Opinion
NO. 12-12-00030-CR
09-12-2012
SAMUEL HOUSTON, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE 217TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
ANGELINA COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Samuel Houston appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance (cocaine). In his sole issue on appeal, he contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Officer Malone of the Lufkin Police Department was working the night shift when he was notified that an arrest warrant had been issued for Appellant for aggravated assault. Officer Malone knew Appellant and had just seen him at 907 Glen in Lufkin, Texas. He and another Lufkin officer, Officer Jackson, went to the location and arrested Appellant without incident. After arresting Appellant, the officers searched his pockets and removed a knife clipped to his back pants pocket. During the search, the officers discovered a cigarette package in the right front pocket of Appellant's pants. Inside the cigarette package were seven pieces of crack cocaine. The material was field tested and tested positive as cocaine. A Texas Department of Public Safety laboratory test established that the cocaine weighed 0.9 grams.
Appellant was indicted for possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a state jail felony as alleged in the indictment. However, the indictment also included two felony enhancement paragraphs, which raised the penalty classification to that of a second degree felony. The case was tried to the court. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the cigarette package and its contents, which was denied. The trial court found Appellant guilty and the two enhancement paragraphs true. The court sentenced Appellant to nine years of imprisonment. This appeal followed.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution, and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23. Specifically, he alleges that the search of the cigarette package exceeded the scope of a lawful search incident to arrest, and the contents of the package are consequently "fruit of the poisonous tree," requiring suppression. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. Lujan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The reviewing court applies a bifurcated standard of review of a motion to suppress. Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 555, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The trial court is given almost complete deference in its determination of historical facts, but the appellate court reviews de novo a trial court's application of law to the facts. Id. Where the trial court does not make findings of fact, as in the instant case, the reviewing court "view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and should assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling as long as those findings are supported by the record." Lujan, 331 S.W.3d at 771; see also Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
The essential rule regarding the scope of the search of a person after a lawful custodial arrest is found in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 477, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973). After lawfully arresting Robinson, the arresting officer searched Robinson's person and found a cigarette packaging containing heroin in Robinson's coat pocket. Id., 414 U.S. at 221-23, 94 S. Ct. at 470-71. The district court admitted the evidence at trial, resulting in his conviction. Id., 414 U.S. at 223, 94 S. Ct. at 471. In upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court held as follows:
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the subject. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that amendment.Id., 414 U.S. at 237, 94 S. Ct. at 477. This rule is followed in Texas. See Carrasco v. State, 712 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Additionally, a search incident to an arrest can include not only the person, but also containers, as long as the containers are "within the arrestee's immediate control." See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-62, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864-65, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981). The parameters of the search are not limited to a cursory, superficial search, and upon discovering a bag in the arrestee's pocket, the officer is entitled to inspect it. Barron v. State, No. 05-10-00703-CR, 2011 WL 2348392, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 15, 2011, pet. denied) (op., not designated for publication). When the inspection reveals contraband, the officer is entitled to seize it as "fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband probative of criminal conduct." Id.Discussion
On appeal, Appellant urges this court "to reconsider the limits of a search incident to arrest," and "ask[s] this Honorable Court to restrict the permissible area of search in this matter is [sic] so that as applied pursuant to Texas Law there is a restriction to protect against 'giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person's private effects.'" In making this argument, Appellant relies upon the reasoning in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). Appellant contends that, analogous to Gant, where a person has been arrested and handcuffed, the police search for weapons is no longer applicable, and any further search or discovery should be curtailed. As applied here, Appellant argues that there was no justification for opening the cigarette container and searching its contents.
Gant is distinguishable from the case at bar because Appellant was not in a vehicle at the time of his arrest. Justice Stevens summarized the holding in Gant as follows: "[W]e hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle." Id., 556 U.S. at 335, 129 S. Ct. at 1714. The rationale of the traditional Robinson and Belton analysis still applies when the search incident to arrest is a search of a person where no vehicle is involved in the underlying detention, arrest, or subsequent search. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 343, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. Belton makes it clear that, when the search incident to arrest exception applies, the officers are authorized to open and search containers that are potentially within the control of the suspect at the time of the arrest. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S. Ct. at 2864. The lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have in the container whether it is open or closed. Id., 453 U.S. at 461, 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
In the present case, the arresting officer executed a valid arrest warrant. After arresting Appellant, the officer searched Appellant, found a cigarette package in his pocket, looked inside the package, and found the crack cocaine. Consistent with Robinson and Belton, and their progeny, the search of Appellant's person incident to the arrest was valid under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under Article 1, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution. The trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress. Since the evidence was legally seized, there was no violation of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23, and the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence.
Appellant's sole issue is overruled.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant's sole issue, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SAM GRIFFITH
Justice
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
NO. 12-12-00030-CR
SAMUEL HOUSTON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Appeal from the 217th Judicial District Court
of Angelina County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 30350)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.