Opinion
5:24-CV-117-M
07-16-2024
DARRELL HUBBARD, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Robert B. Jones Jr. United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Darrell Hubbard's (“Hubbard”) application to proceed in forma pauperis [DE-2] and for frivolity review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), as well as his motions for case conference on issuance of summons, to expedite issuance of summons, and for injunctive relief to preserve evidence, [DE-5, -6, -7]. Hubbard has demonstrated sufficient evidence of inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis is therefore allowed. However, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed, and that the motions for case conference, injunctive relief, and to expedite be denied as moot.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are ‘so nutty,' ‘delusional,' or ‘wholly fanciful' as to be simply ‘unbelievable.'”). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.
In determining whether a complaint is frivolous, “a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the Plaintiff's allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Rather, the court may find a complaint factually frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id. “The word ‘frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition.... The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.” Nagy v. Fed. Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252,256-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (some internal quotation marks omitted). In making its frivolity determination, the court may “apply common sense.” Nasim v. Warden., Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).
In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell A tl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id.
In the present case, Hubbard is proceeding pro se, and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id.', Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274,1278 (4th Cir. 1985). In interpreting a pro se complaint the court's task is not to discern the plaintiff's unexpressed intent, but what the words in the complaint mean. Atkinson v. National Credit Sys., Inc., No. 5:23-CV-640-D, 2024 WL 1309185, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 27, 2024) (citing Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that a “liberal interpretation” of a complaint does not warrant a “complete rewriting”) & Brockv. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997)).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Hubbard's complaint is marked by a lack of specificity and clarity, making it difficult to ascertain the precise nature of his claim. Reading the complaint charitably, Hubbard asserts several claims against the State of New Jersey, the Union County Prosecutor's Office, the Elizabeth Police Department, Candido J. Rodriguez, Jr., Neil G. Duffy, III, Thomas Manahan, James P. Krakowiecki, and “Does 1 to 100” (collectively, “Defendants”) stemming from an incident that occurred in October of 1996. See generally Pl.'s Compl. [DE-1], The 1996 incident and corresponding investigation resulted in several state criminal charges, including promoting prostitution and drug-related offenses, to which Hubbard pleaded guilty on the advice of counsel. Id. at 10, 25, 27. In 2023, Hubbard sought to expunge these offenses from his record, but his 3 petition was unsuccessful. Id. at 10. However, according to Hubbard, while the expungement proceeding was ongoing, he became aware of facts indicating that the Defendants violated his civil rights in 1996 and 1997. Id. at 8-9. These alleged facts form the basis of the instant lawsuit and are summarized below.
In October of 1996, police received a tip that a woman, “TG,” was being held against her will in a private residence by a man running an escort service. Id. at 17. Police subsequently responded to the call and arrived at Hubbard's house, where TG allegedly opened the door to greet them and confirm that there was no man there. Id. at 17-19. Howard asserts that TG's kidnapping phone call was just a prank, and that officers should have concluded their investigation of the residence after TG admitted that there was no man inside. Id. at 12. Instead, officers proceeded to search the home and seize Hubbard's personal property (to wit, his 1992 Lexus S.C. 400), allegedly without a valid warrant or applicable exception to the warrant requirement, and thereafter launched an investigation into Hubbard and his escort service. Id. at 17-22; 29-30.
Hubbard argues that the officers' actions were improper, as they “did not entertain the possibility that an escort service could be operating lawfully and deemed [it] the same as a prostitution service” based on racial stereotyping and prejudice alone. Id. at 13. Hubbard contends that the investigation and criminal proceeding that followed the October search were likewise marred by racial bias and corruption, in part because of a racial profiling program allegedly instituted by Defendant Thomas Manahan, the then-interim Union County Prosecutor. Id. at 34- 40; [DE-1-2] at 18-20. Specifically, Hubbard alleges that Defendant James Krakowiecki, a police detective, unlawfully withheld witness statements made by escorts working for Hubbard from him, manufactured false “kingpin narcotics” charges against Hubbard, and falsified an indictment; law enforcement officers coerced witnesses into making uncorroborated statements against him; and defense counsel, Defendants Candido Rodriguez, Jr. and Neil G. Duffy, III, coerced Hubbard into pleading guilty, despite the lack of a grand jury indictment, arraignment, or offer or valid waiver of trial. Compl. [DE-1] at 22-27; 34-40.
Hubbard asserts multiple civil rights violations, including “Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure, Fifth Amendment malicious prosecution and due process violations, Sixth Amendment: no jurisdictional authority, the right to know who the accuser(s) are, and the right to effective legal representation, and Fourteenth Amendment: racial profiling and right to equal protection” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 1 (capital lettering omitted). Hubbard claims that he is often referred to as the “Black Bill Gates” and that the fraud perpetrated by the Defendants has “structurally muted [his] chance to fulfill [his] life potential.” Id. at 51, 53. In the instant suit, he seeks relief for his injuries and requests 1.2 billion dollars in compensatory damages, a purging of his criminal history, the implementation of a structured settlement aimed at criminal justice reform, and whatever punitive damages a jury determines are just and proper. Id. at 51-58. Hubbard attached several exhibits to the complaint, including, inter alia, a “malicious indictment comparison” chart, an investigation report from the 1996 incident, and edited excerpts from the 1996 case's witness statements. [DE-1-1 to -1-4].
in. DISCUSSION
A civil action may be brought in
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Hubbard's complaint does not establish that venue is proper in this district where Defendants are not alleged to reside in North Carolina and none of the events giving rise to the claims are alleged to have occurred in North Carolina. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” In the instant case, the interest of justice is not served by transfer and, the court should dismiss the complaint for several reasons. See Emrit v. Grammy Awards on CBS, No. 5:23-cv-00499-M, 2023 WL 6545417, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 15,2023) (citing LoRusso v. Duke Energy Co., No. 3:22-CV-598-FDW-DSC, 2023 WL 2334371, at *2 n.6 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 2, 2023) (concluding transfer to proper venue not warranted where the complaint was subject to dismissal as frivolous and for failure to state a claim)), adopted by 2023 WL 6541844, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 6, 2023). The most broadly applicable reason for dismissal-that Hubbard's § 1983 claims are time-barred-is summarized below.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private right of action where a person acting under the color of state law deprives an individual of a federally protected right. “There is no statute of limitations provided in § 1983; rather, federal courts apply the forum state's ‘most analogous' statute of limitations, generally the statute applicable to personal injury actions.” Fayemi v. Offerman, 99 Fed.Appx. 480,481 (4th Cir. June 2,2004) (unpublished) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985)). “However, the date the cause of action accrues is determined under federal law.” Id. (citing Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158,1162 (4th Cir. 1991)). In North Carolina, the statute of limitations for actions under § 1983 is three years, id. (citing Love v. Alamance Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 1504, 1506 (4th Cir. 1985)), while in New Jersey, the statute of limitations is two years, Kreimer v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 11 6 3453 (ES), 2011 WL 4906631, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2011) (citing Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Dep't, 892 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1989); O'Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 2006)). In any event, “[u]nder federal law, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations commences ‘when the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action.'” Fayemi, 99 Fed.Appx. at 481 (citing Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955).
The court may raise a statute of limitations defense sua sponte when a complaint is filed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Nasim, 64 F.3d at 953-54). Here, the defense is warranted because Hubbard's § 1983 claims are based on constitutional violations that allegedly occurred in 1996 and 1997-over twenty-five years ago-and there are no facts alleged in the complaint that would support tolling the limitations period for this length of time. Importantly, ‘“[s]tate law, unless inconsistent with federal law,. . . governs the concomitant issue of whether a limitations period should be tolled,”' Evans v. City of Newark, Civ. No. 14-00120 (KM) (MAH), 2016 WL 2742862, at *6 (D.N.J. May 10, 2016) (citing McPherson v. United States, 392 Fed. App'x 938, 944 (3d Cir. 2010)), and when state tolling rules contradict federal law or policy, in certain limited circumstances, federal courts can turn to federal tolling doctrine, see Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 (3d Cir. 2000).
New Jersey, the appropriate venue for the instant case, allows both statutory and equitable tolling. Turning first to statutory tolling, N.J. STAT. § 2A: 14-21 and N.J. STAT. § 2A: 14-22 outline the bases for tolling the limitations period. Section 2A:14-21 provides that the limitations period will be tolled if the plaintiff is a minor or under a relevant disability at the time the cause of action accrues. Section 2A:14-22, on the other hand, tolls the limitations period if the defendant is not a resident of New Jersey when the cause of action accrues or leaves the state after it accrues but 7 before it expires, and it “appears ... that, after diligent inquiry and effort, long-arm service cannot be effectuated.” In the instant case, nothing in Hubbard's complaint remotely suggests that any of these statutory bases for tolling apply.
New Jersey allows equitable tolling of the limitations period provided that the plaintiff was “induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the deadline to pass,.. . [was] in some extraordinary way [] prevented from asserting his rights,. .. [or] timely asserted his rights mistakenly by either defective pleading or in the wrong forum.” Waselik v. Township of Sparta, Civ. No. 16-4969 (KM-JBC), 2017 WL 2213148, at *5 (D.N.J. May 18, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Cason v. Arie Street Police Dep't, No. 10-0497, 2010 WL 2674399, at *5 n.4 (D.N.J. June 29, 2010)). “However, absent a showing of intentional inducement or trickery by a defendant, the doctrine of equitable tolling should be applied sparingly and only in the rare situation where it is demanded by sound legal principles as well as the interests of justice.” Kirkland v. Morgievich, No. 04-1651 (SDW-MCA), 2008 WL 5272028, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2008) (citing Freeman v. State, 788 A.2d 867, 880 ( N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 2002)).
Here, Hubbard alleges that he did not “discover [his] constitutional rights were violated during [his] 1996 case until [his] expungement petition hearings from October 23, 2023, through December 11, 2023.” Compl. [DE-1] at 4. Hubbard's precise reasoning for this delay is a bit convoluted, as he contends that during the expungement proceeding, Union County Assistant Prosecutor Dalvin Abediyi committed prosecutorial misconduct by emailing the presiding judge witness statements that “should have been included in the court records and shared with [Hubbard's] legal counsel, but were not, with the intent to influence the Judge's decision to deny with prejudice [his] expungement petition.” Id. This alleged misconduct then prompted Hubbard to investigate his 1996 case, where he discovered the constitutional violations that he now seeks 8 to redress. Id. at 4-7.
Notably, the facts Hubbard asserts in support of the alleged constitutional violations committed during the 1996 case imply some level of deceit by the Defendants; for example, he claims that Defendant Krakowieck:i manufactured "kingpin narcotics charges" on his record, and that the police report summary and witness statements used against him were "grossly inaccurate and fabricated." Id. at 5-7. Hubbard also posits that Defendants' actions were motivated by racial bias and encouraged by a widespread racial profiling program. lid. at 11-50. However, by asserting that he became aware of the alleged constitutional violations that occurred in his 1996 case because Assistant Prosecutor Abeyidi's actions in 2023 prompted him to investigate further, Hubbard has not shown that Defendants induced or tricked him into believing that he' had no claim, that the filing deadline had passed, or that he was prevented from asserting his rights for nearly twentyeight years. See Cason, 2010 WL 2674399, at *5 n.4. Instead, it appears that Hubbard did not investigate his 1996 case until 2023, and that with reasonable diligence, he was able to uncover these allegedviolations-nd presumably would have been able to do so prior to the expiration of the limitations period.
For similar reasons, Hubbard also fails to show that equitable tolling is appropriate under federal law, which provides for tolling the limitations period where a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff with respect to her cause of action, where the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting her claim as a result ofother extraordinary circumstances, or where the plaintiff asserts her claims in a timely manner but has done so in the wrong forum. Lake, 232 F.3d at 370. Thus, Hubbard's § 1983 claims are time-barred, and it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed as frivolous.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is 9
ALLOWED, and it is RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed and the motions for case conference, injunctive relief, and to expedite be denied as moot.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. You shall have until April 29, 2024 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).