Opinion
3:21-cv-00343-AC
04-18-2022
JAMES DALE HUFFMAN, Plaintiff, v. AMY LINDGREN; SAMUEL ERSKINE; and CITY OF ST. HELENS, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
JOHN V. ACOSTA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Introduction
Proceeding pro se, plaintiff James Dale Huffman (“Huffman”) filed this lawsuit in Columbia County Circuit Court against Amy Lindgren (“Lindgren”), Samuel Erskine (“Erskine”), and the City of St. Helens, Oregon (“City of St. Helens”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants timely removed this case to federal court on March 5, 2021. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1).
Currently before the court are Huffman's motion to remand (Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 8) and Defendants' motion to dismiss (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 3). For the following reasons, this court recommends Huffman's motion to remand be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Huffman's claims against Lindgren's employment should be remanded to state court. The court further recommends Defendants' motion to dismiss be GRANTED. Huffman's remaining claims should be dismissed without leave to amend.
Background
Huffman's Complaint does not contain labels for claims against Defendants nor does it present coherent, easily understood allegations. To the extent these allegations are understood by the court, they appear to arise from two distinct circumstances.
First, Huffman alleges claims against Defendants for “violation of [his] state a[nd] federal constitutional rights” during judicial hearings held on January 3, 2019 and January 10, 2019. (Compl. ¶ 6). According to the Complaint, on January 3, 2019, Huffman appeared before the City of St. Helens' Municipal Court as an attorney representing his client. (Compl. ¶ 5). There, he “orally informed Defendant Lindgren”-the presiding judge-that she was being disqualified and “was not allowed to hear any matter or proceeding” regarding his client. (Compl. ¶ 5). Huffman alleges Lindgren sought to contact a pro tempore (“pro tern”) judge to replace herself on the bench, but when she called, the pro tern judge was unavailable. (Compl. ¶ 5).
Huffman asserts that, when no pro tern judge was available, Lindgren “illegal[y], and without any authority, set the matter over for one week” despite his objections. (Compl. ¶ 5). During the reset hearing on January 10, 2019, Huffman alleges Lindgren “ordered the Plaintiff handcuffed by the St. Helens Police, who she had secretly summoned, and usurped a public office she did not hold, by pretending to conduct a summary finding of contempt of court, and ordered plaintiff imprisoned in the county jail for six hours” in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. (Compl. ¶ 6). Due to the finding of contempt and brief incarceration, Huffman purports to bring claims for “malicious prosecution, assault and battery, false imprisonment . . . interference with contract . . . and interference with prospective advantage.” (Compl. ¶ 6). He asserts that he provided written notice as required by the Oregon Tort Claims Act. (Compl. ¶ 7).
Though the complaint does not specify whether Defendant Erskine's actions occurred on January 3 or January 10, Huffman alleges that Erskine-the prosecutor opposing Huffman before Lindgren-“made a false and malicious statement that the City of St. Helens had no provision for pro tem judges.” (Compl. ¶ 8). Huffman contends that this statement was false because the City of St. Helens' charter contains a provision for a pro tem office. (Compl. ¶ 8). He also alleges the City of St. Helens “was negligent for failing to properly vet the background of the defendant Lindgren, and for not providing a pro tem judge to preside over Lindgren's disqualification.” (Compl. ¶ 8). Huffman also seeks vicarious liability against the City for all claims brought against Lindgren and Erskine. (Compl. ¶ 8); (Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF. No. 10).
As damages, Huffman requests judgment for a sum not less than $100,000 on claims asserted “in his personal behalf, and on behalf of the taxpayers for the City of St. Helens.” (Compl. ¶ 8).
Huffman's second set of allegations appear directed at the legality and constitutionality of Lindgren's position as a municipal judge for the City of St. Helens. Huffman does not clearly state any claims with respect to these allegations, but his legal theory seems to rest on legal usurpation under ORS §30.510. Or. Rev. Stat, § 30.510. Huffman asserts he brings the action both “as a private individual, and as a taxpayer and private attorney general on behalf of the taxpayer of the City of St. Helens.” (Compl. ¶ 1). Huffman alleges the City “maintains a pretext of a municipal court” that is in reality “an administrative office . . . within the executive department.” (Compl. ¶ 2). He further asserts that Lindgren illegally and unconstitutionally holds positions in multiple branches of government, including as a “public prosecutor for the City of Happy Valley Oregon” and a “purported Municipal Court Judge in other municipalities in the State of Oregon.” (Compl. ¶ 3); Or, Const, art. II § 10. Huffman contends Lindgren was “not legally authorized to receive [a salary from the City of St. Helen's for her judicial position] due to her unconstitutional holding of multiple disqualifying offices.” (Compl. ¶ 4). As relief, he requests Lindgren “be required to disgorge” her “illegal” salary to the taxpayers of St. Helens. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4).
Huffman originally filed this lawsuit in Columbia County Circuit Court. (Notice of Removal, Ex. 1). Defendants removed the case to federal district court on March 5, 2021, citing federal question jurisdiction. (Id.). Defendants move to dismiss Huffman's claims, and Huffman moves to remand the case. See generally (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Complaint); (Pl.'s Mot. for Order to Remand).
Preliminary Procedural Matter
As a preliminary matter, Huffman was suspended from the practice of law on February 1, 2022, for 181 days by the Oregon State Bar. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2), the court hereby takes judicial notice of his suspension from the Oregon State Bar website, as confirmed by Oregon State Bar personnel. Fed, R, Evid. 201; OSB Membership Directory, OREGON STATE BAR (2022), https://www.osbar.org/members/membersearch display .asp?b=751857&s=l.
Under Local Rule 83-6, Huffman had an affirmative duty to notify this court about his suspension. U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules D. Or., Civ, LR 83-6 (July 1, 2021). He did not do so. Instead, the court independently confirmed his suspension with the Oregon State Bar.
Due to his suspension, Huffman may not represent others before this court because he is no longer “in good standing with the Oregon State Bar.” U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules D. Or., Civ. LR 83-2 (July 1, 2021). Consequently, this court may not make any ruling regarding Huffman's “taxpayer derivative suit” in which he purports to represent the “taxpayers of the City of St. Helens.” (Compl. ¶ 1); (Pl.'s Mot. for Order to Remand, at 3). Without ruling on Huffman's claims where he represents taxpayers, and to the extent he proceeds with all claims “in his individual capacity, ” the court makes the following recommendations. (Compl. ¶ 1).
In abstaining from ruling on Huffman's claims where he represents taxpayers, this court does not make any statement or recommendation about the meritoriousness of those claims.
Legal Standard
I. Motion for Remand
A civil lawsuit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the claim is one “arising under” federal law, thus raising a “federal question.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(b) (West). Whether a claim “arises under” federal law for removal purposes is determined by the “well-pleaded” complaint rule. Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998). Under that rule, the plaintiffs complaint must, on its face, raise a federal question. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S, 678, 681 (1946). A federal claim provides federal question jurisdiction under Article III in a broad fashion, and federal courts generally retain jurisdiction in any case containing a federal ingredient. U.S. Const, art. Ill. § 2; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 823 (1824).
When the plaintiffs complaint raises a federal question, state claims forming “the same case or controversy” as the claim arising under a federal question fall under the court's supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). For a federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims alleged in the complaint, the “state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). However, when the removal includes a claim that does not arise under original or supplemental jurisdiction, then the district court “shall sever those claims and remand them to the state court.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c)(2) (West) (emphasis added).
Where the district court has federal question jurisdiction, defendants may remove the lawsuit, including claims with supplemental jurisdiction, from state court to the district court where the lawsuit is pending. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) (West). The removal statute must be strictly construed. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp, v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941).
Plaintiffs may file a motion to remand to state court when the plaintiff believes removal is improper. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (West). When considering a motion for remand, the court must determine whether removal was proper by examining the complaint as it existed at the time of removal. Miller v. Grgurich, 763 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1985). A motion for remand effectively shifts the burden back to the defendant who originally filed for removal, to prove removal was proper and to show the federal district court holds jurisdiction. Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, (1921).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“Section 1447”), any motion to remand a case to state court must be filed within thirty days of the removal. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (West). However, if the motion for remand asserts the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, then the motion may be brought at any time. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (West). Because Section 1447 does not specify a method for practitioners to calculate the thirty-day time window, FRCP 6 dictates that calculation method. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) (specifying that statutes which do not state a method to compute timing must follow FRCP 6). Under that rule, the thirty-day period starts to run on the day after removal is filed. Fed. R. Civ. P, 6(a)(1)(A). If the last day of the period falls on a weekend or holiday, then the time period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a weekend day or holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).
II. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss premised on FRCP 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v, Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To survive the motion, the complaint must state facts sufficient to give proper notice of the claim and its basis: “a plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration omitted). The factual allegations must provide “a right to relief above a speculative level.” Id. When reviewing the complaint, the court must assume as true all facts asserted in a pleading, but it need not accept as true any legal conclusions set forth in a pleading. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court must also construe facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Am. Fam. Ass'n, Inc. v. S.F, 277 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 886 (2002).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Additionally, the facts, as alleged, must give rise to a plausible inference that the defendants violated the plaintiffs rights. Id. Failure to allege a plausible claim will result in dismissal. Id. A “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Moss v. U.S Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S, at 663).
Self-represented, or pro se, plaintiffs' pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). For pro se litigants, only futile claims or claims which are incurably deficient should be dismissed without leave to amend under FRCP 15(a). Fed.R. Civ.P, 15(a)(2); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987). In contrast, pro se claimants with claims which may be cured by amendment are entitled to notice of the claim's deficiencies and leave to file an amended complaint. Eldrige, 832 F.2d at 1135; Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”).
When a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must carefully construe the pleadings and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v. Pardiis, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Thompson v, Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). This rule of liberal construction is “particularly important” in civil rights cases. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). When giving liberal construction to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court ‘“may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.'” Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir, 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).
The Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on whether a pro se litigant who is also an attorney enjoys the same liberal construction of his pleadings. Some district courts within the Ninth Circuit afford pro se attorneys the same liberal construction as other pro se litigants. See e.g, Osgood v. Main Streat Marketing, LLC, 2017 WL 131829, *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2017); Rossmann v. Pompeo, 2017 WL 5163232, *1 (D. Haw. Nov. 7, 2017). In contrast, other district courts deny liberal construction to pro se attorneys because of their sophistication and knowledge of the legal system. See, e.g, Price v. Peerson, 2014 WL 12579823, *4 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2014) (citing Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 82 n.4 (2d Cir. 2011); Godlove v. Bamberger, Foreman, Oswald & Hahn, 903 F.2d 1145, 1148 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Ordinarily, we treat the efforts of pro se applicants gently, but a pro se lawyer is entitled to no special consideration.”), aff'd, 643 Fed.Appx. 637 (9th Cir. 2016)); Spadaro v. City of San Bernadino, 2019 WL 8064075, *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Spadaro v. City of San Bernardino, 2020 WL 917281 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2020).
For the purposes of this Finding and Recommendation, this court continues to construe Huffman's complaint liberally and allow him leave to amend when possible. However, this court is aware that his sophistication and legal experience place him in better position to advocate for himself than most pro se litigants.
Discussion
Huffman alleges that circumstances and conduct surrounding the hearings held on January 3, 2019, and January 10, 2019, resulted in a violation of his “right[s] to due process and equal protection” under the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions. (Compl. ¶ 6). With respect to Lindgren's conduct at those hearings, he seemingly brings a state tort claim for legal usurpation after judicial disqualification, as well as tort claims for “malicious prosecution, assault and battery, false imprisonment . . . interference with contract, and . . . interference with prospective advantage.” (Compl. ¶ 6). Huffman also appears to assert claims for abuse of process and false or malicious statement against Erskine based on Erskine's comments during the hearing. (Compl. ¶ 8). He also asserts a negligence claim against the City of St. Helens while simultaneously seeking vicarious liability against the City for Lindgren's and Erskine's alleged conduct. (Compl. ¶ 8); (Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, at 3). For clarity, the court collectively refers to these allegations as claims arising from the January 2019 hearings.
Separately, Huffman, purporting to represent both the taxpayers of the City of St. Helens and himself in his individual capacity, seems to allege claims against the City of St. Helens and Lindgren for illegal usurpation and unconstitutional employment. (Compl. ¶ 2, 3, 4). The court refers to these allegations as claims arising from Lindgren's employment status.
I. Motion to Remand A. Timeliness of Huffman's Motion to Remand
As an initial matter, Defendants argue that Huffman's motion to remand was not timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 28 U.S.C.A, § 1447 (West); (Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. to Remand, at 3). Defendants are incorrect. To the extent Huffman's motion for remand is based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it was timely because a motion to remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be brought at any time. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (West). To the extent Huffman's motion relies on legal arguments other than subject matter jurisdiction, the motion was still timely.
Defendants filed for removal on March 5, 2021. (Defs.' Notice of Removal, Ex. 1). Huffman filed his motion for remand on April 5, 2021. (Pl.'s Mot. for Order to Remand). Thirty days after March 5, 2021, not counting March 5 itself, is April 4, 2021. However, April 4, 2021, fell on a Sunday. Therefore, under FRCP 6, Huffman reserved time until the end of the day on April 5, 2021 to file his motion for remand. Because Huffman filed his motion on that day, Huffman's motion for remand was timely.
B. Claims Arising from the January 2019 Hearings Were Properly Removed
Huffman's Complaint facially raises federal question jurisdiction through his allegations of equal protection and due process violation under the U.S. Constitution. (Compl. ¶ 6). Moreover, while Huffman did not characterize his claims as such, he appears to allege deprivation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983 claim”). A Section 1983 claim is federal in nature.
Huffman alleges bare facts to show that Lindgren found him in contempt of court and that he was subsequently incarcerated. These facts currently appear to assert more than a colorable claim because the facts could give rise to more than a wholly “immaterial . . . insubstantial and frivolous” federal claim. Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83. Because Huffman's Section 1983 claims are not clearly frivolous, this court proceeds with jurisdiction.
If, even with amendment as explained infra Part II.A, Huffman fails to allege a Section 1983 claim against Lindgren, and therefore also the City of St. Helens, this court may reevaluate whether Huffman's claims are frivolous.
Additionally, Huffman's state claims arising from the January 2019 Hearings share a common nucleus of operative fact with his federal claims. Here, Huffman's state tort claims for malicious prosecution, assault, battery, false imprisonment, interference with contract, interference with prospective advantage, abuse of process, false or malicious statement, and negligence against Lindgren, Erskine, and the City of St. Helens form the same case or controversy as his federal claims because they arise from conduct at the January 2019 hearings. Accordingly, these claims have supplemental jurisdiction and were properly removed.
Huffman argues that remand is appropriate because he failed to “well-plead” his complaint. (Pl.'s Mot. for Order to Remand, at 2). This argument misunderstands the well- pleaded complaint rule which simply requires that the federal claim appear within the complaint. Huffman's Section 1983 claims do. (Compl. ¶ 6). Huffman's admission that his complaint is not well-drafted does not create the ability to remand. (Pl.'s Mot. for Order to Remand, at 2). If plaintiffs could remand their own cases after alleging harm under federal law merely by arguing that they failed to construct the federal claims in a well-articulated fashion, then plaintiffs could seize defendant's removal power solely by writing poorly. See Polo v. Innoventions Int'l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that “[t]he availability of removal is an important check on the plaintiffs mastery”).
If Huffman wishes to eliminate his federal claims which allowed Defendants to properly remove to federal court, then Huffman should either move to amend his complaint and eliminate the federal claims pursuant to FRCP 15(a)(2) or voluntarily dismiss his own case pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(1) and refile in state court without a federal ingredient.
C. Claims Arising from Lindgren's Employment Status Must Be Remanded
To the extent Huffman proceeds in suit against Lindgren's employment in his personal capacity, representing himself, his claims against Lindgren's employment must be remanded because they constitute a separate case from the case arising from the hearings in January 2019. (Pl.'s Mot. for Order to Remand, at 3). When harms alleged by the plaintiff constitute markedly different wrongs which are only tenuously linked, the harms form different cases. Perket v. Keck, Case No. 3:21-CV-00251-AC, 2021 WL 4237144, at *6 (D. Or. Aug, 3, 2021), adopted by, 2021 WL 4226049 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 2021) (citing Am. Fire & Casualty Co. v, Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951)). They form different cases because the harms arise from a different nucleus of operative fact. Id.
In Perket v. Keck, the plaintiff argued that her personal injury claims, arising from a car crash, and her employment claims, arising from alleged discrimination due to her subsequent injuries, shared supplemental jurisdiction. Id. She argued the operative facts of both claims were “inherently interwoven.” Id. This court held that supplemental jurisdiction was not appropriate because the claims arose from “damages entirely unrelated to each other and [were] separated by a significant period of time.” Id. Additionally, the harms alleged by the plaintiff were committed by “unrelated parties whose conduct falls under completely different legal theories.” Id.
Similarly, Huffman's suit against Lindgren's employment is, at most, tenuously linked to his allegations from the hearings in January 2019. As in Perket, where supplemental jurisdiction was improper for employment and personal injury claims separated by a significant period of time and alleging unrelated damages, Huffman's claims are also distinct in time and damages. Huffman's claims against Lindgren's employment derive from 2018 to present, while his other claims arise from temporally limited events on January 3 and January 10, 2019. Furthermore, the damages Huffman requested are unrelated. It appears Huffman's seeks $100,000 based on both his suit against Lindgren's employment and his suit against Lindgren's actions from the hearings in January 2019. Those damages from Lindgren's employment, even if proven, will be wholly separate from any damages which derived from the hearings in January 2019. As the court held in Perket, simply labelling harms as inherently interwoven does not make supplemental jurisdiction proper. Therefore, Huffman's claims against Lindgren's office and employment should be remanded.
II. Motion to Dismiss
Defendants move to dismiss Huffman's remaining claims pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Fed. R. Civ, P. 12(b)(6). For the below reasons, the court recommends Defendants' motion be granted.
Huffman's claims suffer from a distinct lack of factual development. He fails to provide specificity and support illustrating sufficient facts giving rise to any of his claims. His allegations do not provide “more than the sheer possibility that the defendants acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S, at 678.
A. Huffman Fails to State a Claim Against Lindgren
Huffman's claims against Lindgren currently set forth legally and factually insufficient claims because, on the facts alleged, Lindgren is entitled to judicial immunity. Under this doctrine, judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in the course of their official duties. See Simmons v. Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “[a] judge is absolutely immune for judicial acts”); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (noting that “judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages”). Judicial immunity applies regardless of whether the judge's actions were in error, in excess of judicial authority, or committed with malicious intent. Stump v, Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). A judge can be deprived of immunity only when she acts in “‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.'” Id. A clear absence of all jurisdiction requires “‘a clear lack of all subject matter jurisdiction. '” Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court, Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1987).
Judicial findings of contempt, when made in the judge's official capacity, fall under the umbrella of judicial immunity. Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1990). Oregon judges act with “inherent judicial power” when proceeding with contempt sanctions. Or. Rev, Stat, 33.015, 33.025. Furthermore, summary contempt proceedings are not subject to “normal due process requirements, such as a hearing, counsel, and the opportunity to call witnesses.” Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 988 (1997). Summary contempt proceedings occur when a judge seeks order in her courtroom due to an individual's misconduct in open court, in the presence of the judge. Id. .
When a party or attorney believes a judge cannot preside fairly and impartially over a case, the proper remedy is to seek judicial disqualification. Or. Rev. Stat, § 14.250. To correctly disqualify a judge, Oregon practitioners must make a motion to disqualify with the submission of an affidavit describing why the judge cannot act fairly and impartially in the case. OR. REV. STAT. § 14.260(1). Oregon practitioners also must follow all other motion and timing requirements prescribed by Oregon statute. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 14.250-14.270.
Here, Huffman's claims challenge Lindgren's conduct in her capacity as a municipal judge by questioning her power to hear his client's case, her finding of contempt against him, and his subsequent incarceration due to that finding. These claims all target actions taken in the course of Lindgren's official judicial duties. Furthermore, contempt proceedings fall within a judge's broad discretion and colorable authority, without normal due process requirements. Even if Huffman could prove that Lindgren acted with malicious intention toward him, those facts would be insufficient to overcome Lindgren's apparent immunity. For these reasons, Huffman's claims against Lindgren are barred by absolute immunity because Lindgren did not clearly lack all jurisdiction.
However, Huffman's complaint lacks sufficient factual detail for this court to ascertain the extent to which immunity shields Lindgren's actions in this case because he does not explain the context and procedure of Lindgren's alleged disqualification. Huffman alleges only that he sought to orally disqualify Lindgren. Therefore, he has not plausibly alleged Lindgren acted without “all subject matter jurisdiction.” Miller, 521 F.3d at 1147 (emphasis added).
The court should give Huffman leave to amend his complaint to show he disqualified Lindgren pursuant to ORS § 14.250-14.270. To support his amendment, Huffman must plead the timely affidavit and motion he was required to file to disqualify Lindgren in Columbia County Circuit Court. Huffman also must amend his complaint to provide sufficient factual detail as to each of his tort claims. Failure to do so will result in dismissal, with prejudice, of Huffman's federal and state tort claims against Lindgren for failure to state claims pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).
B. Huffman Fails to State a Claim Against Erskine
With respect to Erskine, the prosecutor opposing Huffman before Lindgren, Huffman alleges Erskine “interfere[d] with his disqualification of Lindgren” because he did not take appropriate steps to ensure a pro tern judge was assigned. (Compl. ¶ 8). Huffman further alleges Erskine made a “maliciously false claim” regarding the City of St. Helens' “provision for pro tern judges” by stating that the City of St. Helens did not have a pro tern office. (Compl. ¶ 8). Huffman characterizes these allegations as claims for abuse of process and malicious or false statement.
Huffman's claims against Erskine are incurably deficient. First, Huffman fails to state a plausible claim for relief. There is no such thing as a “malicious statement” claim, and the facts alleged by Huffman-a prosecutor raising an objection before the court-cannot plausibly sustain an abuse of process claim. Second, Huffman's claims against Erskine are barred by prosecutorial immunity which bars liability for a prosecutor's conduct when a prosecutor “present[s] the State's case, ” or when the prosecutor's activities are “intimately associated with the judicial process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). During the conduct alleged, Erskine was serving in his capacity as a prosecutor before the court, and therefore is entitled to absolute immunity from the claims alleged by Huffman.
Consequently, Huffman's claims against Erskine should be dismissed without leave to amend.
C. Huffman's Claims Against the City of St. Helens are Deficient
Without reference to any statute or source of law, Huffman apparently asserts a negligence claim against the City of St. Helens. (Comp. ¶ 8). He also seeks vicarious liability against the City for both his federal and state claims against Lindgren and Erskine. (Comp. ¶ 8); (Pl.'s Response to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, at 3-6). These claims are deficient for three reasons.
(1) Huffman's negligence claim
First, Huffman fails to state a claim for negligence. Huffman alleges only that the City “was negligent for failing to properly vet the background of the defendant Lindgren, and for not providing a pro tem judge to preside over Lindgren's disqualification.” (Compl. ¶ 8). His allegations are merely conclusory, and therefore not entitled to the assumption of truth. This claim should be dismissed.
(2) Huffman's Monell claim
Second, to the extent Huffman seeks to hold the City of St. Helens liable for the Section 1983 claim against Lindgren, he fails to allege a cognizable claim. A municipality can be sued under Section 1983 for constitutional injury, but “[a] municipality cannot be held liable under [Section] 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, to hold a municipality liable for an employee's constitutional violations, plaintiffs must establish one of three theories: (1) that the employee acted pursuant to an official municipal policy; (2) that the employee acted “pursuant to a longstanding [municipality] practice or custom;” or (3) that the employee acted “as a ‘final policymaker'” for the municipality. Lytle v, Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir, 2004). Under the first two theories, plaintiffs must present a specific, direct causal link between the alleged harm and the municipality's policies or practices to state a claim under Section 1983. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 122 (1988); Lvey, 673 F.2d at 268. Isolated instances of misconduct, however, cannot be used to show a municipal policy or custom. See Meehan v. Los Angeles County, 856 F.2d 102, 106-07 (1988) (affirming that singular instances of misconduct cannot rise to the level of policy or custom under Monell). Under the third theory, plaintiffs must demonstrate the alleged “final policymaker” is an employee who holds a position of authority such that her final decision “may appropriately be attributed” to the municipality. Lytle, 382 F.3d at 982. Huffman fails to link official municipality policy or practice to the deprivation of his constitutional rights, and Huffman fails to show that Lindgren acted as a final policymaker.
With regard to the first two prongs of Monell, Huffman alleges that “[Lindgren] pretend[ed] to conduct a summary finding of contempt of court, and ordered plaintiff imprisoned in the county jail .... This conduct was a violation of the plaintiff[‘]s state a[nd] federal constitutional rights.” (Compl. ¶ 6) (emphasis added). As the italicized emphasis shows, Huffman bases his federal claims on Lindgren's finding of contempt and his subsequent incarceration. Consequently, the relevant Monell inquiry is whether Lindgren's finding of contempt was made pursuant to official policy or longstanding practice, because Huffman's Section 1983 harm is directly tied to the finding of contempt. First, even assuming Huffman's facts are true, he has not alleged more than an isolated incident of misconduct; Lindgren held him in contempt only one time. Second, Huffman has not provided facts to show the City of St. Helens has promulgated an official policy or set forth a longstanding practice regarding summary findings of contempt. Therefore, the City of St. Helens has not directly caused Huffman's harm through policy or practice.
Huffman argues that the City of St. Helens is liable under Monell's first prong by linking the City's failure to employ pro tern judges to his alleged harm. According to Huffman, the argument follows that if the City had provided a pro tem judge pursuant to his motion to disqualify Lindgren, then his subsequent harm would not have occurred. (Compl. ¶ 8); (Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, at 5). This argument fails the causation requirement: the link between either the City of St. Helens' pro tem judicial appointment process or the municipal judge hiring process and Lindgren's summary finding of contempt is highly speculative and tenuous.
Despite the weak causal link, Huffman makes an effort to support his argument by asserting that the City Charter requires the presence of pro tem availability. (Compl. ¶ 8); (Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, at 5). He apparently links the City Charter's provision to Lindgren's failure to ensure pro tem coverage over Huffman's case.
Contrary to Huffman's assertion that the City of St. Helens must provide a pro tem office, the City Charter instead states only that the city “council may appoint. . . municipal court judges pro tem.” City of St. Helens, Or., St. Helens Municipal Code § 35(f) (2012) (emphasis added). The municipal code's permissive language shows that Huffman cannot establish that the City of St. Helens' policy regarding pro tem appointment directly caused his harm because the City did not promulgate a mandatory policy for pro tem availability. This allegation therefore fails to state a claim.
With regard to Monett's third prong, Huffman argues that Lindgren is a final policymaker because she was the ultimate authority who “refuse[d] to allow a pro tem judge to preside” over Huffman's hearings. (Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. To Dismiss, at 4). This assertion is contradicted by Huffman's own alleged facts, which state that Lindgren did attempt to contact a pro tem judge. (Compl. ¶ 5). Because neither Lindgren's finding of contempt nor her failure to procure pro tem coverage can be construed as a policy “appropriately attributable” to the City of St. Helens, Lindgren did not act as a policymaker. Lytle, 382 F.3d at 982. Huffman's claims cannot meet any of the three prongs required by Monell, and, under the current complaint, the City of St. Helens cannot be held liable for any Section 1983 claims Huffman raises against Lindgren.
If Huffman instead tries to show the City of St. Helens liable for the Section 1983 claims by asserting that the City hired Lindgren and is therefore liable for her torts, then those claims will also be barred under Monell's holding which prohibits any liability under respondeat superior theory.
(3) Huffman's state law claims
Lastly, any state law claims asserted against the City are barred by imputed immunity. Unlike constitutional claims, Oregon statutes govern whether and when state tort law claims may be brought against municipalities. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.272 (advising when public bodies may be sued for tortious injury). In Oregon, a public body means “local government bodies.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.109 Public bodies receive imputed immunity when tortious liability is alleged against any “officer, employee, or agent of a public body when such officer, employee or agent is immune from liability.” Or. Rev. Stat, § 30.265(5). As a municipality, the City of St. Helens is a public body.
With respect to Erskine, his prosecutorial immunity is imputed to the City of St. Helens, and so bars any claim arising from his conduct. With respect to Lindgren, unless Huffman can amend his complaint to sufficiently show she may not have retained judicial immunity, Lindgren's immunity will also bar vicarious liability against the City of St. Helens. Therefore, Huffman is advised that to state a claim against the City of St. Helens, he must call Lindgren's immunity into question by showing she was properly disqualified.
III. Attorney Fees
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Defendants ask that they be awarded attorney fees from Huffman. (Defs.' Mot. To Dismiss Pl.'s Complaint, at 7). Defendants argue that Huffman brought this suit to retaliate against Lindgren for holding him in contempt of court and it therefore is frivolous. (Id. at 7-8).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, attorney fees for a prevailing party are subject to the discretion of the court. 42 U.S.C. A § 1988(b) (West). Prevailing defendants can recover fees only if the plaintiffs suit was frivolous. Jensen v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 350 Fed.Appx. 115, 118 (9th Cir. 2009); Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 644, 647-48 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)). “A case may be deemed frivolous only when the result is obvious or the . . . arguments of error are wholly without merit.” Gibson v. Office of Atty. Gen., State of Cal., 561 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir.2009) (internal quotations removed).
The court defers awarding fees at this time. Huffman should be allowed an opportunity to amend his complaint pursuant to this Findings and Recommendation. Huffman, as an attorney, is a sophisticated pro se litigant. In addition to his legal knowledge, he previously filed a similar case with similar legal arguments. See Cork v. City of Clatskanie et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00051-PK. The case was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Given his legal knowledge and the prior case alleging similar arguments, Huffman is advised that if he cannot amend his complaint with sufficient pleadings, this court should consider whether Huffman's suit is frivolous and consider an award of attorney fees to Defendants.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Huffman's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8) should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Claims directed at Lindgren's general employment status should be remanded. The court further recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3) be GRANTED. Huffman's federal claims and state claims arising from the January 2019 hearings should be dismissed without leave to amend.
In light of Huffman's current suspension from the practice of law, the court recommends that the deadline for filing objections to this Findings and Recommendation be extended until after expiration of his suspension.
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, ifany, are due within fourteen days. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.