Opinion
133 Index No. 260323/18 Case No. 2022–01678
04-27-2023
In the Matter of Samir IGBARA, individually and on behalf of 24 West Food Corp., Petitioner/Plaintiff–Respondent–Appellant, For the Judicial Dissolution of 24 West Food Corp., Appellant–Respondent, v. Mohammed ABUZAHRIEH et al., Respondents/Defendants–Appellants–Respondents, John Does 1 through 10 et al., Respondents/Defendants.
Siegel & Siegel, P.C., New York (Michael D. Siegel of counsel), for appellants-respondents. Reppert Kelly & Vytell, LLC, New York (Nicholas A. Vytell of counsel), for respondent-appellant.
Siegel & Siegel, P.C., New York (Michael D. Siegel of counsel), for appellants-respondents.
Reppert Kelly & Vytell, LLC, New York (Nicholas A. Vytell of counsel), for respondent-appellant.
Webber, J.P., Moulton, Scarpulla, Mendez, Rodriguez, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Kenneth L. Thompson, Jr., J.), entered March 15, 2022, in favor of petitioner and against respondents Mohammed Abuzahrieh and Abdel Abuzahrieh in the amount of $142,965.64 plus interest, unanimously affirmed.
Supreme Court's entry of judgment clarifying the amount of interest respondents owed petitioner was procedurally proper, as the court's prior decision and order, which did not specify an interest amount, was not "signed by the clerk, and therefore cannot qualify as an entered judgment" ( Bogoch v. W.S.L.S.J. & I. Weinreb, 295 A.D.2d 108, 109, 742 N.Y.S.2d 820 [1st Dept. 2002] ). Furthermore, petitioner's abandoned appeal from the order did not moot later proceedings because the entry of judgment terminated petitioner's right of direct appeal from the order (see Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248, 383 N.Y.S.2d 285, 347 N.E.2d 647 [1976] ).
Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding nine percent interest, as such an award is within the court's discretion in an action under Business Corporation Law § 1118 ( CPLR 5004 ; see also Matter of Schneiderman v. Luv–A–Cup Coffee Serv., 204 A.D.2d 173, 173, 614 N.Y.S.2d 112 [1st Dept. 1994] ). Imposition of the statutory interest rate is not an unfair penalty, but rather, "represents the cost of having the use of another person's money for a specified period" ( Downing v. First Lenox Terrace. Assoc., 107 A.D.3d 86, 91, 965 N.Y.S.2d 9 [1st Dept. 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted], affd 24 N.Y.3d 382, 998 N.Y.S.2d 729, 23 N.E.3d 997 [2014] ). Moreover, the court correctly awarded interest on the full principal, rather than just on $2,000 of the principal representing petitioner's November 2018 salary.
On his cross-appeal, petitioner failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in declining to award him costs and disbursements (see e.g. Matter of Walker v. New York City, 262 A.D.2d 151, 152, 694 N.Y.S.2d 2 [1st Dept. 1999], lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 753, 700 N.Y.S.2d 426, 722 N.E.2d 506 [1999] ). The record is unclear as to whether the court made any findings on the issue of costs, as petitioner failed to include a transcript of the proceedings in the record.