Opinion
No. CV 10 6005099S
October 27, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (#148)
FACTS
On February 14, 2011, the plaintiff, George Hyatt, filed a two-count verified amended complaint against the defendant, Frederick Paoletti, Jr., administrator of the estate of John Lecouras. The complaint alleges the following facts. On April 5, 2007, Charles Lecouras, Jr., passed away. On April 10, 2007, John Lecouras, the paternal uncle of Charles Lecouras, filed an application for administration of the estate. The Probate Court appointed James G. Englis temporary administrator of the estate on April 24, 2007. No will was located and the estate was administered as intestate. John Lecouras was the only living heir. On September 9, 2008, the Probate Court approved the final accounting, permitting the net proceeds of the estate to pass to John Lecouras.
The original verified complaint was brought against John Lecouras, the beneficiary of the intestate estate of Charles Lecouras, Jr. John Lecouras passed away on November 4, 2010 and the Bridgeport Probate Court appointed Frederick Paoletti, Jr., as temporary administrator of his estate. The plaintiff, George Hyatt, moved to cite in an additional party and amend his complaint, adding as a defendant, Paoletti. On January 21, 2011, the motion was granted, Cosgrove, J. The beneficiaries of the subsequently proffered will of Charles Lecouras, Helen Loomis and Peter Charest, moved to intervene as plaintiffs. The beneficiaries and legatees of John Lecouras' will moved to intervene as defendants. The court granted all of the motions to intervene. For the purposes of this memorandum, "the defendant" will refer to Paoletti as he filed the amended motion to dismiss, which the intervening defendants adopted. "The plaintiff" will refer to Hyatt as he filed the objection to the amended motion to dismiss, which the intervening plaintiffs adopted. The decision will be applicable to all parties involved.
In May 2010, the plaintiff learned of Charles Lecouras' death. In the plaintiff's possession was the last will and testament of Charles Lecouras dated November 30, 1986. The will appointed the plaintiff as executor and divided the estate with one-half passing to the plaintiff and the other half divided equally among Helen Loomis, Peter Charest and Joan Smith. In July 2010, the plaintiff filed this case in Superior Court and filed an application for probate of the will in the Stonington Probate Court. In count one of the verified amended complaint, the plaintiff is seeking a temporary and/or permanent injunction enjoining the defendant from (a) conveying, transferring, alienating or otherwise encumbering any interest in the net proceeds of the Charles Lecouras' estate that are now part of the estate of John Lecouras and (b) using the Probate Court decrees approving the final accounting and/or distribution to John Lecouras of the net proceeds of Charles Lecouras' estate in the defendant's defense of this action or the pending application for probate of the last will and testament of Charles Lecouras; and the plaintiff is seeking (c) an order compelling the defendant to return the assets of Charles Lecouras to a fiduciary appointed by the Stonington Probate Court. In count two, the plaintiff is seeking a declaratory judgment declaring that the last will and testament of Charles Lecouras may be admitted to probate in the Stonington Probate Court.
On March 28, 2011, the defendant filed an amended motion to dismiss and memorandum of law in support. The plaintiff, at the March 29, 2011 status conference, was ordered to file a responsive pleading or brief to the motion to dismiss on or before May 1, 2011. The plaintiff's objection to the amended motion to dismiss was filed on May 2, 2011. This matter was heard at short calendar on July 11, 2011.
DISCUSSION
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706, 987 A.2d 348 (2010). "In general, a motion to dismiss is the proper procedural vehicle to raise a claim that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action." Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 392, 900 A.2d 82 (2006). "When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). "[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor . . . clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute . . . It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213-14, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009).
In his amended motion to dismiss and memorandum of law in support, the defendant moves to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendant argues the Superior Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because (1) the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over wills and estates, (2) the action is not within the narrow exception which allows the Superior Court to attack a decree of the Probate Court and (3) absent an appeal from the Probate Court decree, the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction. In regards to count one, seeking a temporary and/or permanent injunction, the defendant argues that plaintiff has not alleged a sufficient cause of action "within the narrow exception of fraud or mistake that would permit the superior court's equitable jurisdiction to trump that of the probate court" because "the plaintiff has failed to allege facts, namely of mistake, that would place this case within the purview of the Superior Court." The defendant argues that the Probate Court provides an adequate remedy at law and, therefore, does not require the intervention of the Superior Court's equitable jurisdiction. Moreover, the defendant argues that the plaintiff may not collaterally attack the Probate Court's decree and that it is mandatory that the Probate Court preside over the admission of the will prior to the Superior Court obtaining jurisdiction, either by way of an appeal or equity.
In addition, the defendant makes a number of other arguments in favor of dismissal. The defendant argues as a threshold matter the plaintiff should have brought the action against the administrator of the estate of Charles Lecouras because this directly and indirectly affects the interests of that estate. "[A] motion to dismiss is not the proper method to raise the issue of the nonjoinder of a party. Instead, the exclusive remedy for nonjoinder of indispensable parties is by way of a motion to strike." Levine v. Police Commission, 28 Conn.App. 344, 351, 612 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 923, 614 A.2d 823 (1992). The defendant relies on the Connecticut Appellate Court decision in Ferris v. Faford, 93 Conn.App. 679, 682, 890 A.2d 602 (2006), where the plaintiff brought suit against the administrator of the estate. In Ferris v. Faford, the plaintiff also sued, however, the beneficiaries of the earlier will. Id. The court need not address this issue further because the nonjoinder of parties is properly addressed under a motion to strike.
Also, the defendant argues that count two seeking a declaratory judgment is precluded by the prior pending action doctrine. "[A] motion to dismiss is the proper vehicle to raise the issue of a prior pending action, [although] the doctrine does not truly implicate subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 403, 973 A.2d 1229 (2009). The plaintiff argues in opposition to the defendant that there is no prior pending action because the application to probate the will has been stayed by agreement in the Stonington Probate Court until the resolution of the present action and the relief sought is not identical in both actions. In light of the court finding that the exclusivity of the Probate Court's jurisdiction over the admission of a will to probate warrants dismissal of count two, the court need not consider the prior pending action doctrine's applicability to the facts in the present case.
Lastly, the defendant argues the plaintiff is not an aggrieved party because there is no decision from the Probate Court, therefore, the plaintiff's claim is not ripe. The defendant elaborates that without having a pecuniary interest that was harmed in either an individual or representative capacity by a decree, the plaintiff lacks standing to initiate an appeal that complies with the statutory condition and failure to comply with the statutory conditions deprives the reviewing court of appellate jurisdiction. "[R]ipeness is a sine qua non of justiciability . . . An issue regarding justiciability . . . must be resolved as a threshold matter because it implicates [the] court's subject matter jurisdiction . . . If it becomes apparent to the court that such jurisdiction is lacking, the [cause of action] must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 812, 967 A.2d 1 (2009). "A party cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy . . . The burden rests with the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Payne v. TK Auto Wholesalers, 98 Conn.App. 533, 537-38, 911 A.2d. 747 (2006). In light of the fact that the plaintiff is seeking relief under the Superior Court's equitable jurisdiction rather than the jurisdiction of the Superior Court over the appeal of a Probate Court decree or order, the court is satisfied that the case is ripe for adjudication. See Daddona v. Kindred Nursing Centers East, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 07 401102 (August 14, 2007, Karazin, J.).
The defendant argues that count two seeking a declaratory judgment that the will of Charles Lecouras may be admitted to probate should be dismissed because of the exclusivity of the Probate Court's jurisdiction. The defendant argues that the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the validity of a will, the admission of a will and the settlement of estates. In addition, the decrees of the Probate Court are conclusive and binding while they remain unreversed. The defendant argues he will be deprived of the ability to raise appropriate defenses to the validity and admissibility of the will if the declaratory judgment is entered in the Superior Court.
The defendant also argues the Probate Court has the exclusive statutory jurisdiction to consider the admissibility of the after-discovered will under General Statutes § 45-188 because the Stonington Probate Court is a court of competent jurisdiction that did not decline to exercise its jurisdiction. General Statutes § 45-188 is now § 45a-297. Section 45a-297 provides in relevant part: "When it appears to any court of probate, during proceedings before it for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as an intestate estate, that such deceased person left a will, the court shall have the power to revoke any order or decree granting letters of administration upon such estate and any other order or decree made by the court in the settlement of such estate as an intestate estate. The court may thereafter proceed with the settlement of such estate under such will . . ." This statute is not applicable because the Probate Court no longer has before it proceedings for the settlement of the estate, rather the plaintiff is seeking to set aside a final distribution of the Probate Court because of a mistake.
The plaintiff counters that the Probate Court does not have general equitable jurisdiction and the remedies sought in his complaint are equitable in nature. The plaintiff argues that the issue in the case is whether there was a mistake in probating Charles Lecouras' estate as intestate because the decedent had a will, which was discovered after the estate was distributed. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that "the Defendant's multiple objections to the probate of the Will effectively prevents the Probate Court from exercising jurisdiction which is tantamount to a rejection of the Will." The plaintiff rejects the defendant's argument that this is a collateral attack on the decree of the Probate Court and argues that this is a direct attack on the decree under the Superior Court's equitable jurisdiction because the plaintiff is seeking relief from a Probate Court decree that was the product of accident or mistake.
The plaintiff makes additional arguments that are not dispositive in the present case. The plaintiff argues that the purpose of the statute of wills will be circumvented if the defendant is allowed to use the intestate administration as a defense because the distribution is contrary to the decedent's expressed intentions in his will. He also argues that he has standing to bring a claim because he was statutorily obligated to submit the will under §§ 45a-282 or 45a-283.
The plaintiff disputes the defendant's claim that he has been negligent in asserting his rights under the will.
"As a general rule, the Probate Court has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over matters involving validity of wills and settlement of estates." Ferris v. Faford, 93 Conn.App. 679, 691, 890 A.2d 602 (2006). "Courts of probate in their respective districts shall have the power to (1) grant administration of intestate estates of persons who have died domiciled in their districts and of intestate estates of persons not domiciled in this state which may be granted as provided by section 45a-303; (2) admit wills to probate of person who have died domiciled in their districts or of nondomiciliaries whose wills may be proved in their districts as provided in section 45a-287; (3) except as otherwise provided in section 45a-98a or as limited by an applicable statute of limitations, determine title or rights of possession and use in and to any real, tangible or intangible property that constitutes, or may constitute, all or part of any trust, any decedent's estate, or any estate under control of a guardian or conservator, which trust or estate is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court . . ." General Statutes § 45a-98(a). "[T]here are three types of actions in which the Superior Court does not exercise original jurisdiction: those involving the custody of a child not the issue of the marriage involved in a divorce, settlement of an executor's or administrator's account, and the question of due execution of a will." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Joshua S., 260 Conn. 182, 216, 796 A.2d 1141 (2002). "If a petition is filed for admission of the will, it will be for the probate court to determine whether or not it should be granted." Miller v. McNamara, 135 Conn. 489, 497, 66 A.2d 359 (1949).
When analyzing the statutorily limited scope of the Probate Court's jurisdiction, the Supreme Court determined that the Probate Court does not have unlimited power to set aside, overturn or modify its own final decrees. Delehanty v. Pitkin, 76 Conn. 412, 418, 56 A. 881 (1904), appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 602, 26 S.Ct. 748, 50 L.Ed. 328 (1905). In Delehanty v. Pitkin, the plaintiff petitioned the "Court of Probate" to set aside its approval of the former will of a decedent and approve a later will in its stead because the plaintiff argued one of the executors of the former will fraudulently destroyed the later will. Id., 413. The Supreme Court took as fact that the refusal to grant the plaintiff's petition was based on want of power to set aside the former decree, not because the petitioner failed to prove the existence of the later will. Id., 415. The Court found the petition to be a direct, not collateral, attack because "[a] direct attack upon a judgment, if successful, wipes it out of existence; while a collateral attack upon it, if successful, leaves it in full force, except as against the party who collaterally attacks it and as regards to the case in which it is so attacked. Clearly the proceeding before the Court of Probate was a direct attack upon the decree in question, seeking to have it set aside by the Court of Probate for fraud; and this, we hold, the Court of Probate had no power to do even for fraud." Id., 423.
"[I]t is generally held that an equitable proceeding for relief on the ground that a judgment is invalid because of fraud, mistake, or the like, which entered into its procurement as an efficient cause constitutes a direct and not a collateral attack upon it." Miller v. McNamara, supra, 135 Conn. 495; see also Daddona v. Kindred Nursing Centers East, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 07 401102 (August 14, 2007, Karazin, J.) (the Superior Court did not have to make a substantive determination over whether the plaintiff's complaint should be construed as a probate appeal when denying the defendant's motion to dismiss because the pro se plaintiff invoked the court's equitable powers); Pignataro v. Cappiello, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. 319464 (May 16, 1996, Levin, J.) (the Superior Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss because "the plaintiff's complaint contains specific allegations of fraud and collusion by the defendants . . . Considering the allegations in their most favorable light, the plaintiff has alleged an equitable cause of action, independent of the statutory right to appeal a probate decree"). "[T]he Superior Court has no jurisdiction to set aside a decree of a Probate Court except upon an appeal. The only relief equity can give in such a case as this is by enjoining any use of the decrees in the administration of the estate as intestate to hamper or defeat proceedings to secure the probate of a will later discovered . . . The necessary basis of such relief is, however, a conclusion that the decrees are void because of fraud, mistake or a like equitable ground. Such a conclusion is not incidental to the relief sought in the action but is the essential and only basis upon which that relief can be given." (Citations omitted.) Miller v. McNamara, supra, 496.
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that the Probate Court permitted the administration of Charles Lecouras' estate under the laws of intestacy because of the mistaken belief that no will existed. Additionally, the plaintiff alleges that he has the November 30, 1986 will of Charles Lecouras in his possession, but did not offer the will to the Probate Court during the intestacy administration because the plaintiff did not learn of Charles Lecouras' death until May 2010. The defendant argues that this claim is properly brought before the Probate Court, however, the Probate Court has no power to set aside its own final decree, only the Superior Court may set aside a final decree through an appeal or through exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, when the decree is void because of fraud, accident or mistake. Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to sustaining jurisdiction, the plaintiff has alleged that the decree of the Probate Court should be set aside because of the mistaken belief that Charles Lecouras died intestate. The Superior Court has the power to hear such a claim through exercise of its equitable jurisdiction. Therefore, the defendant's amended motion to dismiss count one is denied.
In the second count, the plaintiff is seeking a judgment declaring that the November 30, 1986 will of Charles Lecouras may be admitted to probate. The Superior Court does not have the power to hear such a claim or grant such relief. The Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the admission of a will to probate and the Superior Court may only hear such a case through an appeal from the Probate Court. The Superior Court's equitable jurisdiction is limited to enjoining the use of the intestate decree to hamper or defeat the subsequent proceedings to secure the probate of a later discovered will and does not extend to determining if a will should be admitted to probate. Therefore, the defendant's amended motion to dismiss count two is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's amended motion to dismiss the complaint is denied as to count one and granted as to count two.