Opinion
C.A. 8:23-cv-1705-TMC-JDA
05-25-2023
Kalvin D. Hunt, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Mental Health; Columbia Area Mental Health Center; Jeffrey Raynor, Psychiatrist; Ayana McClure, Patients Advocate, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kalvin D. Hunt (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is currently a civil detainee in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Mental Health (“SCDMH”). [Docs. 1 at 2; 2 at 1; 13 at 4.] Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Plaintiff is apparently involuntarily confined in SCDMH after being found not guilty of certain criminal charges by reason of insanity. See Hunt v. State of South Carolina, No. 3:15-cv-4778-TMC (Apr. 22, 2016), ECF No. 18 at n.1; see also Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining “the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records”). Plaintiff's criminal charges resulted from “a February 24, 2012 incident in which [Plaintiff], who was being treated . . . at the Beaufort Naval Hospital, walked out of the hospital, stole a fire truck, and proceeded to run over [a] pedestrian.” Delaney v. CasePro, Inc., No. 9:14-cv-4355-DCN, 2015 WL 1862871, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2015). “Although Plaintiff is not a prisoner, civil detainees should be treated as well as prisoners.” Gist v. Magill, No. 1:15-cv-3380-RBH-SVH, 2016 WL 4498340, at *3 n.4 (D.S.C. July 25, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 4492801 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2016); see also Treece v. McGill, No. 3:08-cv-03909-DCN, 2010 WL 3781695, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2010) (discussing standards applicable to constitutional claims made by civilly committed individuals). “As a civilly committed inmate, Plaintiff's custody status most closely resembles that of a pre-trial detainee.” Hamm v. Scaturo, No. 9:16-cv-2960-RMG-BM, 2017 WL 3835809, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 10, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 3741305 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2017).
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the pleadings filed in this matter and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the pleadings in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard court form. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated May 3, 2023, the Court notified Plaintiff that, upon screening in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Complaint was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in its Order. [Doc. 10.] The Court noted, however, that Plaintiff might be able to cure the deficiencies of his Complaint and granted Plaintiff 21 days to file an amended complaint. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff was notified that “an amended complaint replaces all prior complaints and should be complete in itself.” [Id.] Further, Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies identified [in the Court's Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal.[Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).] Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, which was entered on the docket on May 17, 2023. [Docs. 13; 13-1.]
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is comprised of a standard civil rights complaint form [Doc. 13] and a handwritten attachment [Doc. 13-1], which are both construed together as the Amended Complaint.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Amended Complaint, which are nearly identical to those made in the original Complaint. Plaintiff contends he brings this action to challenge his right to have a 30-day hearing to challenge his confinement. [Doc. 13 at 4.] According to Plaintiff, Defendant Raynor, his treating physician with SCDMH, failed to get him a 30-day hearing to challenge his confinement when he was admitted to the hospital. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff contends he has been waiting for a hearing since March 17, 2023. [Id.] As to the events giving rise to his claims, Plaintiff asserts the Defendants have failed to schedule a 30-day hearing since March 17, 2023; violated a court order of February 17, 2023; and failed to allow him to file a formal grievance. [Id.] Plaintiff contends he is being held involuntarily against his will without a proper channel to report discrepancies in his treatment. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to file a formal grievance against the hospital and his treating physician but Defendant McClure, his patient's rights advocate, failed to let him do so, claiming there was no way she could assist him. [Id. at 9; Doc. 13-1 at 1.] Plaintiff alleges that Columbia Area Mental Hospital “violated [him] for non-compliance to a court order for not taking a medication that was discontinued.” [Doc. 13-1 at 1.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges he is suffering from mental anguish, depression, and anxiety. [Doc. 13 at 6.] He further alleges that he has a negative credit report because the hospital has not allowed him to use his cell phone to pay his bills. [Id.]
For his relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court order the hospital and the doctor to pay money damages for damaging his reputation; order them to have his 30-day hearing; and “suspend the court order violation.” [Id.] Plaintiff also requests $1 million in damages for his pain and suffering and mental anguish. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Balt. City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, the Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal because two of the named Defendants are not persons subject to suit under § 1983 and because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the other two Defendants.
SCDMH and Columbia Area Mental Heath Center
SCDMH and the Columbia Area Mental Health Center (“CAMHC”) are not proper Defendants in this § 1983 action and are therefore entitled to dismissal. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law; therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978). Courts have noted that inanimate objects such as buildings and facilities do not act under color of state law. See Bell v. Scaturo, No. 9:08-cv-1746-GRA, 2009 WL 821958, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 2009) (noting the Columbia Care Center “is a building or a facility, and as such is also not subject to suit under § 1983”). Thus, a facility-such as CAMCH-used primarily to provide mental health services is not considered a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Muhammad v. GEO Care, No. 3:12-cv-1196-MGL-JRM, 2012 WL 4378173, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 24, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4364614 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2012). Additionally, “[i]t is well-settled that [SCDMH,] an agency of the state[,] is not a ‘person' within the meaning of § 1983.” Price v. Sanders, No. 3:07-cv-3924-CMC-PJG, 2008 WL 5076859, at *1 (D.S.C. Nov. 21, 2008), aff'd, 339 Fed.Appx. 339 (4th Cir. 2009). Therefore, SCDMH and CAMHC are entitled to summary dismissal.
CAMHC is “an outpatient facility of [SCDMH]” that provides services “dedicated to the recovery of people with serious mental illnesses.” CAMHC Webpage, https://scdmh.net/ columbia-area-mental-health-center/ (last visited May 22, 2023).
Jeffrey Raynor
Next, Defendant Raynor is also entitled to dismissal. In the Amended Complaint, Defendant Raynor is identified as Plaintiff's treating physician. [Doc. 13 at 3, 5.] According to Plaintiff, Defendant Raynor failed to provide him with a “30 day hearing upon [his] admittance in the hospital to challenge [his] confinement.” [Id. at 5.]
Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to state a claim against this Defendant. Beyond conclusorily asserting that Plaintiff was denied a hearing, the pleadings are void of plausible allegations regarding any right to such a hearing or Defendant Raynor's responsibility to ensure such a hearing. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Griffith v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00239-DCN, 2012 WL 2048200, at *1 (D.S.C. June 6, 2012) (discussing Rule 8's plausibility standard). Plaintiff's allegations are too lacking in factual detail to “nudge[ ] the[ ] claim[ ] across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Francis, 588 F.3d at 193 (explaining that a complaint is insufficient if it relies upon “naked assertions” and “unadorned conclusory allegations” devoid of “factual enhancement”); Syed v. S.C. Vocational Rehab. Dep't, No. 2:14-cv-02576-RMG, 2015 WL 1622094, at *5 (D.S.C. Apr. 10, 2015) (“[E]ven pro se plaintiffs must set forth factual allegations sufficient to nudge [ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible or their complaint must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support a claim for relief that is plausible against Defendant Raynor.
Ayana McClure
Finally, Defendant McClure is also entitled to dismissal. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McClure, his patient's rights advocate, “failed to allow [him] to file a formal grievance against the hospital and [his] treating physician.” [Docs. 13 at 1; 13-1 at 1.] The only other allegation made against Defendant McClure is as follows:
I attempted to file a formal grievance but my patient's rights advocate, Ayana McClure, failed to let me do so. Her claim was that there was no way she could assist me, but I know that's not accurate.[Doc. 13 at 9.] Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim because he has not identified the violation of any constitutional right by this Defendant.
Critically, “the Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or access to any such procedure voluntarily established by a state.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). “The law is well-settled that there is no constitutional right to a grievance procedure.” Owens v. Hough, No. 1:10-cv-948-TLW-SVH, 2011 WL 4054686, at *2 (D.S.C. July 13, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 4051470 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2011). “Even if the prison provides for a grievance procedure, violations of those procedures do not amount to a civil rights cause of action.” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that Defendant McClure participated in the violation of any recognized constitutional right and she is therefore entitled to dismissal on that basis.
Because each of the named Defendants is subject to dismissal for the reasons stated, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 without further leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
As Plaintiff has been afforded an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint, but failed to correct his pleading deficiencies, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed without further leave to amend.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).