Opinion
J-A03034-16 No. 877 EDA 2015
04-05-2016
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 5, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Civil Division at No(s): 10-010108 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and DUBOW, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Appellant, Patrick Carney, appeals pro se from the judgment entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, in favor of Appellee, HSBC Bank, in this mortgage foreclosure action. We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. We add Appellant timely filed post-trial motions pro se on March 6, 2015, which the court denied on March 11, 2015. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on March 23, 2015. The court ordered Appellant on March 25, 2015, to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement pro se on April 13, 2015. On May 5, 2015, the court entered judgment in favor of Appellee. Thereafter, on August 3, 2015, this Court quashed Appellant's separate appeal at docket No. 838 EDA 2015 without prejudice to Appellant to raise any issues pertaining to the foreclosure action within the context of the current appeal at docket No. 877 EDA 2015.
Ordinarily, an appeal properly lies from the entry of judgment, not from the order denying post-trial motions. See generally Johnston the Florist , Inc. v. TEDCO Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 516 (Pa.Super. 1995) (en banc). Nevertheless, a final judgment entered during pendency of an appeal is sufficient to perfect appellate jurisdiction. Drum v. Shaull Equipment and Supply , Co., 787 A.2d 1050 (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal denied, 569 Pa. 693, 803 A.2d 735 (2002). Here, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal prematurely on March 23, 2015, prior to the entry of judgment. The court entered final judgment on May 5, 2015. Thus, Appellant's notice of appeal relates forward to May 5, 2015, the date judgment was entered. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a) (stating notice of appeal filed after court's determination but before entry of appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on day of entry). Hence, there are no procedural/jurisdictional impediments to our review.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DID THE [TRIAL] COURT COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW AND ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE NUMEROUS INTENTIONAL DECEITS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS OF [APPELLEE] AND ITS VARIOUS COUNSELS, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE [TRIAL] COURT OF JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE MATTER WHEN APPELLEE DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO INVOKE THE COURT'S JURISDICTION AND DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF HIS PROPERTY RIGHTS?
DID THE [TRIAL] COURT MAKE AN ERROR IN FACT AND AN ERROR OF LAW IN FAILING TO UPHOLD PA.R.C.P. 2002 BY IGNORING GOVERNMENT-CERTIFIED AND AUTHENTICATED EVIDENCE, THAT THE TRIAL COURT ADMITTED, WHICH CLEARLY ESTABLISHES APPELLEE LACKED STANDING AND WAS THEREFORE NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST?(Appellant's Brief at 3-4).
DID THE [TRIAL] COURT MAKE AN ERROR IN FACT AND AN ERROR IN LAW WHEN [MS. ROMANO] ROBO-SIGNED APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE?
DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND SHOW BIAS IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE, THEREBY DEPRIVING APPELLANT HIS RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS TO A FAIR AND EQUITABLE TRIAL?
As a preliminary matter, we note Appellant proceeds in this appeal pro se. While this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special benefit upon an appellant. Strawn v. Strawn , 664 A.2d 129 (Pa.Super. 1995). See also Cole v. Czegan , 722 A.2d 686, 687 (Pa.Super. 1998) (stating pro se status does not entitle appellant to any particular advantage because appellant lacks legal training). "[A]ppellant has a duty to file a comprehensible brief and to raise and develop properly his appellate issues." Cole , supra. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court. Jones v. Rudenstein , 585 A.2d 520 (Pa.Super. 1991), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 634, 600 A.2d 954 (1991). This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if an appellant fails to conform substantially to the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Laird v. Ely & Bernard , 528 A.2d 1379 (Pa.Super. 1987), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 576, 549 A.2d 136 (1988).
Instantly, Appellant's brief complies in form with most of the pertinent rules of Pennsylvania's appellate procedure. Nevertheless, Appellant's brief fails to provide us with an adequate argument section, pursuant to the applicable rules, which require the argument section to contain a discussion of Appellant's contentions on appeal plus legal arguments and citations supporting those contentions. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Here, Appellant's fourth issue challenges the trial court's bias, but contains no citations to authority. See Dalrymple v. Kilishek , 920 A.2d 1275 (Pa.Super. 2007) (stating failure to support argument with pertinent authority results in waiver on appeal). Instead, this issue consists of a string of contentions and references to Appellant's version of the facts. Thus, Appellant's fourth issue is waived. See id.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable G. Michael Green, we conclude Appellant's remaining issues merit no relief. The trial court's opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of these questions presented. ( See Trial Court Opinion, filed May 8, 2015, at 9-15) (finding: (1)-(3) as security for Note, Appellant executed Mortgage in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), acting solely as nominee for American Brokers Conduit ("ABC"), and its successors and assigns; Mortgage specifically lists MERS as mortgagee and nominee for Lender, ABC; thus, MERS may execute Mortgage as nominee for Lender, ABC; MERS granted signing authority to Ms. Romano, MERS' certifying officer, to execute Assignment of Mortgage ("AOM"); therefore, MERS acted within its specific authority to execute AOM to Appellee, and Ms. Romano had express authority to execute AOM with Recorder of Deeds; Appellant is not third-party beneficiary of AOM, he is not party to AOM, and he did not sign AOM; thus, Appellant lacks standing to challenge validity of transfer and assignment of Note and Mortgage to Appellee; Appellee is owner and holder of Mortgage and Note; Appellant's failure to make monthly payments constituted default under Mortgage and Note; Appellee issued proper pre-foreclosure notifications, and Appellant failed to cure default; Note was endorsed by Lender, ABC, and made payable in blank; Appellee holds and possesses original Note, which it produced at trial). The record supports the trial court's decision; therefore, we have no reason to disturb it. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
Judgment affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/5/2016
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