that Taxpayers did not adequately rebut the presumption of correctness applicable to the Board's decision has ample record support. It is simply "not enough for the taxpayer to show that the means adopted by the tax supervisor were wrong, he must also show that the result arrived at is substantially greater than the true value in money of the property assessed." AMP, 287 N.C. at 563, 215 S.E.2d at 762. Taxpayers failed to make the required showing here. As a result, since Taxpayers failed to establish that the $508,303.00 valuation approved by the Board substantially overstated the true value of their property, we need not determine whether Lincoln County utilized arbitrary or unlawful methods in valuing Taxpayers' property. Id.
Among other things, this failure of proof obviates any need for us to address Taxpayers' challenge to Findings of Fact Nos. 4 and 5, which address the appropriateness of the valuation methods utilized by the County.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for all of these reasons, we conclude that Taxpayers' challenges to the Commission decision are without merit. As a result, the Commission's decision should be, and hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).