Opinion
2018–10928 Index No. 704688/16
11-29-2023
HSBC BANK USA, N.A., appellant, v. Astrid CORRALES, respondent, et al., defendants.
McGlinchey Stafford PLLC, New York, NY (Matthew J. Gordon and Margaret Cascino of counsel), for appellant. Gomberg Legal P.C., New York, NY (Stanislav Gomberg of counsel), for respondent.
McGlinchey Stafford PLLC, New York, NY (Matthew J. Gordon and Margaret Cascino of counsel), for appellant.
Gomberg Legal P.C., New York, NY (Stanislav Gomberg of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., BETSY BARROS, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, PAUL WOOTEN, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER ON MOTION In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Martin J. Schulman, J.), entered July 3, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Astrid Corrales which was for leave to reargue that branch of her prior motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend her answer to assert the statute of limitations as a defense, which had been denied in an order of the same court entered December 20, 2017, and, upon reargument, in effect, vacated that portion of the order entered December 20, 2017, and thereupon, granted that branch of the prior motion.
ORDERED that the order entered July 3, 2018, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
On May 12, 2009, the plaintiff's predecessor in interest, HSBC Mortgage Corporation (USA) (hereinafter HSBC Mortgage), commenced an action (hereinafter the 2009 action) to foreclose a consolidated mortgage given by the defendant Astrid Corrales (hereinafter the defendant). In November 2009, HSBC Mortgage obtained a judgment of foreclosure and sale in its favor. In 2014, the judgment of foreclosure and sale was vacated, and the action discontinued.
On April 20, 2016, the plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose the consolidated mortgage. The defendant served an answer to the amended complaint. The defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against her, or, in the alternative, for leave to amend her answer to assert the statute of limitations as a defense. The defendant argued that this action was time-barred because the mortgage debt had been accelerated on May 12, 2009, when HSBC Mortgage commenced the 2009 action. In an order entered December 20, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion. The defendant moved, inter alia, for leave to reargue that branch of her prior motion which was for leave to amend her answer. In an order entered July 3, 2018, the court, among other things, granted the defendant leave to reargue and, upon reargument, granted the defendant leave to amend her answer to assert the statute of limitations as a defense. The plaintiff appeals.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant leave to reargue that branch of her prior motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend her answer (see R. Vig Props., LLC v. Cohen, 153 A.D.3d 565, 566, 60 N.Y.S.3d 97 ), and, upon reargument, for leave to amend her answer to assert the statute of limitations as a defense. "In the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave, applications to amend or supplement a pleading ‘are to be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit’ " ( Myung Hwa Jang v. Mang, 164 A.D.3d 803, 804, 83 N.Y.S.3d 293, quoting Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 A.D.3d 220, 222, 851 N.Y.S.2d 238 ; see CPLR 3025[b] ). "The burden of demonstrating prejudice or surprise, or that a proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit, falls upon the party opposing the motion" ( Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Spatafore, 183 A.D.3d 853, 853, 122 N.Y.S.3d 557 ). "The [decision] to permit or deny amendment is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court" ( US Bank N.A. v. Murillo, 171 A.D.3d 984, 986, 98 N.Y.S.3d 115 ; see CPLR 3025[b] ; Murray v. City of New York, 43 N.Y.2d 400, 405, 401 N.Y.S.2d 773, 372 N.E.2d 560 ).
In the instant case, the plaintiff failed to establish prejudice or surprise, or that the defense of the statute of limitations was palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (see e.g. CPLR 203[h] ; 3217[e]; Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act, L 2022, ch 821).
Accordingly, we affirm the order insofar as appealed from.
DILLON, J.P., BARROS, MALTESE and WOOTEN, JJ., concur.