Opinion
HDSP180339
12-16-2015
Marjorie E. Huguley v. Kenneth W. Crooms
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON COMPLAINT FOR SUMMARY PROCESS
Nicola E. Rubinow, J.
This memorandum of decision addresses issues raised in the summary process complaint brought by the plaintiff Marjorie E. Huguley (Huguley) seeking possession of premises formerly occupied by the defendant Kenneth W. Crooms (Crooms), alleging that his original right or privilege to occupy such premises has terminated. The memorandum further addresses the special defenses filed by Crooms.
See § 47a-23(a)(3).
The matter was tried to the court on December 7, 2015. Each party was self-represented, testified, and was subject to cross examination. Huguley submitted several documents in evidence.
As the plaintiff, Huguley bears the burden of proving the allegations of her complaint by a fair preponderance of the evidence; Crooms bears like burden as to his special defenses. The court concludes that Huguley has proved each essential allegation of her cause of action and that Crooms has not met his burden of proving any aspect of his special defense. Accordingly, the court enters judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff Huguley.
The standard of proof, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is " properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394, 440 A.2d 952 (1981). " The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential allegations of the complaint." Gulycz v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, 615 A.2d 1087, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 923, 618 A.2d 527 (1992). Similarly, if the burden has been met on one a special defense, the defendant may be found to have overcome the weight of the plaintiff's proof.
I
FACTUAL FINIDINGS
The court has reviewed the pleadings and considered the evidence in its entirety using the applicable principles of law. The facts set forth throughout this decision have been proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
" The [fact-finding] function is vested in the trial court with her unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including her observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties . . ." Cavolick v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198 (2005). " It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony . . . It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). " [T]he trier is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible . . . It is the trier's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses . . . The trier of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness . . . The trier can, as well, decide what--all, none, or some--of a witness' testimony to accept or reject." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osborn, 41 Conn.App. 287, 291, 676 A.2d 399 (1996). The trial court's function as the fact finder " is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted) In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 809508 A.2d 769, 770 (1986).
Starting in 2010, Huguley and Crooms were involved in an intimate domestic partnership, residing together at various locations from time to time. On or about November 16, 2012, Huguley secured a mortgage loan in preparation for her purchase of the property known as 77 Blue Hills Avenue in Hartford, Connecticut (the premises), expressing her intention to use the property for her own investment purposes. (Exs. 1, 2; Tes. Huguley.) Soon thereafter, Huguley acquired title to and became the sole owner of the premises. Huguley then extended to Crooms the privilege or right of residing there with her as her romantic partner. Although no lease agreement, oral or written, ever existed between the parties, Crooms occasionally assisted in and/or performed some general home improvement services at the premises including; on occasion he worked with Huguley to perform plumbing repairs or modifications. Whether he had agreed to do so on Huguley's behalf or not, there is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that Crooms ever made payments related to the loan upon property, either in July 2014 or at any time. (Exs. 1, 2, 4; Tes. Huguley, Crooms.)
The loan terms expressly contemplated that, as the borrower, Huguley would use the proceeds " only for business purposes, namely, to purchase the mortgaged investment property, which will be renovated by the borrower and then resold or leased." Pursuant to the loan terms, Huguley would be the sole person subject to the consequences of any default on this loan. (Ex. 1.)
The court received insufficient evidence from which it could ascertain when the specific nature or quality of Crooms' services. Mindful that in this state, even when presented on cross-examination, " a question is not evidence ; it is the answer, not the question or the assumption made in the question, that is evidence . . ." the court thus lacks an adequate basis upon which it could reasonably assign a value to any work Crooms performed at the premises. (Emphasis added.) Civil Jury Instructions § 2.1-3 [Factfinder's] Duty to Decide on the Evidence.
Lacking in detail or specificity, the court does not credit the testimony Crooms proffered in an effort to establish that he made such payments. Similarly, the court does not credit Huguley's testimony proffered in an effort to establish that Crooms had ever assumed the obligation contractually assigned to her. (Ex. 1.)
While Crooms resided with Huguley at the premises, their relationship deteriorated. On or about June 13, 2014, Crooms engaged in acts of domestic violence against Huguley. On that date, Huguley expressly and unequivocally informed Crooms that he had to leave the property immediately and that he could not live there any more; through this conduct, Huguley effectively notified Crooms that she was terminating his privilege or right to occupy or reside at the premises she owned. Crooms discontinued his occupancy and residence at the premises on or about that date; he has not lived at or occupied the premises since June 13, 2014. (Ex. 4; Tes. Huguley.)
As a result of Crooms' domestic violence against her, Huguley received hospital care and in mid-July 2014, the state of Connecticut commenced criminal prosecution charges against Crooms. In the course of that prosecution, the criminal court (Geathers, J.) issued a Family Violence Order of Protection identifying Crooms as the defendant and Huguley as the protected person. This criminal protective order was issued more than a month after Huguley's clear declaration informing Crooms that he was no longer privileged to occupy or reside at her premises and that he had no right to do so; Crooms's awareness that his right or privilege had been terminated is evident from the fact that upon the criminal protective order, Crooms' residence is listed at 901 Tower Avenue in Hartford, not 77 Blue Hills Avenue. (Ex. 4; Tes. Huguley. See Ex. 3.) The criminal protective order identified Huguley as Crooms' " [i]ntimate cohabitant], prohibited Crooms from contacting Huguley " in any manner", and required Crooms to " [s]tay 100 yards away from the protected person", to " [s]tay away from the home of the protected person and wherever the protected person shall reside, " and to " stay 2500 feet away from the Protected Person's residence at all times. (Ex. 4.)
While crediting Crooms' testimony that the state subsequently decided to forgo further prosecution of the matter, the court received insufficient evidence from which it could determine whether the original charges were nolled or dismissed, or why the state took this action. (Ex. 4; Tes. Crooms.)
As he was released without bond, in addition to the " stay away" and " no contact" provisions, to ensure Crooms' physical separation from Huguley, of the protective order required him to " Comply with the conditions of Alert Notification/GPS program participation . . ." (Ex. 4. See Tes. Crooms.)
Accompanied by a police escort, Crooms came to the premises on one occasion during the summer of 2014 while the criminal protective order was in effect. Given a reasonable opportunity to remove all of his belongings at the time, through his election to leave some undesignated property at the premises he knew he no longer had a right or privilege to occupy, Crooms effectively surrendered or abandoned those items to Huguley. (Ex. 4; Tes. Huguley, Crooms.)
The court credits Crooms' claim to have left behind clothing and articles belonging to him and to his child, but received insufficient evidence from which it could attribute any value, financial or otherwise, to those items. Given the passage of approximately a year and a half since the incident of domestic violence and the state's decision to drop the related criminal prosecution, in the absence of any specific or identifying information concerning those items, the court declines to credit Crooms' claim that he left upon the premises tools that were essential to or used in his work as a building contractor. (Exs. 3, 4; Tes. Huguley, Crooms.)
Despite his absence from the premises, Crooms continued to assert a claim of possession. Accordingly, on August 7, 2015, Huguley caused a valid Notice to Quit to be duly served upon Crooms as a predicate to bringing a summary process action against him. The Notice to Quit clearly and unequivocally informed Crooms that while he once had the right or privilege to occupy and that right or privilege no longer exists, using words of similar import. On August 24, 2015, Huguley caused a Summary Process (Eviction) Writ, Summons and Complaint to be duly served upon Crooms, alleging that right or privilege of occupancy had terminated, but " the defendant still continues in possession and, as relief, claiming a judgment for immediate possession of the premises." (Complaint, 8/25/15.)
Crooms did not contest service of the Notice to Quit relevant to the present action. " There is a presumption of truth afforded to the statements in the marshal's return. Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 607 n.9, 674 A.2d 426 (1996)." Donnie Dickerson, Adminstrator v. Jayne F. Pincus, 154 Conn.App. 146, 153, 105 A.3d 338 (2014). Huguley admits that she had commenced a summary process case against Crooms prior to the summer of 2015, and that the older action had been withdrawn. Such conduct, on the part of Huguley, does not invalidate the present summary process proceedings. (Tes. Huguley.)
On August 31, 2015, Crooms appeared, answered the complaint and filed the following special defense: " Property was acquired for investment purpose. Both Plaintiff and I have equal rights. I invested my money in this property for that purpose. At the same time we both occupy this property until sale." (Special Defense, 8/31/15.) Through this pleading, Crooms has effectively asserted that he has a right or privilege to continue in possession of the premises and to occupy them in accordance with that right or privilege of continued possession. Orally, he has further asserted a right to possession of personalty he claims to have left upon the premises. (Tes. Crooms. See Special Defense, 8/31/15.)
For equitable purposes, the court finds that Crooms has not occupied or resided at the premises since June 13, 2014; that Huguley has had full use of the premises since that date; that the obligation to make payments on the loan used to purchase the premises belonged to Huguley alone; that Crooms never paid rent to Huguley when he lived at the premises; that Crooms never paid any money toward the purchase of the premises or toward reduction of the outstanding loan upon the premises, and never invested any money or services of articulable value toward the improving or repairing the premises; and that any property Crooms left upon the premises has no ascertainable financial or even sentimental value. (Tes. Huguley, Crooms.)
II
RESOLUTION OF THE SUMMARY PROCESS CLAIMS
Occupancy of premises " when one originally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises but such right or privilege has terminated" is a lawful basis upon which an owner of property may pursue summary process. § 47a-23(a)(3). To prevail on this ground as alleged against Crooms under the circumstances of this case, Huguley must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence: that she alone is the owner of the premises, with standing to bring the action; that she once had extended to Crooms the privilege or right of occupancy; that she took clear and unequivocal action to terminate his privilege or right of occupancy; that she caused a sufficient notice to quit to be served upon him; that the time for possession indicated in the notice to quit has passed; that she caused the summary process writ, summons, complaint and attachments to be served upon Crooms; that after the expiration of the time indicated in the notice to quit Crooms had no privilege or right to occupy or possess the premises; and that despite the expiration of the time indicated in the notice to quit, even if he has not been in actual possession of the premises due to operation of a criminal protective order, Crooms continues to be a lawful possessor of the premises or continues to have a privilege or rights to occupy the premises. Having considered facts, the law, and the applicable equities, the court finds that Huguley has met her burden of proving the essential allegations of the complaint while Crooms has not proved any of his special defense. As such, Huguley is entitled to a judgment of possession.
As the Appellate Court has recently reminded us: " [s]ummary process is authorized under § 47a-23 despite the lack of a lease or rental agreement 'where premises or any part thereof, is occupied by one who has no right or privilege to occupy said premises, or where one originally had the right or privilege to occupy said premises but such right or privilege has terminated and the owner or lessor . . . shall desire to obtain possession or occupancy of the same.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trinity United Methodist Church of Springfield, Massachusetts v. Levesque, 88 Conn.App. 661, 666, 870 A.2d 1116, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 907, 908, 876 A.2d 1200 (2005)." Success, Inc. v. Curcio, 160 Conn.App. 153, 160 n.9, 124 A.3d 563 (2015) (action dismissed where plaintiff has not shown standing necessary to pursue summary process).
See Success, Inc. v. Curcio, supra, 160 Conn.App. 159-160.
The court's conclusion is supported by any aspects of the facts proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence. As found in Part I, in November 2012, Huguley alone secured a loan with which she purchased and became the sole legal and actual owner of the premises known 77 Blue Hills Avenue in Hartford, CT. As such, Huguley, alone, has the right to extend to others the right or privilege to occupy the premises. On some date after she became the sole owner of the premises, Huguley extended to Crooms an invitation to use and occupy the premises; Crooms moved into the premises where he and Huguley lived as intimate cohabitants, using and occupying the premises as his residence and storing his personalty there. As further found in Part I, on or about June 13, 2014, Crooms engaged in domestic violence with Huguley. At or about the time of that incident, as the sole owner of the premises lawfully entitled to do so, Huguley clearly and unequivocally told Crooms that he could no longer reside at 77 Blue Hills Avenue in Hartford, CT, and that he had to end his use and occupancy of the premises. Sometime in July 2014, Crooms was named as a defendant in a criminal prosecution brought by the state of Connecticut based upon the June 13, 2014 domestic violence he had perpetrated on Huguley. On July 16, 2014, Crooms became subject to a criminal protective order that prohibited him from entering or coming within 2500 feet of the premises, an order that was fully consistent with Huguley's June 13, 2014 declaration terminating his privilege or right to occupy 77 Blue Hills Avenue in Hartford, CT. Thereafter, Crooms returned to the premises with a police escort and removed the possessions he choose to keep, surrendering or abandoning any and all of the personalty he left at the premises. Further consistent through Huguley's June 13, 2014 oral declaration to Crooms that she was terminating his previously existing privilege or right to occupy the premises, Huguley had Crooms served on August 7, 2015 with a legally sufficient Notice to Quit; Huguley thereby engaged in an act which clearly and unequivocally exercised her option, as the sole owner of the property, to terminate any still-existing privilege or right Crooms had to use, occupy reside at or have a possessory interest in the premises, and to notify him that any still-existing privilege or right would expire on August 13, 2014. Although that date has expired, and although Crooms had not used or occupied the premises after June 13, 2014 through July 16, 2014, when the criminal protective order was put in place, and although the state's decision to discontinue the domestic violence charges against Crooms supports the inference that any related criminal protective order was also discontinued, Crooms has not returned to the premises after the summer of 2014, yet he continues to claim a possessory interest in the premises and to property surrendered and abandoned thereupon that belongs solely to Huguley. If any privilege or right Crooms had to use or occupy the premises had not terminated as of June 13, 2014, when Huguley declared that he had to leave and could no longer reside there, that privilege or right expired after August 13, 2014, as established by the Notice to Quit served August 7, 2014. As Crooms has no extant interest whatsoever in the premises or any personalty left thereupon, based either on law or equity, Huguley has met her burden of proving the essential allegations of her complaint.
See, e.g., Cheshire Land Trust, LLC v. Casey, 156 Conn.App. 833 839, 115 A.3d 497 (2015), citing Cornfield Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Cummings, 148 Conn.App. 70, 76, 84 A.3d 929 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 929, 110 A.3d 433 (2015).
In contrast to Huguley, who has met her burden of proof, Crooms has not proved any of his special defenses by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The facts, as found, establish that Huguley secured a loan on her own and purchased the premises; the terms of the loan support the inference that any benefit from such renovations and subsequent resale or leasing would be for the benefit of Huguley, not Crooms. (Ex. 1.) There is no credible evidence to support a finding that Crooms was a financial or equitable partner in this endeavor, or even that he made any measurable contribution by way of services, to the transaction or planned use for the premises. As found in Part I, there is insufficient evidence upon which the court could attribute any value at all to any " sweat equity" Crooms ever provided by way of repairs or improvements to the premises; even if he did some work upon the property, it cannot reasonably be qualified or quantified, and cannot be considered as an investment. The evidence in its entirety thus fails to support Crooms' claim that the " Property was acquired for investment purpose" with the anticipation that it would benefit him in any way other than through his intimate cohabitation with Huguley. (Special Defense, 8/31/15.) Similarly, the court received no credible evidence from which it could reasonably conclude that Crooms ever provided funds to be used for purchasing the premises, to make payments due on the loan Huguley secured to purchase the premises, that he made loan payments himself, or even that he purchased any supplies that may have been used in the course of his involvement in making repairs or improvements to the premises. Thus, there is no evidence from which the court could reasonably find that Crooms invested any amount of " money in this property for [the] purpose" of accruing an equitable interest in the premises, or any financial profit therefrom. (Special Defense, 8/31/15.)
See footnote 4.
Compare Christ-Janer v. A.F. Conte & Co., 8 Conn.App. 83, 87, 511 A.2d 1017, 1020 (1986) (finding that both plaintiff and defendant each contributed time and services as " sweat equity" related to preparation of architect's plans). The court does not credit Crooms' claims that he performed work at the premises in July 2014, even while acknowledging that the criminal protective order was not issued against him until July 16, 2014, as the court finds Huguley's testimony regarding the domestic violence on June 13, 2014 and her concurrent declaration prohibiting him from access to the property to be more reliable and credible. (Ex. 4, Tes. Huguley, Crooms.)
Furthermore, despite Crooms' allegation that he and Huguley " both occupy this property until sale, " there is no evidence that the parties ever reached any agreement, oral or written, permitting such a finding. (Special Defense, 8/31/15.) As found throughout this decision, the premises belong solely to Huguley; she, as the owner and holder of the loan described in Exhibit 1, is solely responsible for any debt related to the premises and is thus the sole beneficiary of any profits from sale or lease of the premises. As Huguley had ordered Crooms off the property on June 13, 2014, expressly terminating his privilege to occupy or use the premises, even though the July 16, 2014 criminal protective order prohibiting his contact with the premises it did not mitigate his capacity to occupy or use the premises as Huguley had already extinguished any right or privilege he had to do so. The August 7, 2015 notice to quit period expired on August 13, 2015, clearly and unequivocally confirming that Crooms' opportunity to occupy or use the premises had been terminated. Thus, even though Crooms claims to have a continuing possessory interest in 77 Blue Hills Avenue in Hartford, CT, the evidence in its entirety is insufficient to allow reasonable identification of any equitable or legal basis to support a finding that he has any extant right or privilege to the premise; there is no evidence to support his claim that his rights to the premises are " equal" to Huguley's. (Exs. 1, 2; Tes. Crooms, Huguley.)
III
CONCLUSION
As found in Parts I and II, although Huguley vested Crooms with a privilege or right to occupy the premises after she secured a loan and purchased the premises on November 16, 2012, Huguley thereafter terminated Crooms's privilege or right on or about June 13, 2014, when she became a victim of his domestic violence. Moreover, as found in Parts I and II, Crooms was duly served with a valid notice to quit on August 7, 2015 informing him that he had to end any still-existing possession or occupancy of the premises on or before August 13, 2015. Huguley filed this summary process action as permitted by law and has proved, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, each of the essential allegations of her complaint against Crooms. Crooms has not shown the value of any personalty he may have left at the premises; he has not shown a title in himself or herself which accrued after the commencement of his November 2012 intimate cohabitation with Huguley, and he has not shown a title in himself existing at the time the notice to quit was served upon them. Crooms has not proved any of his special defenses, filed August 6, 2015, by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, having found the facts, applied the law, and considered and balanced the equities of the matter, the court finds all issues in favor of the plaintiff and enters judgment in favor of Marjorie E. Huguley for immediate possession of the premises known as 77 Blue Hills Avenue in Hartford, CT. The stay of execution provided by General Statutes § 47a-35 is FINAL.
See General Statutes § 47a-26d.