Opinion
A162644
04-27-2022
MARIA HRISTOPOULOS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NICK GIANNARIS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. FAM0119610)
DESAUTELS, J. [*]
We are familiar with the background of this family law case through our review of five prior appeals. (Hristopoulos v. Giannaris (Jan. 28, 2019, A152099, A152239 [nonpub. opn.]); Hristopoulos v. Giannaris (June 17, 2019, A154077, A154773 [nonpub. opn.]); Hristopoulos v. Giannaris (Nov. 20, 2019, A154868 [nonpub. opn.]).) In the present appeal, Nick Giannaris (Father), in propria persona, challenges a March 2021 order denying him increased visitation with the child he shares with respondent Maria Hristopoulos (Mother). He also seeks orders for a change of venue from San Mateo County to San Francisco County and to appoint a "Special Master" to advocate for the child.
In the body of his appeal, Father also asks that we contact the Judicial Council of the State of California and request that the trial court judge be denied the ability to sit in the family law division of San Mateo Superior Court. Because there is neither jurisdictional basis nor factual support for such a request, we decline to do so. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 422 ["Disparaging the trial judge is a tactic that is not taken lightly by a reviewing court."].) There is similarly no merit to Father's conclusory assertions that the trial court "violated" prior opinions by this court, thus we do not address the claim further.
We decline the requests for special orders and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
Father and Mother have one child, who lives with Mother. Father's residence has not been stable; at times, he has lived in the Bay Area, at times in Southern California, and at times in Greece. Father was required to participate in reunification therapy sessions with the child. He does not currently have physical contact with the child.
We take part of the background facts from our prior opinion in Hristopoulos v. Giannaris, supra, A154077, A154773, which we judicially notice. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
On March 26, 2020, Father filed a request for a change in the then current visitation order. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and intervening circumstances, the hearing on Father's request did not occur until March 17, 2021. Father, who was representing himself, failed to appear at the Zoom video hearing. Finding it was in the best interest of the child not to increase visitation with Father, the court confirmed the existing visitation, which had been limited to one weekly 30-minute videoconference call with the child. In the March 22, 2021 order after hearing, the court ruled in part: "[Father] may have only one weekly 30-minute video/Skype call with the minor every Sunday. [¶] . . . This order is made in full consideration of the best interests of the minor and is deemed to be a final judicial custody order pursuant to [Montenegro v. Diaz] (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249. Therefore, a significant change of circumstance will be required for any modification of custody or visitation."
Although Father claims he was ill and had "emailed the court" and informed Mother and her counsel of his inability to appear at the March 17, 2021 hearing, he fails to point us to anything in the record that supports these assertions.
DISCUSSION
A. Principles of Appellate Review
We begin with the "fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] 'This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.'" (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)
" 'To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.]' [Citation.] 'Mere suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate review.' [Citation.] 'Hence, conclusory claims of error will fail.'" (Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457; accord, Phillips v. Campbell (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 844, 853; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1).) Moreover, an appellant's brief should "point out portions of the record that support the position taken on appeal. The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error." (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)
We review the court's ruling on custody and visitation rights for abuse of discretion, and we do not disturb the court's determination in the absence of a manifest showing of abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Murga (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 498, 504.)
B. Father Has Not Met His Burden on Appeal
Father contends the trial court was biased against him and did not act in the child's best interest, but he has failed to meet his burden to show the court abused its discretion. Father's 46-page opening brief is a one-sided representation of the proceedings with limited citations to the record or legal authority. His brief "ignores the precept that all evidence must be viewed most favorably to [the prevailing party] and in support of the [judgment]." (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1531; see Horowitz v. Noble (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 120, 139 [in absence of legal argument with citation to authority, we may treat point as waived].)
Father similarly fails to meet his burden on appeal regarding his change of venue and appointment of a special master claims.
"While we are mindful that [Father] is representing himself on appeal, his status as a party appearing in propria persona does not provide a basis for preferential consideration. A party proceeding in propria persona 'is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.' [Citation.] Indeed,' "the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney." '" (First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1.)
In support of his appeal, Father does cite the June 25, 2020 status update report from the reunification therapist that recommended a "step-up in duration of father/son visits," but he fails to cite the January 20, 2021 report by the same therapist, which advised the court that that the child "is not currently able to comfortably resume the level of visitation and unsupervised contact he had with father prior to August, 2020." "Whether [Father] is amenable to re-starting this process is in question. It is a step backwards . . . ." Father also neglects to mention his failure to meet with the therapist as directed in the three months preceding the March 2021 hearing that reaffirmed the existing visitation orders. This failure led to the absence of an updated report and recommendation.
Father acknowledges a May 2018 order granting Mother permission to record his video calls with the child. After learning of the March 2021 order maintaining the status quo, Father further acknowledges that in April 2021, Mother again complained of his impropriety in video calls with the child, after which Father cancelled the subsequent video call. Under these known circumstances demonstrating, at a minimum, ongoing tension between the parents and at least one skipped visit with the child after the court's order, Father has not met his burden to show the March 2021 order was a manifest abuse of discretion.
We recognize that the Legislature has declared a public policy "to ensure that children have frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have . . . ended their relationship" (Fam. Code, § 3020, subd. (b), italics added), and appreciate the reunification therapist's comment in the June 2020 report that "a healthy relationship with father is a vital one." Accordingly, we would encourage the parties to take whatever steps are appropriate to foster the kind of healthy relationship that would be in the child's best interest.
Assuming that, as recommended, this father-child relationship is "worked through properly, and provides for a child's emotional wellbeing and physical health," nothing in this opinion prevents Father from petitioning the trial court to seek increased or in-person visitation. (See Montenegro v. Diaz, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256 [changed circumstance rule applied whenever final custody has been established by judicial decree].) However, the propriety of such an order remains in the hands of the trial court, which is best positioned to assess and order a visitation schedule that is in the best interest of the child. We find nothing in the record presented to us that demonstrates an abuse of discretion here.
DISPOSITION
The March 22, 2021 order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Pollak, P.J., Streeter, J.
[*] Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.