Opinion
B310145 B320534
02-20-2024
THE GINA MARTELLI REVOCABLE TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 11, 2016 v. BETTY BLAIR et al., Defendants and Respondents. MAXIMILIAN HUTTER, Individually and as Administrator, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant,
Thomas Vogele & Associates, Thomas A. Vogele, and Timohy M. Kowal for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Mary O' Neill, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent. Bunn and Bunn, David G. Bunn; Orren & Orren, Tyra T. Orren for Defendant and Respondent Betty Blair.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 18STPB10734, David S. Cowan & Paul T. Suzuki, Judges. Affirmed as to case no. B320534. Dismissed as to case no. B310145.
Thomas Vogele & Associates, Thomas A. Vogele, and Timohy M. Kowal for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Mary O' Neill, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent.
Bunn and Bunn, David G. Bunn; Orren & Orren, Tyra T. Orren for Defendant and Respondent Betty Blair.
LEE, J.[*]
INTRODUCTION
Before us are two of the many appeals stemming from a contentious series of lawsuits and conservatorship proceedings brought by members of the Hutter-Martelli family. Frank and Angela Martelli had two daughters, Gina Martelli and Nance Hutter. Frank, Angela, and Gina have all died since litigation began. Angela's estate is now represented by Nance's son, appellant Maximilian (Max) Hutter. Gina's estate is represented by respondent Betty Blair, the Martellis' friend and neighbor. Both appeals involve Gina's assets and the relationship between Blair, those assets, and the family.
As many of the parties in this matter share a surname, we refer to them by their first names.
In case no. B320534 ("settlement appeal"), Max seeks to vacate a judgment implementing a settlement agreement between Angela's guardian ad litem and Blair that resolved a variety of claims concerning Blair's influence on Gina and Angela and the validity of an amendment to Gina's trust. Among those claims is case no. B310145 ("asset transfer appeal"), in which Max seeks to vacate an order transferring Gina's assets into Gina's trust after her death.
In the settlement appeal, we conclude Max has provided an inadequate appellate record and failed to cite sufficient legal authority in support of his claim that Angela's postjudgment death rendered the settlement agreement void. As such, Max has not met his burden of establishing error, and we affirm. The settlement agreement, in turn, resolved the issues in the asset transfer appeal. We, therefore, conclude that appeal is moot, and we dismiss it.
BACKGROUND
This case involves a long, convoluted history of fractured family relationships and internecine lawsuits. Because we resolve the matter based on Max's failure to carry his appellate burden, we limit our background discussion accordingly.
1. Context Underlying the Two Appeals
In 2015, Nance filed petitions to be appointed conservator for Frank, who was gravely ill, and Angela, who Nance alleged was not competently caring for Frank and lacked the capacity to manage her own affairs. Nance lived on the East Coast. Gina resided with her parents in Los Angeles, as she had for many years. Frank died before a conservator was appointed. But Angela vigorously opposed the conservatorship petition.
Nance's main assertion in Angela's conservatorship case was that Gina was in possession of assets belonging to Frank and Angela's trust (the Martelli Family Trust) and was exercising undue influence over her mother. During the February 2017 trial, however, Nance was unable to prove those claims. In dismissing Nance's petition for lack of evidence, the court held that it was "apparent from Nance's conduct during litigation that Nance's concerns were not her mother's well-being. She seemed deaf to Angela's requests that Nance cease this hugely expensive and drawn out litigation. The issue as the Court saw it was what Nance would ultimately inherit. If Nance could show Gina exercised undue influence, Nance stood to inherit what Gina would have otherwise. ... At trial, Nance had no evidence at all to support her claims of wrongdoing by Gina." The court later concluded that Nance had engaged in "frivolous litigation, without evidentiary support" and "in bad faith."
By that point, the proceedings had generated hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees and caused Angela and Gina intense distress. But litigation continued throughout 2017, this time over who should pay those fees.
2. Gina's Trust and Pour-over Will
Meanwhile, in 2016, with the assistance of the attorney who had defended her against Nance's misappropriation accusations, Gina executed the trust that is the subject of the settlement appeal. She concurrently executed a pour-over will transferring to the trust any assets in her estate remaining outside the trust at her death; that process is the subject of the asset transfer appeal. Blair, Gina's friend and neighbor, was named successor trustee as well as the executor of the pour-over will.
2.1. The 2016 Trust and 2018 Amendment
In the original trust, Angela was listed as the primary trust beneficiary after Gina's death. Gina was adamant that her money be used exclusively for her mother's support-and equally adamant that Nance receive nothing. Nance had not been involved with her parents' lives for many years, and Gina found it offensive that Nance was seeking conservatorships over them. Thus, the trust "specifically ma[de] no provision for, and specifically disinherited] ... Nance Martelli Hutter and her issue."
In 2017, amidst the conservatorship and fee disputes, Gina's ovarian cancer resurfaced. That December, Nance responded to her sister's illness by filing an ex parte application contending Gina was on her death bed, and Angela was not capable of being home alone.
By February 2018, Gina's cancer had become terminal, and she returned to her attorney to amend her trust. Angela attended the meeting; Blair did not. Gina was concerned that if trust assets were retained for Angela's benefit, as the trust currently provided, the funds could fall into Nance's hands or be used to pay attorneys' fees-including Nance's fees-in Nance's ongoing litigation. Gina's lawyer suggested that one way to prevent the money from being used in this way would be to change the trust beneficiary from Angela to someone Gina could count on to use the assets for Angela's care; the risk was that the new beneficiary would be under no obligation to follow through. Gina suggested that Blair and Blair's husband could be trusted to implement this plan after Gina's death.
Gina executed the amendment on February 19, 2018. Under the amendment, the entire trust estate would be distributed to Blair if she survived Gina by 60 days; if she did not, the estate would pass to Blair's husband; if neither Blair nor her husband survived Gina by 60 days, the estate would be maintained exclusively for the support and maintenance of Angela; if Angela did not survive Gina, or upon Angela's death, the remainder of the estate would be distributed as provided in the original trust.
Gina died on April 25, 2018.
2.2. Appointment of the Guardian ad Litem
Shortly after Gina's death, a private fiduciary, nominated by Nance, filed a second petition to appoint a conservator for Angela, this time alleging Blair was exerting undue influence. As before, Angela vigorously opposed the conservatorship, and six more months of intense, expensive litigation followed.
In the end, no conservator was appointed, but in February 2019, at trial on the matter, the parties stipulated to appointment of a guardian ad litem as a less restrictive alternative. The guardian ad litem, respondent Mary O'Neil, was given authority to investigate Angela's relationship with Blair, including potential claims of undue influence and elder abuse, and whether Angela had any claim to the assets in Gina's trust.
The trial evidence demonstrated that nearly a million dollars in fees and costs had been incurred on the various conservatorship proceedings by that point.
3. The Asset Transfer Petition (Asset Transfer Appeal)
On March 25, 2019, Blair, in her capacity as trustee of Gina's trust and executor of Gina's pour-over will, filed a petition under Probate Code section 850 and Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943 to transfer Gina's remaining assets to the trust.Angela, as a party-in-interest, was served with the petition by mail. The guardian ad litem was also served; she did not oppose the petition because she believed it would be in Angela's best interest for the trust to hold the property, whomever the trust's beneficiaries turned out to be. By order dated August 8, 2019, the court granted the petition and declared the property to belong to the trust. In February 2020, Angela moved to New York to live with the Hutters.
The petition sought to transfer six bank accounts, 250 shares of stock, and an automobile, all of which were identified in the trust as trust property but none of which had been formally transferred to the trust.
Max and Nance had moved into Angela's Bel Air home four months earlier, in October 2019. Over the next few weeks, they restricted Angela's contacts, including with the guardian ad litem, persuaded Angela to make changes to her estate plan, and hired new lawyers to represent her. Although the court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the Hutters from taking Angela out of state or restricting her access to the guardian ad litem, in February 2020, the court granted their request to bring Angela to New York for a 45-day visit. Within days of Angela's departure, $250,000, which Angela had received after Gina's death from a pay-on-death account, was withdrawn from Angela's California bank account and deposited into a new joint account in New York in the names of Angela and Max. Angela never returned to California.
Around the same time, a new lawyer-brought on by the Hutters-filed a slew of motions on Angela's behalf. Among them was a motion filed February 6, 2020, seeking to vacate the transfer of Gina's assets to Gina's trust. Counsel argued the order should be vacated based on lack of notice, denial of due process, excusable mistake or neglect under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, and extrinsic fraud or mistake.
These filings occurred after the court, concerned about the Hutters' influence, had barred the new attorney from the case.
On October 5, 2020, after a contested hearing, the court denied the motion to vacate in a lengthy order. Max appealed.
That appeal is case no. B310145, the asset transfer appeal.
4. Challenge to Gina's Trust Amendment (the Settlement Appeal)
Meanwhile, in June 2019, the guardian ad litem filed a lawsuit challenging Gina's trust amendment, demanding that the amendment be declared invalid based on undue influence and mistake, and for constructive trust of the trust assets.Ultimately, however, the guardian ad litem negotiated a settlement.
Angela objected to this course of action. She had always maintained that Gina's money belonged to Gina, and Angela had no desire to pursue claims against Gina's trust or estate. Angela was aware of Gina's wish to leave her estate to Blair and did not object to it.
The proposed settlement provided that the assets from Gina's trust would be retained for Angela's use and benefit during Angela's lifetime. Unlike the terms of the original trust, however, Angela would access the funds via interest-free loans, secured by her Bel Air residence, to be paid back to the trust upon her death. The guardian ad litem believed this approach would satisfy Gina's two goals: First, to have funds available to support Angela but unavailable to pay attorneys' fees, and second, to ensure none of her assets went to Nance or Nance's children. The agreement also included a release of Angela's and Blair's claims against one another.
In mid-February 2020, the guardian ad litem discussed the settlement terms with Angela, and Angela agreed to them in principle.
On April 23, 2020, Blair petitioned to approve the settlement agreement, but five months later, in September 2020, Angela reversed her previous position and objected. By this point, Angela was living with the Hutters in New York.
Between February and May 2021, the probate court held a five-day trial on the petition to approve the guardian ad litem's settlement of the challenges to Gina's trust amendment. Then, on June 7, 2021, the court approved the settlement in a thorough statement of decision.
The trial was delayed to allow Angela's health to recover. In December 2020, Angela had attempted suicide by drinking a caustic liquid. She testified that the suicide attempt stemmed from stress due to litigation fees.
The court concluded the settlement was in Angela's best interest. The court noted the extraordinary litigation expenses and reasoned that it was entirely foreseeable, based on the state of the evidence, that Angela would lose her suit against Blair and thereby receive no benefit under Gina's trust. By settling the case, Angela minimized her risk of loss and would receive support from the trust during her lifetime. "In essence, the settlement would be a double win for Gina and Angela. Gina and Angela would accomplish their original intent (1) to support Angela and (2) not provide for Nance."
Several notices of appeal were filed from the judgment, but the appeals were ultimately dismissed for failure to pay required fees and other defaults. Motions to vacate the dismissals were filed and denied.
On July 22, 2021, Angela died.
On August 13, 2021, Max, proceeding in propria persona, filed a motion to vacate the order approving the settlement. He argued that Angela's death had rendered the settlement agreement void because she died before the judgment was completed. He also argued the settlement was unenforceable because, as a result of her death, no benefit could be conferred to Angela.
After additional briefing, the court issued a tentative decision. The tentative concluded that the motion was untimely and Max lacked standing to bring it. Although Code of Civil Procedure section 473 provides parties with discretionary relief from default or void judgments, the tentative stressed that Max did not provide any legal support or analysis to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief on that basis. On the merits, the court was not persuaded by Max's argument that the settlement lacked consideration because the parties had contemplated Angela's death before the distribution of any loans. Nor had Max demonstrated the existence of extrinsic fraud or mistake, "especially in light of the lengthy five-day trial on the Petition to Approve the Settlement." At the subsequent hearing on the motion, the court adopted its tentative and denied the motion.
Max filed a timely notice of appeal.
That appeal is case no. B320534, the settlement appeal.
DISCUSSION
In case no. B320534, the settlement appeal, Max argues the court erred by denying his motion to vacate the settlement agreement on standing and timeliness grounds. He also argues the court erred on the merits when it concluded the settlement agreement and resulting judgment were valid. Because Max neither provides legal analysis and citation to authority to support the latter argument nor affords us a record sufficient to evaluate it, we conclude he has not established that the trial court prejudicially erred by denying his motion to vacate the settlement agreement. Since that agreement settled the claims at issue in the asset transfer appeal, case no. B310145 is now moot.
1. Max has not established prejudicial error in the settlement appeal.
" 'A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.'" (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; accord Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)" 'We review the trial court's action, not its precise reasoning[.]'" (Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 438, 447.) Thus, we will affirm a judgment that is correct on any legal basis, even if that basis was not invoked by the trial court. (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32.) There can be no prejudicial error from erroneous logic or reasoning if the decision itself is correct. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980-981.)
"[W]e cannot presume prejudice and will not reverse the judgment in the absence of an affirmative showing there was a miscarriage of justice. [Citations.] Nor will this court act as counsel for appellant by furnishing a legal argument as to how the trial court's ruling was prejudicial. [Citations.]" (Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963.)
Although Max contends the trial court erred on timeliness and standing grounds, he acknowledges the court also rejected his motion on the merits by concluding the settlement and judgment were valid. Because he does not establish the court erred on that basis, we affirm without addressing Max's remaining arguments.
1.1. Max has not provided an adequate appellate record.
Appellants bear the burden of providing us with a record that allows us to resolve the issues they raise. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296.) The record before us does not paint a full picture of what happened in this case, much less assist us in discerning or resolving Max's claim of error.
Max contends that because of Angela's death, her right to access $330,000 from Gina's trust was ultimately worthless, leaving her with only "psychic value" in exchange for the release of civil claims worth millions. Presumably, testimony from the five-day trial on the petition to approve the settlement would shed light on the value of the settlement agreement-psychic or otherwise. Yet the record before us does not include reporters' transcripts from that trial, a settled statement of what occurred at trial, or any other record of the oral proceedings on that issue. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.134 &8.137.) As such, we do not know what testimony or arguments were advanced and cannot evaluate either Max's claim that the settlement failed to provide Angela with a significant benefit or his assertion that she sacrificed millions in potential claims. "Where no reporter's transcript has been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. To put it another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error." (In re Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992; Pringle v. La Chapelle (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1003 ["Without the proper record, we cannot evaluate issues requiring a factual analysis."]; see, e.g., Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 447 [failure to provide trial transcript when appealing attorneys' fees order based on trial work].)
Even on the inadequate record we have been given, Max's contentions fail in light of the trial court's statement of decision, which Max cites only once in his argument on this point. There, the court concluded that the evidence was "tenuous" as to either a claim of undue influence by Blair or a claim that Gina's money actually belonged to Angela, making the guardian ad litem's decision to compromise those claims reasonable. The court also held that the settlement was in Angela's best interest in that it offered "a peaceful and fair resolution to the litigation that allows Angela to live comfortably through her lifetime" and was consistent with Gina's wish to provide for Angela. The court estimated attorneys' fees could easily reach two million dollars if litigation continued, and concluded that settling the case "to stop the litigation expense is a bona fide and good faith reason to settle and benefits Angela." Indeed, the court reasoned, the "plan to avoid exposure and liability to pay these fees was one of the driving motivators to initiate the amendment to Gina's trust by Angela herself."
Max has not provided a record or argument sufficient to undermine the court's conclusions. Accordingly, he has not met his burden of proving the court erred.
1.2. Max has not developed his legal argument.
It is the appellant's "responsibility . . . to support claims of error with meaningful argument and citation to authority." (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Our role, by contrast, is to evaluate "legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made." (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 762 ["It is not this court's role to construct arguments that would undermine the lower court's judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness."].) "When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived." (Badie v. Bank of Am. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784785.) We are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants. (Maral v. City of Live Oak (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 975, 984-985.)
To the extent we can discern his contention, Max claims that because of her death, Angela received "no significant benefit"-only "psychic value"-from the settlement agreement, which renders the agreement void. He posits that the worth of such "psychic value" is a "novel proposition that [we] should review: if mere psychic value is cognizable in law, how can it be weighed in relation to economically and legally cognizable items like money, cause[s] of action, and the right to a jury trial?" Although this "novel proposition" appears to involve interlocking issues of contract law, probate law, civil procedure, law of the case, and the impact of prior judgments, however, Max does not develop his argument on any of these topics. We decline to do so on his behalf. (See Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 546 [it is not the court's function to serve as the appellant's backup counsel].)
In his opening brief, Max cites a single case, involving the powers of guardians ad litem, for the proposition that "Angela's opposition to the settlement must be respected unless the settlement furnished 'some countervailing and significant benefit.' (In re Christina B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1454 [(Christina B.)].)" Without citation to the record, he states that the trial "court reasoned that the settlement provided a significant benefit because it gave [Angela] access to $330,000 in funds, by way of secured, interest-free loans, for her support." Because Angela died shortly thereafter, she could not take advantage of that provision, and, therefore, "received no significant benefit" in return for releasing her "claims against Blair, worth potentially millions." Max does not explain how Christina B. supports his legal theory. (See Shaw v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 740, 754 (Shaw) ["citing cases without any discussion of their application to the present case results in forfeiture"].)
Nor is Max's legal theory itself clear. The heading states: "Angela's death just 45 days after the order confirmed that the settlement failed to provide her a significant benefit in exchange for millions in concessions." In the first paragraph, he references "consideration for Angela's releases," which makes it look like a claim that the settlement agreement is subject to recission under the law of contract due to Angela's death. But Max's sole case citation, in the next paragraph, implies a contention that the settlement exceeded the scope of the guardian ad litem's authority. Whatever argument Max intended to make, he has not provided us with enough analysis to evaluate it.
In his reply brief, Max distinguishes Blair's cited authorities but does not advance any meaningful caselaw to support his own position-advanced there for the first time-that the settlement was a contingent agreement based on a "personal condition" that was extinguished upon Angela's death. As an initial matter, we "do not consider points raised for the first time in the reply brief absent a showing of good cause for the failure to present them earlier. [Citation.] This rule is based on considerations of fairness-withholding a point until the closing brief deprives the opposing party of the opportunity to file a written response unless supplemental briefing is ordered. [Citation.]" (Shaw, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 754.) In any event, the authority Max provides in the reply brief does not support this claim.
Max cites two outdated cases that address issues unique to assignments of real property: Thomson v. Lineer (1948) 86 Cal.App.3d 838, a two-page appellate opinion involving an option contract for the sale of land, and the sole case cited in that opinion, Maynard v. Polhemus (1887) 74 Cal. 141, a three-paragraph California Supreme Court opinion addressing unlawful restraint on alienation of real property. The settlement agreement in this appeal does not involve either an option contract or a restraint on the conveyance of real property. Contrary to Max's assertion, neither case involves contractual impossibility, and neither appears relevant to the issues before us.
2. Because the settlement is valid, the asset transfer appeal is moot.
"It is well settled that appellate courts will decide only actual controversies. We will not opine on moot questions or abstract propositions, nor declare principles of law that cannot affect the matter at issue on appeal. [Citation.]" (Shaw, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 772.) In general, a "case is considered moot when 'the question addressed was at one time a live issue in the case,' but has been deprived of life 'because of events occurring after the judicial process was initiated.' [Citation] ... The pivotal question in determining if a case is moot is ... whether the court can grant the plaintiff any effectual relief." (Wilson &Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1574.)
As we have discussed, Max has not met his burden of establishing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate the judgment implementing the settlement agreement. As such, that agreement is still binding on Angela's heirs. The settlement agreement, in turn, resolved Angela's motion to vacate the trial court's order granting Blair's petition to transfer assets into Gina's trust under Probate Code section 850 and Estate of Heggstad, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th 943. The order denying that motion to vacate is the subject of Max's asset transfer appeal in case no. B310145. We therefore conclude the asset transfer appeal is moot. (See La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn. of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 586, 590 ["when, as here, a case becomes moot pending an appellate decision, the reviewing court will simply dismiss the appeal on the ground it can no longer grant any effective relief"]; Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1179 ["One such event occurring for which a reviewing court will dismiss an appeal is when the underlying claim is settled or compromised"].)
The agreement provided: "Except for the rights, duties and obligations created by the Agreement, the GAL [guardian ad litem] on behalf of Angela Martelli, on the one hand, and Betty Blair, ... on the other hand, jointly and severally hereby forever fully and finally waive, release, and discharge the other, together with their respective heirs . from . any matter related to . the Estate of Gina S. Martelli, deceased, the Gina S. Martelli Trust, [and] the Martelli Family Trust . ." (Italics added.)
In its statement of decision approving the settlement, the court explained: "The following lawsuits will be resolved with the settlement agreement: ... [¶] 2. Angela's Probate Code Section 850 petition. [¶] 3. Angela's appeal regarding the trial court's ruling on her motion to set aside Heggstad Order affirming assets belonging to Gina." Angela did not challenge this conclusion in her 20-page objections to the statement of decision.
DISPOSITION
The October 5, 2020 order denying the motion to vacate in case no. B310145 and the October 15, 2021 order denying the motion to vacate in case no. B320534 are affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: BAKER, Acting P.J., MOOR. J.
[*] Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.