Opinion
23A-JT-1732
04-30-2024
In re the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of I.D., La.D., Le.D. (Minor Children) and L.D. (Father), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner and Kids' Voice of Indiana, Appellee-Guardian ad Litem
Attorney for Appellant Danielle Sheff Sheff Law Office Indianapolis, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Indiana Department of Child Services Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Natalie F. Weiss Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney for Appellee Kids' Voice of Indiana Katherine Meger Kelsey Chief Legal Counsel Kids' Voice of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Geoffrey A. Gaither, Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 49D09-2204-JT-3394, -3396 49D09-2301-JT-173
Attorney for Appellant Danielle Sheff Sheff Law Office Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Indiana Department of Child Services Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General
Natalie F. Weiss Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee Kids' Voice of Indiana Katherine Meger Kelsey Chief Legal Counsel Kids' Voice of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
CRONE, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] L.D. (Father) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his minor children I.D., La.D., and Le.D. (collectively the Children). Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue the termination hearing and that the termination order is clearly erroneous. We disagree on both counts and therefore affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] A.B. (Mother) gave birth to Le.D. in May 2007, La.D. in May 2013, and I.D. in March 2014. According to Father's testimony at the termination hearing, he pled guilty to battering Mother in "2000 something, 2, 4." Tr. Vol. 2 at 15. He was also "in prison from 2007 to 2012" for a "[d]ealing and possession" of cocaine conviction. Id. Father and Mother then lived together until approximately 2018, when Father left the home. Mother later married C.D.
The record is silent regarding Father and Mother's formal custody and parenting time arrangements, if any.
[¶3] On January 12, 2021, Mother "died as a result of a domestic violence altercation" with C.D. Appealed Order at 2. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) removed the Children from the home and placed them with their maternal great aunt (Great Aunt). On January 14, 2021, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Children were children in need of services (CHINS) due to Mother's death and Father's inability to care for the Children. At the virtual initial hearing on that date, at which Father appeared, the trial court granted wardship to DCS, appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the Children, appointed counsel for Father, authorized continued placement of the Children with Great Aunt, and authorized unsupervised parenting time for Father.
[¶4] At an attorneys-only hearing on April 12, 2021, counsel admitted on Father's behalf that the Children were CHINS "because Father needs assistance to provide housing and the children need therapy to deal with the tragic loss of their mother." Ex. Vol. 1 at 65. The trial court accepted the admission and adjudicated the Children as CHINS. The court authorized "increased parenting time for [Father], up to and including [temporary trial visitation], upon the positive recommendation of the child and family team." Id. In its dispositional decree, the court ordered Father to "become engaged in family therapy referred by the [DCS] Family Case Manager [FCM] and follow all recommendations" and to "enroll in, participate in, and successfully complete a Father Engagement Program." Id. at 73.
At the termination hearing, Father testified that he was living on his own when Mother died and that his home did not have enough bedrooms for the Children. Tr. Vol. 2 at 19. Father remained in that home until he was incarcerated in May 2022. Id. at 10.
[¶5] At some point, the Children were placed with maternal aunt T.W. (Aunt).Le.D. ran away from Aunt's home, became involved in a delinquency proceeding, and ultimately was placed at Transitions Academy, where he remained throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings. Although Father had the ability to visit the Children weekly, he visited them just four times between January 2021 and June 2021. At the termination hearing, Aunt testified that after the last visit, Father called her and told her that he was going to help her aunt kill her "so he can get his kids back." Tr. Vol. 2 at 34. Aunt promptly informed DCS.
The first official mention of the Children's placement with Aunt appears in a September 2021 periodic review hearing order. Ex. Vol. 1 at 75. At the termination hearing, Aunt testified that the Children had been in her care since Mother "passed away January of 2021." Tr. Vol. 2 at 32. Father disputes this testimony based on the trial court's January 14, 2021 order. Regardless, it is undisputed that the Children were in Aunt's care by June 2021, and it is not unreasonable to infer that the Children were placed with Aunt by the end of January 2021.
[¶6] Father did not visit with the Children after June 2021, although he did write a letter to Le.D. a few months before the termination hearing. In a September 2021 periodic review hearing order, the trial court found that Father had "not been exercising consistent parenting time nor participating in services" and had "not maintained contact with counsel." Ex. Vol. 1 at 76. In October 2021, the trial court granted DCS's motion for Father's parenting time to be "fully supervised." Appealed Order at 2.
[¶7] In May 2022, Father pled guilty to level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, for which he had been charged in July 2020. In exchange for the plea, the State agreed to dismiss charges for class A misdemeanor unlawful possession of a firearm by a domestic batterer and class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Ex. Vol. 1 at 162. Father was sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction (DOC) plus four years of home detention. Father was incarcerated at Plainfield Correctional Facility.
[¶8] In January 2022, the permanency plan for La.D. and I.D. was changed from reunification to adoption. In April 2022, DCS filed termination petitions for La.D. and I.D. In December 2022, the permanency plan for Le.D. was changed from reunification to adoption. In January 2023, DCS filed a termination petition for Le.D. On February 1, 2023, the termination hearing was set for May 10, 2023.
[¶9] On May 10, Father appeared at the hearing in person and by counsel. At the outset, counsel told the trial court,
At this time, [Father] has informed me that he's received a time cut and will be out he believes in the next sixty days.... He believes that . then he would be able to complete any services and still have an opportunity for reunification. We would ask for
that opportunity and it's my understanding the children are placed in relative [care], so we don't believe it would be a harm to continue this matter for a little longer.Tr. Vol. 2 at 4-5. The court asked if the release was "certain[.]" Id. at 5. Counsel replied,
[H]e told me he just received his first time cut and he says the second one will be coming and it's more of an automatic and that - so that would put him out in sixty days, early release. He just got it so it's not showing on the DOC's website at the momentId.
[¶10] DCS's counsel objected, stating,
I received [Father's] Department of Correction's records, it's been a couple months, but there was no indication there. His sentencing information and - and he filed a petition for time credit back in August that was denied. At this point, he is showing his earliest possible release date as - as May of 2024. So, without any evidence of an early release, I - I think it would - it - it doesn't make sense to push this out again.Id. The GAL also objected, stating,
The children have been placed with [Aunt] since the beginning of this case, they're doing great. To my understanding, there hasn't been any visits facilitated or anything like that in that time. At this time, we think it's in the best interest of the children to have some permanency and move forward with an adoption.Id. at 6.
[¶11] Father's counsel responded, "With all due respect, your honor, we've been in the middle of COVID. The . „ prison won't let visitors at [sic], so [Father] . „ doesn't control that, DCS and the Guardian ad Litem control his access to the children. So, to use that against him I think is unfair." Id. DCS's counsel replied,
Judge, the CHINS case was filed more than two years ago, so he had time before he was incarcerated to participate in services and my evidence today will show that he chose not to do that. So we he get - gets out [sic] is . „ neither here or there. Yes, he hasn't had an opportunity to participate while he's been incarcerated but he did prior to incarceration."Id.
[¶12] The court gave Father an opportunity to speak, and he said,
Actually, before I was incarcerated I was getting visits seeing my kids, I was visiting my kids. [W]e were visiting and they just sent me to prison. I got my first time cut, well it's sent down state, so I - it's been four months since I've been waiting. So, they catching up right now and that one will get me immediate release. I'm up for a twelve month time cut, my out date is May 7th of '24 so it's putting me out in '23. So, we just waiting on them to put it . „ in the records and release me.Id. at 6-7. The trial court confirmed with DCS's counsel that the "CHINS was filed in January '21" and stated, "[Father], I'm going to deny your motion for a continuance, we're going to proceed." Id. at 7.
[¶13] DCS's counsel then called the following witnesses: Father, Aunt, court appointed special advocate (CASA) Margaret McMillan, and FCM Raven Harvey. At the conclusion of the hearing, DCS's counsel offered into evidence thirty-one exhibits, which consist of court documents from both the instant CHINS proceedings and prior CHINS proceedings of which Father claimed to be unaware, as well as court documents from Father's current and prior criminal proceedings. The court took the matter under advisement and asked the parties to submit proposed orders. On June 29, 2023, the court signed DCS and the GAL's joint proposed order, thereby adopting it verbatim. Father now appeals.
After Father filed a notice of appeal, he filed a verified motion for remand to file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion and hold the appeal in abeyance for a ruling. The motions panel of this Court denied the motion, and we see no reason to disturb that decision.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 - The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's last-minute motion to continue the termination hearing.
[¶14] Father first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue the termination hearing. Continuances are governed by Indiana Trial Rule 53.5, which provides in pertinent part, "Upon motion, trial may be postponed or continued in the discretion of the court, and shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause established by affidavit or other evidence." "The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. of Fam. &Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006), trans. denied. "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it." State ex rel. Hill v. Jones-Elliott, 141 N.E.3d 1264, 1266 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020). Motions for continuance made for the first time on the morning of trial are disfavored. Blackford v. Boone Cnty. Area Plan Comm'n, 43 N.E.3d 655, 664 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015).
[¶15] Here, Father made no effort to substantiate his last-minute claim that he would be released early from prison, and the trial court was not obligated to believe his unsworn, self-serving statement. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
Citing an addendum to his brief, Father states that he "was released on July 20, 2023, 72-days after the hearing[,]" and that "[t]he information had not been updated on the DOC offender website at the time of the May 10, 2023 termination hearing; thus, Father could not present the documentation to the Court at that time." Appellant's Br. at 26 n.10. Father could have promptly attempted to obtain some sort of written verification from the DOC that his request for a sentence reduction had been granted.
Father argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court's "denial of the continuance violated [his] due process rights." Appellant's Br. at 28. It is well understood that an argument cannot be presented for the first time on appeal. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Gurtner, 27 N.E.3d 306, 311 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015). "[A]ppellate review presupposes that a litigant's arguments have been raised and considered in the trial court." Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013). This includes due process claims. See In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 834 n.1 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001) (finding mother's due process claim waived because she raised it for first time on appeal).
Section 2 - The termination order is not clearly erroneous.
[¶16] Father also challenges the merits of the termination order. "The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the children involved." B.H. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 355, 364-65 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). "[A] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is 'perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.'" In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). "[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities." In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008). Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore "termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed." Id.
[¶17] "We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights." In re C.A., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014); see also In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014) ("Decisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts, recognizing their superior vantage point for weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility.").
In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)].In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
[¶18] Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous if the record contains no facts or inferences to support them. City of Gary v. Conat, 810 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). "A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. Even if erroneous, findings "do not warrant reversal if they amount to mere surplusage and add nothing to the trial court's decision." Id. Unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as true. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). If the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015), trans. denied; T.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012), trans. denied.
Father criticizes the trial court's verbatim adoption of the appellees' proposed order. This practice, while not favored, is not prohibited. B.H., 989 N.E.2d at 365 n.7. It does not alter our standard of review, but it does weaken our confidence that the findings are the result of the trial court's considered judgment. Harris v. Davis, 88 N.E.3d 1081, 1086 n.2 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). "The critical inquiry is whether such findings, as adopted by the court, are clearly erroneous." Id.
[¶19] Among other things, a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove each element by "clear and convincing evidence." R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 629; Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. If the trial court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). Here, the trial court found that DCS met its burden to prove elements (B)(i), (C), and (D).
[¶20] Father challenges numerous findings, asserting that they contain various "material misrepresentations, errors, and inaccuracies[.]" Appellant's Br. at 29. This means, of course, that the remaining unchallenged findings stand as proven. In re De.B., 144 N.E.3d 763, 772 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020). The uncontested portions of the challenged findings also stand as proven.
[¶21] In challenging the findings, Father focuses on perceived failures, shortcomings, and biases of the FCM and the CASA, which were thoroughly explored on cross-examination at the termination hearing. Thus, the trial court was well aware of those considerations, and it weighed the FCM's and the CASA's testimony, as well as Father's testimony, accordingly. We may not second-guess those assessments on appeal.
[¶22] At bottom, we conclude that the uncontested findings clearly and convincingly support the trial court's determination that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's placement outside Father's home will not be remedied, (2) termination is in the Children's best interests, and (3) there is a satisfactory plan for the Children's care and treatment. "In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child's removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis." In re R.S., 158 N.E.3d 432, 439 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020).
We acknowledge one particular finding that is wholly unsupported by the evidence: that Aunt obtained a no-contact order against Father in June 2021. Appealed Order at 4 (finding 25). The GAL's insistence on the validity of this finding is not well taken. Father also vigorously disputes conclusion 8, which states that he "continued to engage in criminogenic behavior despite his children needing support after the tragic death of their mother." Id. at 7. Father notes that he "had no criminal charges after the July 2020 possession of a handgun charge[.]" Appellant's Br. at 42. But Father disregards his threat to kill Aunt in June 2021. See Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(b)(1)(A) (stating that a person who communicates a threat to commit a forcible felony with the intent that another person be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out commits level 6 felony intimidation).
We first identify the conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and then determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. The second step requires trial courts to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Habitual conduct may include a parent's prior
criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment. The trial court may also consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied.Id. at 439-40 (citations omitted). "Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that a parent's past behavior is the best predictor of his future behavior." Id. at 440; see also E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (observing that trial courts have "discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination"). "DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change, but only needs to establish that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change." In re Ma.J., 972 N.E.2d 394, 401 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012).
[¶23] The Children were removed from their home in January 2021 and remained in placement with Aunt because Mother, the custodial parent, was killed by her husband and because Father admitted that the Children needed therapy and housing that he could not provide at that time. The trial court found, and Father does not dispute, that "[a]t the time of placement, [La.D. and I.D.] had some behavior problems and were in shock. [La.D.] was receiving all Fs in school and [I.D.] was quiet. Currently, [La.D.] is getting As in school, and [I.D.] is an honor roll student who loves to sing and dance." Appealed Order at 4. The court further found that Aunt "regularly" visits Le.D. at Transitions Academy and "participates in family therapy once a month," and that when Le.D. "receives passes, he spends that time in [Aunt's] home on the weekend." Id.
[¶24] In the nearly year and a half that elapsed before his incarceration in May 2022, Father did not obtain suitable housing or complete the court-ordered therapy and engagement services, and he visited the Children only four times, despite being able to visit them weekly. Father also threatened to kill Aunt. The trial court found, and Father does not dispute, that in addition to being convicted of battering Mother, dealing and possessing cocaine, and possessing a firearm as a serious violent felon, Father pled guilty to battering a public safety official in February 2018 and was found guilty of possessing cocaine or a narcotic drug in March 2005. Given Father's lengthy history of violent and antisocial behavior, as well as his limited engagement with services and the Children when he was not incarcerated, the trial court was justified in concluding that Father "has demonstrated that he is not committed to preserving the parent-child relationship" and that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to the Children's placement outside his home will not be remedied. Appealed Order at 7. See Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. &Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (stating that failure to exercise right to visit children demonstrates lack of commitment to complete actions necessary to preserve parent-child relationship), trans. denied.
Father asserts that DCS made no efforts to provide him with services in prison, but we note that failure to provide services cannot serve as a basis for attacking a termination order. In re Tr.S., 63 N.E.3d 1065, 1068 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). Moreover, Father himself testified that at the time of the termination hearing, the prison was "just now starting to open up" service programs in the wake of COVID restrictions. Tr. Vol. 2 at 26. Father emphasizes that he "worked for Pen Products, obtained his GED, and participated in Thinking for Change while incarcerated." Appellant's Br. at 47. As noted above, however, a trial court has "discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination." E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. And it would not have been unreasonable for the court in this case to infer that Father participated in those services solely with an eye toward early release from prison for his own benefit, as opposed to any desire to be more expeditiously reunited with the Children.
Father asserts that "[t]he evidence at trial indicated that [Aunt] would not allow [him] to exercise his unsupervised visitation after she believed [he] and [Great Aunt] were working against her based on Father and [Great Aunt] taking the children to dinner and a dispute arising in June 2021." Appellant's Br. at 37. Even assuming this to be true, there is no evidence, other than Father's own equivocal testimony, that he asked the trial court to enforce his visitation rights. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 20 ("Q[.] Did you seek a court order to keep your visitation? A[.] I - I would think so, yes."). When FCM Harvey was asked whether Father inquired about visitation with the Children when she met with him in prison in December 2022, she replied, "Not that I can recall." Id. at 60. We remind Father that "[i]ndividuals who pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive and meaningful relationships with their children." Matter of A.C.B., 598 N.E.2d 570, 572 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992).
[¶25] In determining what is in a child's best interests, the trial court must consider the totality of the evidence. In re G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 908 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). "The trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child." In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022), trans. denied (2023). "A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do so supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child." G.M., 71 N.E.3d at 908. A child's need for permanency is a central consideration in determining the child's best interests. P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799. "The court need not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship." A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied. "[W]e have previously held that the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests." Id. at 1158-59.
[¶26] Here, both the FCM and the CASA recommended that Father's parental rights be terminated. With respect to the FCM's recommendation, the trial court found, and Father does not specifically dispute, that Father did "not have a solid plan for post-release" and that "removing the children from a stable environment would be detrimental considering the trauma they have been through." Appealed Order at 5. And we have already determined that the unchallenged findings support the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal will not be remedied. Viewing the evidence in its totality, we cannot conclude that the trial court's best interests determination is clearly erroneous.
[¶27] And finally, as for DCS's plan for the care and treatment of the Children, it need not be detailed to be considered "satisfactory" for purposes of the statute, as long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the Children will be going after the parent-child relationships are terminated. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied. "A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the children. In other words, there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent." Id. (citation omitted). Here, DCS's plan is for the Children to be adopted, which is satisfactory. Therefore, we affirm.
In his motion for remand, Father challenges Aunt's suitability as the Children's prospective adoptive parent. We note that "it is within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination court, to determine whether an adoptive placement is appropriate." A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007.
[¶28] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.