Opinion
No. 1D19-3683
10-28-2020
Michael B. Wedner, Dennis P. Dore, Samantha D. Dunlap-Smart, Jacksonville; and Warren B. Kwavnick, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant. Howard C. Coker, Rebecca B. Creed, Joseph V. Camerlengo, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
Michael B. Wedner, Dennis P. Dore, Samantha D. Dunlap-Smart, Jacksonville; and Warren B. Kwavnick, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
Howard C. Coker, Rebecca B. Creed, Joseph V. Camerlengo, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
Per Curiam.
AFFIRMED . See § 768.74(5), Fla. Stat. (2019) (enumerating factors for courts to consider when determining whether an award is excessive or inadequate); Lassitter v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs , 349 So. 2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1977) ("Under the general rule a verdict should not be disturbed on the ground of excessiveness unless it is manifestly so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience, or unless it is so excessive as to be indicative of prejudice, passion or corruption on the part of the jury, ...." (quoting Odoms v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 339 So. 2d 196, 198 (Fla. 1976) )); see also Odom v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 254 So. 3d 268, 277 (Fla. 2018) ("Because assessing the amount of damages is within the province of the jury, this Court has made clear that when reviewing a motion for remittitur, a court ‘should never declare a verdict excessive merely because it is above the amount which the court itself considers the jury should have allowed.’ " (quoting Bould v. Touchette , 349 So. 2d 1181, 1184 (Fla. 1977) )).
Ray, C.J., and Bilbrey and Nordby, JJ., concur.