Opinion
D083078
05-06-2024
In re the Marriage of KENLLY IGIRIO and BRITTON JEWELL. v. BRITTON JEWELL, Appellant. KENLLY IGIRIO, Respondent,
Quinn & Dworakowski, Stephane Quinn and David Dworakowski for Appellant. Law Offices of Bowler and Bowler, E. Toby Bowler; Arias & Lockwood and Christopher D. Lockwood for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, No. FAMSS1904066 Teresa S. Bennett, Judge.
Quinn & Dworakowski, Stephane Quinn and David Dworakowski for Appellant.
Law Offices of Bowler and Bowler, E. Toby Bowler; Arias & Lockwood and Christopher D. Lockwood for Respondent.
IRION, ACTING P. J.
Britton Jewell appeals the family court's postjudgment order that set aside provisions of a stipulation and order regarding child custody and visitation and awarded Kenlly Igirio attorney fees and costs. Jewell contends Igirio's request for the set-aside order was procedurally defective and the court abused its discretion in granting her request. Jewell also contends the court had no jurisdiction to award Igirio need-based attorney fees and costs incurred before the stipulation and order were entered, because the stipulation and order expressly resolved all claims that could have been brought in connection with the parties' requests for order identified in the stipulation and order; and the court abused its discretion by awarding her fees and costs as a sanction for unnecessarily increasing litigation expenses. We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Marriage and Divorce
Igirio and Jewell married in Florida in 2013; moved to California in 2016; had a son, Alexander, in 2017; and divorced in 2019. The dissolution judgment incorporated a marital settlement agreement by which the parties agreed to take joint legal custody of Alexander and to share physical custody according to a schedule set out in the agreement. The custody arrangement was "made with the understanding that [the parties] intend to continue residing in California until they relocate to Florida."
B. Pre-move Away Litigation
On September 29, 2020, Jewell filed a request for order giving him more parenting time with Alexander and prohibiting Igirio from moving with Alexander to Florida. Igirio filed a responsive declaration in which she asked the family court to deny Jewell's request.
On November 10, 2020, Igirio filed a request for order granting her sole physical custody of Alexander and allowing her to move with him to Florida. She asked the family court to order Jewell to pay $20,000 in attorney fees. Jewell filed a responsive declaration in which he asked the family court to order Igirio not to move Alexander, to appoint a child custody evaluator, to increase his parenting time, and to award only $5,000 in attorney fees.
On December 14, 2020, Jewell filed a request for order appointing a child custody evaluator to examine whether it would be in Alexander's best interest to move with Igirio to Florida. The parties later stipulated to the appointment of Amy Miller as evaluator, and the family court entered an order approving the stipulation.
The family court held a hearing on the parties' requests for order on March 29, 2021, at which it made temporary custody and visitation orders pending trial on the move-away request and took under submission Igirio's request for attorney fees. The court later issued an order directing Jewell to contribute $7,500 to Igirio's attorney fees.
On January 25, 2022, Jewell made an ex parte application for an order directing immediate release of Miller's child custody evaluation to his retained expert and imposing sanctions on Igirio for refusing to agree to release it. The family court ordered release of Miller's evaluation and reserved ruling on the request for sanctions.
Igirio and Jewell entered into a stipulation on February 16, 2022, to resolve without trial the outstanding requests for order. The parties agreed to replace the custody and visitation provisions of the dissolution judgment with provisions that maintained the joint legal custody of Alexander to which they had previously agreed, granted Igirio sole physical custody of Alexander and allowed her to move with him to Florida, and set out a detailed visitation schedule for Jewell. The stipulation provided that if Jewell relocated to Florida, he and Igirio "shall discuss and try to agree on a modified parenting schedule"; and if they could not agree, "they shall seek court intervention to resolve the dispute." The stipulation stated it was "meant to resolve any and all rights and claims that either Party could have brought before the [c]ourt in connection with [the then-pending requests for order and ex parte application]," including, but not limited to, Igirio's "relocation with [Alexander], custody modification, visitation modification, and issues incidental thereto." The family court approved the stipulation and entered it as an order.
The stipulation divided the visitation schedule into three phases. The first phase covered February 10-28, 2022, and granted Jewell visitation "every weekend from 6:00 p.m. Thursday to 4:00 p.m. Sunday." The second phase covered March 1, 2022, through February 28, 2023. It granted Jewell visitation for two weeks in California (one week in July 2022 and the other in November 2022); required Igirio to transport Alexander to California; and divided the parties' time with Alexander among the days of the weeks he would be in California. The second phase also granted Jewell visitation for four weeks in Florida (one week each in March 2022, June 2022, December 2022, and another month of his choice), and divided the parties' time with Alexander among the days of the weeks Jewell would be in Florida. The third phase covered March 1, 2023, into the future. It granted Jewell visitation for two weeks in California each year (one week in July and the other in November); four weeks in Florida each year (one week in March, June, December, and another month of his choice); and two additional weeks at a location of his choice.
C. Post-move Away Litigation
Igirio moved to Florida in February 2022. The following month, Jewell traveled to Florida to visit Alexander. While there, he told Igirio he had hired a firm in November 2021 to find him a job in Florida and he would be moving to Florida in June 2022 to start a new job.
On April 1, 2022, Igirio filed a request for order directing Jewell to contribute to payment of her attorney fees and imposing fees as a sanction. In a supporting declaration, Igirio stated that Jewell did not inform her, her attorney, or the court about his plan to move to Florida while they were negotiating the February 16, 2022 stipulation. She complained that "the efforts to resolve the issues of [Jewell's] parenting time with [her] living in Florida and [him] in California" were "now for naught as the parenting schedule set forth in the February 16 stipulation is clearly not useful for the circumstances of [Jewell] living in Florida." Igirio's attorney submitted a declaration with attached documents detailing the fees Igirio had incurred through March 31, 2022. The attorney stated that as a result of Jewell's failure to disclose his intent to move to Florida during the negotiations that led to the February 16, 2022 stipulation: (1) "hours of time that were expended in resolving the issues in this case premised on [Igirio] living in Florida and [Jewell] in California were completely wasted"; (2) "the opportunity to resolve the custody arrangement with both parties in Florida was lost"; and (3) "the parties will be forced to deal with custody issues anew, likely compelling more attorney's fees and costs," after Jewell moves and Florida becomes the state with jurisdiction over custody and visitation.
On June 3, 2022, Igirio filed a request for order setting aside the February 16, 2022 stipulation and order on the basis of fraud and mistake. In a supporting declaration, she stated that had she known Jewell was intending to move to Florida immediately, she would not have entered into the stipulation and instead would have tried "to settle the issue of his parenting time as a resident of Florida." Igirio further stated she had "made several concessions to get the move away completed that would not have been necessary had [Jewell] been candid about his intentions." She complained his failure to disclose his plan to move to Florida caused her to "waste thousands of dollars on attorney's fees" and required her to "deal with the issue of his parenting time in Florida as the California order is inappropriate for [the] circumstances."
Jewell filed a combined opposition to Igirio's April 1, 2022 and June 3, 2022 requests for order. He argued the February 16, 2022 stipulation and order barred Igirio's request for contribution to payment of her attorney fees under principles of res judicata, she had no need for contribution, and the amount she requested was unreasonable. Jewell argued the stipulation and order should not be set aside and he should not be sanctioned, because he timely informed Igirio of his intent to move to Florida and his decision to do so and because providing additional information would not have altered the terms of the stipulation and order. In a supporting declaration, Jewell stated that he and Igirio had discussed the possibility of his moving to Florida since September 2021; he started investigating the possibility by hiring a career counseling agency on December 16, 2021; he had no definitive intent to move to Florida when the parties stipulated to the resolution of the pre-move away litigation on February 16, 2022; and he did not decide to move until he accepted an offer of employment in Florida on March 11, 2022. Jewell stated he told Igirio that November 2021 was when he submitted his first job application in Florida, not when he hired an employment search firm. A director of the career counseling agency Jewell hired submitted a declaration stating that Jewell hired the agency on December 16, 2021.
Igirio submitted a reply declaration to which she attached exhibits. She stated the February 16, 2022 stipulation and order did not resolve all then-outstanding issues, and the parties' attorneys continued to negotiate concerning sale of the marital home, child support, spousal support, and attorney fees; and she attached a letter from her attorney to Jewell's attorney on those topics. Igirio also reiterated the point that had she known at the time that Jewell was actively seeking employment in Florida, she would not have entered into the stipulation and instead "would have focused [her] efforts and resources on specific orders dealing with the parenting schedule upon [his] relocation to Florida."
The family court held a hearing on October 5, 2022, on Igirio's requests for order at which it considered the parties' filings and heard argument from their attorneys, but took no testimony. The court issued a written order on November 14, 2022. As to the February 16, 2022 stipulation, the court found that "had [Jewell] been forthcoming and indicated that he in fact was seeking potential employment within the next several months or less than a year and relocating to Florida, the time spent on discussions about how [Alexander] would share time with [Jewell] in California and in Florida would not have taken up the bulk of the stipulation. The actual share plan that the parties agreed to was obsolete as of March 2022, one month later, when [Jewell] accepted a position and eventually so informed [Igirio]." The court "set aside that portion of the stipulation involving a custodial share plan that contemplated these parties living on opposite coasts" and "returned [the parties] to their status prior to the agreement being entered." The family court rejected Jewell's argument that res judicata barred Igirio's request for attorney fees, found Igirio had a need for contribution toward payment of fees and Jewell was in a superior position to meet that need, and ordered Jewell to pay Igirio $30,000 in fees and $582 in costs. The court also imposed $10,000 in attorney fees as a sanction against Jewell based on the "protracted litigation" and his "increas[ing] the costs of litigation" by "failing to disclose his imminent search for work in Florida while negotiating a custody plan that did not contemplate an imminent relocation by [him] to the same area of Florida."
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Set-aside of Custody and Visitation Provisions of Stipulation and Order
Jewell's primary argument on appeal is the family court prejudicially erred by granting Igirio's request for order setting aside the custody and visitation provisions of the February 16, 2022 stipulation and order. He contends her request was procedurally deficient by failing to identify the statutory basis therefor and by failing to include a copy of a pleading proposed to be filed as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). Jewell further contends Igirio's request failed on the merits because she presented no evidence he withheld material information whose disclosure would have caused her not to sign the stipulation. We reject these contentions.
Igirio's request for order was not procedurally deficient. In family law cases, a party filing a request for order "must set forth facts sufficient to notify the other party of the moving party's contentions in support of the relief requested," but need not file a memorandum of points and authorities "unless required by the court on a case-by-case basis." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.92(b)(1), (6).) Although Igirio did not cite any statute in her request for order, she stated she was asking the family court to set aside the stipulation and order "on the basis of fraud and mistake," and went on to state the facts she believed justified that relief. That simple request provided Jewell with the notice required by rule 5.92(b)(1). Igirio was not required also to file a proposed pleading with her request. That requirement applies when a party against whom a dismissal or default has been entered moves to set aside the dismissal or default, and is designed to ensure the party seeking relief is ready to proceed on the merits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); Jimenez v. Chavez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 50, 63-64; Peltier v. McCloud River R.R. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1809, 1820-1821; In re Marriage of Warner (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 714, 720-721.) Igirio did not seek relief from a dismissal or a default that, if granted, would require her to file a new pleading and proceed to litigate on the merits. She sought to vacate an order regarding custody and visitation to which she allegedly had mistakenly stipulated and which she claimed no longer suited the parties' circumstances. Although the parties may now have to litigate custody and visitation again, that litigation will require no new pleading from Igirio.
Igirio argues the statutory basis for setting aside the stipulation and order was Family Code section 2122, not Code of Civil Procedure section 473. We disagree. Family Code section 2122 authorizes a court in a marital dissolution proceeding to set aside for fraud or mistake a stipulated judgment or any part thereof that adjudicates support or division of property. (Id., §§ 2121, subd. (a), 2122, subds. (a), (e).) The portions of the order Igirio sought to set aside did not adjudicate support or division of property; they adjudicated custody and visitation. An order modifying custody and visitation "taken against [a party] through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" may be set aside under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. (Exley v. Exley (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 831, 836; see In re Marriage of Jacobs (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 273, 282 (Jacobs) ["A stipulation in open court has been held to be a 'proceeding' within the meaning of section 473, and subject to the remedial provisions of that section."].)
Jewell has shown no reversible error in the family court's order setting aside the February 16, 2022 stipulation and order. We review such an order for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Brewer &Federici (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1346; Jacobs, supra, 128 Cal.App.3d at p. 284.) "[T]he appropriate test of abuse of discretion is whether or not the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered." (In re Marriage of Connolly (1979) 23 Cal.3d 590, 598 (Connolly).) The abuse of discretion standard of review is "deferential," but "the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court's ruling under review. The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious." (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 709, 711-712, fns. omitted (Haraguchi).) As the appellant, Jewell must show the family court prejudicially abused its discretion. (Conservatorship of Farrant (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 370, 378; Taliaferro v. Riddle (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 235, 236-237.) As we shall explain, he has not done so.
We reject Jewell's assertion "the review standard in this case should be de novo" because the family court "relied solely on the written pleadings and filed declarations" and "did not conduct an evidentiary hearing and/or make credibility findings." We review factual findings for substantial evidence whether they are based on oral testimony or, as in this case, declarations. (Haraguchi, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 711, fn. 3; Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479 (Shamblin); Goldstein v. Barak Construction (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 845, 853.)
One of the grounds on which Igirio sought to set aside the stipulation and order was mistake." 'Courts may set aside stipulations where a mistake of fact is clearly shown, on such terms as will meet the justice of the particular case; but in order to warrant relief the mistake must be of a material character, such as will change the legal rights of the parties, and the mistake must be one which could not have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care.'" (Harris v. Spinali Auto Sales, Inc. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 447, 454 (Harris).) A party's failure to disclose information unknown to the other party and relevant to the other's decision to enter into a stipulated order may allow the other to set aside the order on the basis of mistake of fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b) [authorizing relief from order based on mistake]; Civ. Code, § 1577 [defining "mistake of fact"]; H. D. Arnaiz, Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1368 (H.D. Arnaiz, Ltd.) [" 'mistake of fact exists when a person understands the facts to be other than they are' "]; In re Marriage of Varner (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 128, 144 (Varner) [spouse could set aside stipulated judgment based on other spouse's failure to disclose existence or value of community asset].) Such a nondisclosure occurred here.
Igirio and her attorney stated in their respective declarations that Jewell did not tell them while they were negotiating the stipulation that he was planning to move from California to Florida and was actively seeking employment in Florida. Jewell admitted in a declaration that he hired a career counseling agency on December 16, 2021; accepted employment in Florida on March 11, 2022; did not tell Igirio he would be moving to Florida until March 24, 2022; and moved there on June 13, 2022. Igirio also declared she entered into the stipulation on the assumption Jewell would be remaining in California and would not be moving to Florida immediately, and she would not have done so had he told her during the negotiations that he was actively looking for a job in Florida and planning to move there as soon as possible. The stipulated visitation schedule, with its third phase blocks of time for Alexander to be away from Igirio while he visited Jewell in California and while Jewell visited him in Florida (see fn. 1, ante), clearly contemplated Igirio's move with Alexander to Florida and Jewell's continued residence in California for some years. As the family court noted in its order setting aside the stipulation: "When [Jewell's] side was the only side who was aware that if [he] took the job he was interviewing for, these negotiations would have been meaningless in a few weeks, it hardly meets the criteria of negotiations at arm's length with all of the relevant facts known to both sides in order to reach a mutually equitable agreement satisfactory to both parties."
We conclude the record contains substantial evidence that in signing the stipulation Igirio" 'underst[ood] the facts to be other than they [were]'" (H. D. Arnaiz, Ltd., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368), and that Jewell's failure to disclose the true facts "induce[d] [her] to stipulate to [an order] on the basis of incomplete or inaccurate information" (Varner, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 144). Relief is authorized for such a mistake. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); Harris, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d at p. 454.) The family court's decision "to set aside that portion of the stipulation involving a custodial share plan that contemplated these parties living on opposite coasts" was not "arbitrary and capricious" (Haraguchi, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 712) and did not "exceed[ ] the bounds of reason" (Connolly, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 598) so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Jewell insists, however, the stipulation and order should not have been set aside because public policy strongly favors settlement of litigation and Igirio did not meet her "formidable burden" to undo the settlement. Specifically, he contends: (1) Igirio was represented by counsel during the negotiations and could have further investigated the issues involved, but chose not to; (2) she presented no evidence of fraudulent intent or misrepresentation of material fact by him about his plans to move to Florida; and (3) her claim she would not have signed the stipulation had she known about those plans was not reasonable. We are not persuaded.
Jewell cites no authority to support his contention Igirio should have conducted an investigation into his plans to move to Florida before she signed the stipulation. He knew those plans while the negotiations were ongoing and should have disclosed them to Igirio before she agreed to visitation provisions that were premised on his remaining in California. Nondisclosure may be actionable when a person "knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing." (Rest.2d Contracts, § 161, subd. (b); see Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Great American Ins. Co. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 739, 749-750 [citing Rest.2d Contracts, § 161 in support of point that "nondisclosure may be actionable"].) Jewell's failure to disclose his plans allowed Igirio to set aside the stipulation and order on the ground of mistake. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); Varner, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 144; Harris, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d at p. 454.)
Igirio did not have to prove a fraudulent misrepresentation by Jewell to set aside the custody and visitation terms of the stipulation and order. Although she asserted fraud as a ground for her request, she also asserted mistake. As we have explained, the latter ground was sufficient for the family court to grant her request. "[I]f any applicable ground will sustain the trial court's order, the ruling will not be disturbed on appeal." (Jacobs, supra, 128 Cal.App.3d at p. 284.)
Finally, we reject Jewell's contention the family court erred by setting aside the stipulation and order because, in his view, "Igirio's claim that knowledge of [his] efforts to secure a job in Florida would have led her not to sign the [s]tipulation is not reasonable." Jewell contends that since he did not have a job in Florida when the parties signed the stipulation, "he could not leave California and needed a parenting schedule that accommodated his work pending any potential move," which the stipulation provided until he moved to Florida in June of 2022. That the stipulation served Jewell's needs for a few months does not show Igirio's claim is unreasonable. The detailed visitation schedule set out in the stipulation shows the parties contemplated Jewell would remain in California much longer than he actually did. (See fn. 1, ante.) Igirio stated in a declaration that "the mistaken assumption that [Jewell] would remain in California for the immediate future was a material reason why [she] agreed to many of the provisions in the stipulation," and "[h]ad [she] known that [he] was intending to move to Florida immediately, [she] would have never entered into the February 16, 2022, [s]tipulation and [o]rder." The reasonableness of Igirio's assumption was a question of fact for the family court. (See Reid v. Landon (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 476, 483 ["The court must be satisfied that but for the mistake the complainant would not have assumed the obligation from which [s]he seeks to be relieved"].) In granting the request to set aside the custody and visitation terms of the stipulation and order, the family court implicitly found Igirio's statements true. That finding is binding on us. (See Shamblin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 479 [appellate court should defer to trial court's factual determinations based on declarations]; Conservatorship of S.A. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 48, 55 [deferring to trial court's implied finding on credibility]; Walton v. Bank of California (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 527, 543 [determination whether party acted under mistake is for trial court and its finding is conclusive on appeal if supported by substantial evidence].)
B. Attorney Fees and Costs Under Family Code Section 2030
Jewell argues the family court lacked jurisdiction to award Igirio $30,000 in attorney fees and $582 in costs incurred before February 16, 2022, because she did not reserve the right to seek such fees in the stipulation, which resolved all claims either party could have brought in connection with the requests for order that were resolved by the stipulation and order. We disagree.
Jewell has forfeited this contention. In neither his opening brief nor his reply brief did he cite any legal authority supporting the contention the family court lacked jurisdiction to award Igirio attorney fees and costs. Issues have no life of their own; they must be supported by reasoned argument and citations to authority. (Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418-419.) If they are not, they are forfeited. (Ibid.)
Even were the contention not forfeited, we would reject it. Jewell does not argue the family court lacked "jurisdiction in a fundamental sense- authority over the subject matter and the parties." (In re Rashad P. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 167, italics added.) Rather, he challenges the court's exercise of its authority to order him, as the party with greater financial resources, to contribute to payment of Igirio's litigation expenses as needed to ensure her adequate legal representation. (See Fam. Code, § 2030, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1056.) Jewell asserts Igirio's request for need-based fees and costs was barred by the stipulation and order based on res judicata. He is wrong.
The February 16, 2022 stipulation and order "resolve[d] any and all rights and claims that either Party could have brought before the [c]ourt in connection with [the then-pending requests for order and ex parte application]," including, but not limited to, Igirio's "relocation with [Alexander], custody modification, visitation modification, and issues incidental thereto." Igirio's April 1, 2022 request for fees and costs was based on events that occurred after she signed the stipulation, namely, Jewell's disclosure he would be moving to Florida and her need to litigate custody and visitation issues anew based on his move. Res judicata is no bar to a claim about which Igirio neither knew nor should have known when she resolved the pre-move away claims. (McCready v. Whorf (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 478, 482; Allied Fire Protection v. Diede Construction, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 150, 156.)
C. Attorney Fees Under Family Code Section 271
Jewell's final claim of error is the family court abused its discretion by awarding Igirio $10,000 in attorney fees as a sanction for his failure to disclose his plan to move to Florida during the negotiations of the February 16, 2022 stipulation. He contends "there was no competent substantial evidence presented that [he] failed to disclose material facts relevant to the negotiations resulting in the [s]tipulation." We again disagree.
A family court "may base an award of attorney's fees and costs on the extent to which any conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction." (Fam. Code, § 271, subd. (a).) The purpose of this statute is "to punish 'a party [who] has unreasonably increased the cost of litigation.'" (In re Marriage of Blake &Langer (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 300, 310.) We review an order imposing sanctions under section 271 for abuse of discretion. (Blake &Langer, at p. 308.) "[W]e will overturn such an order only if, considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order." (In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1225-1226.)
There was no abuse of discretion in this case. The family court found Jewell's "actions in failing to disclose his imminent search for work in Florida while negotiating a custody plan that did not contemplate an imminent relocation by [him] to the same area of Florida [where Igirio lives] increased the costs of litigation in this matter. These costs could easily have been utilized to negotiate an agreement in light of a pending move by both parties within a few months of each other rather than entering into negotiations contemplating a lengthy time [Jewell] would remain in California after their son had relocated with [Igirio] to Florida." This finding is supported by the declarations of Igirio and her attorney that they negotiated the stipulation on the assumption Jewell would remain in California and that they will have to start over now that he has moved to Florida. Imposing sanctions served the statutory purpose of punishing Jewell for unnecessarily driving up litigation costs in a matter that had already been extensively, and expensively, litigated. Because substantial evidence supports the court's order and the order was not arbitrary and capricious, we must uphold it. (Haraguchi, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 711-712.)
III.
DISPOSITION
The November 14, 2022 order setting aside the custody and visitation provisions of the February 16, 2022 stipulation and order and awarding respondent attorney fees and costs is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: DATO, J., KELETY, J.