Opinion
01-03-2017
Jill HUMPHRIES, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Dandridge Law Office, New York (Sherilyn Dandridge of counsel), for appellant. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York (David Lawrence III of counsel), for respondents.
Dandridge Law Office, New York (Sherilyn Dandridge of counsel), for appellant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York (David Lawrence III of counsel), for respondents.
SAXE, J.P., MOSKOWITZ, GISCHE, KAHN, GESMER, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Rakower, J.), entered November 12, 2014, which granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The motion court correctly determined that the State Human Rights Law retaliation claim (Executive Law § 290 et seq. ) is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel (see Buechel v. Bain, 97 N.Y.2d 295, 303–304, 740 N.Y.S.2d 252, 766 N.E.2d 914 [2001], cert. denied 535 U.S. 1096, 122 S.Ct. 2293, 152 L.Ed.2d 1051 [2002] ). An arbitration award previously found that plaintiff was terminated for just cause due to her insubordination, among other things, and not in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination. That award collaterally estops plaintiff from establishing a causal connection between the termination of her employment and her complaints of discrimination, as is required to state a cause of action for retaliation (see Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 312–313, 786 N.Y.S.2d 382, 819 N.E.2d 998 [2004] ; Executive Law § 296[7] ). Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the course of the four-day arbitration hearing (see Buechel v. Bain, 97 N.Y.2d at 304, 740 N.Y.S.2d 252, 766 N.E.2d 914 ). Contrary to her contention, "prior arbitration awards may be given preclusive effect in a subsequent judicial action" (Bernard v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 87 A.D.3d 412, 415, 927 N.Y.S.2d 655 [1st Dept.2011] ; see also Okocha v. City of New York, 122 A.D.3d 550, 550–551, 998 N.Y.S.2d 21 [1st Dept.2014], lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 910, 2015 WL 3605164 [2015] ).
Since none of the remaining alleged adverse employment actions amount to a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of her employment (see Messinger v. Girl Scouts of U.S.A., 16 A.D.3d 314, 314–315, 792 N.Y.S.2d 56 [1st Dept.2005] ), plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for retaliation.