Opinion
No. CV97 034 41 57S
June 4, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (MOTION 138 DATED APRIL 10, 2000)
This case arose out of personal injuries sustained by the plaintiffs on September 9, 1996 when they were arrested and charged with larceny. They filed suit against the City of Bridgeport, Officer Eddie Correa, Jr., and Warnaco, a clothing outlet located in Bridgeport. In the allegations relevant for this motion the plaintiffs alleged:
(a) that the defendant Eddie Correa, Jr. acting under color of state law, wrongfully and improperly detained them in violation of § 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count one);
(b) that the conduct of the defendant Eddie Correa, Jr., constituted a knowing and intentional false imprisonment (Count two);
(c) that the defendant Eddie Correa, Jr. was negligent in that he arrested the plaintiffs without securing probable cause for the arrest and that he failed to properly investigate the allegations of the charges (Count three);
(d) that the defendant City of Bridgeport is obligated to pay damages to the plaintiffs for the infringement of their civil rights that stemmed from the aforementioned negligence. (Count four).
In this action the defendants the City of Bridgeport and Officer Correa seek summary judgment, arguing that defendant Correa had probable cause for the arrest. They further allege that they are immune from liability for discretionary acts pursuant to common law. Finally they allege that Connecticut General Statutes § 7-465 shields the City of Bridgeport from liability.
Connecticut General Statutes § 7-465 provides in relevant part:
(a) Any town, city or borough, notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, general, special or local, shall pay on behalf of any employee . . . all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded for infringement of any person's civil rights or for physical damages to person or property, except as hereinafter set forth, if the employee, at the time of the occurrence, accident, physical injury or damages complained of, was acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, and if such occurrence, accident, physical injury or damage was not the result of any wilful or wanton act of such employee in the discharge of such duty.
I. Statement of Facts
Based upon the pleadings, affidavits and other documentary evidence, the pertinent facts that are not in dispute are as follows.
On September 9, 1996 the plaintiffs were shopping at the defendant Warnaco Outlet Store (Warnaco) then located at 130 Gregory Street, Bridgeport, Connecticut. Plaintiff's Exhibit, Affidavit of Dolan Hunter, ¶ 11. Shortly thereafter Bridgeport Police Officer Boyd responded to a complaint from Warnaco personnel. Bridgeport Police Department incident report 96-0912183. Defendant's Exhibit, Exhibit A.
When Officer Boyd arrived at Warnaco, she received information that two individuals, later identified at the plaintiffs, had taken a purse belonging to a Warnaco employee and cashier, Elaine Leake. Ms. Leake told Officer Boyd that she had laid her purse on the counter where she was waiting on customers. According to Ms. Leake, she momentarily turned her back. During that time her purse was taken. Defendant's Exhibit Q, page 28; Exhibit R, page 29.
The Warnaco store manager, Jack Shaw, advised Officer Boyd that he saw the plaintiff Dorcus Hunter take the purse and then join the plaintiff Dolan Hunter. Despite efforts by store personnel to stop them, the plaintiffs left the Warnaco parking lot in a red station wagon. Bridgeport Police Department incident report 96-0912183, Defendant's Exhibit A; Deposition of Jacob Shaw, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, page 29; Defendant's Exhibits B, page 21; Exhibit E, page 147-48; Exhibit K, page 163; Exhibit L, page 36, 147-48, 180; Exhibit N, page 47; Exhibit O, page 48. Mr. Shaw was positive in his identification. Deposition of Jacob Shaw, Defendant's Exhibit E, page 147; Deposition of Officer Correa, Defendant's Exhibit H, page 21.
The plaintiff Dolan Hunter returned to the Warnaco store later that same day. An argument began. Warnaco personnel called for police assistance. In response to the complaint of a disturbance, Officer Correa arrived at the store, received information concerning the argument and spoke briefly with the store manager and cashier. The cashier told Officer Correa that the plaintiff Dorcus Hunter had taken her purse. Deposition of E. Leake, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, page 43. She was positive in her identification. Deposition of E. Leake, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, page 43. Officer Correa placed Mr. Hunter under arrest. Deposition of Dolan Hunter, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Page 120-21; Affidavit of Dolan Hunter, Plaintiff's Exhibit 7, p. 6.; Affidavit of Officer Correa, Defendant's Exhibits C, page 19; Exhibit D, page 25; Exhibit F, page 37; Exhibit G, page 21; Exhibit P, page 21; Exhibit Q, page 28; Exhibit R, page 29.
Officer Correa based his arrest decision upon the following factors:
1. Plaintiff's presence at the scene during the theft of the purse.
2. Witnesses descriptions of the Plaintiffs, particular Mr. Hunter as an employee of Warnaco.
3. The Plaintiffs' admission of their presence during the relevant time.
4. The description of the car used by the parties . . .
5. The return of Mr. Hunter once he discovered that they could identify her.
6. The lack of any other individuals in the store who could have engaged in the criminal activity.
7. The time sequence.
8. The certainty of the store manager that they were the people he saw leave with the purse.
9. My training and experience which indicated that, given the scenario, there was probable cause to believe the Plaintiffs took the purse.
Interrogatory Responses by Officer Correa dated April 13, 1999, Defendant's Exhibit J; see also Deposition of Officer Correa, Defendant's Exhibit H.
The matters of State of Connecticut v. Dolan Hunter, CR 96 122150, and State of Connecticut v. Dorcus Hunter, CR 96 0122149, were nolled February 24, 1997.
II. Discussion A. Summary Judgment
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact, a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. Practice Book §§ 17-45, 17-46; Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 455, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 317, 477 A.2d 1005 (1984). However, "the nonmoving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). Furthermore, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
"To establish a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment must produce specific facts indicating that a genuine factual issue exists . . . If the evidence [produced by the nonmoving party] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted . . . The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Bullock v. City of New York et al., Docket Number 02 CIV 7698 (DC), District Court for the Southern District of New York. (March 12, 2004, Chin, J.) (internal citations omitted, internal quotations omitted).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, that party must come forward with sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 263 (1986).
B. False Arrest CT Page 9110
The plaintiffs' primary claim is that the defendant, acting under color of state law, wrongfully and improperly detained them in violation of § 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A § 1983 claim for false arrest derives from the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures, including the right to be free from arrest absent probable cause. Wevant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996). "The bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection, of course, is the Warrant Clause, requiring that, absent certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant from a neutral and disinterested magistrate . . ." Franks v. Delaware, 483 U.S. 154, 165 (1978).
A false arrest claim under § 1983 is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under Connecticut law. Parsons v. Town of Watertown, No. 3:00CV1519(DJS), United States District Court, D. Connecticut (March 30, 2004, Squatrito, J.). Under Connecticut law, "[f]alse imprisonment, or false arrest, is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another." Green v. Donroe, 186 Conn. 265, 267, 440 A.2d 973 (1982); Outlaw v. City of Meriden, 43 Conn. App. 387, 392, 682 A.2d 1112, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 946, 686 A.2d 122 (1996).
"The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest, whether that action is brought under state law or under § 1983." Wevant, 101 F.3d at 852; Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted) (citations omitted); Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2002). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating a lack of probable cause for the arrest. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-46 (1979); Williams v. City of New York, 02 Civ. 3693 (CBM) United States District Court, S.D. New York (October 23, 2003, Motley, J.). Probable cause is a question that may be resolved on a motion for summary judgment if there is no dispute of material fact regarding the pertinent events and knowledge of the officers. Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1995).
The issue of whether an arresting officer had probable cause to arrest can be determined as a matter of law if "the pertinent events and knowledge of the officers" are not in dispute . . . Whether or not there was probable cause to arrest depends on the information available at the time of the arrest . . . judged against the "totality of the circumstances." . . . There is probable cause to arrest "when the arresting officer has `knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.'" . . . The amount of evidence "need not reach the level of evidence necessary to support a conviction . . . but it must constitute more than rumor, suspicion, or even a strong reason to suspect." . . . (Citations omitted; internal citations omitted.)
Williams v. City of New York, 02 Civ. 3693 (CBM) United States District Court, S.D. New York (October 23, 2003, Motley, J.) pages 4-6. Finally, "courts evaluating probable cause for an arrest must consider those facts available to an officer at the time of the arrest and immediately before it." Bullock v. City of New York, et al., 02 CIV 7698 (DC), United States District Court S.D. New York (March 12, 2004, Chin, J.).
Under Connecticut law, "[P]robable cause is the knowledge of facts sufficient to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has reasonable grounds for presenting an action . . . Its existence or nonexistence is determined by the court on the facts found . . . In those cases, the facts were not in dispute and consequently the determination of the ultimate fact of probable cause was a question of law. When, however, the underlying facts are in dispute there is a constitutional right to have those facts determined by a jury . . ." Cosgrove Development Co. v. Cafferty, 179 Conn. 670, 427 A.2d 841 (1980).
"Probable cause requires only a `probability or a substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.' Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983). The probable cause determination is based on the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest. See Calamia v. City of New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1032 (2d Cir. 1989). An arresting officer advised of a crime by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint or information charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect an arrest absent circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim's veracity. See Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995)." Hernandez v. City of Rochester, 00-CV-6263L, United States District Court, W.D. New York (April 30, 2003, Larimer, J.).
In the present case, there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were shopping at the Warnaco store at the time of the incident. The victim and a security guard both identified the plaintiffs as the individuals who had taken Ms. Leake's purse. These neutral witnesses' statements were unequivocal. "[I]t is well-established that a law enforcement official has probable cause to arrest if he received his information from some person, normally the putative victim or eyewitness, who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth." Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). In light of these facts, an officer with reasonable caution would have believed that the plaintiffs had committed the larceny.
Plaintiffs' contention is that Officer Correa should have investigated further, in particular, should have accepted their statements of innocence. This additional information, they suggest, defeats this summary judgment motion. "While the police may not purposely withhold or ignore exculpatory evidence that, if taken into account, would void probable cause, probable cause attaches to a warrantless arrest even if police could have undertaken further investigation." Williams v. City of New York, 02 Civ. 3693 (CBM) United States District Court, S.D. New York (October 23, 2003, Motley, J.) pages 4-6. Simply stated, "Once a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest." Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority, 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997). An arresting officer may rely on the report of a victim of a crime. Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.2d 1271, 1290 (2d Cir. 2002). The plaintiffs have done nothing more than present a general denial. This is insufficient to overcome the lack of genuine controversy in this matter.
The fact that the victim and the plaintiffs present conflicting accounts does not negate probable cause. Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). "The law does not impose a duty on an arresting officer to investigate exculpatory defenses offered by the person being arrested or to assess the credibility of unverified claims . . . before making an arrest." Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d at 135. A police officer is not required "to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as a lack of requisite intent." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979). Nor does the ultimate disposition of the plaintiffs' criminal action affect this decision. Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995); Quiles v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 10934 (LTS) (THK) Southern District D. New York (August 13, 2003, Taylor Swain, J.).
Although the existence of probable cause is sufficient to support the defendant's motion for summary judgment, additionally Officer Correa has a qualified immunity. "In an unlawful arrest action, an officer is immune if he has arguable probable cause, and is subject to suit only if his judgment was so flawed that no reasonable officer would have made a similar choice . . . Arguable probable cause is all that is required because (t)he concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct." Williams v. City of New York, 02 Civ. 3693 (CBM) United States District Court, S.D. New York (October 23, 2003, Motley, J.) page 6 (internal citations omitted; internal quotations omitted). Thus, even if probable cause to arrest did not exist, Officer Correa would still be entitled to qualified immunity if he can establish that there was "arguable probable cause" to arrest. Escalera v. Lunn, 354 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2004).
"Officers can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the existence of probable cause . . . and in those situations courts will not hold that they have violated the Constitution." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001). Therefore, "in situations where an officer may have reasonably but mistakenly concluded that probable cause existed, the officer is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity." "Arguable probable cause exists `if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met . . . [T]he analytically distinct test for qualified immunity is more favorable to the officers than the one for probable cause; "arguable probable cause" will suffice to confer qualified immunity for the arrest." Escalera. See also Boyd v. New York, 336 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2003); Szekeres v. Schaeffer, 3:01 cv 2099 (MRK); 3:01 cv 2108 (MRK) United States District Court, D. Connecticut (March 26, 2004, Kravitz, J.) page 10, 15. "If police officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether there was probable cause, there is `arguable probable cause' sufficient to warrant qualified immunity for the defendant officers."
For the reasons already given, Officer Correa also is entitled to qualified immunity from suit on plaintiffs' claims. It is evident that Officer Correa's "actions were objectively reasonable or, put differently, that `officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.'" Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1994)). Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate.
III. Conclusion CT Page 9114
Because defendant had probable cause to arrest, plaintiffs cannot make out a claim for either false arrest or a violation of § 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Furthermore, the defendant had arguable probable cause for his actions, entitling them to qualified immunity from plaintiffs' claims. Insofar as the plaintiffs' claims against the city are based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, they cannot be maintained for the same reasons that justify dismissal as to the individual police officers.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is ordered granted.
DEWEY, J.