Huggins v. ABK Tracking, Inc.

Full title: Williams HUGGINS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ABK TRACKING, INC., et al.…

Court: United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Evansville Division

Date published: Jun 9, 2023

676 F. Supp. 3d 662 (S.D. Ind. 2023)

Opinion

No. 3:22-cv-00135-MPB-MJD

2023-06-09

Williams HUGGINS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ABK TRACKING, INC., et al., Defendants.

Jeremy Wayne Schnepper, Schnepper Law, Evansville, IN, Natasha Baker, Phil Telfeyan, Equal Justice Under Law, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs. Alex Maurice Beeman, Reminger Co. LPA, Evansville, IN, for Defendants ABK Tracking, Inc., ABK Alarms, Inc., ABK Remote Drug Testing, Inc. Aaron M. Ridlen, Caryn Nieman Szyper, J. Derek Atwood, Jill Gagnon Haddad, Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant David Kiely. Bernard Lobermann, IV, Matthew Stephen Koressel, Patrick A. Shoulders, Ziemer Stayman Weitzel & Shoulders, LLP, Evansville, IN, Craig R. Emig, David L. Jones, Jones Wallace LLC, Evansville, IN, for Defendant Indiana Vanderburgh County.

Matthew P. Brookman, Judge

Jeremy Wayne Schnepper, Schnepper Law, Evansville, IN, Natasha Baker, Phil Telfeyan, Equal Justice Under Law, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs. Alex Maurice Beeman, Reminger Co. LPA, Evansville, IN, for Defendants ABK Tracking, Inc., ABK Alarms, Inc., ABK Remote Drug Testing, Inc. Aaron M. Ridlen, Caryn Nieman Szyper, J. Derek Atwood, Jill Gagnon Haddad, Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant David Kiely. Bernard Lobermann, IV, Matthew Stephen Koressel, Patrick A. Shoulders, Ziemer Stayman Weitzel & Shoulders, LLP, Evansville, IN, Craig R. Emig, David L. Jones, Jones Wallace LLC, Evansville, IN, for Defendant Indiana Vanderburgh County.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS TO STRIKE AND ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Matthew P. Brookman, Judge

Plaintiffs William Huggins and Hobert Keith Miller bring this putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state laws, challenging Defendant Vanderburgh County who, through Defendant Vanderburgh County First Judicial Circuit Judge David Kiely, has, allegedly, established a "no-bid" arrangement with Defendants ABK Tracking, Inc.; ABK Alarms, Inc.; and ABK Remote Drug Testing, Inc.,¹ to provide electronic monitoring and drug/alcohol testing for both pretrial and sentenced defendants. Plaintiffs allege the arrangement amounts to a "pay-ABK-or-go-to-jail" extortion scheme for Vanderburgh County criminal defendants. Plaintiffs assert the arrangement has deprived them, and others similarly situated, of their constitutional rights by allowing ABK to "charge exorbitant fees for electronic monitoring and drug/alcohol testing" and incarcerate those who cannot pay. Plaintiffs assert several constitutional and state law claims, detailed herein. Vanderburgh County, ABK, and Judge Kiely have all separately moved to dismiss this matter, each bringing forth Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) arguments. (Docket No. 38; Docket No. 41; Docket No. 45). Each Defendant has also brought a motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs' Complaint. (Docket No. 39; Docket No. 43; Docket No. 44). Plaintiffs have also moved for a Preliminary Injunction. (Docket No. 53). An Evidentiary and Preliminary Injunction Hearing was held on January 19, 2023 before the Court.² (Docket No. 76). The Court holds that abstention is appropriate in this matter under both Rooker-Feldman and Younger v. Harris.

1 Collectively referred to as ABK.

2 The parties originally consented to then Magistrate Judge Matthew P. Brookman. (Docket No. 33). On April 4, 2023, the case was reassigned to District Judge Matthew P. Brookman (Docket No. 84) and the previous reference to the Magistrate Judge was withdrawn. (Docket No. 85).

I. Background ³

3 The following facts are taken from the allegations in the Class Action Complaint (Docket No. 2, "Compl."), which are accepted as true for purposes of the pending motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.

Vanderburgh County has two criminal courts: Superior and Circuit. (Compl. at ¶ 34). Superior Court is a county court. Ind. Code §§ 33-33-82-5, 7. Circuit Court is the First Judicial Circuit Court for the State of Indiana, encompassing Vanderburgh County. Ind. Code § 33-33-82-2. The judge of Circuit Court is an elected position. Ind. Code § 33-28-2-1. Judge Kiely is the judge of Circuit Court. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 36). Judge Kiely also oversees the probation department. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 37).

Judge Kiely, on behalf of Vanderburgh County, authorized an exclusive, no bid, unwritten contract with ABK to designate ABK as the sole vendor for electronic monitoring and drug and alcohol testing for both pretrial and sentenced criminal defendants, including probationers in Vanderburgh County. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 44).⁴ ABK Tracking, Inc., ABK Alarms, Inc., and ABK Remote Drug Testing are private, for-profit companies ran by president, Danny Koester. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 15-16). The exclusive control permits ABK to set and charge exorbitant fees from electronic monitoring and drug/alcohol testing. (Id. at ¶ 3). ABK not only has discretion over how much it charges, but often, also, over how often a person tests. (Id. at ¶ 63). ABK profits from these fees, but also sends a portion of its profits back to pay probation staff salaries and court expenses, known as an "administrative fee." (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 47). Vanderburgh County does not pay anything to ABK for this arrangement. (Id. at ¶ 45).

4 Elsewhere in the complaint, Plaintiffs contradict the allegation that ABK's contract is exclusive. (See Compl. ¶¶ 92-93 (alleging that Vanderburgh County's treatment courts and community corrections work-release programs use a different vendor for drug and alcohol testing and that the juvenile court uses a different vendor for electronic monitoring services)).

Judge Kiely has rejected at least one proposal from a different company, Total Court Services, that would have provided the same services, but at a lower cost. (Compl. ¶ 22). Total Court Services would have used collected fees to offset the costs for those who cannot afford the fees, rather than using fees to fund the salaries of probation department staff and court operations. (Id. ¶ 22).

Individuals arrested in Vanderburgh County, Indiana are typically booked at the county jail and may be released by the court upon posting bail or on their own recognizance without bail. (Id. at ¶ 38). If an arrestee is released subject to conditions of supervision, they could include the imposition of additional pretrial release conditions and ABK fees on top of bail, which are imposed without considering the ability to pay. (Id. at ¶ 41). Failure to comply with these requirements may result in revocation of release. (Id. at ¶ 42). Likewise, if an individual is convicted, certain sentencing options, including electronic home detention, are not offered to those that cannot afford it. (Compl. ¶ 14).

Plaintiff Huggins has been subject to ABK fees as part of both pretrial and post-trial supervision. (Id. at ¶ 99; Docket No. 2-3, Huggins Decl. at ¶¶ 2, 28). Huggins was on pretrial supervision from April 2021 to February 2022, when he had to pay ABK $30 per drug test, which were performed on a weekly basis. (Compl. at ¶ 100; Huggins Decl. at ¶ 3). Huggins was also charged $60/month in pretrial supervision fees. (Id.). When Huggins was sentenced to electronic home detention in February 2022, ABK charged Huggins a $300 set-up fee, an ongoing $112 weekly fee, and a $35 per drug test fee (one to two times per week). (Compl. at ¶ 101; Huggins Decl. at ¶¶ 4, 6). Huggins's average monthly ABK fees were $600. (Id.). Huggins is indigent and cannot afford ABK's fees. (Compl. at ¶ 102; Huggins Decl. at ¶¶ 21-24). When unable to pay, ABK will not allow him to test. The Vanderburgh County Prosecutor has filed Petitions to Revoke ("PTR"), including on March 29, 2022, and May 17, 2022. (Compl. at ¶ 102; Docket No. 2-9; Docket No. 2-13). Due to these PTRs, Huggins was temporarily removed from electronic home detention and switched to probation, under which he must undergo random drug testing once per week. (Compl. at ¶ 103; Huggins Decl. at ¶¶ 25-26).

Plaintiff Miller began pretrial supervision in June 2022. (Compl. at ¶ 106; Docket No. 2-7, Miller Decl. at ¶ 2). In pretrial supervision he was required to take in-person breathalyzer tests six days a week. (Compl. at ¶ 107; Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 5). He paid ABK $7 per day, in cash, for the breathalyzers, resulting in ABK fees of approximately $168 per month, plus another $40 per month for supervision fees. (Compl. at ¶ 108; Miller Decl. at ¶ 10). Between June and August 2022, Miller paid ABK close to $500 in fees. (Compl. at ¶ 109; Miller Decl. at ¶ 15). ABK would not allow Miller to test without first paying and Probation staff had advised Miller that not paying would result in a warrant being issued for his arrest. (Compl. at ¶¶ 72, 110; Miller Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 9). On April 13, 2023, on the State's motion, Miller's criminal charges were dismissed and his bond was released. State of Indiana v. Hobert Keith Miller, Cause No. 82D03-2206-F5-003480, Order dated April 13, 2023.⁵

5 The Court may take judicial notice of state court documents. Spiegel v. Kim, 952 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 2020).

ABK has discretion in charging fees. (Compl. ¶ 50). Supervisees are not informed of ABK fees until they meet with ABK or a probation officer. (Id. at ¶ 53). Court orders do not specify the fee amounts, nor do the judges discuss the fees. (Id.). ABK charges different (and lower) rates when the County, such as the Sheriff's Department pays the fee. (Id. at ¶ 60). The Sheriff also has a fund that can be used to subsidize, either partially or wholly, the cost of ABK electronic monitoring for supervisees who cannot afford it; but, the fund is not advertised, so it is difficult for supervisees to gain access and only judges from the Superior Court authorize its use. (Id. at ¶ 61). With the narrow exception of the Sheriff's fund, supervisees have no ability to challenge ABK's fees. (Id. at ¶ 62).

ABK will request a defendant sentenced to electronic home detention be removed if it determines the person cannot afford ABK's fees. (Id. at ¶ 68; See Docket No. 2-5, "Sample Petition to Revoke from Prosecutor Douglas Brown"). Moreover, Circuit Court judges—knowing ABK's stance—will refuse to sentence defendants to electronic home detention if they cannot afford it. (Compl., at ¶ 69). Circuit Court judges will not conduct a thorough ability to pay assessment, but rather simply ask defense counsel if the client can afford it. (Id.). Moreover, prosecutors in Circuit Court will not offer work release as a part of a plea agreement because work release is funded and run by the county, and therefore ABK does not benefit from it. (Id. at ¶ 71).

ABK will call the Evansville Police Department and have a supervisee arrested at ABK's Evansville office without any judicial review and, often, without any notice to the defendant. (Id. at ¶ 73).⁶ In 2021, ABK called the Evansville Police Department ("EPD") 172 times, resulting in the EPD taking 148 people to the county jail and at least 11 of those 148 were jailed for, at least in part, non-payment of ABK fees. (Id. at ¶ 73). Vanderburgh County courts have collaborated with ABK to create "hold forms" that ABK and police use to arrest people without first obtaining a warrant. (Id. at 74).

6 Neither Miller nor Huggins alleges he has been arrested in this manner.

Plaintiffs seek to enjoin ABK from charging pre- and post-trial fees and to enjoin all Defendants from incarcerating anyone⁷ for non-payment of fees. (Compl. at ¶ 6). Plaintiffs also request damages from Defendant ABK for the unconstitutional fees Plaintiffs and the putative class were, and continue to be, forced to pay. (Id.).

7 Neither named Plaintiff alleges that he has been incarcerated based solely on his ability to pay. They allege another individual, David Carney, was incarcerated after ABK Tracking asked that his sentence be revoked for his inability to pay (Compl. ¶ 72; Exhibit 8)

Huggins and Miller bring the action on behalf of "[a]ll persons who have been or will be charged fees by ABK as part of a criminal matter in Vanderburgh County, Indiana." (Compl. at ¶ 185). They propose two subclasses: the "pretrial subclass" consisting of "[a]ll persons who have been or will be charged fees by ABK as a pretrial bond condition of a criminal matter in Vanderburgh County, Indiana" (Id. at ¶ 186) and the "indigent subclass" consisting of "[a]ll indigent persons who have been or will be charged fees by ABK as part of a criminal matter in Vanderburgh County, Indiana" (Id. at ¶ 187).

Count I alleges "Violation of Procedural Due Process for Financial Conflict of Interest (on behalf of all class members against all Defendants)" (Compl. at 41). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have a financial interest in ABK's fees because ABK profits from its fees and a portion of ABK's fees pay for Vanderburgh County probation staff salaries and court operations, to which Judge Kiely, as the head of the probation department, has a pecuniary interest in. (Id. at ¶ 222). They allege that because all Defendants have a financial interest in ABK's fee scheme, Defendants violate due process as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at ¶ 223).

Count II alleges "Violation of Procedural Due Process Regarding Deprivation of Property Interest in Fee Amount (on behalf of the pretrial subclass against all Defendants)" (Compl. at 42). Plaintiffs allege that by charging pretrial defendants fees without any finding of guilt, Defendants deprive pretrial defendants of their property rights without due process as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at ¶ 225).

Count III alleges "Violation of Procedural Due Process for Arbitrary Bail (on behalf of the pretrial subclass against all Defendants)" (Compl. at 42). Plaintiffs assert that pretrial fees are imposed as quasi-bail, yet without the attendant due process protections, namely notice and opportunity to be heard. (Id. at ¶ 227). They allege the Defendants have authorized and implemented a pretrial fee scheme whereby pretrial defendants must pay ABK's fees without evaluating pretrial defendants' ability to afford the fees prior to charging the fees, incarcerating pretrial defendants when they cannot afford the fees, and subjecting pretrial defendants to the fees for indeterminate periods. (Id.).

Count IV alleges "Violation of Equal Protection for Wealth-Based Discrimination (on behalf of the indigent subclass against all Defendants)" (Compl. at 43). Plaintiffs allege that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits outcomes in the carceral system from turning on a person's ability to make monetary payment. (Id. at ¶ 229). However, Defendants treat similarly situated individuals, namely criminal defendants, differently based on whether they are indigent. (Id. at ¶ 230). Indigent defendants are subject to threats, arrest, revocation requests, incarceration, and fewer sentencing options because of their poverty, amounting to wealth-based discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. (Id. at ¶¶ 230-231).

Count V alleges "Violation of Due Process for Debtors' Prisons (on behalf of the indigent subclass against all Defendants)" (Compl. at 43). Plaintiffs allege that under Defendants' scheme, criminal defendants in Vanderburgh County can be incarcerated for inability to pay ABK's fees, which violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which prohibits outcomes in the carceral system from hinging on a person's ability to make monetary payment. (Id. at ¶¶ 233-234).

Count VI alleges "False Imprisonment (on behalf of the indigent subclass against Defendants ABK)" (Compl. at 43). Plaintiffs allege that ABK unlawfully orders the arrest of criminal defendants who cannot afford ABK's fees. (Id. at ¶ 236).

Finally, Count VII alleges "Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights (on behalf of all class members against all Defendants)" (Compl. at 44). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have conspired to deprive Plaintiffs and criminal defendants in Vanderburgh County of their constitutional rights by forcing them to pay money on penalty of incarceration. (Id. at ¶ 239).

Plaintiffs request declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. First, they seek a declaratory judgment that (1) Vanderburgh County's contract with ABK, as orchestrated by Judge Kiely, is unlawful; and (2) the Defendants' ongoing policy of denying electronic home detention as a sentencing option to indigent defendants is unlawful. (Compl. at ¶ 240(a)(b)). Second, Plaintiffs request a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from continuing the unlawful fee scheme described in their complaint. (Id. at ¶ 240(c)). Plaintiffs also seek a judgment ordering Defendants Vanderburgh County and Judge Kiely to train all law enforcement and court employees on the preliminary and permanent injunctions. (Id. at ¶ 240(d)). Finally, Plaintiffs request compensatory damages, including all fees paid to Defendant ABK, and an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. (Id. at ¶ 240(e)(f)).

Plaintiffs have moved for a preliminary injunction on Counts One through Five of the Complaint. (Docket No. 53). They request that the Court enjoin Defendant ABK from charging any and all fees to supervisees⁸ in Vanderburgh County. (Id.). Vanderburgh County, Judge Kiely, and ABK have each moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, respectively. (Docket No. 38; Docket No. 42; Docket No. 45). Finally, each Defendant moves to strike portions of Plaintiffs' Complaint. (Docket No. 39; Docket No. 43; Docket No. 44).

8 Supervisees include both those who are under ABK supervision for pretrial conditions as well as those under ABK supervision for sentence-related conditions. (Docket No. 53 at ECF p. 2).

II. Motions to Dismiss

A. Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits of the case. Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990).

Rule 12(b)(1) requires dismissal of claims over which the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations from the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Franzoni v. Hartmarx Corp., 300 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2002). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court "may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." Capitol Leasing Co. v. F.D.I.C., 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff faced with a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss bears the burden of proving that the jurisdictional requirements have been met. Kontos v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 826 F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 1987).

Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal only if a complaint lacks "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618-19 (7th Cir. 2007). A sufficient complaint need not give "detailed factual allegations," but it must provide more than "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955; Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 618-19. In evaluating a motion under 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Thompson v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002).

B. Analysis

Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional bar because Plaintiffs' suit purports to seek federal review of state court judgments. Defendants further argue that the Court must abstain under Younger v. Harris, because Plaintiffs ask this Court to interfere in ongoing state criminal proceedings. Judge Kiely also argues that Plaintiffs' suit is not justiciable because their alleged injuries—the payment of fees ordered in their state criminal cases—are neither traceable to nor redressable by Judge Kiely as he is not the judge presiding over either of their criminal cases. Vanderburgh County also argues that it is not a proper party to this lawsuit because, under Indiana law, trial court judges and probation officials are employees of the State of Indiana, not the counties in which they serve, therefore Judge Kiely could not act "on behalf of" Vanderburgh County.

The Court begins with a discussion of whether Judge Kiely is a Vanderburgh County policymaker and then proceeds to the Rooker-Feldman and Younger analyses. Because the Court finds abstention appropriate, it will not address Judge Kiely's standing arguments. Sinochem International v. Malaysia International Shipping, 549 U.S. 422, 431, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) (reiterating that a federal court may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining its jurisdiction, but "there is no mandatory sequencing of jurisdictional issues.") (internal citations omitted). A federal court does not have to decide whether the parties present an Article III case or controversy before abstaining. Id.

1. Judge Kiely County or State Official Designation

Judge Kiely and Vanderburgh County argue he is not a policymaker for the municipality, but instead a state official. Plaintiffs bring an official capacity claim for declaratory relief against Judge David Kiely under Rule 23(b)(2), seeking to bar the Judge from continuing to authorize and enforce the ABK fee scheme. (Compl. ¶ 216). Plaintiffs allege that Judge Kiely is a county policymaker and administrator, as both head of the probation department and the architect of the ABK policy. (Id. at ¶ 19). They further allege that the Vanderburgh County Commissioners have taken the position that Vanderburgh County judges have exclusive authority to set court policies. (Id.).

Where a § 1983 claim is brought against an individual in his official capacity, it is really a claim against the municipality. Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 494 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, Plaintiffs seek to impose liability upon Vanderburgh County for the actions taken by Judge Kiely in his official capacity as Vanderburgh County Circuit Court Judge. However, the standards for establishing municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set out by the Supreme Court in Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), dictate that a municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. In order for Plaintiffs to state a viable claim against Vanderburgh County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relying on the allegations as to conduct by Judge Kiely, Kiely must be a Vanderburgh County official with final policymaking authority. Billings v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 807, 817 (7th Cir. 2001).

Whether an official has final policymaking authority "is not a question of federal law and is not a question of fact in the usual sense." Woods v. City of Michigan City, Ind., 940 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1991). " 'Whether an official had final policymaking authority is a question of state law.' " Id. (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S. Ct. 915, 924, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988)). The Court must look at the official's particular function at issue with the understanding that "the actual function of a government official, in a particular area, will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official's functions under relevant state law." McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786, 117 S. Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997).

Indiana's judiciary is a branch of the state's constitutional system. Lake County Bd. of Comm'rs v. State, 181 N.E.3d 960, 963 (Ind. 2022) (citing Ind. Const. art. 3, § 1; id. art. 7, § 1). Trial courts are units of the judicial branch. Id. "Indiana law reveals that judges of Indiana's circuit, superior, and county courts are judicial officers of the State judicial system." Woods, 940 F.2d at 279. "They are not county officials." Pruitt v. Kimbrough, 536 F. Supp. 764, 766 (N.D. Ind. 1982), aff'd 705 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1983). County courts in Indiana are exclusively units of the judicial branch of the state's constitutional system. Id. See also Parsons v. Bourff, 739 F. Supp. 1266 (S.D. Ind. 1989); State ex rel. McClure v. Marion Superior Court, 239 Ind. 472, 158 N.E.2d 264 (1959). The Indiana Constitution requires the State to be divided into judicial circuits and the judges "shall be elected by the voters thereof." Ind. Const. art. 7, § 7. Article 6, Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution, on the other hand, designates county officers and contains no reference to judges. Likewise, Article 2 of Title 36 of the Indiana Code makes no reference to any county judicial office.

As in Woods, Indiana law controls because Plaintiffs have sued Judge Kiely in his official capacity as an Indiana circuit court judge who is an arm of the State. Woods itself involved a suit against a county on the ground that the state-court judge had issued an illegal bond schedule. Plaintiffs argue that Judge Kiely acted in contradiction to state and federal law. In Woods the parties did not dispute that the judge's bond schedule conflicted with state law. Woods, 940 F.2d at 278. Yet because "municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where, and only where, a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made . . . by the official . . . responsible for establishing final policy," 940 F.2d at 279 (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)), and "because the judge under Indiana law is not such an official vis a vis the city and county," the Seventh Circuit held that "[n]o municipal liability attach[ed]." Id. Despite Vanderburgh County raising Woods's application in its opening memorandum to its motion to dismiss (Docket No. 40), Plaintiffs do not discuss it, let alone try to distinguish it, in any of the briefing that followed.

Woods is also consistent with case law in other circuits. See, e.g., Daves v. Dallas County, Tex., 22 F.4th 522, 532-41 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (holding that county could not be held liable for judges' act in setting bond schedule because the judges were state officials, not county policymakers); Hamilton v. City of Hayti, Mo., 948 F.3d 921, 929 (8th Cir. 2020) (same); King v. City of Crestwood, Mo., 899 F.3d 643, 648-50 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that court is part of state judicial system and so judge was state official, not county policymaker).

Indiana circuit court judges continue to function as state officials when the judge oversees probation operations through the court authorized by state law. Ind. Code § 11-13-1-1. Indeed, the Indiana Supreme Court recently held that probation officers who "serve a vital role in the trial court" and have "an inseparable relationship with the judiciary—a state entity . . . are state employees." Lake County Board of Commissioners v. State, 181 N.E.3d 960, 963 (Ind. 2022); see also Ind. Code § 11-13-1-1(c) (probation officers "serve at the pleasure of the appointing court" and they "are directly responsible to and subject to the orders of the court.").

Plaintiffs' reliance on cases involving Illinois sheriffs does not impact this analysis. Both DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage Cnty., 209 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2000) and Ruehman v. Sheahan, 34 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 1994) apply Illinois law to the question of whether sheriffs are policymakers for the State or a local entity. In Ruehman, the Seventh Circuit held that in designing and implementing a computer system for tracking of active arrests warrants, the sheriff was not acting as an arm of the state. 34 F.3d at 528-29. The court recognized the Illinois Constitution, which provides that a sheriff is the chief law enforcement official of each county and, therefore, is not a state officer. Id. at 528 (citing Ill. Const. Art. VII § 4(c)). The Seventh Circuit has recognized an exception to that finding, when the sheriff does not serve the county alone, but also follows orders from state courts, as in Scott v. O'Grady, 975 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1992). But, in Ruehman, the Seventh Circuit found that there was no state-ordered authority that required him to use a computer system to track these arrest warrants and, thus, the sheriff was not following an order from the state courts in his design and implementation of the computer system. Id. at 529. Likewise, DeGenova recognized that the while the sheriff is a county officer under Illinois law, he may still act on some occasions on behalf of the State. 209 F.3d at 976. But, Illinois statutes "make it clear . . . that when the Sheriff manages the jail, he is a county officer." Id. This case law is not analogous to Judge Kiely and is not in accord with Indiana law regarding state court judges. Judge Kiely acted in his Official Capacity as an arm of the State of Indiana, not a county official.

2. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Vanderburgh County, Judge Kiely, and ABK each argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. They argue that Plaintiffs had or have a reasonable opportunity to raise the issues alleged here in state court. Defendants assert that the fees Plaintiffs complain of are imposed as part of the conditions of their pretrial release and/or probationary sentences in their state criminal proceedings, which were ordered under state laws governing criminal proceedings.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine imposes a "jurisdictional bar" that prohibits federal courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States from reviewing final state court judgments (outside of the habeas context). Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), Andrade v. City of Hammond, 9 F.4th 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2021); See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). The doctrine reflects the fact that "[l]ower federal courts are not vested with appellate authority over state courts." Sykes v. Cook County Circuit Court Prob. Div., 837 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2016).

The doctrine applies to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). It is a narrow doctrine. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464, 126 S. Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517). The doctrine is limited to federal claims that " 'directly' challenge a state court judgment or are 'inextricably intertwined with one.' " Andrade, 9 F.4th at 950 (quoting Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue, 940 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 2019)). "Inextricably intertwined" requires plaintiff's alleged injury to be "caused by the state court judgment." Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson, 62 F.4th 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742). If the plaintiff's alleged injury is "independent" of the judgment, then the doctrine does not bar federal court jurisdiction. Andrade, 9 F.4th at 950. Rooker-Feldman requires "plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise the [federal] issue in state court proceedings." Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2017). The Court addresses these requirements in turn.

a. Final State Court Judgment

Defendants do not address whether the state court judgments in this case were rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. On April 14, 2021, Huggins was charged with three felonies, including possession of a narcotic drug, unlawful possession of a syringe, and one misdemeanor after being arrested. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF pp. 1-2, 18-19). A magistrate judge set a cash bond in the amount of $500. (Id. at ECF p. 3). Huggins posted bail and agreed to "comply with all conditions as ordered by the Court until said cause is final." (Id.). As a condition of the bond, the magistrate judge ordered Huggins to enroll in Drug Abuse Probation Services (DAPS) with ABK. (Id.). On April 16, 2021, Huggins signed a formal bond condition for DAPS, agreeing, in pertinent part to:

Follow all orders or instructions, written or verbal, of your probation officer and other designated program office(s) to include, evaluation, counseling and treatment. Failure to appear for probation/court related appointments and/or monitoring is a violation of your probation and may result in a revocation[; and]


. . .

[Be] subject to a urinalysis (drug test) or breathalyzer at any time. You must provide a valid sample of your urine for testing upon request.

(Docket No. 41-1 at ECF p. 4; Docket No. 41-1 at ECF pp. 25-27).

On February 7, 2022, after Huggins pleaded guilty to all counts, and the presiding judge sentenced him to 600 days in the Indiana Department of Correction, with 300 days to be served on ABK electronic home detention and 300 days suspended to probation. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF p. 8; Docket No. 41-1 at ECF pp. 36-37). On the misdemeanor count, Huggins was sentenced to 60 days also to be served on ABK electronic home detention with all counts to be served concurrently. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF p. 8; Docket No. 41-1 at ECF pp. 36-37). Huggins started electronic home detention with ABK on March 8, 2022. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF p. 9).

On March 28, 2022, Huggins filed a "Motion for Modification of Sentence" requesting the sentencing court modify his sentence to limit the number and frequency of tests for controlled substances performed by ABK. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF p. 9; Docket No. 41-1 at ECF pp. 38-39). He indicated he is unable to pay for the testing frequency. (Id.) Thereafter, the State of Indiana filed petitions to revoke on March 29, 2022, April 28, 2022, and May 17, 2022. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF pp. 40-50). On May 20, 2022, the presiding judge removed Huggins from electronic home detention and placed him on DAPS. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF p. 11). At the time this action was filed Huggins's "Motion for Modification of Sentence" remained pending. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF p. 14).

On June 20, 2022, Plaintiff Miller was charged with felony domestic battery, felony domestic battery in the presence of a child, and misdemeanor criminal mischief. (Docket No. 41-2 at ECF p. 2; Docket No. 41-2 at ECF pp. 11-14). On June 21, 2022, the magistrate judge set bond in the amount of $5,000 surety or $500 cash, and in pertinent part, ordered release with a condition that Miller "comply with all conditions as ordered by the Court until said cause is final." (Id.). As a condition of the bond, the magistrate judge ordered Miller placed on Alcohol Abuse Probation Services (AAPS) with ABK. (Id.; Docket No. 41-2 at ECF p. 3).⁹ On June 27, 2022, Miller signed formal bond conditions for AAPS, agreeing, in pertinent part, to the same conditions as Huggins, referenced above. (Docket No. 41-2 at ECF pp. 16-18). At the time the present matter was filed, Miller was still subject to the bond conditions.

9 According to the probable cause affidavit, Miller was allegedly intoxicated when the incidents giving rise to the charges occurred. (Docket No. 41-2 at ECF p. 14).

Final judgment was entered in Huggins's criminal case on February 7, 2022, making the order setting bond conditions appealable. See Ind. Code § 35-38-4-1 ("(a) An appeal to the supreme court or the court of appeals may be taken by the defendant: (1) as a matter of right from any judgment in a criminal action . . . (b) Any decision of the court or intermediate order made during the proceedings may reviewed."); See also Ind. R. App. P. 7 (Review of Sentences); 9 (time to appeal a final judgment is within thirty (30) days after the entry of a Final Judgment).¹⁰ Thus, the order setting Huggins's conditions was final before this federal lawsuit was filed on August 30, 2022. Likewise, so was Huggins's February 7, 2022, sentence. (Id.).

10 Huggins did waive the right to appeal any sentence imposed by the Court, so long as the Court sentenced him within the terms of the Plea Agreement. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF p. 34).

Miller's criminal case was still pending when this federal lawsuit was filed, although the order setting his conditions on bond had been issued prior to the federal case's inception. That order was an interlocutory order, which could be appealed under Ind. R. App. 14(b) (Discretionary Interlocutory Orders). See also Steiner v. State, 763 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing and remanding to trial court with instructions to vacate the condition of bond imposing random drug screens).

In Harold v. Steel, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in dictum, said "[n]othing in the Supreme Court's [Rooker-Feldman] decisions suggests that state-court decisions too provisional to deserve review within the state's own system can be reviewed by federal district and appellate courts." 773 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 2014). Further, Judge Easterbrook, in recognizing a Circuit split, noted "[a] truly interlocutory decision should not be subject to review in any court; review is deferred until the decision is final." Id. (collecting cases exemplifying the split, but not resolving the issue). See also, Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742 (stating, in 2016, "[the Seventh Circuit] ha[s] held that interlocutory orders entered prior to the final disposition of state court lawsuits are not immune from the jurisdiction-stripping powers of Rooker-Feldman") (citing Harold, 773 F.3d at 887). Rooker-Feldman would, therefore, apply to the interlocutory and final orders at issue in this matter, alike.

b. Independent Injury

Next, the Court considers whether Plaintiffs have alleged an injury independent of the state court judgment. Plaintiffs' complaint identifies their injuries as unlawful deprivation of property and deprivation of liberty.

Plaintiffs argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar their claims, because they do not challenge their underlying criminal charges or convictions, nor the ability of Vanderburgh County courts to impose supervision or sentencing conditions. Instead, they challenge the fees associated with those conditions that ABK charges, which they argue are not court-imposed and thus are not a state court decision.

Plaintiffs alleged injuries are not independent of the state court judgments. The complaint traces Plaintiffs' alleged injuries directly to the aforementioned orders, even if Plaintiffs do not mention the orders specifically. Plaintiffs allege that they "must pay ABK fees as a condition of their supervision and thus as a condition of their freedom." (Compl., ¶ 97 (emphasis added)). Likewise, Huggins "is currently subject to ABK fees as a condition of his probation." (Compl., ¶ 7 (emphasis added)). And Miller was, at the time of this litigation's filing, "subject to ABK fees as a condition of his pretrial supervision." (Compl., ¶ 8 (emphasis added)). These "conditions" were created by way of one of the orders discussed above. The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs' argument that their injuries separate from the state court orders and failed to be remedied by the state court orders. The only source of Plaintiffs' obligation to pay ABK fees and to submit to ABK's testing is by way of these orders. Where, as here, the plaintiff's injury is "effectuated" by the state court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives lower federal courts of jurisdiction. Swartz, 940 F.3d at 391. For this Court to find that the Plaintiffs were wrongfully deprived of their property or their liberty, the federal court would have to find that these court orders were entered in error, either procedurally or substantively. "This Rooker-Feldman forbids." Hadzi-Tanovic, 62 F.4th at 401 (citing Swartz, 940 F.3d at 391). Because Plaintiffs' alleged injury was "effectuated" by the state court decisions, Rooker-Feldman blocks federal suit.

In Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, consumers sued a debt collection agency and agency's attorneys following agency's obtaining judgments against consumers in state small-claims court actions. 548 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2008). The consumers alleged that the agency's demand for attorney fees in state actions violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. The consumers appealed arguing that it was not the state court's award of attorney's fees that caused their injury, but instead the attorneys' preceding, fraudulent misrepresentations. 548 F.3d at 605. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's claims were not independent of the state court judgment, despite the fact that the allegedly unlawful actions occurred prior to that judgment, because it "could not determine that defendants' representations . . . related to attorney fees violated the law without determining that the state court erred by issuing judgments granting the attorney fees." Id.

In Sykes, the plaintiff went to her mother's probate proceedings to present a motion and brought her service dog. 837 F.3d at 736. Instead of letting plaintiff present her motion, the judge asked her a series of questions about the dog, struck her motion, and entered an order barring the dog from the courtroom. Sykes filed the federal court case and argued that she should be able to bring a lawsuit in federal court for denial of reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act because it is independent from the state judge's order. Id. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit concluded that, although the judge's conduct preceded the order, "[i]f the judge violated the ADA by engaging in impermissible questioning or wrongly banning [the dog] from her courtroom, those alleged violations were also the basis of her order." Id. at 743.

Most analogous, in Jakupovic v. Curran, the plaintiff was charged in Lake County, Illinois, with domestic battery and placed under pretrial electronic supervision. 850 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2017). However, the sheriff's department did not release plaintiff as ordered because the department required pre-trial detainees to have a Lake County residence in order to be monitored electronically. Id. at 901. The next day Plaintiff filed an emergency motion, arguing that the electronic monitoring condition of his bond could not be satisfied because he was not a resident of Lake County, and that, as a result, he would be subject to indefinite custody. Id. The trial court denied his motion, refused to reconsider the order, and concluded that having a Lake County residence for purposes of electronic monitoring was one of the conditions of his bond and his inability to meet that condition was insufficient grounds for reconsideration. Id. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to modify his bond conditions. The trial court scheduled a hearing, but just prior to the hearing, Plaintiff pleaded guilty. Id. He did not file any appeal in Illinois state court.

Instead, Jakupovic sued the Lake County Sheriff, the jail's pretrial unit manager, a Lake County probation officer, and a Lake County Assistant State's Attorney under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his six-day detainment violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and constituted false imprisonment under Illinois law. He argued that Rooker-Feldman did not bar his claims, because he did not challenge the state court's judgments that detained him for a lack of a Lake County residence. Instead, he stressed that he was challenging the policy or procedure. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's entry and remanded with instructions to dismiss Jakupovic's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 903. The Court of Appeals reasoned that where "the injury is executed through a court order, there is no conceivable way to redress the wrong without overturning the order of a state court" thus Rooker-Feldman applied. Id. In other words, "[a]lthough Jakupovic alleges that defendants-appellees detained him under their own residence 'policy,' we cannot find that policy unconstitutional without also concluding that the state court's judgments, ordering the same residence requirement and detainment, were unlawful." Id. at 904.

Like Jakupovic, Plaintiffs' challenge here to ABK fees stems directly from the state court orders authorizing the fees in their respective criminal cases. This Court cannot find that the ABK fees and costs are being improperly assessed without concluding that the state court's orders were improper. The only reason that Plaintiffs are obligated to ABK supervision and pay any associated costs is because they were ordered to by the state court. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF p. 3; Docket No. 41-2 at ECF p. 3; Docket No. 41-1 at ECF p. 8; Docket No. 41-1 at ECF pp. 36-37; Docket No. 41-1 at ECF p. 11). Thus, this Court could not find the challenged policies unlawful without also concluding that the state court's judgments, ordering the same, were unlawful. See Jakupovic, 850 F.3d at 904 (citing Kelley, 548 F.3d at 605).

c. Reasonable Opportunity to Raise in State Court

Although Plaintiffs' claims are not independent of the state court's decisions, the claims are only barred under Rooker-Feldman if plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to raise the issues in state court proceedings. See Taylor v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 374 F.3d 529, 534-35 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Kelley, 548 F.3d at 605-06. "The 'reasonable opportunity' inquiry focuses not on ripeness, but on difficulties caused by 'factor[s] independent of the actions of the opposing part[ies] that preclude[ ]' a plaintiff from bringing federal claims in state court, such as state court rules or procedures." Taylor, 374 F.3d at 534-35 (quoting Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 558 (7th Cir. 1999)).

Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that no process exists to challenge ABK's fees. See, e.g., (Compl. at ¶ 62) ("With the narrow exception of the sheriff's fund to subsidize electronic monitoring for Superior Court supervisees, supervisees have no ability to challenge ABK's fees."); ¶ 142 ("Second, no Defendant provides an ability to contest these fees. There is no opportunity at the time the fees are imposed or afterwards to waive or reduce the fees, with the narrow exception of the use of the sheriff's fund for electronic monitoring in Superior Court."). However, this Court is not required to accept allegations that are merely legal conclusions. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (a court "need not accept as true legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.").¹¹

11 "[I]n ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Capitol Leasing Co., 999 F.2d at 188. However, "[i]t is settled law that a federal court determining whether it has jurisdiction may look beyond the face of the plaintiff's complaint to resolve factual disputes." Rennie v. Garrett, 896 F.2d 1057, 1057-58 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Capitol Leasing Co., 999 F.2d at 191 ("[T]he question of jurisdiction is inappropriate for summary judgment, and discussing the interplay of Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 56 verges on non sequitur") (citation omitted).

Contrary to Plaintiffs' allegations, each Plaintiff had in fact reasonable opportunity to raise these issues in state court. At both Plaintiffs' initial hearings, under Indiana Code § 35-33-7-5, the state court is required to advise on the amount and conditions of bail. See Ind. Code § 35-33-7-5(4). The state court is also required to determine whether the charged person is indigent (Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6) considering the person's assets, income, and necessary expenses. See Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5.¹² The state court may also impose conditions upon the charged person. See Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.2. This includes the right to "[i]mpose reasonable restrictions on the activities, movements, associations, and residence of defendant during the period of release" and "any other reasonable restrictions designed to assure the defendant's presence in court or the physical safety of another person or the community." Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.2(a)(3); Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.2(a)(9).

12 The trial court may prorate fines, fees, and court costs based on the ability to pay. See Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5. The trial court is also explicitly authorized to review whether the charged person is indigent at any time during the criminal proceedings. See Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.

As a condition of bail, Huggins was placed on DAPS with ABK and Miller on AAPS also with ABK. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF p. 3; Docket No. 41-2 at ECF p. 3). Either could have filed a motion to modify the terms of their bail, and, if unsuccessful, seek an interlocutory appeal. See Steiner v. State, 763 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied (state court erred by imposing random drug testing as a condition of bail where no evidence indicated that the defendant would use drugs while admitted to bail); Ind. App. Rule 14(B).

Post-conviction, Huggins also has reasonable opportunity to challenge the fees he is being assessed. In rendering a sentence, a state court can suspend any part of a felony sentence to probation or other alternative sentencing (e.g., day reporting) or direct placement in a community corrections program (e.g., work release). See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2.2. A state court has authority to sentence persons to home detention. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2.5-5. The state court can also order drug and alcohol testing as part of a suspended sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3. Upon entry of a conviction, a convicted person can seek a motion to correct error or an appeal of the sentencing judgment, or both. See e.g., Carswell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (convicted child molester appealed conditions of probation, including his submission to alcohol and drug tests); Antcliff v. State, 688 N.E.2d 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (appealed placement of defendant in home detention). This includes impositions of fees and costs, as sentencing decisions include decisions as to whether or not to impose fees and costs. See Amick v. State, 126 N.E.3d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019); Briscoe v. State, 783 N.E.2d 790, 792-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (challenging imposition of fees where trial court failed to conduct an indigency hearing); Banks v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (challenging statutory authority to charge indigent defendant the public defender fee).

A convicted person can also file a request to modify sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17. Huggins has done so. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF pp. 38-39). Huggins has filed a "Motion for Modification of Sentence" wherein he requests the sentencing court modify his sentence to limit the number and frequency of tests for controlled substances performed by ABK and, thus, reduce the amount of fees he has to pay. (Id.). Huggins's state court judge asked him whether he could afford electronic home detention and Huggins felt compelled to answer "yes," because of his family's needs, despite not knowing how they would be able to afford the costs associated with electronic home detention. (Docket No. 2-3 at ECF p. 2, ¶ 4). This did not give the state court an opportunity to consider his purported inability to pay. See Martin v. State, 115 N.E.3d 1272, 1272 (Ind. 2019) (the sentencing court must consider alternative measures of punishment if a probationer is unable, despite sufficient or bona fide efforts, to acquire the resources to do so).

The parties disagree as to whether the ABK-related fees are authorized under Indiana law. Defendants argue that the fees are authorized under Indiana's well-developed statutory code setting forth bail and pretrial services fees, as well as costs, fines, and fees after a criminal defendant has been convicted in Indiana, and thereafter allocated by statute. (See, e.g., Docket No. 42 at ECF pp. 4, n. 7, 13, n. 14; Docket No. 46 at ECF pp. 2-8). Plaintiffs contend that ABK fees are imposed on top of and in addition to the other fees and are not statutorily mandated. (See, e.g., Docket No. 51 at ECF p. 4). The outcome of that argument has no impact on today's discussion. A failure to follow state regulation does not constitute a constitutional violation. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations, not violations of state statutes or regulations); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (7th Cir. 1988) (a violation of state law does not give rise to a Section 1983 claim unless it independently violates the Constitution or federal law). And, whether ABK fees are permissible under Indiana law does not impact the ability of Plaintiffs to challenge those fees in their state criminal actions. Carswell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding, in part, sentencing court did not have authority to require defendant to pay for any counseling expenses his victims might incur as result of his offenses as condition of defendant's probation, as such a future expense was not within the scope of Indiana restitution statutes).

Plaintiffs criticize ABK for making a "venue-like" argument that Plaintiffs could have brought their claims in state court. (Docket No. 50 at ECF pp. 10-11). They argue that they had no obligation to pursue their claims in state court because plaintiffs seeking a federal remedy under Section 1983 are not required to first exhaust their state court remedies. The argument misconstrues Defendants' establishing a prong of the Rooker-Feldman analysis, which considers Plaintiffs' reasonable opportunity to address the injuries at issue in their state criminal cases. In sum, Plaintiffs claim injuries caused by state court orders, but they do not allege injuries independent of those orders, and they have a reasonable opportunity to present their claims in state court. For these reasons, Rooker-Feldman bars this suit.

3. Younger Abstention

Vanderburgh County, Judge Kiely, and ABK also argue that Younger abstention requires this case be dismissed because it calls for intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. They argue that Plaintiffs seek federal review of state-court imposed pretrial services fees and probation fees in ongoing state criminal cases. These state criminal proceedings involve categorically important state interests and, furthermore, they argue, offer adequate opportunity to review the constitutional challenges that Plaintiffs raise here.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that there are ongoing criminal proceedings,¹³ but argue that Younger is inappropriate because this case does not challenge important state interests in criminal prosecutions, that neither criminal prosecutions nor bail hearings provide an adequate opportunity to raise Plaintiffs' claims, that Defendants' actions cause irreparable, great, and immediate injury, and that they have alleged bias.

13 Miller's criminal matter had not yet been dismissed at the time of Plaintiffs' briefing on this issue.

Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), federal courts are to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings. Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); Village of DePue, Ill. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 537 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2008). The Younger doctrine has come to mean that absent unusual circumstances, a federal court must refrain from entertaining injunctive relief which might interfere with the officers or judicial process of state courts and administrative agencies when important state interests are involved. See, e.g., New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 2518, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) ("NOPSI").

Younger abstention applies in three classes of cases: where federal jurisdiction would intrude into ongoing state criminal proceedings, or into certain civil enforcement proceedings (judicial or administrative) akin to criminal prosecutions, or into civil proceedings "that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts." Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013). Beyond these "exceptional" situations, Younger abstention is not appropriate even when there is a risk of litigating the same dispute in parallel and redundant state and federal proceedings. Id. at 78, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588.

Abstention principles focus on three paramount concerns: (1) the judicial or judicial in nature state proceedings must be on-going; (2) the proceedings must implicate important state interests; and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state court proceeding to raise the constitutional challenges. Trust & Inv. Advisers, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 1994). The decision whether to abstain "does not rest on a mechanical checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction." Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16, 103 S. Ct. 927, 937, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). The "challenge must stand or fall upon the answer to the question whether the [Indiana] court action is the type of proceeding to which Younger applies." NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 367, 109 S. Ct. at 2518.

a. Ongoing Judicial Proceedings

First, as Plaintiffs concede, Huggins's case is ongoing. On February 7, 2022, Huggins, after pleading guilty to three Level 6 felony offenses, was sentenced to 600 days in the Indiana Department of Correction, but permitted by the presiding judge to serve half of that sentence on electronic home detention through ABK Tracking, and the remaining 300 days on probation in lieu of prison. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF pp. 10, 36). To the extent that Huggins asks this Court to act, by way of injunctive relief, against ABK, which carries out certain conditions of Huggins's sentence pursuant to court order, for its continuing acts in carrying out those orders, Huggins is asking this Court to interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding. See Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 651 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding probationer's continuing conduct claims against probation officer were barred by Younger abstention doctrine); see also Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124, 95 S. Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975) ("The policy of equitable restraint expressed in Younger is founded on the premise that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.") (citation omitted); Sarlund v. Anderson, 205 F.3d 973, 975 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding Section 1983 claims may be barred by Younger abstention when a plaintiff seeks to derail an ongoing probation revocation proceeding). Plaintiffs argue this case is distinguishable from Tobey because they do not challenge their supervision conditions nor have they sued any individual ABK employee or probation officer, but simply "the fees associated with their conditions[.]" (Docket No. 49 at ECF p. 13). But, the fees cannot be separated from the very conditions that obligate their payment.

With respect to Miller, his underlying criminal proceeding has been dismissed. "But the Supreme Court long ago held that parties may not avoid Younger "by withholding defenses from the state proceeding and commencing the federal suit as soon as the state case ends." Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608, 95 S. Ct. 1200, 1210, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975)) ("[W]e believe that a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party in appellee's posture must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court, unless he can bring himself within one of the exceptions specified in Younger).

b. Important State Interests

Second, while state criminal proceedings typically involve important state interests, Plaintiffs argue that no important state interest is implicated because the Plaintiffs do not challenge their underlying criminal cases nor have they interfered with the ability to prosecute Plaintiffs. However, Younger is not read nor applied that narrowly. Younger prohibits federal courts from "taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings," including ongoing supervision of a probation and attempts to "derail" an ongoing probation revocation proceeding. Tobey, 890 F.3d at 651; Sarlund, 205 F.3d at 975. In O'Shea v. Littleton, the Supreme Court explained that Younger forbids federal courts from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings, even if the desired federal intrusion relates only to issues such as setting bond, sentencing, and fees associated with a state criminal proceeding. 414 U.S. 488, 500-01, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). The Court held that a group of plaintiffs had no standing to challenge various criminal practices, including the imposition of excessive bail, which were alleged to be racially discriminatory and discriminatory against indigents. Id. at 498, 94 S. Ct. at 677. The Court, in dicta, stated that even if some plaintiffs had standing, the principles of Younger mandated that no federal equitable relief could be granted in the absence of irreparable injury "both great and immediate." Id. at 499, 94 S. Ct. at 678 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 91 S. Ct. at 751). The Court points out that any person charged with a crime, who became dissatisfied with the officials' compliance with a federal injunction, would have recourse to federal court seeking compliance or even contempt. Enforcement of the injunction would mark "a major continuing intrusion . . . into the daily conduct of state criminal proceedings." Id. at 502, 94 S. Ct. 669. This extensive federal oversight would "indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger v. Harris . . . . and related cases sought to prevent." Id. at 500, 94 S. Ct. at 678.

Plaintiffs rely on Gerstein v. Pugh, for the proposition that Younger abstention is inappropriate. 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). In Gerstein, the Supreme Court upheld a federal court injunction requiring a judicial hearing in Florida courts on probable cause for pretrial detention. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125, 95 S. Ct. 854 -69. The Supreme Court indicated that the district court "correctly held" that Younger was inapplicable as "[t]he injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution." Id. at 108 n.9, 95 S. Ct. at 860 n. 9. But Gerstein is distinguishable from this case. In Wallace v. Kern, the Second Circuit discussed Younger and its progeny, including Gerstein, in detail to explain why Gerstein did not authorize a New York federal district court to require an evidentiary hearing on bail determinations within a certain period of time. 520 F.2d 400, 404-08 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit rejected "[t]he proposition that the principles underlying Younger are applicable only where the federal court is seeking to enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution" id. at 405, noting that the Supreme Court had extended Younger to civil cases in which the state has a "particular interest." Id.¹⁴

14 The Second Circuit further stated "[t]he assurance that a defendant who has been indicted from a crime be present to stand his state trial and be sentenced if convicted is patently of prime concern to the state." Id.

Gerstein is further distinguishable because, there, the Supreme Court explained that in Florida, "the federal plaintiffs there had no right to institute state habeas corpus proceedings . . . and that their only other state remedies were a preliminary hearing which could take place only after 30 days or an application at arraignment, which was often delayed a month or more after arrest." Id. As the Supreme Court later explained, "the teaching of Gerstein was that the federal plaintiff must have an opportunity to press his claim in the state courts." Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 432, 99 S. Ct. 2371, 2381, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336-37, 97 S. Ct. 1211, 1217-18, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977)). Therefore, Gerstein addressed detention without a probable cause finding and without any avenue for judicial review, whereas this case addresses pretrial and/or probation fees after a finding of, at least, probable cause and, in the case of Huggins, a conviction, and with multiple avenues of judicial review in the underlying criminal matter. All that Younger and its progeny mandate, however, is an opportunity to raise federal claims in the course of state proceedings. This case does not present the situation that arose in Gerstein, namely where preliminary detention could occur without any judicial finding of probable cause and without legal recourse.¹⁵

15 For the same reasons, Plaintiffs' claims are also distinguishable from those raised in Hoffman v. Jacobi, No. 4:14-cv-00012-SEB-TAB, 2014 WL 5323952 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 17, 2014) (holding that Younger was inapplicable where the federal plaintiff was challenging "the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing".) (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 107 n. 9, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54).

c. Opportunity to Raise Constitutional Issues in State Court

Third, Younger is appropriate because Plaintiffs have an adequate opportunity to challenge the fees imposed in their state criminal cases on constitutional grounds, as discussed in detail in section II.B.2.c, above. Plaintiffs' "failure to avail themselves of such opportunities does not mean that the state procedures were inadequate." Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337, 97 S. Ct. 1211, 1218, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977).

Plaintiffs claim that ABK's fees are unreviewable in state court because they allege the precise amount of the fees are not listed in the bail orders or probation orders. The argument is illusory. The ABK fees Plaintiffs challenge were authorized by a state court order, whether it be a bail condition requiring drug testing or a probation order mandating GPS monitoring. And Indiana's courts are open to and do address challenges to state court orders, including those relating to bail, fees, and a defendant's ability to pay. See, e.g., Burnett v. State, 74 N.E.3d 1221, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that "[a]ny disparate treatment based on a defendant's financial situation—whether it be by conferring a benefit, modifying a sentence, or something else—triggers the requirement to have an indigency hearing at the time the fees are imposed to determine the defendant's ability to pay"); Coleman v. State, 61 N.E.3d 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that probation department could not impose fees on defendant and trial court was required to hold an indigency hearing); Johnson v. State, 27 N.E.3d 793, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that an indigency hearing should take place no later than when a defendant completes her sentence); Everroad v. State, 730 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing trial court's imposition of fines and costs when the trial court did not hold an indigency hearing); Steiner, 763 N.E.2d at 1024, trans. denied (state court erred by imposing random drug testing as a condition of bail where no evidence indicated that the defendant would use drugs while admitted to bail).

In Coleman, the Indiana Appellate Court considered an issue where the trial court's sentencing order did not list any court costs or fees, and the probation order's monetary obligation section included ordered amount sections that were blacked out with the exception of "fine," "safe school fee," and "sexual assault victim fee," which were all blank. 61 N.E.3d at 393-94. The probation department subsequently imposed an aggregate amount of $640 in fees on the state court defendant. The Indiana Appellate Court found that, "based on the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court imposed these probation fees." Id. at 394. Therefore, it vacated the fees and remanded for further proceedings.

Likewise, in Burnett, the trial court, at sentencing, stated that Burnett had "various probation fees that are required." 74 N.E.3d at 1227. The trial court's sentencing order and order of probation stated that the state court defendant had to follow "all standard conditions and fees of probation" and that defendant's probation would become non-reporting upon "payment of all fees." Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals held that "[b]because the trial court did not impose any probation fees or costs on [the defendant] it was erroneous to accept the imposition of these fees without a petition from the probation department and a showing that [the defendant's] financial situation has changed since the sentencing hearing." Id. Accordingly, the Indiana Court of Appeals vacated the fees and remanded for further proceedings and also held that the trial court should have conducted an indigency hearing regarding probation fees. Id.

Plaintiffs' suggestion that they have no adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issues presented in this case in the defense of their criminal proceedings because the ABK fees are not part of court orders is belied by Burnett, Coleman, Everroad, Johnson, and Steiner, especially the former two. The Seventh Circuit has likewise recognized that state criminal defendants have opportunities to challenge issues beyond guilt or innocence in state court, noting there are other available methods for challenging conditions of bond like moving to modify or reconsider allegedly inappropriate or illegal conditions. Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 904 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 651 (7th Cir. 2018) (applying Younger abstention when a plaintiff had a "problem with how his probation officer is treating him," because "he may easily lodge his objections in the state court overseeing his probation.").

That Plaintiffs have an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issues presented in this case in their criminal proceedings is further supported by the record. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Koester testified that ABK has "honored every" probationary request for a "reduced pricing" on drug testing and GPS. (Docket No. 80 at ECF p. 14, 14:6-21).

Indiana courts are neither unable nor unwilling to review the fees and costs associated with conditions of bail or probation, thus providing Plaintiffs the chance to raise their claims without the need to come to federal court. The availability of state court remedies counsels that this Court may not intervene under equity jurisprudence to decide these disputes.

d. Younger exceptions

Based on the above findings, abstention under Younger is appropriate unless Plaintiffs demonstrate exceptional circumstances that would require federal intervention. Plaintiffs argue that such circumstances exist because of the irreparable harm Defendants cause by assessing ABK fees so exorbitant that they interfere with the supervisees' livelihoods and by incarcerating supervisees for not paying ABK fees.¹⁶ Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2002)). Federal intervention in the state proceeding may be appropriate when, for example, "(1) the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, (2) there is an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate equitable relief, or (3) the challenged provision is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions". Jacobson v. Village of Northbrook Mun. Corp., 824 F.2d 567, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

16 Irreparable harm is "harm that cannot be repaired and for which money compensation is inadequate." Orr v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 502 (7th Cir. 2020).

Plaintiffs claim that the second exception is present here, in that Defendants are biased because of a direct (ABK), and an indirect (Judge Kiely and Vanderburgh County) pecuniary interest in collecting ABK's fees. ABK directly profits and a portion of the ABK fees are used to pay for probation staff salaries and court expenses. Plaintiffs argue that the financial conflict of interest central to Defendants' ABK fee scheme prevents county judges from fairly hearing Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to ABK's fees. Plaintiffs contend that a "fundamental assumption underlying the Younger abstention doctrine is the presence of a competent state forum. When the state tribunal is deemed to be biased or to have otherwise prejudged the controversy," as Plaintiffs allege here, "abstention in deference to the state proceeding under Younger is inappropriate." Hogsett, 43 F.3d at 295.

In Tumey v. Ohio, the Supreme Court reversed convictions for prohibition-law violations rendered by the mayor. 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927). In addition to his regular salary, the mayor personally received a portion of the fees and costs he levied against alleged violators. Id. at 531-32, 47 S. Ct. 437. In addition to this personal pecuniary interest, the Tumey Court based its decision on the mayor's "official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village." Id. at 535, 47 S. Ct. 437. See also Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 97 S. Ct. 546, 50 Led.2d 444 (1977) (judge's issuance of search warrants, pursuant to a state statute whereby the judge received some compensation based upon the number of warrants issued, held to violate due process because of the judge's pecuniary interest).

Dugan v. Ohio also involved prohibition law violations and fines imposed in a mayor's court. 277 U.S. 61, 48 S. Ct. 439, 72 L.Ed. 784 (1928). However, this time the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. Id. at 65, 48 S. Ct. 439. Unlike Tumey, the mayor in Dugan received a salary not dependent on whether he convicted in any given case. Id. The mayor had no executive duties and "[h]is relation . . . to the fund contributed to by his fines as a judge, or to the executive or financial policy of the city, [was] remote." Id.

In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of an Ohio procedure authorizing the mayor of a small town to adjudicate traffic offenses, the fines for which accounted for a significant portion of the municipality's budget. 409 U.S. 57, 57-58, 93 S. Ct. 80, 81-82, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972). While the mayor did not have a personal stake in the proceedings, the Court upheld the challenge, explaining that the mayor's executive responsibility for the village's finances could have affected how he decided cases before him. Id. at 60, 93 S. Ct. at 83 ("[T]he test is whether the [ ] situation is one which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused . . .") (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532, 47 S. Ct. at 444). The Court, in coming to this holding, distinguished it from Dugan noting that the mayor in Dugan had only limited executive authority and fiscal responsibility and the Court explained that, in Dugan, the mayor's relationship to the finances and financial policies of the city was too remote to warrant a presumption of bias. Ward, 409 U.S. at 60-61, 93 S. Ct. at 83-84.

Plaintiffs admit that "ABK's fees do not pay for judge's salaries. (Compl. at ¶ 126). And nowhere do Plaintiffs allege that Judge Kiely is tasked with the double-duty of serving as a county executive official overseeing the county budget and serving as a circuit court like the circumstances in Tumey and Ward. As the Indiana Supreme Court explained in Lake County Board of Commissioners, 181 N.E.3d at 961, the General Assembly recognized a "dual system of responsibility," granting the judiciary primary authority over probation officers' employment, but "counties are responsible for paying probation officers' salaries and certain expenses." Though probation officers "serve at the pleasure of and are responsible to trial courts," id. at 964, the Judicial Conference of Indiana—a statewide judicial entity—is responsible for setting standards for the hiring, training, and supervision of probation officers, including setting their minimum compensation. Id. at 963 (citing Ind. Code §§ 11-13-1-3, -5, -8, -9). From there, counties "must comply with the minimum compensation requirements" adopted by the Judicial Conference and must consult with "at least one (1) judge of a court or division of a court authorized to impose probation" before setting the officers' compensation. Ind. Code § 36-2-16.5-3. And with respect to the supplemental adult probation fund, the money "may be used only to supplement adult probation services or pretrial services and to supplement salaries for probation officers or employees of a pretrial services agency"—it cannot be used "to replace other probation services or pretrial services funding." Ind. Code §§ 35-33-8-3.3(h), 35-38-2-1(h). As a further limit on the use of the fund, the salary of a probation officer may only be supplemented according to the pay schedule adopted by the county fiscal body. Ind. Code §§ 35-33-8-3.3(f)-(g), 35-38-2-1(f)-(g). This multi-layered state-law system is not structured in a manner that indicates the state tribunal is biased. See Hogsett, 43 F.3d at 295.

Plaintiffs' argument that all Defendants have a bias that incentivizes ABK supervision for longer and under more conditions to generate more money overlooks the obvious conclusion that none of the Defendants are presiding over the Plaintiffs Huggins and Miller's criminal proceedings. (Docket No. 41-1 at ECF pp. 2, 3, 8, 36-37; 41-2 at ECF pp. 11-12). Certainly, Judge Kiely is not. Moreover, the presiding state court tribunal is the body that confers upon ABK discretion regarding any particular criminal defendant. The state judiciary's ultimate capacity for fair and impartial decision making checks any alleged ABK pecuniary interest. Hogsett, 43 F.3d at 297.

In sum, the "gist of Younger's test for availability, however, lies in the fact that errors can be rectified according to state law[.]" Daves v. Dallas County, Texas, 64 F.4th 616, 633 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (overruling O'Donnell v. Harris Cnty., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018) and noting that recent years has seen a surge of interest in criminal procedure reform and providing a detailed discussion as to Younger's applicability to such cases). Younger bars this Court from considering Plaintiffs' injunctive request, which would require a directive to Vanderburgh courts regarding their supervisory procedures and, further, open this Court to state criminal defendants who claim any federal court order was not complied with by the Vanderburgh county courts or judges.

4. Count Six: False Imprisonment

Counts One through Five and the Count Seven claims are directly tied to the state trial court judge's assessment of pretrial or probation conditions. (Compl., (Count One: "Defendants have a financial interest in ABK's fees," ¶ 222)); (Count Two: "By charging pretrial defendants fees . . ." ¶ 225); (Count Three: Pretrial fees are imposed as quasi-bail, yet without the attendant due process protections[,] ¶ 227); (Count Four: "Indigent defendants are subject to threats, arrest, revocaton [sic] requests, incarceration, and fewer sentencing options because of their poverty." ¶ 230); (Count Five: "Under Defendants' fee scheme . . ." ¶ 234); and (Count Seven: "Defendants have conspired . . . by forcing [Plaintiffs] to pay money on penalty of incarceration." ¶ 239). These claims all fall within the above abstention discussions. Arguably, however, Count Six, False Imprisonment, which is the only count brought solely against ABK, alleges that "ABK unlawfully orders the arrest of criminal defendants who cannot afford ABK's fees. (Compl. ¶ 236). These allegations appear to be separate from the court-ordered ABK fees and, moreover, Plaintiffs clarify that this is a state law claim (Docket No. 50 at ECF p. 35), although they do not specifically invoke federal pendent or supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in their complaint. Having found abstention appropriate as to the federal claims, even if the allegations giving rise to the false imprisonment claim fall outside of the Rooker-Feldman and Younger analyses, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) ("The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .") Hagan v. Quinn, 867 F.3d 816, 830 (7th Cir. 2017) ("The usual practice in this circuit is for district courts to 'dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.' ") (quoting Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999)).

III. Conclusion

In sum, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docket No. 38; Docket No. 41; Docket No. 45) to the extent the Court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit. Because the Court will dismiss this matter, it also DENIES Defendants' Motions to Strike (Docket No. 39; Docket No. 43; Docket No. 44); Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 53); ABK's Motion for Leave to Submit Supplemental Evidence (Docket No. 86); and the parties' Joint Motion to Amend Case Management Plan (Docket No. 88) as moot. Final judgment in accordance with this entry shall now follow.

SO ORDERED.