Opinion
Civil Action 4:20-cv-2944-JD-TER
01-12-2022
DARNELLE HUDSON, Plaintiff, v. MS. JOETTE SCARBOROUGH, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS E. ROGERS, III, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant Scarborough violated his constitutional rights. Presently before the court is Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 23). A hearing was held on September 28, 2021. Plaintiff was present but Defendant Scarborough was not present nor was anyone present on her behalf. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff originally filed this action on August 13, 2020, and an order authorizing service of process was issued on August 17, 2020. (ECF No. 7). The summons was executed and a process receipt and return was filed revealing that Defendant Scarborough was personally served by the United States Marshals Service on November 23, 2020, as indicated in the Process Receipt and Return. See Summons Returned Executed (ECF No. 13). Defendant Scarborough failed to file an answer or otherwise appear in this action, as indicated by the docket and Plaintiff's Affidavit and Request for Entry of Default (ECF No. 16). As a result, an Entry of Default (ECF No. 17) was made by the Clerk of Court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a) on April 8, 2021. (ECF Nos. 16 and 17). On July 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. (ECF No. 23). A hearing was scheduled for September 28, 2021, and a Notice of Hearing was entered on Plaintiff's motion and for a determination of damages. (ECF No. 27). Defendant Scarborough was personally served with the notice of hearing by the United States Marshals Service on August 23, 2021. (ECF No. 31). As stated above, neither Defendant Scarborough nor anyone on her behalf has appeared in this action.
III. FACTS
The allegations against Defendant Scarborough in Plaintiff's complaint are accepted as true in light of her default. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Rawlins, 523 F.3d 318, 322 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009) (accepting plaintiff's allegations against defaulting defendant as true, noting a defaulting defendant “admits the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established”) (quoting Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3D 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001)). As Judge Lydon recently described in Rollins Ranches, LLC, & Brit. Gundogs, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. Rachael Watson, aka Rachael Corbett, Defendant., No. 0:18-CV-03278-SAL, 2021 WL 5355650, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2021):
. . . Although a defaulting defendant is held to have “admit[ted] the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, ” he is not held to have admitted conclusions of law. Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). “In short, despite occasional statements to the contrary, a default is not treated as an absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff's right to recover.” Id. ...
As such, “[a] plaintiff's burden in moving for default judgment is not satisfied ... by simply pleading facts; rather, the plaintiff's complaint must also state a cognizable claim to which his or her well-pleaded facts provide support and show an entitlement to relief.” Silvers v. Iredell Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 515CV00083RLVDCK, 2016 WL 427953, at *4 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 3, 2016) (citing Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780), aff'd, 669 Fed.Appx. 182 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Broxton v. Blue Ridge in Fields, No. CV 0:18-2022-JFA-PJG, 2019 WL 3315245, at *2 (D.S.C. July 24, 2019) (“[T]he court must still determine if the unchallenged factual allegations constitute a legitimate cause of action and support the relief sought.”).(Id. at *2-3).
Plaintiff has brought suit against Defendant Scarborough, a classification employee, in her individual capacity alleging that his rights were violated between March 20, 2018, and October 7, 2018, while housed at the Kershaw Correctional Institution. Plaintiff asserts that he is a mental health inmate (Plaintiff's Exhibit #2) diagnosed by a psychiatric doctor and was held unconstitutionally by the Defendant on lock-up at the Kershaw Correctional Institution (KCI) restrictive housing unit (RHU) for over seven months past his completion of (SD) time. Plaintiff alleges he was part of the mental health inmates' state class action filed in 2005 in which the state judge ordered in 2014 that there be a decrease in the length of stay in segregation lock-up. (Plaintiff's Exhibit #1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was aware of the order and aware that Plaintiff was one of the mental health inmates similarly situated with all the other mental health inmates. (Plaintiff's Exhibit #2).
Plaintiff alleges Defendant intentionally held him on lock-up unconstitutionally for seven months because he exercised his right to be released from lock-up after he successively completed 18 months on security detention custody without any disciplinary charges. Plaintiff submitted a copy of the SCDC policy on Restrictive Housing Unit which states that for a Level III and Level IV “Advance and release will be approved after successful completion of 6-18 months service.” (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 at p. 6 of 26, section 4.8.3). Based on the facts submitted, Plaintiff successfully completed eighteen months of service without any disciplinary problems. The RHU policy also states: “Upon receipt of approval by the Central Classification to release an inmate from security detention, the Classification Case Manager/Worker will initiate a Custody Review in the automated Offender Management System indicating the recommended disposition. An inmate who is released will be appropriately classified to the general population.. . .” (Id. at 5.4). At the default judgment hearing, Plaintiff presented a copy of the Classification Plan which states: “Central Classification will have the primary responsibility for all transfers and bed management of the Agency.” (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 at sec. 7). Based on his good conduct on security detention, Plaintiff states he was recommended to be removed from security detention on February 8, 2018. Plaintiff submitted a copy of an Inmate Request form in which he inquired why he was still being held on lockup after being “released from S.D. custody a month or so ago; however, I'm still being held on lockup for no reason. Why?” (Exhibit #7). The response was “you were recommended to be removed from S.D. on 2/8/2018. Central Class has made the decision to approve you to come off of S.D. and you are now in AP3 status. Which you are waiting to go to a program.” (Id.) Plaintiff wrote another staff Request on April 11, 2018, stating “Why am I still being held on RHU lock-up after I have completed my S.D. time? I been complaining about my mental conditions and stress. Why am I being held on lockup?” The response was “you are currently waiting on Central Classification for transfer.” (Exhibit # 8). Plaintiff submitted the RHU Classification Review form dated May 22, 2018. The writing on the form is not legible however the box to be released from RHU and returned to general population was checked. (Exhibit #12). Plaintiff submitted a copy of a Request to Staff Member form dated July 5, 2018, stating “I went before the S.D. Board on or about 5-20-2018, I was recommended by the Board for release of S.D. and to be placed back on a yard with general population. However, its 7-5-2018 and U haven't received no disposition back or you or head classification concerning my S.D. status/custody level. Can you please tell me why haven't I been released from S.D. and transferred from this lock up?” (Exhibit #14). Plaintiff also wrote a letter to General Counsel dated July 8, 2018, stating that he was being housed at KCI RHU lock-up on S.D. custody. (Exhibit #15). Plaintiff stated that he had been placed on S.D. on 4-11-2016 and had been there 24 months at the time of the letter which was six months over the completion of his S.D. time pursuant to policy OP-22.38, RHU, section 4.8.3 which provides for advance release after successful completion of 6-18 months. Id. Plaintiff indicated that he had written classification over and over to no avail. The response on July 17, 2018, was that his request had been forwarded to Operations, Classification and Mental Health. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that he was in lock-up status and subjected to lock-up conditions for 24 hours a day in his cell and was subjected to, but not limited to, lights staying on from 3 a.m. through 11p.m. which hurt his eyes, caused him to suffer with bad headaches, that he was served cold food which caused his stomach to hurt so bad that he needed medical attention, and the conditions caused him severe stress resulting in depression, anxiety, emotional strain, and mental anguish. Plaintiff had sleep loss and a forty pounds weight loss in two months. Plaintiff alleges he wrote Defendant Scarborough Staff Requests asking to be released from lock-up but she never responded. So, he started writing staff requests to the institutional classification officers, but they responded that only Defendant Scarborough could release him. Plaintiff started having suicidal thoughts and became so weak mentally that the psychiatric counselor started visiting him weekly on lock-up. After Defendant Scarborough was aware Plaintiff had complained to other staff members and had filed a Step 1 grievance, she took him off of the “awaiting program level three status” and put Plaintiff back on security detention. Plaintiff alleges his rights were violated because he was placed back on security detention with no notice of charges, no notice of a hearing, and he was deprived of his right to be present at the security detention placement and to give testimony. Plaintiff alleges he was denied his right to appeal the decision. Based on SCDC policy, Plaintiff alleges he had the right to be personally present at the hearing and to appeal the decision. Plaintiff alleges that “the defendant held me on lock-up under security detention custody level 3 from the day she placed me back on security detention til October 7, 2018, approx 7 months over my 18 months on lock-up was over.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 8). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Scarborough intentionally retaliated against him causing him mental anguish and loss of privileges to punish him for exercising his First Amendment right to file a grievance and request to be released from S.D. detention. Plaintiff makes a claim of retaliation when his custody change was due to complaining about Defendant Scarborough and a due process claim that Scarborough gave no notice of a hearing before placing him on S.D. in lock-up.
Plaintiff has not submitted any medical or mental health records.
At the hearing, in addition to testifying to the above facts stated in the complaint, Plaintiff testified that he had “laid down” doing nothing wrong and had not received any type of disciplinary charges so that he could be released from lock-up and its restrictions due to an immediate family member having cancer. Plaintiff described being in a cell with no books, television, not allowed visitors, recreation, and only allowed one telephone call a week. Plaintiff described how he sat in solitary confinement for seven months longer than he was supposed to because he requested to be released from RHU back into the general population and complained to others when Defendant Scarborough would not respond to his requests and filed a grievance. Plaintiff testified to the conditions he was subjected to due to the retaliation and how hard it was on him mentally with him sitting on his bed all day where he would “rock” back and forth and losing a significant amount of weight. Plaintiff submitted several exhibits at this hearing, to wit:
Plaintiff's Exhibits:
1. Order of State Court Judge Baxley
2. Classification summary report
3. SCDC policy
4. Classification plan
5. Classification review
6. Classification review
7. Inmate requests
8. Request to staff
9. Request to staff
10. Grievance form
11. Inmate request
12. Classification review
13. Request to staff
14. Request to staff
15. Letter to general counsel
16. Classification summary report
17. Inmate grievance form
18. Inmate request
19. Inmate grievance form
20. Inmate disposition(ECF No. 35, list).
Plaintiff testified and alleged that he suffered with eye pain, headaches, mental anguish, anxiety, hurt feelings, emotional strain, severe depression, severe headaches, loss of sleep, appetite, weight loss and physical freedom from confinement of lock-up and restraints. Plaintiff stated that he was subjected to loss of privileges of canteen, visitation, religious programs, educational programs, correspondence and required mental health services to begin seeing him once a week placing him on stronger psycho-tropic medications.
Plaintiff has requested monetary damages. Specifically, Plaintiff requests nominal damages in the amount of $300,000.00 and punitive damages in the amount of $250,000.00. (ECF No. 1).
IV. DISCUSSION
1. LIABILITY
Plaintiff asserts causes of action for retaliation and a due process violation resulting in cruel and unusual conditions of confinement in violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a claim for retaliation under § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege either that the retaliatory act was taken in response to the exercise of a constitutionally protected right or that the act itself violated such right.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir.1994). Bare or conclusory assertions of retaliation are insufficient to establish a retaliation claim. Id. at 74. An inmate must allege facts showing that his exercise of a constitutionally protected right was a substantial factor motivating the retaliatory action. See, e.g., Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1318 (4th Cir.1996); Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1387 n. 11 (4th Cir.1995). An inmate must also allege facts showing that he “suffered some adversity in response to [his] exercise of [constitutionally] protected rights.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Wicomico Cnty., 999 F.2d 780, 785 (4th Cir.1993). See Al-Amin v. Bush, No. CA 0:13-1176-BHH-PJG, 2015 WL 1414241, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A. 0:13-01176, 2015 WL 1400019 (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2015). As to claims of retaliation, “In order to state a colorable retaliation claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the defendant took some action that adversely affected his First Amendment rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between his protected activity and the defendant's conduct.” Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant intentionally retaliated against him for exercising his right to be released from lock-up after successively completing eighteen months on security detention custody or lockup without any disciplinary charges. Plaintiff states that based on his good conduct on security detention he was released from security detention custody on or about February 8, 2018, and placed on “awaiting program custody level 3" but was not released from lock-up to the general population or transferred from the KCI lockup and placed in a step down program.
The SCDC Policy on Restrictive Housing Unit which Plaintiff submitted into evidence at the hearing states the following:
5. Procedure for Release From Security Detention:
5.1 The decision to release an inmate form Security Detention is recommended by the ICC and approved by Central Classification and will be based upon the inmate's overall disciplinary record and compliance with all agency policies and procedures while in Restrictive Housing Unit. The inmate may submit a written statement regarding his/her placement. The Classification Caseworker will create a Custody Review for inmates approved for release....
5.4 Upon receipt of approval by the Central Classification to release an inmate form security detention, the Classification Case Manager/Worker will initiate a Custody Review in the automated Offender Management System indicating the recommended disposition. An inmate who is released will be appropriately classified to the general population. The Classification Case Manager/worker will coordinate with Central Classification for ed space management purposes.
Instead, as soon as he proceeded to exercise his First Amendment rights to grieve the lack of release from lockup, Defendant placed him back in security detention, removed him from the “awaiting program level 3" without justification or disciplinary offense, he received no notice of hearing, and was not allowed to be present at the hearing, and was not allowed to appeal the decision. Plaintiff asserts he was placed back in security detention custody level for an additional seven months when he was supposed to be released from RHU and placed in the general population.
The facts as taken as true in this case are that Plaintiff completed his eighteen months without disciplinary charges, the RHU Classification Committee upon the regularly scheduled ninety-day review recommended on November 30, 2017, that Plaintiff be released to general population for being six months disciplinary free (Exhibit 6), that upon inmate's request on April 20, 2018, he was informed that he was “recommended to be removed from S.D. on 2/8/2018. Central Class has made the decision to approve you to come off of S.D. and you are now in AP3 status. Which you are waiting to go to a program.” (Exhibit 7). The RHU Classification Committee Review recommended that Plaintiff be released from RHU and Returned to the general population on May 23, 2018 (Exhibit 12), and the Division of Classification and Inmate Records RHU multi-disciplinary team inmate disposition form dated October 9. 2018, by the Chairperson for the RHU Multi Disciplinary Team and October 10, 2018, by the Classification Case Manager/Designee noted that Plaintiff was being released from security detention and transferred to Perry Lifers Program (Exhibit 20). Plaintiff filed grievances regarding not being released from security detention by Classification. Plaintiff asserts that Scarborough was in charge of Classification and Plaintiff was told that he was waiting on Central Classification for transfer (Exhibit #8). After filing the grievances, Plaintiff asserts he was then placed back in S.D. and denied due process. Therefore, the facts are sufficient to establish liability for retaliation.
Plaintiff alleges that due to retaliation and violation of due process he was subjected to cruel and unusual conditions of confinement by being placed in security detention for an additional seven months and subjected to solitary confinement in his cell for 24 hours a day for seven months, lights on from 3:00 a.m. through 11:00 p.m. causing bad headaches, was served cold food which made his stomach hurt, became depressed due to the stress and began suffering with anxiety, emotional strain, mental anguish resulting in a loss of sleep, losing approximately forty pounds in two months, developing suicidal thoughts, and requiring a visit from the mental health doctor every week.
Plaintiff asserts that his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to due process were violated. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “To state a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). While prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause, they do not have a constitutionally protected interest in avoiding penalties for disciplinary infractions. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974). When the punishment at issue does not cause the original sentence to be enhanced, protected interests will generally be limited to freedom from restraint that imposes atypical and significant hardships on the inmate relative to ordinary prison life. Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Since “[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, ” temporarily losing privileges as “[d]iscipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. To recover under the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must establish that “defendants acted with something more than mere negligence.” Brooks v. Dunlap, 2019 WL 1146687, at *8 (D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2019) (quoting Golson v. Dep't of Corr., 914 F.2d 1491, at *1 (4th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table opinion)). Prisoners may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, but such rights are subject to restrictions “imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)). “[Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” Id. at 560. In Wolff, the Supreme Court held that “due process required written notice to the inmate of the charges, an opportunity for the inmate to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense, and a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, 929 (4th Cir. 1990).
The facts taken as true are sufficient to establish liability for a violation of due process. Here, Plaintiff did not receive timely written notice of any violations that would cause him to be placed back into security detention and solitary confinement in the RHU, did not receive any notice of charges, and was not allowed to attend a hearing, present witnesses or evidence or appeal the decision. Plaintiff was placed back into lock-up with no books, magazines, televison, visitation, recreation, canteen privileges and was in his cell in solitary for an additional seven months. The Exhibits submitted reveal that the RHU Classification Committee Review recommended that he be released from RHU and returned to the general population on November 30, 2017. (Exhibit #6). Further the second RHU Classification Committee review dated May 22, 2018, had the box was checked that it was again recommended that Plaintiff be released from RHU and returned to the general population. (Exhibit #12). Taking the facts as true and based on the evidence presented at the hearing, there is no indication that Plaintiff was released by Defendant Scarborough based on the committee reviews and there were no disciplinary charges or offenses against the Plaintiff to place Plaintiff back in security detention. Therefore, taking Plaintiff's allegations as true from an entry of default, Plaintiff was not given the constitutionally required due process protections.
2. DAMAGES
For the reasons discussed above, the Plaintiff is entitled to relief on his claim against Defendant Scarborough. Rule 55(b)(1) provides that if a plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation, the clerk must enter judgment against the defaulting party for that amount plus costs. However, the fact that the complaint specifies an amount does not make it a sum certain. See Richardson v. Duncan, 2018 WL 851342, (D.S.C, Jan. 11, 2018) (citing KPS & Associates v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003)). A claim is not for a sum certain “unless there is no doubt as to the amount to which a plaintiff is entitled as a result of the defendant's default.” HMG Property Investors, Inc. v. Parque Industrial Rio Canas, Inc., 847 F.2d 908 (1st Cir. 1988). Determining the amount must involve nothing more than “computations which may be figured from the record.” Id. Because Plaintiff is seeking damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights, the amount to which he is entitled is not certain; however, “[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c).
Richardson v. Duncan, 2018 WL 851342 (D.S.C. Jan. 11, 2018), adopted sub nom. Richardson v. Wilkes, 2018 WL 835227 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2018), affd, 735 Fed.Appx. 67 (4th Cir. 2018).
Section 1983 creates “a species of tort liability, ” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978), and, therefore, “when § 1983 plaintiffs seek damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts.” Memphis Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986). Rule 55(b)(2) provides that, in determining the amount of damages to award upon a defendant's default, the court may hold a hearing to “(A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter.”
It is difficult to place a dollar figure on pain and suffering and emotional and mental claims. Nonetheless, taking the facts as true and having considered Plaintiff's testimony regarding the retaliation resulting in intensity of the conditions of confinement without due process causing his physical and mental health to suffer, it is recommended that Plaintiff be awarded damages.
Plaintiff credibly testified during the hearing that he was in pain from having to have the lights on from 3:00 a. m. until 11:00 p.m. resulting in terrible headaches requiring pain medicine, stomach pain from being served cold food, and stress resulting in the loss of forty pounds in two months. Plaintiff also credibly testified that he suffered with stress, depression and anxiety resulting in suicidal thoughts due to being in solitary confinement twenty-four hours a day for about seven months after he was supposed to have been released but could not get anyone to help and being told that Defendant Scarborough was the only person that could help but she refused.While the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not addressed the issue of whether or not a plaintiff may maintain a claim under 1997e(e) for nominal and punitive damages in the absence of physical injury when the plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation, courts in this district have decided the issue along the same lines as a majority of circuit courts. See e.g., Carter v. Myers, No. 0:15-2583-HMH-PJG, 2017 WL 3498878, *5 (D.S.C. 2017) (“[T]he court finds that § 1997e(e) does not preclude the recovery of nominal and punitive damages for the violation of a constitutional right where there is no physical injury.”); See also Smith v. James, No. 8:13-cv-1270-RMG, 2014, WL 2809609, at *8 (D.S.C. June 20, 2014). However, while Plaintiff has testified to pain and suffering and emotional injury, he has not presented any medical evidence. See Bickley v. Gregory, No. 2:16CV131, 2016 WL 6306148, at *8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:16CV131, 2016 WL 6398804 (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2016) (Ms. Bickley testified that, as a result of defendants' conduct, she suffered from panic attacks, was unable to sleep, cried often, and felt upset and physically sick. Due to the emotional distress that defendants' conduct caused Ms. Bickley, the undersigned recommends an award of $2,000.00 to Ms. Bickley for emotional distress. The record does not support an award for $15,000.00 as requested, in part because there is no evidence that Ms. Bickley received mental health treatment in connection with the defendants' misconduct). It is well established that the relief granted in a default judgment is limited to that supported by the allegations in the Complaint and the proof submitted at the damages hearing. Samuel v. Dickey, No. 4:12-CV-2277-TLW, 2015 WL 1297923, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2015) (citing Jackson v. Midlands Human Res. Ctr., 296 S.C. 526, 529, 374 S.E.2d 505, 506 (Ct.App.1988) (“In a default case, the plaintiff must prove by competent evidence the amount of his damages, and such proof must be by a preponderance of the evidence. Although the defendant is in default as to liability, the award of damages must be in keeping not only with the allegations of the complaint and the prayer for relief, but also with the proof that has been submitted. A judgment for money damages must be warranted by the proof of the party in whose favor it is rendered.” (citations omitted)). As previously stated, other than his testimony, Plaintiff did not submit evidence of medical care or mental health treatment due to the matters alleged in this complaint. Therefore, it is recommended that Plaintiff be awarded nominal damages in the amount of $10,050.00. (201 days x 50.00 a day).
Plaintiff has not produced evidence, expert or otherwise, regarding treatment he has received or may need for these issues.
Punitive damages are allowed in an action under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be “motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). “The callous indifference required for punitive damages is essentially the same as the deliberate indifference required for a finding of liability on the § 1983 claim.” Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1987). There are several factors to consider in awarding punitive damages: (1) whether punitive damages bear a reasonable relationship to the harm that is likely to occur from the defendant's conduct as well as to the harm that actually has occurred; (2) how long the defendant continued in his actions; (3) whether the defendant was aware his actions were causing or were likely to cause harm; (4) whether the defendant attempted to conceal or cover up his actions or the harm caused by them; (5) whether or how often the defendant engaged in similar conduct in the past; (6) whether the defendant made reasonable efforts to make amends by offering a fair and prompt settlement for actual harm caused once liability became clear to him; (7) if the defendant profited from his wrongful conduct; (8) whether punitive damages bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages; (9) the financial position of the defendant; (10) the cost of litigation; (11) any criminal sanctions imposed on the defendant for his conduct; (12) any other civil actions against the defendant based on the same conduct; (13) the appropriateness of punitive damage to encourage fair and reasonable settlements when a clear wrong has been committed. Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656, 413 S.E.2d 897, 908 (W.Va.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The amount of punitive damages to be awarded, if any, lies within the province of the trier of fact.” Givens v. O'Quinn, 447 F.Supp.2d 593, 602 (W.D. Va. 2006) (citations omitted). However, due process prohibits the imposition of “a grossly excessive punishment on a tortfeasor.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).The record is silent on many of the Fleming Landfill, Inc. factors, particularly past similar conduct and Defendant's financial position. However, based on the record presented, the Plaintiff was subjected to S.D. for an additional seven months after repeatedly requesting release and Defendant was aware of the circumstances. S.D. is an extreme form of confinement under the circumstances present by Plaintiff. Here, Plaintiff should be awarded $10,000.00 in punitive damages. See, e.g., Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2016) (upholding jury award of $4,000 in punitive damages where the officer punched a restrained non-threatening inmate); Estate of Davis v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388, 1396-97 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding punitive damages award of $5,000 against each defendant where trial court found evidence of malicious or evil intent in officer's beating of inmate while inmate offered no resistance).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 23) be granted and judgment against Defendant Scarborough be entered in the amount of $20,050.00.