Summary
In Hunter, the plaintiff brought negligence claims under theories of direct liability and vicarious liability premised on the negligent setup of his cabin.
Summary of this case from Coletti v. Carnival Corp.Opinion
CASE NO. 22-20236-CIV-ALTONAGA/Torres
2022-07-01
Randolph HUNTER, Plaintiff, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, Defendant.
Philip Dixon Parrish, Philip D. Parrish PA, Miami, FL, Glenn J. Holzberg, Law Offices of Glenn J. Holzberg, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff. Keith Anton, Horr, Novak, Skipp, Doral, FL, Valentina M. Tejera, Carnival Corporation, Miami, FL, David James Horr, Juan Carlos Perez, Jr., Horr Novak & Skipp, P.A., Miami, FL, for Defendant.
Philip Dixon Parrish, Philip D. Parrish PA, Miami, FL, Glenn J. Holzberg, Law Offices of Glenn J. Holzberg, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.
Keith Anton, Horr, Novak, Skipp, Doral, FL, Valentina M. Tejera, Carnival Corporation, Miami, FL, David James Horr, Juan Carlos Perez, Jr., Horr Novak & Skipp, P.A., Miami, FL, for Defendant.
ORDER
CECILIA M. ALTONAGA, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant Carnival Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [ECF No. 25], filed on May 13, 2022. Plaintiff, Randolph Hunter, filed a Response [ECF No. 28], to which Defendant filed a Reply [ECF No. 29]. The Court has carefully reviewed the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 21], the parties’ written submissions, and applicable law. For the following reasons, the Motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2019, Plaintiff took a voyage aboard Defendant's cruise ship, the Carnival Sunshine. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 8). His cabin, number 3104, was occupied by five people including himself. (See id. ¶¶ 18–20, 24, 27). The cabin contained two bunk beds plus an additional bed on the floor between the bunk beds. (See id. ¶ 16). On top of each bunk bed, there is a designated place for a ladder to be fitted. (See id. ¶ 15). Specifically, each top bed has two slots (or grommets) where the ladder's "J Hooks" may be attached and secured. (Id. (quotation marks omitted)). The slots prevent the ladder from sliding. (See id. ). They are located on the long side of each top bunk bed. (See id. ).
Plaintiff claims that the addition of the fifth bed in the cabin led to improper placement of the ladder by an employee. (See id. ¶¶ 14, 17–20). Because the fifth bed blocked the place on the floor where the ladder would normally stand, one of Defendant's employees — the steward for Plaintiff's cabin — placed the ladder on the short side of one of the top bunk beds. (See id. ¶¶ 14, 17). As a result, the ladder was not secured in the slots. (See id. ).
Defendant slept on the top bed. (See id. ¶ 10). When he awoke on May 11, 2019, he began to descend the ladder. (See id. ¶ 11). The ladder unexpectedly shifted to one side, causing his left leg and foot to be caught between the ladder rungs. (See id. ¶ 12). Plaintiff's leg bent awkwardly, resulting in severe injuries. (See id. ¶¶ 12–13, 26).
Shortly after, Defendant's chief security officer visited Plaintiff's cabin. (See id. ¶ 22). The officer was angry to learn that five people were occupying the cabin. (See id. ¶ 23). He told Plaintiff that the "room should never have been set up for five people" and Plaintiff was "lucky" that he was not "hurt worse." (Id. ¶ 23 (quotation marks omitted)). Defendant allegedly approved the cabin's five-bed set-up in advance of the cruise. (See id. ¶¶ 19–20, 24).
Plaintiff then brought this action. The Amended Complaint asserts four claims for relief. Count I, for vicarious liability based on the active negligence of the cabin steward, asserts that "notice ... is not required" to state a vicarious liability claim, but that Defendant "was on notice of a prior incidents [sic] involving passengers suffering falls on bunk beds within the passenger cabins" in any event. (Id. ¶ 29 (alteration added)); (see also id. ¶¶ 27–34). Count II alleges a direct claim of negligence stemming from Defendant permitting five people to occupy cabin 3104. (See id. ¶¶ 35–42).
Counts III and IV, respectively, assert direct claims of negligent failure to warn and failure to maintain. (See id. ¶¶ 43–63). Both counts allege that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition (the unsecured ladder). (See id. ¶¶ 44, 56). Supporting that assertion, the counts allege that Defendant "kn[ew] the dimensions of" the cabin; "typically no more than four passengers occupy these cabins in the two bunkbeds"; Defendant "authorized a fifth passenger, and therefore a fifth bed to be placed in the cabin"; and this additional bed "would require the ladder for the two upper bunks to be removed from the grommets" and therefore be unsecured. (Id. ¶ 44 (alteration added)). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew of the unsecured ladder for at least 12 hours before the accident because Defendant inspects each cabin at the beginning of each cruise and trains its crew on the proper way to arrange beds in the ship's cabins. (See id. ¶¶ 44–45).
Defendant now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint on the basis that Plaintiff fails to state claims for relief.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a "short and plain statement of the claim" showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 10(b), which also covers pleadings, "require[s] that discrete claims ... be plead[ed] in separate counts[.]" Magluta v. Samples , 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (alterations added; citations and footnote call number omitted). "Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’ " Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off. , 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). District courts possess "inherent authority to sua sponte demand repleader of" shotgun complaints. Thetford v. Hoover City of Graves , 619 F. App'x 986, 987 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Magluta , 256 F.3d at 1284 & n.3 ).
"To survive a motion to dismiss [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (alteration added; quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Although this pleading standard "does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ ... it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (alteration added; quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Pleadings must contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (alteration added; citation omitted). "A complaint is plausible on its face when it contains sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Gates v. Khokhar , 884 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).
Courts evaluating motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take its factual allegations as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc. , 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc. , 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988) ).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Count I does not plead a proper vicarious liability claim, Count II is an impermissible shotgun pleading, and Counts III and IV fail to plausibly allege Defendant had notice of the ladder's dangerous placement. (See Mot. 2, 8, 10). Plaintiff disagrees with each of these arguments. (See generally Resp.). So does the Court.
A. Vicarious Liability (Count I)
Defendant first contends that Count I fails to state a proper vicarious liability claim because of its insistence that "notice ... is not required." (Am. Compl. ¶ 29 (alteration added); Mot. 2–8). According to Defendant, Count I is, in substance, a negligent maintenance or negligent-failure-to-warn claim, meaning that Defendant's prior notice of the dangerous condition that caused injury is a necessary element. (See Mot. 3). Thus, argues Defendant, Count I should be dismissed because it attempts to circumvent the pleading requirements of direct negligence claims by styling itself a vicarious liability claim. (See id. ).
The Eleventh Circuit recently considered the distinction between direct and vicarious claims. In Yusko v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. , 4 F.4th 1164 (11th Cir. 2021), the plaintiff sustained injuries while dancing with a professional dancer, a cruise crewmember, during a dance competition onboard. See id. at 1166. The district court granted summary judgment to the cruise line on the plaintiff's vicarious liability claim. See id. The district court reasoned that the cruise line lacked notice of the risk-creating condition that caused the plaintiff's injury — namely, the dancer's purportedly negligent dancing. See id.
The parties appear to agree that federal maritime law governs the outcome of this case. (See generally Mot.; Resp.). The Court will not disturb this assumption. See Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines , 912 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Even when the parties allege diversity of citizenship as the basis of the federal court's jurisdiction (as they did in this case), if the injury occurred on navigable waters, federal maritime law governs the substantive issues in the case." (collecting cases)).
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. See id. It observed that although in past cases it had "applied the notice requirement when a shipowner is alleged to be directly liable for a passenger's injuries through, for example, the negligent maintenance of its premises[,] ... the notice requirement does not — and was never meant to — apply to maritime negligence claims proceeding under a theory of vicarious liability." Id. at 1167 (alterations added; emphasis in original). Vicarious liability claims are different, the court explained, because vicarious liability "is not based on the shipowner's conduct." Id. at 1169. Indeed, "an employer can be held liable under a vicarious liability theory even if it has not violated any duty at all." Id. (citing Meyer v. Holley , 537 U.S. 280, 285–86, 123 S.Ct. 824, 154 L.Ed.2d 753 (2003) ). Applying these principles, the Eleventh Circuit held "that a passenger need not establish that a shipowner had actual or constructive notice of a risk-creating condition to hold a shipowner liable for the negligent acts of its employees." Id. at 1170.
But the Yusko court nonetheless acknowledged a tension in its maritime tort precedents. The cruise line had argued that permitting vicarious liability claims to proceed without requiring proof of notice would make the notice element of direct liability claims "superfluous." Id. To illustrate the point, the court compared Yusko to Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc. , 867 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1989). In both Yusko and Keefe , the plaintiffs sustained injuries from dancing on a cruise ship. See Yusko , 4 F.4th at 1166, 1170 ; Keefe , 867 F.2d at 1320. Yet, in Yusko , the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff did not need to establish notice, see 4 F.4th at 1170, while in Keefe , the court held that notice was a necessary element of the plaintiff's claim, see 867 F.2d at 1322.
The Eleventh Circuit defended the divergent outcomes in Yusko and Keefe . The difference between the two cases, the court said, was that the Yusko plaintiff asserted a vicarious liability claim, but the Keefe plaintiff did not. See Yusko , 4 F.4th at 1166, 1170. As the court explained:
A plaintiff is the master of his or her complaint and may choose to proceed under a theory of direct liability, vicarious liability, or both. It may be true that, in some cases, it will be easier for a passenger to proceed under a theory of vicarious liability than under one of direct liability. But common sense suggests that there will be just as many occasions where passengers are limited to a theory of direct liability. Sometimes, as in Keefe , a passenger will not be able to identify any specific employee whose negligence caused her injury. In other cases, a passenger will seek to hold a shipowner liable for maintaining dangerous premises ..., for failing to warn of dangerous conditions off-ship ..., or for negligence related to the actions of other passengers ....
Id. at 1170 (alterations added).
Here, Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff has pleaded a vicarious liability claim in Count I. Defendant instead argues that Count I is not a proper vicarious liability claim because it is premised on the cabin steward's alleged creation of an unreasonably dangerous condition. (See Mot. 3). But this argument minimizes the leeway courts afford plaintiffs to frame their own claims. As Yusko made clear, "[a] plaintiff is the master of his or her complaint and may choose to proceed under a theory of direct liability, vicarious liability, or both." 4 F.4th at 1170 (alteration added). And just as Yusko permits, Plaintiff has asserted both direct and vicarious liability claims against Defendant here. Plaintiff may or may not be able to prove the cabin steward's negligence in the end. But Plaintiff is certainly allowed to allege that the cabin steward negligently set up Plaintiff's cabin and that Defendant is vicariously liable as a result.
Insisting otherwise, Defendant relies principally on Britt v. Carnival Corporation , No. 1:21-cv-22726, 580 F.Supp.3d 1211 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2021). In that case, the plaintiff slipped and fell on the top step of a wet staircase that the defendant's employees had just mopped. See id. at 1214–15. No signs warned the plaintiff of the wet surface, and the wet step lacked properly maintained non-skid tape. See id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff alleged that the "employees who mopped the step or deck were negligent for failing to put caution signs in the area, cordon off the wet area until it dried, remain in the area to warn passengers ..., [or] dry the step or deck[.]" Id. (alterations added; citation omitted).
The court dismissed the plaintiff's vicarious liability claim. See id. at 1216–17. It reasoned that the plaintiff, "in effect," sought to impose liability on the defendant "for is [sic] its employees’ negligently creating and then failing to warn about a dangerous condition on the premises[,] i.e. , a wet deck or step." Id. at 1215 (alteration added). The court acknowledged Yusko . See id. But it declined to read Yusko as "permit[ting] negligent maintenance and failure to warn claims brought under a vicarious liability theory." Id. (alteration added; footnote call number omitted).
Britt ’s understanding of Yusko is too narrow. Yusko , after all, counseled respect for a plaintiff's province as "the master of his or her complaint[.]" 4 F.4th at 1170 (alteration added). True, the Yusko court hypothesized scenarios in which passengers would be "limited to a theory of direct liability[.]" Id. (alteration added). Britt , however, confronted none of those imagined situations.
The Britt court staked its dismissal of the vicarious liability claim on Yusko ’s statement that a passenger might be "limited to a theory of direct liability" when the "passenger ... seek[s] to hold a shipowner liable for maintaining dangerous premises" or "for failing to warn of dangerous conditions[.]" Id. (alterations and emphasis added); see Britt , 580 F.Supp.3d at 1215–16 (quoting Yusko , 4 F.4th at 1170 ). That statement does not, as Britt reasoned, give courts license to recast passengers’ vicarious liability claims as negligent maintenance claims. To the contrary, it requires taking a plaintiff's claims as they are while also recognizing that a plaintiff will not always be able to plead a vicarious liability claim plausibly and in good faith. This correct reading of Yusko mandates survival of the vicarious liability claim here. Count I, like the vicarious liability claims in both Britt and Yusko , does not "seek" to hold Defendant liable for anything other than its employee's allegedly negligent actions. Yusko , 4 F.4th at 1170 ; see Britt , 580 F.Supp.3d at 1215–16. Plaintiff was therefore not required to allege Defendant's notice of the negligently arranged cabin (although, in any event, it does (see Am. Compl. ¶ 29)). See, e.g. , Ewing v. Carnival Corp. , No. 19-20264-Civ, 2022 WL 1719315, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 27, 2022) (recounting that after Yusko , the district court permitted the plaintiff to pursue a vicarious liability claim against Carnival based on a Carnival employee's failure to properly secure bunk bed without establishing notice); Elardi v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. , No. 19-cv-25035, 2021 WL 7367291, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2021) (reconsidering and reversing prior ruling that lack of notice precluded vicarious liability claim, ruling instead that plaintiff could assert vicarious liability claim against Royal Caribbean based on employee's negligent installation of sofa).
This reading of Yusko is consistent with the Court's February 23, 2022 Order in Billotte v. Carnival Corporation. See Billotte v. Carnival Corp. , No. 22-20091-Civ, Order on Motion to Strike [ECF No. 20] filed February 23, 2022 (S.D. Fla. 2022). The plaintiff in Billotte never asserted a vicarious liability claim, so her direct claims for negligent maintenance and failure to warn required notice. See id. at 2–3.
Defendant argues in its Reply, but not in its Motion, that the Amended Complaint does not adequately identify the crewmember whose alleged negligence would make Defendant liable. (See Reply 3; Mot. 2–8). This argument is both untimely and unpersuasive. The Court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply. See SEC v. Keener , No. 1:20-cv-21254, 2020 WL 4736205, at *6 n.4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2020) ("It is improper to raise an argument for the first time in a reply." (citations omitted)).
Additionally, the Amended Complaint identifies the allegedly negligent employee by his or her position (cabin steward), cabin assignment (cabin 3104), and conduct (placing the ladder on the short end of the bunkbed); and alleges that these facts will easily enable Defendant to identify the employee during discovery. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 17). These allegations suffice.
Defendant points to several other decisions that, it says, support its contention that Count I must allege notice. (See Mot. 3–8). But none of these cases takes Defendant very far. A careful review reveals why.
Let's begin with Quashen v. Carnival Corporation , No. 1:20-cv-22299, 576 F.Supp.3d 1275 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2021). There, the relevant count of the complaint did "not assert a claim of vicarious liability" at all. Id. at 1298 (citation omitted). That omission alone required granting summary judgment to the defendant. See id. at 1298–300.
The Quashen court went on to suggest, alternatively, that permitting a passenger to assert vicarious liability claims for employees’ negligent creation of an unreasonable risk "would allow [the] Plaintiff to bypass the notice requirement simply by identifying an employee involved in Carnival's mere creation or maintenance of a defect." Id. at 1299 (alteration added). But that comment, aside from being unnecessary to the court's ultimate disposition, does not bear the weight of reason. In essence, it echoes the mistaken argument — rejected in Yusko and subtly repeated by Britt — that "the notice requirement in [the] direct liability caselaw will be superfluous" unless notice is also a required element of vicarious liability claims. Yusko , 4 F.4th at 1170 (alteration added). Quashen , therefore, does not support dismissal.
Next, we consider Hodson v. MSC Cruises, S.A. , No. 20-22463, 2021 WL 3639752 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2021), report and recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 3634809 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2021). The Hodson court recommended granting summary judgment on the plaintiff's vicarious liability claim because the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to support her allegation that the cruise line's employee acted unreasonably. See id. at *13. But Hodson did not conclude that the plaintiff needed to establish the cruise line's notice to save that claim from summary judgment. The decision thus sheds no light on the merits of Count I here.
Finally, Defendant relies on two Eleventh Circuit decisions: Newbauer v. Carnival Corporation , 26 F.4th 931 (11th Cir. 2022), and Pizzino v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. , 709 F. App'x 563 (11th Cir. 2017). That reliance is unfounded. Newbauer and Pizzino both addressed only direct claims against shipowners. See Newbauer , 26 F.4th at 936 ("Newbauer sued Carnival directly for negligent maintenance and failure to warn and has not raised any negligence claims under the theory of vicarious liability."); Pizzino , 709 F. App'x at 564 ("Pizzino filed suit against Norwegian, alleging that it had negligently created and failed to eliminate a hazardous condition[.]" (alteration added)). Notice was therefore required, as Yusko and prior decisions have made plain that it should be.
But not so here — when the relevant claim asserts vicarious liability. Here, as in Yusko , Plaintiff "is the master of his ... complaint[,]" 4 F.4th at 1170 (alterations added), so he may seek to hold Defendant "liable under a vicarious liability theory even if it has not violated any duty at all[,]" id. at 1169 (alteration added; citation omitted).
The Motion is denied as to Count I.
B. Direct Liability for Negligence (Count II)
Turning to Count II, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's direct negligence claim should be dismissed because it is a shotgun pleading that "offers no novel or additional facts ... and likewise introduces no new legal theories" beyond the Amended Complaint's other claims. (Mot. 9 (alteration added)). Plaintiff insists that Count II does not meet the Eleventh Circuit's standard for a shotgun pleading and, in any event, it pleads a theory of negligence that is distinct from those pleaded in his negligent-failure-to-warn and maintenance claims. (See Resp. 16). The Court agrees with Plaintiff.
Recall that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain a "short and plain statement of the claim" showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A pleading that violates either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, is often disparagingly referred to as a shotgun pleading. See Weiland , 792 F.3d at 1320.
In Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office , 792 F.3d 1313, the Eleventh Circuit catalogued the four most common types of shotgun complaints. The four categories include: (1) a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all previous counts, (2) a complaint full of conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts, (3) a complaint that does not separate into a different count each claim for relief, and (4) a complaint that asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without identifying which defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions. See id. at 1321–23. This list is not exhaustive. Although the four "groupings cannot be too finely drawn," id. at 1321, the "unifying characteristic of all shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another ... to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them[,]" id. at 1323 (alterations added; footnote call number omitted).
Curiously, Defendant argues that Count II falls into the third category of shotgun pleading that Weiland identified — namely, complaints that "commit[ ] the sin of not separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief." Weiland , 792 F.3d at 1322–23 (alteration added; footnote call number omitted); (see Reply 5). That is so, Defendant contends, because Count II relies on the same legal theories as Count I and thus lumps two different causes of action into a single claim, one that Defendant concedes "plead[s] a wholly different claim of direct liability." (Reply 5 (alteration added)).
This argument is incoherent. If Plaintiff were indeed attempting to plead multiple claims in the same count, as Defendant suggests, then it would make no sense to argue that Counts I and II are based on the same legal theory, as Defendant does. (See id. ). Too, there is no basis for Defendant's contention that Counts I and II are based on the same legal theory. Count I is a claim of vicarious liability predicated on the cabin steward's alleged negligence. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27–34). Count II asserts that Defendant's decision to permit five people to occupy Plaintiff's cabin after other incidents involving accidents on bunk beds was negligent and that Defendant had notice of the dangerous condition in the cabin. (See id. ¶¶ 35–42). These are different theories.
More to the point, nothing about Count II makes it a shotgun pleading. It does not incorporate the allegations of any other claim for relief. (See id. ). It does not allege only vague or immaterial facts. (See id. ). It is a single, direct claim of negligence clearly asserted against only one defendant. (See id. ). And most fundamentally, it affords Defendant fair notice of Plaintiff's allegations against it. Defendant's request to dismiss Count II is therefore denied.
Defendant argues, once again for the first time in its Reply, that Count II fails to plausibly allege a breach of duty. So, once again, the Court reiterates that parties may not raise new arguments in replies. See Keener , 2020 WL 4736205, at *6 n.4 ; see also S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(c)(1) (providing that a "reply memorandum shall be strictly limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition").
C. Direct Liability for Negligent Failure to Maintain and to Warn (Counts III and IV)
Defendant's final argument is that Counts III and IV should be dismissed because they do not plausibly allege Defendant's notice of a dangerous condition in Plaintiff's cabin. (See Mot. 10–17). In trying to make its case, Defendant devotes much time to arguing that Plaintiff's only allegations of actual or constructive notice are too conclusory to withstand dismissal. (See id. 16–17). The Court disagrees.
Plaintiff alleges several specific facts that push his "claims across the line from conceivable to plausible[.]" Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (alteration added). In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant approved the five-person room arrangement despite knowing the size of its cruise cabins, and thus knew that adding an additional bed to a cabin would require moving the bunk bed ladder to a place where it would not be secured. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19–20, 23–24, 44). It is more than reasonable to infer that Defendant knew (or should have known) how the bunk beds installed on its ship function. See Bailey v. Wheeler , 843 F.3d 473, 480 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining that courts "draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in a plaintiff's favor" when evaluating a motion to dismiss (alteration added; citation omitted)).
Plaintiff's allegations thus support the plausible theory that Defendant should have been aware that moving a bunk bed ladder from a secured to an unsecured position could pose a danger to a passenger climbing it. Plaintiff also specifically alleges that Defendant's crewmembers inspected the cabin at least 12 hours in advance of the cruise and, thus, Defendant knew (or should have known) of the ladder's placement well in advance of the accident. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44–45).
In all, Counts III and IV's allegations "contain sufficient factual matter ... to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (alteration added; citation and quotation marks omitted).
Defendant's citation of Moseley v. Carnival Corporation , 593 F. App'x 890 (11th Cir. 2014), does not persuade the Court otherwise. That case involved an alleged dangerous condition at a port of call rather than on the ship, and the plaintiff there, unlike Plaintiff here, "failed in her amended complaint to allege any facts that would support Carnival's actual or constructive notice of danger." Id. at 893. Throughout its Motion, Defendant cites a litany of other cases that collectively stand for the principle that a passenger who asserts direct negligence claims against a shipowner must plausibly allege the shipowner's notice of the dangerous condition that led to injury. (See Mot. 10–17); see also, e.g. , Malley v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. , 713 F. App'x 905, 907–08 (11th Cir. 2017) ; Harding v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. , 90 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1307–08 (S.D. Fla. 2015). None of these decisions undermines the conclusion that Counts III and IV sufficiently allege Defendant's actual or constructive notice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Carnival Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [ECF No. 25] is DENIED .
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 1st day of July, 2022.