Opinion
No. CV 03-040 78 94 S
May 25, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
FACTS
The plaintiff, Lucille R. Hrostek and the defendant, Daniel Massey met in late 1991, while both were in the process of obtaining a divorce.
At the time of their initial meeting, Lucille R. Hrostek was employed as a paralegal by the law firm of Tremont and Sheldon in Bridgeport. Although she was also a certified arborist, she was not practicing that occupation when the parties began a romantic relationship in February of 1992.
The plaintiff has two children by her former husband, Gregory Jacko, born April 3, 1985, and Marisa Jacko, both May 31, 1983.
Lucille Hrostek and Daniel Massey began to cohabit in May or June of 1993, when Daniel Massey's divorce was being finalized. They moved into Lucille Hrostek's home, 127 Benz Street, Ansonia, which she had obtained as part of her divorce settlement.
At the time of Lucille Hrostek's divorce from her former husband, Gregory Jacko, the Benz Street property was mortgaged, and she faced the possibility of foreclosure. Daniel Massey paid part of the mortgage debt, thus preventing the contemplated foreclosure, and permitting Lucille Hrostek to sell the home. All of the proceeds from the sale of the Benz Street property were retained by Lucille Hrostek.
During Daniel Massey's marriage, title to his residence, 12 Christmas Tree Hill Road, Shelton, was in the name of his wife. The former spouse also owned all of the shares of stock in Daniel Massey's company, Graham-Massey Analitical Labs, Inc. In both instances, Daniel Massey claimed that the property was placed in his wife's name for "tax purposes."
Title to 12 Christmas Tree Hill Road, Shelton, and ownership of the shares of stock were ordered transferred to Daniel Massey when his divorce became final in 1993. Lucille Hrostek provided none of the consideration used in the acquisition of 12 Christmas Tree Hill Road, or the shares of stock in the laboratory.
When Daniel Massey, Lucille Hrostek, and her two children moved into the Christmas Tree Hill Road home, extensive cleanup and reconditioning was necessary. The house was renovated during 1993 and 1994, at which time a pool was added, a patio was constructed, and an addition was completed. The addition permitted each of the plaintiff's children to occupy an individual bedroom. Daniel Massey paid for all of the improvements and renovations, while Lucille Hrostek took an active part in the decisions.
In 1999, the parties constructed a new home at 22 Red Fern Ridge, Shelton. Daniel Massey paid for the construction of the home, and the purchase of the lot, although the plaintiff again took an active role in furnishing the home, and dealing with the contractors and sub contractors.
During the course of the cohabitation, Lucille Hrostek pursued educational opportunities, and was employed infrequently outside the home. Having obtained a B.A. from Sacred Heart University in 1982, the Plaintiff obtained two masters degrees in the 1990s.
She was awarded a Masters in School Counseling from Southern Connecticut State University in 1992, followed by receipt of a Masters Degree in Psychology from the University of Hartford in 2000.
At the time her relationship with Daniel Massey ended, she had earned all of the credits necessary to acquire a doctorate, but had not completed the required dissertation. All tuition and related expenses were paid by Daniel Massey.
The plaintiff was employed for a brief period in 2001-02 at the Westchester Jewish Community Hospital, as part of an internship program.
During the course of their cohabitation, Daniel Massey paid virtually all of the household and related expenses. These included private school tuition for the plaintiff's two children, vacation trips, recreation expenses, landscaping services, housekeeping services, and the cost of the design and construction of the home on Red Fern Ridge.
Lucille Hrostek used credit cards without limitation, and had access to funds. One of the credit cards was in her name.
During the relationship the parties purchased a vacation home in Cavendish, Vermont. Although Daniel Massey paid for the home, title was held jointly by "Daniel M. Massey and Lucille R. Jacko." (Ex. 3) as joint tenants.
In 1996, Daniel Massey and Lucille Hrostek executed wills (Ex. 1 2). Despite being advised by the attorney who drafted both wills, Attorney Andrew Emery Garson, that placing the couple's residence in both names with rights of survivorship would provide for more favorable tax consequences, the Christmas Tree Hill Road property remained in the name of Daniel Massey only.
The relationship between Daniel Massey and Lucille Hrostek ended in the fall of 2003, although their arrangement had not been entirely tranquil throughout 2003 and the later part of 2002.
The defendant gave the Plaintiff a check for $10,000 in January of 2003, which she cashed some time later. He also offered sums of money to her, and offered to pay the cost of Gregory Jacko's education at Providence College, as the relationship was ending.
The plaintiff, Lucille Hrostek, claims that she and Daniel Massey entered into an agreement at the time they began to cohabit.
Pursuant to the alleged oral agreement, Lucille Hrostek claims that she agreed to manage the household, while Daniel Massey agreed to be responsible for all of the finances, and agreed to pay all of the expenses. The plaintiff further claims that she and Daniel Massey agreed to share all of the assets they acquired during the course of their relationship, on a 50/50 basis.
The plaintiff contends that Daniel Massey had no assets when the relationship began, because title to both the Christmas Tree Hill Road home and the shares of stock in Graham-Massey Analitical Labs were held by his wife. She claims to be entitled to $3,531,695.00, based upon Daniel Massey's net worth of $7,063,930 in September 2003.
In Count One of her four-count complaint, the plaintiff claims that Daniel Massey breached their oral agreement to share assets on a 50/50 percentage basis. Lucille Hrostek does not claim that the contract was ever reduced to writing.
Count Two involves claims of unjust enrichment, while Counts Three and Four contain allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation respectively.
A counterclaim filed by the defendant, Daniel Massey, was withdrawn prior to trial.
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PROVE AN ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT
Lucille Hrostek maintains that an oral agreement existed between her and the defendant, Daniel Massey. She claims that in return for her managing the household, he agreed to be the family breadwinner, and pay all expenses.
She further maintains that the parties contracted to share, on a 50/50 percentage basis, all assets acquired during their cohabitation.
Connecticut has long recognized that cohabitation, in and of itself, does not create any contractual relationship, or impose any legal duties or obligations on parties who have freely chosen to live together. Our courts have consistently refused to recognize the validity of a "common law" marriage. Loughlin v. Loughlin, 280 Conn. 632, 643 (2006); Hames v. Hames, 163 Conn. 588, 593 (1972); State ex. Rel Felson v. Allen, 129 Conn. 427, 432 (1942). The rights and obligations of marriage do not arise when parties cohabit outside of marriage. McAnerney v. McAnerney, 165 Conn. 277, 285 (1973).
However, except in situations where the consideration for an agreement is based upon the performance of sexual acts, a contract which is contrary to public policy, parties who chose to live together outside of marriage, are free to enter into contracts with one another. Courts will enforce a contract, express or implied, between non marital partners, and may employ equitable remedies to enforce those agreements where necessary. Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 339-41 (1987).
As with any contract, a proported contract between cohabitating individuals must be definite and certain as to its material terms and conditions. Augeri v. C.F. Wooding Co., 173 Conn. 426, 430 (1977). There must be a bargain, in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange, between the parties. Ubysz v. DiPietro, 181 Conn. 47, 51 (1981).
In order to create a contract, there must be an unequivocal acceptance of an offer. The acceptance must be explicit, full and unconditional, and the burden is on the plaintiff to prove a meeting of the minds, and her version of the contract. Bridgeport Pipe Engineering Co. v. DeMatteo Construction Co., 159 Conn. 242, 246 (1970). In order to form a contract, there must be an offer and an acceptance, based upon mutual understanding. Cavallo v. Lewis, 1 Conn.App. 519, 520 (1984).
Lucille Hrostek does not rely upon any written contact or other writing by the defendant Daniel Massey, for a claim that a contract between them was forged. Instead, she claims that the statement "what's mine is yours and what's yours is mine," said at the outset of their cohabitation, and allegedly repeated by the defendant, created a contractual relationship.
She further claims that the defendant Daniel Massey agreed to share any assets acquired after cohabitation began on a 50/50 percentage basis.
These claims are not well taken, and the plaintiff has utterly failed to prove that any phases uttered by the defendant in the course of a romantic relationship, were intended to form a binding and enforceable contract.
At all times, the plaintiff retained control of the proceeds of the sale of the Benz Street property. The residences on Christmas Tree Hill Road and Red Fern Ridge were always in the name of the defendant, Daniel Massey. This was true, even in the face of advice concerning adverse tax consequences which could flow from the arrangement.
The evidence strongly suggest that Daniel Massey, having just completed a divorce in which he was forced to obtain judicial orders designed to secure the conveyance to him of his home, and the return of stock in his company, made a conscious decision to retain all property in his name. The only exception was the property in Vermont, which was acquired after the parties began to cohabitate.
The defendant's generosity displayed toward Lucille Hrostek and her children in the years subsequent to 1993, should not be used to visit upon him the adage "no good deed goes unpunished."
It is found, that the plaintiff has failed to prove a clear and definite promise sufficient to form the basis of a contractual relationship.
It is further found that she has failed to prove that a meeting of the minds occurred, sufficient to give rise to contractual rights and remedies.
Nor is there any proof that the alleged agreement was supported by consideration. The defendant continued to support the plaintiff and her children, just as he did from the outset of the cohabitation.
Furthermore, even if an enforceable contract were found to exist, it is not clear that the defendant, Daniel Massey, based upon the evidence presented, was the breaching party.
Despite ample opportunity to do so, the alleged "contract" was never reduced to writing, or formalized.
Therefore, because the plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of either an express or implied contract, it is unnecessary to consider the defendant's various defenses, including the statute of limitations defense.
PLAINTIFF CANNOT PREVAIL ON HER CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The plaintiff further claims that, even in the absence of a binding contract, she is entitled to recover based upon the theory that the defendant, Daniel Massey, has been unjustly enriched. This claim is not availing.
Consistent with the equitable theories of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, a party may recover, even in the absence of a valid contract. These theories are grounded in concepts of restitution. Sidley v. DeVries, 215 Conn. 350, 351-52 n. 1 (1990). They are based on the principle that one should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another, but should be required to make restitution for property received, returned, or appropriated. Burns v. Koellner, 11 Conn.App. 375, 384 (1987).
Nothing in the evidence or the exhibits supports a claim of unjust enrichment.
Both parties were recently divorced, when the cohabitation relationship began. The plaintiff had two children by her marriage to Gregory Jacko.
Lucille Hrostek and Daniel Massey lived for a brief period at 127 Benz Street, Ansonia, property obtained by the plaintiff following her divorce. Daniel Massey supplied funds to keep the property from being foreclosed, and Lucille Hrostek retained all of the net proceeds of the sale.
The plaintiff's claim that the defendant had no assets when they began to cohabit, and that she is entitled to one-half of all that he owns, is both fatuous, and disingenuous.
Daniel Massey improved, at his expense, 72 Christmas Tree Hill Road, to accommodate the plaintiff and her children. He built a new home at 22 Red Fern Circle, where the plaintiff and her children resided.
During the period of cohabitation, the defendant paid for private school tuition, trips and vacations, two advanced degrees obtained by Lucille Hrostek, health insurance, automobiles, and numerous other items, large and small.
He purchased a vacation home, and placed title to the home, as joint tenants, in both his name, and that of Lucille Hrostek.
At the time the cohabitation began, Daniel Massey had a successful business, which provided a substantial income. That the business continued to prosper and flourish during the period of cohabitation, is not sufficient to subject him to claims of unjust enrichment, from a plaintiff who did not work at the company during the relationship.
The plaintiff cannot prevail on Count Two.
CLAIMS OF NEGLIGENT AND INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION NOT PROVEN
In Counts Three and Four, the plaintiff advances claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. Neither claim finds a basis in the evidence.
In order to sustain a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must establish four elements; 1) a false representation made as a statement of fact, 2) that the statement was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it, 3) that the statement was made to induce the other party to act upon it, and 4) the other party did act upon it, to his or her detriment. The absence of any one element is fatal to recovery. Bradley v. Oviatt, 86 Conn. 63, 67 (1912); Citino v. Redevelopment Agency, 51 Conn.App. 262, 275 (1998); Miller v. Appleby, 183 Conn. 51, 54-55 (1991); Pavia v. Vanech Heights Construction Co., 159 Conn. 512, 515 (1970).
Negligent misrepresentation, requires: 1) a misrepresentation of fact, 2) that the defendant knew or should have known that the representation was false, and 3) that the plaintiff justifiably relied upon the false statement. Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33, 73 (2005); Restatement (Second) Torts, S. 552.
Claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation are usually drawn from a commercial context. D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 217-18 (1987). Our Supreme Court has recognized that analogies drawn from commercial litigation fail to respond adequately to the situation of emotional trauma commonly associated with the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage. Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212, 219 (1991); Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 182 (1979). The emotional trauma produced by the end of a ten-year cohabitation relationship is also traumatic, thus providing limited applicability for precedents extracted from purely commercial arrangements.
In order to prevail in a claim of fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation, the Plaintiff must establish fraud. This must be done by clear and convincing evidence. Bruneau v. W W Transportation Co., 138 Conn. 179, 182 (1951). Clear and convincing evidence is more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. It is enough evidence to establish a very highly probability that the facts asserted are true, or exist. Cadle Co. v. D'Addario, 268 Conn. 441, 445 (2004); Lopinto v. Harris, 185 Conn. 527, 534 (1981).
The plaintiff, based on the facts presented, has fallen far short of either the clear and convincing standard, or the fair preponderance standard.
The statement "what's mine is yours and what's yours is mine," is, at best, a statement of present intention, or a demonstration of affection for one with whom the defendant was involved in an intimate relationship. It was not a statement of fact, and did not represent a legal conclusion.
Nor has it been proven that the statement was "untrue," given the defendant's generosity, and the living arrangements at the time. It was not intended to mean that all assets were held as common property.
Nor has it been proven that the statement was made, with the intent of inducing the plaintiff, Lucille Hrostek, to change her position. The plaintiff did not change her position as a result of any statement by the defendant, assuming, arguendo, that the statements were in fact uttered.
The defendant denies ever saying that he would split all assets on a 50/50 percentage basis. It is found that the defendant is credible on this point, in that he had recently completed a divorce, in which property was returned to him.
The claim of negligent misrepresentation must also fail.
The defendant did not misrepresent any facts to the plaintiff, and there has been no showing that Lucille Hrostek relied to her detriment on any statement made by Daniel Massey. Negligent misrepresentation requires that a plaintiff prove that she sustained pecuniary loss, caused by justifiable reliance upon a particular statement of statements. Updike, Kelly Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 643 (2004).
CONCLUSION
Judgment may enter in favor of the defendant, Daniel Massey, as against the plaintiff, Lucille Hrostek, on Counts ONE, TWO, THREE and FOUR.