Opinion
Order on Motion to Dismiss Entered July 6, 1933. Opinion Filed November 9, 1933.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Martin County, Elwyn Thomas, Judge.
Oscar S. Miller, for Appellant;
Smith Kanner, for Appellee.
Appellee has moved the Court to dismiss this appeal on the ground that appellant's brief wholly fails to comply with Amended Rule 20 of this Court relating to the preparation of briefs. The motion is well taken and we could properly grant it on authority of St. Andrews Bay Lbr. Co. v. Bernard, 102 Fla. 389, 135 Sou. Rep. 831, wherein a full explanation of the meaning and purpose of the rule will be found.
However, the transcript is before us and the briefs of both parties have been filed. A review of the record has convinced us that no reversible error was committed in the entry of the final decree appealed from. In lieu of dismissal of the appeal on the ground going to the sufficiency of the appellant's brief the decree appealed from having been found by us to be without error, will be affirmed and motion to dismiss denied.
On motion to dismiss appeal, motion denied and decree affirmed.
DAVIS, C. J., and WHITFIELD, ELLIS, TERRELL, BROWN and BUFORD, J. J., concur.
This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court upon the transcript of the record of the decree herein, and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the Court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the Court that there is no error in the said decree; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the said decree of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby affirmed.
DAVIS, C. J., and WHITFIELD and BUFORD, J. J., concur.
The fact that no consideration passed to South Atlantic Sea Food Company for the mortgage given to Hudgins Fish Company, declared fraudulent in this case, subjected it to attack in favor of a judgment creditor of South Atlantic Sea Food Company whose claim was prejudiced by the mortgage that was given before the judgment was obtained but after the debt was incurred. I therefore concur in holding the decree appealed from correct.