Opinion
No. CV06 5002684 S
April 13, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is an action for personal injuries by the plaintiff against the defendant operator and defendant lessor of a rental automobile. The defendant lessor, CAMRAC, Inc., d/b/a Enterprise Rent-A-Car has moved to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint as legally insufficient on the grounds that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (the "Graves Amendment") bars vicarious liability of an owner engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles in the absence of negligence or criminal wrongdoing.
Subsection (a) of § 30106 states in relevant part: "An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any [s]tate or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if (1) the owner (or affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner). " 49 U.S.C. 30106(a).
The Graves Amendment conflicts with and by its terms preempts state laws which impose vicarious liability on owners of leased or rented motor vehicles for damages as is the case with General Statutes § 14-154a.
General Statutes § 14-154a states in relevant part: "(a) Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner."
The plaintiff has filed an objection to the defendant's motion on the grounds that the Graves Amendment violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, Article 1, § 8.
In its objection to the motion to strike, the plaintiff argues that the court's earlier decision denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint removes the question of preemption of Connecticut law from this case. The plaintiff misconstrues the court's decision on the motion to dismiss. At short calendar, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the name of the defendant corporation was incorrect and that no such entity existed. The court denied the motion on those grounds and no decision was made on the issue of preemption.
There are only four reported Connecticut cases that have directly ruled on or referred to the applicability of the Graves Amendment and few reported decisions from other states that have addressed the issue of its preemption of state vicarious liability statutes.
In Davis v. llama, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 05 4007074 (March 14, 2006, Brunetti, J.) (41 Conn. L. Rtpr. 178), Judge Brunetti held that the Graves Amendment preempts § 14-154a relying principally on Infante v. U-Haul Co. of Florida, Docket No. 05-18167, slip op. at 1 (N.Y.Sup.Ct., Queens County, January 18, 2006). Judge Brunetti cited Infante for the proposition that the Graves Amendment "resolved a long-standing debate as to the propriety of imposing vicarious liability on car owners who rent or lease their vehicles which are subsequently involved in motor vehicle accidents." In Dorsey v. Beverly, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 06 5004081 (March 7, 2007, Jones, J.) [ 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 51], the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment for the same reasons.
In Whiston v. Curry, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 5004796 (January 4, 2007, Rittenband, J.T.R.) [ 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 599], the defendant auto lessor's motion to strike which asserted that the Graves Amendment preempted § 14-154a was denied by the court on the grounds that the plaintiff's complaint alleged negligence on the part of the defendant for failing to require proof of financial responsibility from the lessee of the vehicle. For purposes of the motion to strike, the allegation of negligence rendered the Graves Amendment inapplicable to the action and the defendant's vicarious liability pursuant to § 14-154a remained in the case.
The only other reference to the Graves Amendment is dicta in footnote 1 in Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp., 98 Conn.App. 665, 668, 911 A.2d 315 (2006) where the Appellate Court stated that the Graves Amendment preempts state law and abolishes claims for vicarious liability against lease companies.
In its memorandum in opposition to the motion to strike, the plaintiff cites Graham v. Dunkley, 827 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup.Ct. Queens Cty. Sept. 11, 2006, Polizzi, J.), a New York lower court case, as authority for its claim that the Graves Amendment is an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
"[W]hile the courts may declare a statute to be unconstitutional, our power to do this should be exercised with caution, and in no doubtful case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ciordano v. Ciordano, 39 Conn.App. 183, 188-89, 664 A.2d 1136 (1995). "(I)n passing upon the constitutionality of a legislative act, we will make every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity . . . The party challenging a statute's constitutionality has a heavy burden of proof; the unconstitutionality must be proven beyond all reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bottone v. Westport, 209 Conn. 652, 657, 553 A.2d 576 (1989); Rudy's Limousine Service, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 76 Conn.App. 80, 89, 826 A.2d 1161 (2003). Beyond offering the New York lower court decision as authority for the unconstitutionality of the Graves Amendment, the plaintiff has offered no additional case law or argument and accordingly, the plaintiff has not sustained its burden of proving that the federal statute is unconstitutional.
With respect to the applicability of the Graves Amendment to the present action, this court is inclined to follow the decisions in Davis v. Illama, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 05 4007074 and Dorsey v. Beverly, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 06 5004081. The plaintiff has alleged in the second count of its complaint that the motor vehicle driven by the defendant operator was a "rental automobile" and the defendant lessor submitted a copy of the rental agreement evidencing its engagement in the business of renting motor vehicles. The plaintiff has not pled any negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the defendant lessor. Accordingly, on the basis of the pleading and the facts alleged, the Graves Amendment bars recovery for vicarious liability against the defendant lessor CAMRAC.
The motion to strike the second count of the plaintiff's complaint is hereby granted.