Opinion
November 17, 1970
Order of the Supreme Court, Bronx County, entered February 17, 1970, denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, unanimously reversed on the law and the motion granted. The clerk is directed to enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $64,224.57 with interest and costs. Appellant shall recover of respondent $50 costs and disbursements of this appeal. The complaint alleges that during the period from January 3, 1968 to September 26, 1969, plaintiff sold and delivered, at defendant's request and upon her promise to pay therefor, coal and fuel oil of the value of $64,224.57. Pursuant to the statute (CPLR 3016, subd. [f]) plaintiff's cause of action was supported by a detailed schedule consisting of some 380 separate items, setting forth dates, quantities, types of fuel or services, and agreed price and reasonable value. A second cause of action was alleged upon an account stated. The answer consisted only of general denials. Defendant does not dispute the amount due nor does she dispute plaintiff's employee Eichhorn's assertion that he told her that deliveries would be made only on her individual responsibility. General denials in an answer are insufficient to raise triable issues. ( Duban v. Platt, 23 A.D.2d 660, affd. 17 N.Y.2d 526; Bertolf Bros. v. Leuthardt, 261 App. Div. 981; Anderson v. City of New York, 258 App. Div. 588.) Moreover, an analysis of the instant record fails to disclose any proof by the defendant that she did not personally assume the obligation to pay for the fuel which was delivered. Although she claimed that she was merely the registered agent for these buildings, and that they were owned by corporations, the names of the corporations are not listed. In every case of an application for summary judgment we must examine the facts and proof submitted to ascertain if there is any real issue for trial. The defendant was bound to come forward with proof of evidentiary facts showing the existence of a genuine and substantial issue. The defendant's attorney's affidavit is lacking in probative value. It was not made on personal knowledge of the facts. Defendant's own affidavit contains only conclusory statements. We find, therefore, that the defendant has failed to show that she has a bona fide defense — a burden imposed upon her by law. (See Gray Mfg. Co. v. Pathe Ind., 33 A.D.2d 739; Israelson v. Rubin, 20 A.D.2d 668, affd. 14 N.Y.2d 887; Kramer v. Harris, 9 A.D.2d 282.)
Concur — Stevens, P.J., Nunez, Steuer and Tilzer, JJ.